




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LUXEMBURG. No. 1 (1871).

C. X. K. 30
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CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

ALLEGED VIOLATION

OF THE

NEUTRALITY

OF THE

108700 *or*

GRAND DUCHY OF LUXEMBURG:

1870-71.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1871.

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Correspondence respecting the Alleged Violation of the Neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

No. 1.

*Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by Count Bernstorff,
December 9.)*

Versailles, December 3, 1870.

AT the outbreak of the war the Government of His Majesty the King declared that it would respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, on the presumption that it would also be respected on the part of the French, and, as a matter of course, would be maintained with earnestness and good-will by the Grand Duchy itself.

The Royal Government has faithfully observed that promise, and has gone so far in its consideration that it has subjected itself to all the inconveniences in regard to the transport of its wounded which the protest of the French Government against the transport of wounded men through Luxemburg territory, proposed in the interest of humanity, imposed on it.

To its deep regret, however, neither on the part of France nor on that of Luxemburg have the proceedings corresponded with the presumptions that were entertained.

A number of cases, wherein a hostile disposition of part of the population went so far as even to actual ill-treatment of German officials there, may be left unmentioned, so as not to make the Grand Ducal Government responsible for the offences of individuals, who certainly deserved a stricter repression than they appear to have met with.

A striking instance of violation of the neutrality occurred in the provisioning of Thionville by railway trains at night from Luxemburg, so long as the fortress remained in the hands of the French.

The Grand Ducal Government expressed its regret thereupon, and could not but admit the fact: it is proved beyond doubt that the dispatch of those railway trains to Thionville could not have taken place without the connivance of Grand Ducal police and railway officials. The Royal Government addressed its complaint to the Grand Ducal Government on that occasion, and drew its attention to the consequences which must necessarily ensue from such conduct.

That warning has, unfortunately, not been attended to.

On the contrary, the violation of the neutrality has lately extended so far that it is impossible for the Royal Government to overlook it.

After the surrender of Metz there was a transit of French soldiers and officers in masses through the Grand Duchy, for the purpose of entering France again, by evading the German posts.

The French Vice-Consul residing in Luxemburg has established a regular office at the railway station there, where the fugitives have been provided with means and vouchers to enable them to continue their march into France to enter the Army of the North.

The number of combatants added to the French forces in this manner amounts, according to the statements before us, to more than 2,000 men.

No measures have been taken against this on the part of the Grand Ducal Government; the French soldiers have neither been sent into the interior nor prevented from returning to France with the notorious intention of taking part in the war against Germany. No difficulties have been put in the way of the French Vice-Consul in his just as notorious conduct in contempt of the neutrality of Luxemburg.

That there is a flagrant violation of the neutrality of the Grand Duchy in the transit through it for the purpose of entering the active French forces, in the official furtherance thereof by the functionary of the French Government, in the toleration of such conduct by the Grand Ducal Government, there can be no doubt. Therefore, the premises with which the Royal Government was obliged to connect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy no longer exist.

In consequence of this, I have to request your Excellency, by command of His Majesty, to inform the Government where you are, as one of the Signatories of the Treaty of May 11, 1867, that the Royal Government can no longer consider itself bound to any consideration of the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, in the military operations of the German army, and in the measures for the security of the German troops against the injuries inflicted on them from Luxemburg.

At the same time, the Government of His Majesty the King reserves to itself the prosecution of its claims against the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg for the damages done to it through the non-maintenance of the neutrality.

I respectfully request your Excellency to read this despatch to the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and to leave a copy of it with him.

Receive, &c.
(Signed) VON BISMARCK.

No. 2.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received December 9.)

(Extract.)

Brussels, December 8, 1870.

M. DE BALAN, the Minister of the North German Confederation at this Court, read this morning to Baron d'Anethan, and left with his Excellency, the copy of a Circular dated 3rd December, addressed to the Prussian Ministers abroad, on the subject of the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

This despatch, I am informed, contains an enumeration of various acts constituting violations of neutrality which the Prussian Government declares the Government of the Grand Duchy to have committed or permitted, such as allowing trains of provisions to be conveyed by the Luxemburg Railway to Thionville; the passage of French soldiers across the territory of the Grand Duchy, on their way to take service in France; permitting the French Vice-Consul to organize trains for the transport of French soldiers who have escaped from captivity, to which the Administration of the Railway is charged with lending aid.

On these grounds the Grand Duchy is asserted to have violated its neutrality to the utmost, and the Prussian Government declares it considers itself no longer bound by the Treaty of May 1867, and will take such measures as may suit it, whether for military operations or for the security of the German forces, just as if the Grand Duchy formed part of Germany.

No. 3.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 9, 1870.

THE North German Ambassador placed in my hands to-day, in original, the accompanying Circular,* containing the declaration of Prussia that she could no longer respect the neutrality of Luxemburg.

I told Count Bernstorff that I would read it and inform him of my views upon the subject when I next had the pleasure of meeting his Excellency.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 4.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received December 12.)

My Lord,

Brussels, December 11, 1870.

I CALLED on M. Tachard this afternoon and showed him a copy of the Circular note of Count Bismarck of the 3rd instant, declaring that Germany is no longer bound by the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, which he had not seen.

In return, M. Tachard showed me a despatch addressed to his Government, dated the 27th ultimo, informing them that a menacing letter containing a threat of occupation

had been addressed by the Prussian Government to the Grand Ducal Government, and that M. Servais, the President of that Government, had sent for the French Vice-Consul at Luxemburg, who had given full explanations of his proceedings with reference to the French soldiers who had passed through Luxemburg.

In remarking on the Prussian note, M. Tachard said, with reference to the charge of provisioning Thionville, that this had been entirely his own act; in the expectation that Marshal Bazaine would break through the Prussian lines before Metz, he had thought it advisable to provide provisions for them, and he had accordingly forwarded a large quantity of food in sealed waggons from France across Belgium and the Grand Ducal territory to Thionville, but that the Luxemburg Government was no more aware than the Belgian Government of the contents of those vans, which, on arriving at Luxemburg, were received by his own agents and directed to Thionville. This had happened once, and it was probably to this circumstance that the warning mentioned in the Prussian note referred.

With regard to the passage of French officers and soldiers through Luxemburg to France, which forms another ground of complaint by Prussia against the Grand Ducal Government, M. Tachard said it was perfectly true that, after the capitulation of Metz, a number of French military had escaped into the Grand Duchy in the greatest distress; that he had sent agents to the frontier to distribute money and clothing to them, and that on arriving at Luxemburg many of them received passports and the means of reaching Arlon, where the members of a society established at Lille took charge of them, fed and lodged them, and when it was necessary paid their journey to France; but, M. Tachard added, not one of these men was armed, or wore anything by which the Grand Ducal authorities could recognize them as being soldiers; they travelled through the country as peasants, bourgeois, cattle-drivers, priests, or in other characters designated in their passports. They were not under charge of officers, and travelled singly, and the Grand Ducal Government had no more right to arrest and imprison them than they had to detain any other Frenchman travelling through the Grand Duchy. The number of his countrymen that had thus passed through the Grand Duchy and Belgium amounted to 2,700, of whom 350 were officers. As to the infractions of neutrality charged against the Luxemburg Government, M. Tachard said, if the provisioning of Thionville was one, he could only say that the Prussians had transgressed the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg to a far greater extent. It was well known that Antwerp had served throughout the war as the port of supplies to the German army of saltpetre, sulphur, petroleum, and other warlike requisites, to say nothing of vast quantities of provisions, cattle, and sheep. Many of the chief merchants in Antwerp were Germans, and these goods passed in transit through Belgium and Luxemburg to Saarbruck, and thence to wherever they were required, without let or hindrance; while as to the presence of foreign military men in the Grand Ducal territory, he could only say it was notorious that Prussian officers were seen daily walking about the town of Luxemburg with their side-arms.

M. Tachard gave me to understand that he had precise reports of the amount of the stores destined for the German army which had passed in transit through Belgium, as well as of various other breaches of Belgian neutrality of which the Germans had been guilty.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

No. 5.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received December 14.)

My Lord,

Brussels, December 13, 1870.

THE "Moniteur Belge" of this date contains a letter from a correspondent of the "Cologne Gazette" at Luxemburg, stating that the news that Prussia has declared to the Grand Ducal Government that she no longer considers herself bound by the Treaty of 1867, has created the greatest excitement in Luxemburg. Every one attacks the French Compagnie de l'Est, and holds it responsible for what has occurred.

That Company, it is said, which is all-powerful in the Grand Duchy, has excited demonstrations hostile to Germany which are much to be regretted, and may ultimately bring about the ruin of the country.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received December 14.)

My Lord,

Brussels, December 13, 1870.

THE Brussels papers of this date contain letters from Luxemburg, stating that the Patriotic Committee is organising a general petition throughout the Grand Duchy to the King of Holland, in order to protest against the accusations brought against it of having infringed the laws of neutrality. The petitioners implore the King to maintain the independence of Luxemburg, its neutrality, its traditions, its laws, and its institutions.

The Presidents of the United Societies were convoked for yesterday, the 12th December.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

Earl Granville to Mr. Odo Russell.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 15, 1870.

I HAVE this evening requested you by telegraph to ascertain whether there can be any present intention on the part of the Prussian Government of acting on Count Bismarck's Circular of the 3rd instant, stating that Prussia can no longer consider herself bound to respect the neutrality of Luxemburg.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received December 17.)

My Lord,

Brussels, December 16, 1870.

THE "Echo du Parlement" of this date contains the text of the address drawn up by the Patriotic Committee of Luxemburg to the King of Holland, declaring that the Government of the North German Confederation has been shamefully deceived in the judgment formed of the behaviour of the people of Luxemburg, calling upon Prince Henry of the Netherlands as a witness of the efforts of the Grand Ducal Government to uphold the neutrality of the country, and upon His Majesty to preserve Luxemburg from the danger that threatens its independence, and never to allow the political existence of the country to be disposed of without the free vote of the country.

To this address is appended an appeal from the Committee to the inhabitants of Luxemburg to sign this address, copies of which will be prepared in every commune of the Grand Duchy, and which will be collected on the 19th instant, to be forwarded to His Majesty the King Grand-Duke.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

Inclosure in No. 8.

Extract from the "Echo du Parlement" of December 16, 1870.

DANS une réunion extraordinaire tenue hier à l'Hôtel de Ville, le Comité Patriotique a arrêté l'adresse suivante:—

"Sire,

"C'est avec la plus profonde anxiété que les populations Luxembourgeoises viennent d'apprendre la teneur de la note Allemande, qui nous accuse ouvertement d'avoir méconnu les devoirs de la neutralité, et qui déclare la Prusse déliée de l'obligation de respecter l'heureuse situation faite au Grand Duché par le Traité de Londres.

"Sire,

"Le Gouvernement de l'Union a été indignement trompé dans l'appréciation de la conduite des Luxembourgeois.

“Son Altesse Royale Monseigneur le Prince Henri, le Représentant bien-aimé de votre Majesté, a été témoin des efforts incessants faits par notre Gouvernement pour sauvegarder la neutralité dont nous jouissons ; les nations voisines, la Prusse, la France, et la Belgique, peuvent certifier hautement d’avoir vu sans cesse le petit Luxembourg le premier au poste de la charité et de la bienfaisance ; et l’Europe entière peut sceller de sa parole la déclaration que vous fait en ce moment solennel un malheureux peuple, qui n’a d’autre titre pour sa défense que le sentiment du droit, du devoir, et de la justice.

“Sire,

“Notre pauvre patrie est en ce moment plus menacée qu’à aucune autre époque de son histoire. C’est au milieu de cette crise suprême que nous venons supplier votre Majesté de sauver le Luxembourg, et de ne jamais permettre qu’on dispose de son existence politique sans le libre vote de ses populations.

“Les soussignés ont l’honneur de se dire, de votre Majesté, les très-fidèles, les très-dévoués, et les très-respectueux serviteurs et sujets.”

Appel à nos Concitoyens.

“L’indépendance et la neutralité de notre Grand Duché sont en danger. Le Gouvernement de Prusse, qui était l’un des garants du Traité de Londres, s’est délié de son engagement. Un changement de notre destinée si heureuse en vertu de ce Traité paraît imminent.

“Dans ce moment suprême, le Comité Patriotique Luxembourgeois espère qu’une supplique revêtue de la signature de la grande majorité des Luxembourgeois, exposant à Sa Majesté notre Roi Grand-Duc la situation de nos vœux, et déposée aux pieds de son trône, pourra conjurer le danger.

“En conséquence, le Comité Patriotique Permanent, réuni d’urgence le Lundi 12, a formulé l’adresse dont les journaux ont déjà hier reproduit le texte ; il en a déposé des exemplaires dans les secrétariats de toutes les communes, et invite tous les Luxembourgeois, à qui la conservation de la situation que nous a faite le Traité de Londres est chère, à aller, sans le moindre retard, y apposer leurs signatures.

“Les adresses seront réunies Lundi le 19 courant, pour être envoyées à Sa Majesté le Roi Grand-Duc.

“Nous prions tous les patriotes Luxembourgeois de nous prêter le concours de leur activité pour que l’adresse et l’invitation d’y adhérer soit immédiatement portée à la connaissance de tous.”

(Les Délégués du Comité Patriotique.)

(Translation.)

AT a special meeting held yesterday at the Town Hall, the Patriotic Committee adopted the following address :—

“Sire,

“It is with the deepest anxiety that the people of Luxemburg have just learnt the tenor of the German note which openly accuses us of having disregarded the duties of neutrality, and declares Prussia to be released from the obligation of respecting the fortunate position in which the Grand Duchy was placed by the Treaty of London.

“Sire,

“The Government of the Union has been unworthily deceived in its appreciation of the conduct of the Luxemburgers.

“His Royal Highness Prince Henry, your Majesty’s beloved Representative, has witnessed the unceasing efforts made by our Government to preserve the neutrality which we enjoy ; the neighbouring nations, Prussia, France, and Belgium can distinctly certify to having constantly seen little Luxemburg foremost at the post of charity and benevolence ; and the whole of Europe can confirm with its word the declaration made to you at this solemn moment by an unfortunate people, which has no other title for its defence than the feeling of right, duty, and justice.

“Sire,

“Our poor country is more threatened at this moment than at any other epoch of its history. It is in the midst of this great crisis that we entreat your Majesty to save Luxemburg, and never to allow its political existence to be disposed of without the free vote of its people.

"The Undersigned have the honour to style themselves your Majesty's most faithful, devoted, and respectful servants and subjects."

"Appeal to our Fellow-Citizens."

"The independence and the neutrality of our Grand Duchy are in danger. The Government of Prussia, which was one of the guarantors of the Treaty of London, has withdrawn itself from its engagement. A change in our lot, which was so fortunate in virtue of that Treaty, seems imminent.

"At this critical moment the Luxemburg Patriotic Committee hope that an appeal signed by the large majority of the inhabitants of Luxemburg, placing before His Majesty our Grand Duke the condition of our wishes, and laid at the foot of his throne, may avert the danger.

"Consequently, the Permanent Patriotic Committee, in a special session held on Monday the 12th, has drawn up the Address, the text of which was published in the papers yesterday; they have placed copies of it in the office of every commune, and call upon all Luxemburgers, to whom the preservation of the position in which we were placed by the Treaty of London is dear, to affix their signatures to it without delay.

"The addresses will be collected on Monday, the 19th instant, to be sent to His Majesty the King Grand Duke.

"We beg all Luxemburg patriots to lend us their active co-operation in order that the Address, and the invitation to join in it, may be immediately brought to the knowledge of every one."

(The Delegates of the Patriotic Committee.)

No. 9.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 17, 1870.

COUNT BERNSTORFF communicated to me on the 9th instant a copy of Count Bismarck's Circular of the 3rd of this month, stating that the Prussian Government can no longer consider itself bound to any consideration of the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in the military operations of the German army, and in the measures for the security of the German troops against the injuries inflicted on them from Luxemburg; while, at the same time, it reserves to itself the prosecution of its claims against the Grand Duchy for damages done to it through the non-maintenance of neutrality.

The specific grounds on which this declaration is based are:—

1. That provisions were introduced into Thionville by railway trains at night from Luxemburg, while that fortress remained in the hands of the French.

2. That after the surrender of Metz there was a transit of French soldiers and officers in masses through the Grand Duchy for the purpose of entering France again by evading the German posts.

3. That the French Vice-Consul has established a regular office at the railway station at Luxemburg, where the fugitives have been provided with means and vouchers to enable them to continue their march into France to enter the Army of the North.

Her Majesty's Government have received with great regret the information that the Prussian Government have thought that there were grounds to bring a charge against France and Luxemburg, co-signatories of the Treaty of May 11, 1867, of having violated the neutrality of Luxemburg, which, by that Treaty, they had bound themselves to maintain, and which the former of those Powers had, at the opening of the war, declared its intention of continuing to observe, provided the neutrality were also respected by Prussia.

Her Majesty's Government would learn with still greater concern that any charges involving a breach of neutrality, were upon full inquiry, substantiated. For the present, they advisedly abstain from giving any opinion upon the particular points raised, and from inquiring whether, if substantiated, they constitute an infraction of the Treaty. It is to be expected that the Provisional Government of France, and His Majesty the King Grand-Duke of Luxemburg, will give their explanations to the co-signatories of the Treaty of 1867. Until such information is given, it would be premature to give any opinion.

There are, however, other observations on the Circular which Her Majesty's Government feel constrained to make.

Although it is stated that the complaints of infraction of the neutrality of Luxemburg have formed the subject of remonstrance on the part of Prussia, they are now, for the first time, brought before Her Majesty's Government, and yet they are accompanied at once by a declaration on the part of Germany of their validity, and Count Bismarck goes so far as to inform Her Majesty's Government that "the Royal Government can no longer consider itself bound to any consideration of the neutrality of the Grand Duchy in the military operations of the German army, and in the measures for the security of the German troops against the injuries inflicted on them from Luxemburg."

It is obvious that principles of a wide application are involved in this statement.

A pressing military emergency might possibly justify in some degree measures in the way of prevention or repression, but no such circumstances have been alleged.

Count Bernstorff has informed me that although he cannot speak with authority, having no instructions, he believes that the Circular is not intended to contain a denunciation of the Treaty of 1867, and Her Majesty's Government gladly accept this construction; but even on this assumption it appears to Her Majesty's Government that the regular course would have been that the North German Confederation should have in the first place required from the Grand Duke of Luxemburg explanations on the whole of the charges which they had to make, and then communicated the result to the other co-signatories with a representation of the necessity that they should take into consideration the effect of a state of facts so verified.

Her Majesty's Government, however, observe that, whatever may have been the importance of the acts complained of, they were transitory in their nature and have ceased to have any practical bearing on the issues of the war.

There is no longer any question of provisions for Thionville or of fugitive soldiers from Metz.

Her Majesty's Government, therefore, feel justified in assuming that the publication of the Circular of the 3rd of December is intended as an indication of the displeasure of Prussia at the disregard which she alleges has been shown to her remonstrances, when, if attended to, they might have led to some practical result, and that His Prussian Majesty will be satisfied with the caution thus given to the Grand Ducal Government, and abstain from giving effect to the declaration in the Circular that Prussia will no longer feel herself bound to take into consideration the neutrality of the Grand Duchy in the military operations of the German army, and in the measures for the security of the German troops. For the events of the war must clearly demonstrate to His Majesty that the proceedings of which complaint has been made, whatever importance they might have in the earlier stages of the war, are matters bygone, and are not likely again to be resorted to, and are not, as the case stands, calculated to interfere with the operations of the German armies or to imperil the security of the German troops.

Your Excellency will read and give a copy of this despatch to Baron Thile, with a request that it may be forwarded to Count Bismarck to be submitted to the King of Prussia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 10.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Granville.—(Received December 19.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, December 15, 1870.

THE Prussian Minister delivered to Prince Gortchakoff some days ago a copy of Count Bismarck's despatch on the alleged breach of its neutrality by the Government of Luxemburg, and his Excellency declined expressing any opinion upon it until he had taken the Emperor's orders on the subject.

His Excellency, however, informs me that he wrote immediately to the Hague, suggesting that the King should cause an inquiry to be made without delay into the case, and that if the conduct of any subordinate officers of the Luxemburg Government justified the complaints of Prussia, they should be held responsible for it, and every possible satisfaction given to the Prussian Government.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received December 21.)

(Extract.)

Brussels, December 19, 1870.

M. TACHARD, the French Minister, has had the goodness to read to me some Extracts from a despatch which he addressed yesterday to his Government on the subject of the accusations brought by Count Bismarck against the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg of having allowed its neutrality to be violated in favour of France.

With reference to the charge of having assisted in conveying provisions to the French fortress of Thionville, M. Tachard says, that what occurred was a purely commercial transaction, with which the Grand Ducal Government was in no way mixed up; a commission having been given for the conveyance of a certain quantity of provisions to a State of the Zollverein, the goods were purchased partly in France and partly in Belgium, and the usual bill of lading being made out, they were consigned to Luxemburg, and forwarded by the French Compagnie de l'Est in three sealed waggons to Luxemburg.

On arriving at that place, the waggons were duly inspected by the Grand Ducal Custom-house officers, and on being found to contain neither contraband of war nor any object of illicit traffic, the consigner, as he was perfectly justified in doing, gave the goods a fresh destination, and they were despatched to Thionville.

The railway between the Luxemburg frontier and the fortress had, however, been broken up, partly by the German troops, partly by the French themselves, but the agents of the Compagnie de l'Est having brought with them what was necessary for its reparation, with the help of 500 men from Thionville, succeeded in the course of the night in restoring the line to working order, and in forwarding the provisions to Thionville.

Although the Grand Ducal Government had not in any way been mixed up in the business, the French Legation at Brussels certainly had assisted, to the best of their ability, in the transaction which was in all respects similar to those which had been carried on to a far greater extent on Prussian account, with this difference, however, that while the train of provisions sent to Thionville consisted of only three waggons, he could state, on the authority of M. Regnais, the Director of the Grand Luxemburg Railway, that not less than 1,000 waggons, containing provisions of all kinds, had been forwarded by German merchants from Antwerp across Belgium and Luxemburg for the use of the German army.

In remarking on the other charges brought against the Grand Ducal Government, M. Tachard explains what took place with reference to the French soldiers that had escaped into Luxemburg, in terms similar to those already stated to your Lordship in my despatch of the 11th instant.

He maintains that the passage of unarmed Frenchmen in plain clothes travelling, singly or in groups of two and three, through the Grand Duchy into France, even though they may have formed part of the Imperial army, can in no way be converted into a breach of the neutrality of that country; and that in affording assistance to his distressed countrymen the French Vice-Consul only acted in accordance with his duty, as the French Consuls in Belgium and he himself had done. As to the statement that the French Vice-Consul had established a bureau at the Luxemburg Railway Station for the purpose of enabling the French refugees to continue their march to join the French army, M. Tachard says that an agent, M. Jammont, had been sent to assist the Vice-Consul, who was overwhelmed with work, and that as that gentleman lived some distance out of town and far from the railway, M. Jammont took a small room near the station, where he distributed refreshments to his countrymen as they arrived, and assisted them on their way to Arlon, and that he had done this from feelings of humanity as well as from prudential motives, for he thus saved his weary countrymen a long walk to and from the Vice-Consul's house, and prevented those demonstrations of sympathy so hateful to Prussia, which the appearance of a number of Frenchmen in the streets of Luxemburg could not fail to excite.

No. 12.

Vice-Admiral Harris to Earl Granville.—(Received December 23.)

My Lord,

The Hague, December 20, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of a despatch from M. Servais, Minister of State for the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, inclosing copy of the despatch which his Excellency has addressed in answer to one from Count Bismarck dated December 3rd.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. A. J. HARRIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 12.

M. de Servais to Vice-Admiral Harris.

M. le Ministre,

Luxembourg, le 17 Décembre, 1870.

LE Chancelier de la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord a communiqué au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine d'Angleterre la dépêche par laquelle il a notifié au Gouvernement du Grand Duché de Luxemburg la grave détermination que, puisque le Grand Duché n'a pas rempli ses obligations comme Etat neutre, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse ne croit pas non plus devoir avoir égard dans les opérations militaires des armées Allemandes à la neutralité du Grand Duché.

J'ai l'honneur de faire parvenir à votre Excellence la réponse que j'ai faite à la dépêche prérappelée.

Je pense être parvenu à combattre les griefs qui ont été opposés au Gouvernement Luxembourgeois, et à démontrer que pendant toute la guerre il a tenu une conduite conforme à ses devoirs; que surtout s'il pouvait être accusé d'avoir favorisé une des Puissances belligérantes, ce ne serait pas la France, comme on le prétend, mais plutôt l'Allemagne.

Dans les premiers temps de la guerre, craignant ce qui arrive aujourd'hui, j'ai fait faire des ouvertures à votre Excellence comme à quelques autres Représentants des Puissances signataires du Traité du 11 Mai, 1867, au sujet de la nomination dans le Grand Duché d'agents qui pourraient s'assurer de la vérité des faits que l'une ou l'autre des parties belligérantes serait dans le cas de reprocher au Gouvernement Luxembourgeois. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine n'a pas cru devoir accueillir ces ouvertures. Votre Excellence, en me communiquant les motifs de cette détermination, m'a écrit sous la date du Septembre ce qui suit:—

"As regards the remarks made to me by M. d'Olimart on the 9th ultimo, the substance of which I transmitted to Earl Granville, respecting the expediency of the appointment by Her Majesty's Government of a trustworthy agent to reside in the Duchy, whose reports would counteract the misrepresentations of irresponsible newspaper correspondents, I am instructed by his Lordship to state that Her Majesty's Government have the fullest confidence in the loyalty of the Grand Ducal Government, and are convinced of their intention to abide by their obligations. They need therefore be under no apprehension of Her Majesty's Government being misled by statements to the contrary effect emanating from unauthorized sources."

Je n'ai donc pas à craindre que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine puisse avoir le moindre doute au sujet des faits que j'avance dans ma réponse, d'autant plus qu'ils sont généralement établis par des documents irrécusables. J'ai dès lors la conviction aussi qu'il considérera la détermination notifiée par le Chancelier de la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord comme n'étant aucunement justifiée par les motifs allégués.

Comptant sur la justice du Gouvernement Prussien, j'ai lieu d'espérer que cette détermination ne sera pas exécutée. Si elle devait l'être cependant, elle constituerait au Traité conclu le 18 Mai, 1867, entre les principales Puissances de l'Europe, une infraction dont le caractère dangereux ne saurait être méconnu. Ce qui n'échappera surtout pas au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine, c'est que la neutralité conférée à certains Etats en Europe n'aurait plus aucun caractère sérieux, si l'existence d'un Etat constitué comme neutre en vertu d'un Traité pouvait dépendre de la volonté d'une seule des Puissances Contractantes.

J'ai donc une entière confiance que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine donnerait au Grand Duché son appui s'il pouvait avoir besoin d'invoquer la garantie stipulée par le Traité du 11 Mai, 1867, à l'effet de faire respecter son indépendance.

Recevez, &c.

Le Ministre d'Etat, Président du Gouvernement,

(Signé) L. J. E. SERVAIS.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

Luxembourg, December 17, 1870.

THE Chancellor of the North German Confederation has communicated to the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of England the despatch by which he has announced to the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg the serious decision that, since the Grand Duchy has not fulfilled its obligations as a neutral State, the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia do not think that they are on their part bound, in the military operations of the German armies, to have regard to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy.

I have the honour to forward to your Excellency the reply which I have made to the above-mentioned despatch.

I think I have succeeded in refuting the complaints which have been made against the Luxemburg Government, and in proving that during the whole war they maintained a course in accordance with their duty; that, especially, if they could be accused of having favoured either of the belligerent Powers, it would not be France, as is alleged, but rather Germany.

At the commencement of the war, fearing what has now occurred, I caused overtures to be made to your Excellency, as well as to several other Representatives of the Powers, signatories of the Treaty of the 11th of May, 1867, concerning the appointment in the Grand Duchy of agents, who might ascertain the authenticity of the facts which one or the other of the belligerents might have to bring against the Luxemburg Government. The Government of Her Majesty the Queen did not think it necessary to entertain these overtures. Your Excellency, in communicating to me the motives of this determination, wrote to me under date of September, as follows:—

“As regards the remarks made to me by M. d'Olimart on the 9th ultimo, the substance of which I transmitted to Earl Granville, respecting the expediency of the appointment by Her Majesty's Government of a trust-worthy agent to reside in the Duchy, whose reports would counteract the misrepresentations of irresponsible newspaper correspondents, I am instructed by his Lordship to state that Her Majesty's Government have the fullest confidence in the loyalty of the Grand Ducal Government, and are convinced of their intention to abide by their obligations. They need, therefore, be under no apprehension of Her Majesty's Government being misled by statements to the contrary effect emanating from unauthorised sources.”

I need not, therefore, fear that the Government of Her Majesty the Queen can have the slightest doubt as to the facts which I bring forward in my reply, the more so as they are generally established by unexceptionable documents. Hence, also, I am convinced that they will consider the decision announced by the Chancellor of the North German Confederation as being in no respect justified by the motives alleged.

Relying on the justice of the Prussian Government, I have reason to hope that that decision will not be put into execution. If such were, however, to be the case, it would constitute an infraction of the Treaty concluded on the 18th of May, 1867, between the principal Powers of Europe, the dangerous character of which could not be disregarded. And what, above all, will not escape the notice of Her Majesty's Government is, that the neutrality conferred on certain States in Europe would no longer have any real existence, if the existence of a State constituted as neutral in virtue of a Treaty could depend on the will of a single one of the contracting Powers.

I am, therefore, fully confident that Her Majesty's Government will give their support to the Grand Duchy if it should have need to appeal to the guarantee stipulated by the Treaty of the 11th May, 1867, in order to cause its independence to be respected.

Accept, &c.

The Minister of State, President of the Government,
(Signed) L. J. E. SERVAIS

Inclosure 2 in No. 12.

M. de Servais to Count Bismarck.

M. le Chancelier,

Luxembourg, le 14 Décembre, 1870.

PAR sa dépêche du 3 de ce mois, arrivée à Luxembourg le 9, votre Excellency m'informe que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse ne se croit plus tenu de respecter, dans les opérations militaires des armées Allemandes, la neutralité du Grand Duché, parce que celui-ci n'aurait mis aucune bonne volonté à maintenir sérieusement sa neutralité.

J'espère voir abandonner cette grave détermination, car je suis convaincu que des renseignements qui ne sont pas exacts l'ont fait prendre. J'aurai l'honneur de donner à votre Excellence des explications, qui, je le pense, prouveront que les faits dont doit résulter l'atteinte que le Grand Duché aurait portée à la neutralité, ou n'ont pas le caractère qui leur a été attribué, ou n'engagent pas la responsabilité de l'Etat. Je ferai précéder ces explications de quelques considérations qu'il me paraît indispensable de présenter d'abord.

Le Grand-Duché de Luxembourg a eu, dans la guerre qui a éclaté entre les deux pays voisins, une position très difficile. Il forme un Etat trop faible pour songer à se défendre contre une agression quelconque ; le danger devait donc paraître grand que sa neutralité ne fût pas maintenue, lorsque pendant plusieurs mois de grandes armées étaient constamment en lutte le long de la frontière ; le danger était encore augmenté parce qu'un fait posé par une des parties belligérantes, dès que seulement il était considéré comme contraire à la neutralité par l'autre, lors même qu'il ne l'aurait en réalité pas été, pouvait devenir pour cette dernière un motif de ne pas respecter le Grand Duché ; car chacun des belligérants avait déclaré qu'il en respecterait l'indépendance si l'autre la respectait.

Dans cette situation des choses, le Gouvernement du Grand-Duché eût été bien coupable s'il ne s'était pas imposé, comme un devoir impérieux, de ne pas donner lieu au moindre reproche fondé et d'éviter avec le plus grand soin tout acte qui pourrait être considéré comme contraire à ses obligations.

J'ai reconnu bientôt que nous avions à redouter un autre danger aussi grand que celui que je viens d'indiquer ; celui qui pourrait provenir de faux rapports adressés à l'une ou à l'autre des Puissances belligérantes. Il s'est manifesté dès le commencement de la guerre, quand des soldats Français venant de Sierck se rendirent de temps en temps, sans armes, à Schengen, pour faire de petits achats, comme l'ont fait aussi plus tard les soldats Allemands. Votre Excellence sait que ce fait a été travesti en une véritable invasion armée du territoire Luxembourgeois, qu'il a produit une grande émotion et a provoqué des mouvements de troupes ; il était avancé par des personnes qui prétendaient parler de visu, qui n'avaient pas d'autre but que de nuire au Grand Duché. Peu de temps après, des informations fausses données au Gouvernement Français nous mirent dans la nécessité de nous défendre également contre des reproches venus de ce côté. Inquiet du danger qui m'était ainsi révélé, je m'attachai à donner au Chargé d'Affaires Luxembourgeois à Berlin des éclaircissements sur des faits qui étaient dénaturés par les journaux et qui pouvaient faire de l'impression ; je le chargeai plus d'une fois de déclarer qu'il nous serait agréable de voir procéder à une instruction qui pourrait établir la vérité.

Les choses se sont constamment assez bien passées, malgré les causes fondées d'inquiétude qui existaient pour nous. La France a, dans deux circonstances, élevé des réclamations assez vives contre le Grand Duché ; c'était quand le Gouvernement Luxembourgeois s'est empressé de consentir au passage des blessés Allemands, et quand il n'a pas fait arrêter les soldats Prussiens qui, venant d'Audun-le-Tiche, ont dans les environs de Rumelange traversé le territoire Luxembourgeois : ces affaires n'ont cependant eu aucune suite fâcheuse. A part celles que l'incident de Schengen a provoquées, aucune observation ne nous a été faite par le Gouvernement de la Confédération du Nord au sujet de notre conduite, jusqu'au 4 Octobre, où votre Excellence m'adressa sa dépêche dans laquelle elle signale comme une atteinte à la neutralité dont le Grand Duché serait responsable, le fait que la Compagnie qui exploite nos chemins de fer aurait dirigé vers Thionville un train transportant des denrées et de la poudre. Je puis même me féliciter que constamment le Gouvernement Luxembourgeois a reçu à Berlin des témoignages d'approbation pour la ligne de conduite qu'il suivait. J'éprouve une grande satisfaction à rappeler ces témoignages.

Après les difficultés auxquelles a donné lieu la question du transport des blessés à travers le territoire Luxembourgeois, M. de Thile pria le 21 Août M. Fœhr, qu'il avait fait venir à cet effet chez lui, d'exprimer ses remerciements au Gouvernement Luxembourgeois, qui avait donné ce consentement, tandis qu'une semblable demande n'avait pas été accueillie par la Belgique, qui la considérait comme incompatible avec la neutralité qu'elle devait observer ; plus tard, le 4 Septembre, à l'occasion de l'incident de Rumelange, M. de Thile a écrit à M. Fœhr une lettre conçue dans les termes suivants :—

« Conformément à la promesse que je vous ai donnée dans notre dernière conversation, au sujet de la violation involontaire de votre territoire par des soldats Prussiens, je n'ai pas tardé à me mettre en rapport avec le Ministère de la Guerre, et je crois pouvoir aujourd'hui vous donner l'assurance que de pareils faits ne se répéteront pas. Si cet incident a pu être vidé ainsi, sans embarras, c'est dû, je me plais à le constater, au jugement calme et juste de M. Servais, qui ne s'est pas départi de la conviction qu'il est

Bien loin des vues du Gouvernement Prussien d'autoriser l'atteinte même la plus légère aux droits des pays neutres."

Après la fin de Novembre, ainsi longtemps après la dépêche concernant le convoi de denrées dirigé vers Thionville, il s'est encore passé un fait à l'occasion duquel M. de Thile a reconnu, au moins implicitement, qu'aucun reproche n'était à adresser au Grand Duché. Une maison de Liège s'était adressée au Gouvernement pour acheter de vieux fusils dont il désirait se défaire; elle en offrait un prix assez élevé. J'étais bien certain que cette vente ne pouvait constituer une infraction à la neutralité; craignant cependant qu'elle ne fut présentée comme telle et qu'on ne prétendit que les fusils seraient expédiés en France, j'ai cru devoir prévenir le Gouvernement Prussien et lui demander s'il n'avait rien à objecter contre le marché proposé. M. Fœhr m'a informé de l'accomplissement de sa mission par lettre du 28 Novembre, dans les termes suivants:—

"Je viens de quitter M. de Thile; il m'a chargé de vous remercier de l'attention que vous aviez vis-à-vis du Gouvernement Prussien de l'avoir informé du projet de vendre nos anciens fusils à une maison de Liège. Il m'a dit qu'au point de vue de notre neutralité, on ne pouvait pas nous empêcher de céder ces fusils à un tiers qui n'est pas sujet de la nation avec laquelle l'Allemagne est en guerre. Il a ajouté cependant qu'il a la conviction que les fusils sont modifiés à Liège pour être livrés à la France, soit directement, soit par la voie d'Angleterre. Quoi qu'il en soit," dit-il, "vous pouvez les vendre sans violer le principe de neutralité; mais si la vente n'est pas urgente, je vous saurais gré de retarder la conclusion du marché."

Cette recommandation a été suivie.

En présence de ces témoignages, votre Excellence reconnaîtra qu'il m'était permis d'être rassuré, et de supposer que jusqu'au 28 Novembre dernier le Gouvernement Prussien n'avait à élever aucune réclamation contre le Grand Duché, à raison de la manière dont il observait la neutralité. J'étais assurément heureux qu'il en fût ainsi.

J'ai donc pris connaissance, M. le Chancelier, de votre dépêche du 3 de ce mois, avec un sentiment d'un bien pénible désappointement; je ne perds pas courage cependant en abordant l'examen des griefs que cette dépêche formule contre le Grand Duché; car j'ai la conscience d'avoir voulu remplir loyalement les obligations que le Traité du 11 Mai, 1867, nous impose, comme l'intérêt du pays l'exigeait.

Votre Excellence relève d'abord les dispositions hostiles d'une partie de la population Luxembourgeoise, qui auraient été telles que de mauvais traitements auraient été exercés sur des fonctionnaires Allemands, sans qu'ils auraient donné lieu à une répression suffisante; elle ne rend cependant pas le Gouvernement responsable de délits qui ont été commis par des particuliers.

Je ne veux pas récriminer, et il ne m'appartient pas de le faire; je dirai donc seulement, en ce qui concerne les dispositions hostiles d'une partie de la population Luxembourgeoise, qu'elles ne semblent au moins pas résulter des faits suivants: D'abord les Allemands, expulsés de France, qui ont traversé notre pays, et qui manquaient souvent complètement de ressources, ont obtenu chez nous toute l'assistance dont ils avaient besoin pour continuer leur voyage. Ensuite aucun pays de l'Europe n'a proportionnellement fait autant de sacrifices que le Grand Duché pour porter des secours, particulièrement aux blessés Allemands; les Membres du Comité de Secours établi à Luxembourg et nos médecins ont donné la preuve du plus grand dévouement dans les ambulances Allemandes, de façon que quand ils arrivaient les premiers après la fin d'un combat, on disait dans l'armée, "Voilà de nouveau les braves Luxembourgeois." Cette charité qu'on a montrée contredit péremptoirement les accusations de quelques malveillants, et doit au moins valoir pour racheter les fautes qui pourraient avoir été commises par des individus isolés.

Je ne connais rien des mauvais traitements qui auraient été fréquemment exercés sur des fonctionnaires Allemands par nos nationaux. Je regrette que ceux qui ont été exercés n'aient pas été portés à la connaissance des autorités chargées de la répression des délits; ils auraient certainement provoqué des poursuites, comme ils en provoqueraient encore maintenant, si les auteurs en étaient signalés. Je puis donner à votre Excellence l'assurance qu'il a été recommandé particulièrement aux différentes autorités de veiller à ce que les sujets Allemands fussent protégés, parce que nous avons plus d'un motif pour éviter tout reproche de ce côté; nous avons d'ailleurs toujours tenu à honneur dans notre petit pays à protéger les étrangers, parce que nous sentons le besoin de leur donner une bonne opinion de nous. J'ajouterai que les seuls délits que nous n'avons pas fait réprimer, depuis un certain temps, sont ceux commis sur le territoire Luxembourgeois, le long de la frontière, par des sujets Allemands; ils sont assez nombreux, comme l'attestent les procès-verbaux qui en ont été dressés. Nous avons pensé qu'ils devaient être attribués à des circonstances passagères et qu'il n'y avait pas trop lieu de s'en préoccuper.

Je viens aux faits que votre Excellence considère comme constituant une atteinte à la neutralité. Je ferai d'abord une observation générale. Les faits signalés ne se rapportent pas aux premiers temps de la guerre pendant lesquels le résultat de celle-ci aurait pu paraître douteux, mais aux temps où des victoires décisives avaient été remportées par les armées Allemandes. Le Gouvernement Luxembourgeois aurait été d'un aveuglement impardonnable si dans ce moment il avait voulu, d'une manière quelconque, favoriser la France ; il devait être certain qu'il ne pouvait échapper aux conséquences que sa conduite était dans le cas d'entraîner. Il avait donc le motif le plus puissant d'être excessivement prudent. Or, il l'a été quand il avait moins à craindre, ce qui a été reconnu. Peut-on supposer qu'il aurait voulu cesser de l'être au moment où par une imprudence il compromettrait tout ?

Votre Excellence rend le Gouvernement Luxembourgeois responsable du ravitaillement de la forteresse de Thionville, qui aurait eu lieu au moyen de trains expédiés nuitamment de la gare de Luxembourg.

J'ai déjà répondu sur ce point dans ma dépêche du 15 Octobre. Je croyais l'avoir fait d'une manière satisfaisante, puisque aucune erreur que j'aurais commise ne m'a été signalée, ni verbalement, ni par écrit. Je dois donc reprendre la question.

Je me permets de faire remarquer d'abord qu'il ne peut s'agir que d'une seule expédition faite pendant la nuit du 24 au 25 Septembre. Il n'y en a pas eu d'autre depuis que l'autorité militaire Allemande a voulu intercepter les communications avec la France par l'enlèvement des rails du chemin de fer près de la frontière, qui a eu lieu vers la fin du mois d'Août. Aussi votre Excellence, dans sa dépêche du 4 Octobre, à laquelle elle se réfère à ce sujet dans celle du 3 Décembre, ne s'occupe-t-elle que du convoi expédié dans la nuit du 24 au 25 Septembre.

Je constate, en outre, que le convoi dont il s'agit ne consistait qu'en denrées alimentaires. Il avait d'abord été rapporté au Gouvernement qu'il comprenait de la poudre de guerre ; c'est ce qui l'a déterminé à notifier à l'instant le fait, à cause de sa gravité, au Gouvernement Prussien. Votre Excellence a eu la même opinion, comme la prouve sa dépêche du 4 Octobre.

Il a été parfaitement établi cependant, c'est aussi ce qui est implicitement reconnu dans la dépêche à laquelle je réponds, que dans la nuit du 24 au 25 Septembre il n'a été transporté que des denrées alimentaires. Je crois, dès lors, qu'on ne peut pas nous opposer la notification faite au Gouvernement Prussien comme un aveu d'une atteinte portée à la neutralité, puisque cette notification a eu lieu sous l'influence d'une erreur sur le véritable caractère du fait signalé. Je pense plutôt que nous pouvons invoquer notre manière d'agir comme une preuve de loyauté, puisque nous n'hésitons pas à reconnaître même les choses qui peuvent nous paraître préjudiciables, avant d'avoir la certitude qu'elles existent.

J'ai encore à constater des circonstances de fait importantes. Les trains par lesquels ont été effectués les transports n'ont pas, comme semble le croire votre Excellence, été formés à la gare de Luxembourg ; ils n'ont fait que traverser le Grand Duché, comme ils ont traversé la Belgique. Ils ont transporté exclusivement des marchandises chargées à l'étranger ; ils n'en ont absolument pas transporté qui seraient provenues du Grand Duché. Les conséquences à tirer de ces circonstances me paraissent évidentes.

Je me demande maintenant, si le transport de denrées alimentaires qui a été effectué pendant la nuit du 24 au 25 Septembre peut être considéré comme contraire à la neutralité ?

Je pourrais soutenir la négative par des considérations tirées du droit des gens et appliquées à la situation de Thionville au moment où le transport a eu lieu ; mais je ne crois pas devoir m'y arrêter. Je me bornerai seulement à faire remarquer qu'on ne peut pas, lorsqu'il s'agit de denrées alimentaires, faire prévaloir les principes rigoureux qui seraient suivis s'il s'agissait de munitions de guerre.

Je me fonderai, pour soutenir la cause du Grand Duché, sur des considérations de fait.

Depuis la guerre, non pas quelques trains, mais des centaines, je pourrais dire des milliers de trains chargés de denrées ont été expédiés par nos chemins de fer pour le ravitaillement des armées Allemandes ; parmi ces denrées il y en avait beaucoup qui provenaient de notre pays et qui étaient livrées par des fournisseurs nationaux. Ces faits sont de notoriété publique. Non seulement le Gouvernement les a tolérés, mais il les a favorisés ; en effet, quand des plaintes étaient faites sur les retards apportés aux expéditions, il intervenait pour les faire disparaître ; il demandait à la Compagnie qui exploite nos chemins de fer de remplir l'obligation qu'elle a contractée envers l'Etat d'effectuer les transports dont elle serait chargée.

Ainsi nous avons donné, pendant la guerre, à l'Allemagne toutes les facilités qu'elle pouvait désirer pour s'approvisionner en denrées alimentaires. Je ne pense donc pas

qu'une violation de la neutralité, à son préjudice, puisse nous être reprochée, à raison d'un transport effectué pendant la nuit du 24 au 25 Septembre vers Thionville.

Si tout cela n'était pas vrai, alors encore je croirais pouvoir soutenir que l'Etat Luxembourgeois n'a encouru aucune responsabilité. Il n'exploite pas et ne concourt pas à exploiter les chemins de fer. Une Compagnie privée étrangère fait cette exploitation; elle a des employés qu'elle nomme sans l'intervention du Gouvernement, conformément à l'Article 23 de son cahier des charges, ainsi conçu: "Les fonctionnaires salariés seront au choix et à la nomination des concessionnaires; ils pourront, ainsi que les ingénieurs, être étrangers."

Votre Excellence a émis dans sa dépêche du 4 Octobre l'opinion que des fonctionnaires Luxembourgeois avaient fait l'expédition qui a eu lieu dans la nuit du 24 au 25 Septembre, et elle répète une idée analogue dans sa dépêche du 5 Decembre. Non, ce sont les employés, pour la plupart étrangers, d'une Compagnie étrangère. Le fait de ces employés ne peut donc lier l'Etat que lorsque celui-ci a une faute à se reprocher. Tel n'est pas le cas. Les trains chargés de denrées alimentaires, expédiés dans la nuit du 24 au 25 Septembre, ne présentaient rien qui devait empêcher de les laisser circuler librement sur tous nos chemins de fer, et de les laisser diriger par la ligne de Luxembourg vers la France, comme d'autres la parcouraient journellement; il n'y avait de mesure à prendre, soit à la gare de Luxembourg, soit ailleurs pour les arrêter, que si on avait été prévenu qu'il était question d'exécuter quelque projet auquel il y avait lieu d'opposer des obstacles. Le Gouvernement Luxembourgeois n'a été informé de rien de semblable; il est impossible de lui en faire un reproche; car l'administration des douanes du Zollverein, dirigée par un fonctionnaire Prussien dont le zèle est reconnu, et les employés attachés à la direction royale des chemins de fer de Sarrebruck qui, à la gare de Luxembourg, sont chargés du service de la ligne vers la Moselle, n'ont pas été mieux informés que le Gouvernement Luxembourgeois; un défaut de vigilance, dont il aurait à répondre, ne peut encore pas lui être imputé, lorsqu'on voit que le convoi de denrées alimentaires dont question a pu traverser, pour aller et retourner, le territoire Français, de la frontière à Thionville, sur un parcours de plusieurs lieues, dans un endroit occupé par les troupes Prussiennes.

Je me permets encore un mot: le passage de la frontière Française jusqu'à Thionville des trains expédiés dans la nuit du 24 au 25 Septembre forme en réalité le fait reproché au Grand Duché. Comment celui-ci pourrait-il être déclaré responsable de ce fait qui s'est accompli sur un territoire étranger? Je me dis ensuite qu'une ou deux sentinelles placées en France près de la frontière, sur le chemin de fer, à la place surtout où les rails étaient enlevés, auraient empêché tout transport d'être effectué. C'est parce que ces précautions n'ont pas été prises là où on avait intérêt à les prendre, que le Grand Duché pourrait être traité comme s'il avait porté atteinte à la neutralité, encore qu'il ne s'agit que d'un acte non posé par le Gouvernement du pays. Je puis espérer qu'il n'en sera pas ainsi, car ce serait trop rigoureux.

Je tiens à dire finalement à votre Excellence que nous n'avons jamais négligé de surveiller l'exploitation de nos chemins de fer, pour qu'on ne pût pas en abuser d'une manière contraire aux obligations que la neutralité du Grand Duché lui impose. Nous avons cru d'autant plus devoir le faire, que la Compagnie chargée de cette exploitation est étrangère. Ainsi, dès le 4 Août, j'ai écrit au Commissaire du Gouvernement près cette Société une lettre qui renferme des recommandations renouvelées plusieurs fois plus tard; elle est de la teneur suivante:—

"Je n'ai pas appris que l'administration de nos chemins de fer ait posé des actes qui auraient pour but de favoriser l'une des parties belligérantes et pourraient devenir pour l'autre un motif de ne pas respecter notre neutralité. A cause de la gravité des conséquences que de pareils actes pourraient avoir, je crois devoir vous recommander de veiller d'une manière toute particulière à ce qu'aucun agent de l'administration de nos chemins de fer ne se permette un fait qui puisse être considéré comme une immixtion dans les opérations de la guerre, et de m'en informer immédiatement si quelque chose de pareil arrive. Je ne reculerai pas devant les mesures les plus sévères pour réprimer toute tentative de ce genre.

"Le Gouvernement n'a pas de motif de croire qu'une des deux nations belligérantes veuille violer notre territoire; cependant il a cru devoir charger les différentes administrations du pays de l'informer immédiatement de toute atteinte à notre indépendance qui pourrait avoir lieu, afin qu'il pût prendre les mesures que les circonstances exigeraient; je vous prie de me transmettre également toute nouvelle de ce genre qui pourrait vous parvenir."

Votre Excellence verra encore dans ces dernières lignes la preuve des soins que nous avons mis à prévenir indistinctement toutes les atteintes à la neutralité.

J'aborde maintenant la question de la violation de la neutralité résultant, d'après votre Excellence, de la conduite que nous aurions tenue à l'égard des militaires Français qui ont traversé notre territoire après la prise de Metz.

J'eusse désiré que nous eussions été avertis si notre manière d'agir n'était pas approuvée ; mais malgré un entretien que le Chargé d'Affaires Luxembourgeois a eu avec M. de Thile, dans lequel la question dont s'agit a été touchée, rien n'a été dit qui pouvait faire croire que nous ne satisfaisions pas à l'opinion qu'on avait de nos obligations, et que nous exposions l'indépendance du pays. Quoi qu'il en soit, je pense pouvoir démontrer que nos procédés ont été corrects.

Un premier reproche nous est fait ; c'est que nous n'aurions pas empêché les militaires Français de rentrer en France pour prendre service dans l'Armée du Nord.

Je crois d'abord qu'on a exagéré le nombre de ceux auxquels des mesures préventives auraient été applicables. Il ne faut évidemment pas y comprendre les militaires qui auraient eu des saufs-conduits. C'était principalement des officiers, des élèves de l'Ecole d'Application, des gardes mobiles, des employés des administrations attachées à une armée, des médecins et des infirmiers des ambulances, enfin des blessés rétablis. La plus grande partie des hommes de cette catégorie, appartenant à l'armée de Metz, ont passé par Luxembourg, où beaucoup de personnes ignoraient qu'ils étaient libres de se rendre où ils voulaient. De là des impressions et des bruits inexacts.

Parmi les évadés qui ont atteint le Grand Duché, il y en a un grand nombre au sujet desquels nous ne pouvons, dans aucun cas, avoir une responsabilité. Ce sont ceux qui ont gagné la Belgique en employant les moyens qui leur ont servi en France pour échapper à l'armée Allemande ; ils pouvaient exécuter leur projet, car ils étaient favorisés par la nature accidentée et boisée du pays et par le peu de longueur du trajet à faire. A ces évadés il faut assimiler les prisonniers de guerre auxquels on a permis de se sauver comme ils le déclaraient, ce que différents indices semblaient confirmer, et qui ont pu se rendre dans le Grand Duché, des lieux les plus éloignés, à travers les provinces Allemandes.

Je ferai encore remarquer que les militaires Français ont tous traversé le territoire Luxembourgeois sans s'y arrêter, sans y former aucun rassemblement, et sans être en uniforme, et sans même obtenir les secours que l'Etat accorde souvent aux étrangers sans ressources.

Après cela j'invoque un fait auquel on n'a pas été assez attentif, et qui s'explique par la situation géographique du Grand Duché et par les positions qu'ont constamment occupées les troupes Allemandes : c'est qu'aucun militaire Français n'a pénétré de notre pays en France. Tous, sans exception, se sont rendus en Belgique, Etat neutre, vers lequel nous n'avons pas l'obligation de les empêcher de se diriger, si l'on se rapporte à la réponse de M. de Thile sur la question de la vente de fusils ; ils ont dû y être traités selon les dispositions au sujet des militaires appartenant aux armées des Puissances belligérantes. S'il y en a eu parmi eux qui sont rentrés en France pour y prendre service, la cause n'en peut être imputée au Grand Duché. Mais je dois admettre, d'après tout ce que j'ai appris, qu'en Belgique on n'a pas négligé les mesures que le respect de la neutralité pouvait exiger.

Supposons maintenant que tout ce qui précède ne soit pas fondé ; que de nombreux militaires Français sujets à être internés, soient arrivés dans le Grand Duché, qu'ils n'aient pas passé en Belgique, qu'ils n'y aient pas été retenus s'il y avait lieu, et que le Grand Duché doive répondre de cette circonstance, alors je me permettrai d'invoquer le Traité de Londres du 11 Mai, 1867, qui a fait au Grand Duché une position particulière. Il résulte des Articles III et V de ce Traité, que "le nombre des soldats nécessaires pour veiller au maintien du bon ordre peut seulement être entretenu à Luxembourg et qu'il ne peut y être ni maintenu ni créé aucun établissement militaire." D'après ces dispositions le Grand Duché, qui d'ailleurs ne forme qu'un petit pays dont les ressources sont bornées, ne peut être comparé à un autre Etat neutre ; il ne peut ni être en situation, ni être tenu d'interner les milliers d'individus qui pourraient s'évader, lorsque des armées entières comprenant plus de cent mille hommes sont faites prisonnières de guerre. Je crois pouvoir me prévaloir de ces conséquences inévitables du Traité de Londres avec d'autant plus de confiance que les armées Allemandes ont mis, depuis la guerre, plus de soin à le respecter.

Votre Excellence fait un second grief au Gouvernement Luxembourgeois au sujet des militaires Français ; c'est la tolérance qu'il aurait eue envers l'Agent Consulaire Français, lequel aurait établi dans le Grand Duché un véritable bureau de recrutement.

Je fais remarquer d'abord à ce sujet que le Gouvernement est rendu responsable du fait d'un tiers, et d'un tiers qui représente une Puissance étrangère. Il faudrait qu'il y eût des circonstances bien graves pour qu'une telle décision pût se justifier. Mais je

crois pouvoir avancer que de pareilles circonstances ne se présentent pas et que le Gouvernement n'a rien à se reprocher.

L'Agent Consulaire Français a eu des rapports avec les militaires de sa nation qui sont venus à Luxembourg depuis la reddition de Metz; nous en avons été informés, nous ne pouvions d'ailleurs pas en douter si même nous n'avions pas été informés du fait.

Quels étaient ces rapports? D'après les constatations que nous avons d'abord faites, ils n'avaient pas un caractère reprehensible. Nous avons connu que des secours étaient donnés à des hommes exténués de fatigue et de faim, que des moyens leur étaient fournis pour la continuation de leur voyage en Belgique, généralement jusqu'à Arlon ou jusqu'à Namur.

Bientôt on annonça dans les journaux étrangers que le Consul Français avait un bureau d'enrôlement à Luxembourg, qu'il recevait les engagements des hommes qui voulaient prendre du service en France. Quoique trop souvent de fausses nouvelles soient répandues par la presse au sujet du Grand-Duché, le Gouvernement n'hésita pas à tenir compte des informations qu'elle donnait sur la conduite de l'Agent Consulaire Français, et mit le plus grand soin à s'assurer si elles étaient fondées. Mais des découvertes qui les auraient confirmées n'étaient pas faites. Nous sumes même que des personnes n'appartenant pas à la nation Française, qui s'adressèrent à l'Agent Consulaire pour s'engager, obtinrent un refus. L'on ne se borna pas à exercer une surveillance exacte pour apprendre la vérité et empêcher un abus qui ne pouvait être toléré; un de mes collègues et moi nous vîmes le Consul et nous lui fîmes toutes les représentations que la gravité de l'affaire exigeait; nous reçûmes de lui, pour le passé et pour l'avenir, les assurances que nous pouvions demander. Je ne me contentai pas de cela; pour lui faire sentir que la chose était sérieuse, je lui écrivis, le 3 Décembre, comme à titre d'avertissement, la lettre suivante:—

“J'ai eu l'honneur de vous entretenir de la question du passage des militaires Français à travers le Grand Duché; je vous ai prié de vous abstenir de tout acte qui pourrait être considéré comme une atteinte portée sur le territoire Luxembourgeois à la neutralité que le Gouvernement du pays est tenu d'observer. Vous m'avez donné toutes les assurances que je pourrais désirer à cet égard. Cependant l'on prétend, et les journaux Allemands surtout le disent, que vous auriez établi à Luxembourg une espèce de bureau de recrutement pour l'armée Française, parce que vous fourniriez aux hommes qui se proposent de s'y faire incorporer les moyens pour réaliser leurs projets. Nous ne pouvons pas tolérer des faits qui auraient un caractère d'immixtion dans les opérations de la guerre, sans nous exposer à des réclamations. Dès lors, Monsieur, je crois devoir vous demander instamment de ne poser aucun acte qui pourrait être considéré comme destiné à soutenir la France dans la guerre contre la Prusse. Votre loyauté me donne la certitude que vous ne ferez rien de contraire à une recommandation qui est dictée par la considération des plus grands intérêts de mon pays.”

La réponse que je reçus conteste les bruits qui avaient été répandus, dont nous ne pouvions pas non plus autrement constater la réalité.

Voilà comme nous avons agi. Nous avons attaché toute l'importance nécessaire aux faits, et nous avons mis toute l'attention requise à les constater.

Votre Excellence dit que nous avons commis une faute en ne protestant pas. Il est évident qu'une protestation ne pouvait pas intervenir, si une faute n'était pas établie à charge de l'Agent Consulaire; il fallait qu'elle fût même bien établie, parce que c'est une chose grave que d'attaquer la conduite d'un Agent d'une Puissance étrangère, une chose à laquelle on se résout rarement. J'avouerai cependant que si les faits allégués avaient été prouvés, nous étions décidés à faire même plus qu'une simple protestation: l'exéquatur aurait été retiré.

Il se pourrait sans doute que nous n'eussions pas réussi dans nos investigations par suite de circonstances indépendantes de notre volonté; s'il en était ainsi, je regretterais que nous n'eussions obtenu de personne des renseignements qui pouvaient nous éclairer; nous les aurions acceptés avec empressement, comme tous ceux qui peuvent nous faciliter l'accomplissement de notre devoir.

Ainsi, nous avons surveillé l'Agent Consulaire Français, nous l'avons averti très sérieusement sans même avoir acquis aucune preuve contre lui. Dans ces circonstances, l'Etat Luxembourgeois ne peut pas avoir encouru, si cet Agent avait même réellement commis les faits lui reprochés, la responsabilité à laquelle s'attachent les conséquences d'une violation de la neutralité. Je crois sincèrement que le Grand Duché se trouverait dans une situation qui manquerait de toute sécurité, si le contraire pouvait être admis.

Il me reste à présenter quelques dernières observations et j'aurai fini ma tâche; elles concernent l'ensemble des faits. Ce sont les suivantes:—

Les questions qui peuvent être soulevées au sujet du point de savoir si des actes constituent ou non une atteinte à la neutralité ne peuvent pas recevoir une solution qui serait réglée d'après les doctrines d'une théorie rigoureuse ; elles dépendent des intentions qui peuvent être révélées par les circonstances. C'est ce qu'a parfaitement reconnu M. de Thile dans sa dépêche du 4 Septembre citée plus haut. Rien n'est plus juste ; car l'atteinte à la neutralité emporte l'idée d'un acte hostile, et suppose la volonté de nuire.

C'est conformément à l'idée que je viens d'exprimer que le Gouvernement Luxembourgeois a apprécié beaucoup de faits qui se sont passés dans la guerre actuelle. Ainsi il est admis que les soldats d'une Puissance belligérante ne peuvent pas entrer sur le territoire d'un Etat neutre sans que celui-ci ait l'obligation envers l'autre Puissance de les retenir ; cependant il est arrivé plusieurs fois que le Gouvernement Luxembourgeois n'a pas cru devoir observer cette règle à l'égard de soldats Allemands, parce que leur arrivée dans le Grand Duché ne pouvait pas détruire l'effet de déclarations exprimant la volonté de respecter la neutralité du pays, ni la signification d'une conduite générale conforme à ces déclarations. Des uhlans montés et équipés ont pénétré dans différentes de nos localités sans qu'on s'en soit préoccupé ; les détachements Allemands qui sont arrivés à Rumelange ont pu librement rentrer dans leur corps ; des soldats blessés à Audun-le-Tiche, recueillis par nos habitants, ont pu également rejoindre les leurs ; des soldats isolés ont assez souvent traversé le Grand Duché même en armes, pour se rendre soit en France à l'armée en campagne, soit en Allemagne. Je pourrais encore citer d'autres faits du même genre.

Nous n'avons pas songé à élever des plaintes au sujet de tout cela. Nous avons la conviction qu'il n'y avait pas d'intention de méconnaître l'indépendance du Grand Duché.

Ce n'est pas tout : depuis le commencement de la guerre, les wagons servant à l'exploitation des chemins de fer du Grand Duché ont fréquemment été retenus en Allemagne. Ils y servaient au transport des troupes, du matériel de guerre et des vivres nécessaires à l'armée, comme des pièces authentiques le constatent. Le nombre de ces wagons s'est quelquefois élevé à plusieurs milliers. Il est donc arrivé que le transport des marchandises a pu s'effectuer difficilement ou a été complètement arrêté sur nos chemins de fer ; le commerce et l'industrie ont souffert de cette cause.

Je crois que les wagons des chemins de fer peuvent être considérés comme matériel de guerre lorsqu'ils servent pour les transports militaires ; l'Allemagne a donc profité d'un matériel de guerre provenant du Grand Duché et en a profité au détriment de celui-ci ; ou en d'autres termes, si les wagons ne doivent pas avoir la qualification de matériel de guerre, elle a tiré parti pour ses opérations militaires, de véhicules qu'elle s'est procurés dans le Grand Duché et dont celui-ci avait besoin. Le Gouvernement a cherché naturellement à obtenir la restitution des wagons, parce que l'intérêt du pays le demandait ; mais il n'a pas cru devoir se plaindre d'une violation de la neutralité, à raison de la nature du fait, parce qu'il considérait les circonstances et reconnaissait qu'elles n'indiquaient aucune pensée d'empiètement, surtout en présence de la manière bienveillante dont ses démarches ont été accueillies.

Dès lors aussi la conduite du Grand Duché pendant la guerre, si, malgré ma conviction, elle n'était pas pleinement justifiée par les considérations que j'ai fait valoir plus haut, ne pourrait pas être appréciée par l'autorité Allemande avec une sévérité qui ne tiendrait compte de rien. J'exprime au contraire la confiance qu'elle ne le sera définitivement qu'en égard aux bonnes intentions du Gouvernement Luxembourgeois, qui ont été officiellement reconnues, qui résultent des mesures qu'il a plusieurs fois prises, même au risque de se compromettre à l'égard de la France, et qu'il prend encore tous les jours plus spécialement dans l'intérêt de l'Allemagne, ainsi que du soin qu'il met à s'abstenir d'actes qui ne lui sont pas défendus, dès que seulement ils pourraient recevoir une fausse interprétation, comme l'établissent les faits rapportés dans cet exposé. Je puis donc espérer encore que le Grand Duché échappera aux dangers qu'entraînerait une violation de ses obligations comme Etat neutre.

Je crois enfin devoir faire observer à votre Excellence que la détermination qu'elle m'a notifiée ne me paraît pas conforme au Traité du 11 Mai, 1867. Les termes de ce Traité assurent la neutralité du Grand Duché sous la garantie des Puissances Contractantes, parmi lesquelles se trouve la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord. Une telle stipulation n'aurait aucune portée si chacune des Puissances qui y ont adhéré pouvait cesser de reconnaître la neutralité et procéder isolément ensuite comme s'il s'agissait d'un Etat dont la position n'aurait pas été réglée par une Convention internationale. La nécessité qu'un accord intervienne pour toute action qui changerait les

conditions de l'existence du Grand Duché me paraît donc évidente. Je dois faire toute réserve sous ce rapport.

J'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que je communiquerai la présente dépêche aux signataires du Traité de Londres du 11 Mai, 1867.

Veuillez, &c.

Le Ministre d'Etat, Président du Gouvernement,
(Signé) L. J. E. SERVAIS.

: (Translation.)

M. le Chancelier,

Luxemburg, December 14, 1870.

IN your despatch of the 3rd instant which reached Luxemburg on the 9th, your Excellency informs me that the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia no longer considers itself bound, in the military operations of the German armies, to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy, because the latter had not shown itself anxious to preserve a strict neutrality.

I hope to see this grave decision given up, as I am convinced that incorrect information have caused it to be taken. I shall have the honour to furnish explanations to your Excellency, which will, I think, prove that the facts on which are founded the alleged breach of neutrality on the part of the Grand Duchy are either not of the character attributed to them, or do not involve the responsibility of the State. I will preface these explanations by some considerations which it appears to me to be indispensable to offer first.

In the war which has broken out between the two neighbouring countries the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg has occupied a very awkward position. It is a State too weak to think of defending itself against any aggression whatever; the danger of its neutrality not being preserved must therefore have appeared great, while for several months large armies were continually fighting along its frontier; the danger was still more increased, because an act committed by one of the belligerent parties, as soon as it was considered contrary to neutrality by the other, even if it were not so in reality, might become a motive for the latter not respecting the Grand Duchy; for both belligerents had declared that they would respect its independence if the other respected it.

In this condition of affairs, the Government of the Grand Duchy would have been very much to blame if it had not taken upon itself as an imperative duty, not to give reason for the slightest well-founded complaint, and to avoid with the greatest care any act which might be considered contrary to its obligations.

I soon became aware that we had another danger to fear as great as the one I have just pointed out; that which might be caused by false reports addressed to one or other of the belligerent Powers. It was shown at the very commencement of the war, when French soldiers coming from Sierck went from time to time unarmed to Schengen, in order to make small purchases, as was afterwards also done by German soldiers. Your Excellency knows that this fact was transformed into a regular armed invasion of Luxemburg territory, that it created a great sensation and caused movements of troops; it was put forward by persons who declared that they spoke from ocular evidence, and who had no other object than to injure the Grand Duchy. Shortly afterwards incorrect information given to the French Government compelled us to defend ourselves in the same way against reproaches in that direction. Disquieted by the danger which was thus revealed to me, I applied myself to enlightening the Luxemburg Chargé d'Affaires concerning those facts which had been misrepresented by the newspapers and which might make an impression. I begged him more than once to declare that we should be glad to see instructions given which might establish the truth.

Affairs continued to go on pretty well, notwithstanding the well-founded reasons which we had for anxiety. France, in two instances, raised some rather serious claims against the Grand Duchy; this was when the Luxemburg Government had readily consented to the passage of the German wounded, and when they did not cause the Prussian soldiers to be arrested, who, coming from Audun-le-Tiche, crossed Luxemburg territory in the neighbourhood of Rumelange; these matters had not, however, any serious results. With the exception of those caused by the incident at Schengen, no observation was made to us on the part of the Government of the North German Confederation concerning our conduct, until the 4th of October, when your Excellency addressed a despatch to me, in which you specify as a breach of neutrality, for which the Grand Duchy is responsible, the fact that the Company which manages our railways had sent to Thionville a train conveying provisions and powder. I can even congratulate myself on the Luxemburg Government having constantly received from Berlin expressions of

° approbation concerning the line of conduct they were following. I feel great satisfaction in recalling those expressions.

After the difficulties caused by the question of transporting the wounded across the Luxemburg territory, M. de Thile on the 21st of August begged M. Föhr, whom he had sent for on that account, to express his thanks to the Luxemburg Government for having given their consent to that arrangement, whereas a similar request had not been granted by Belgium, who considered it as incompatible with the neutrality she was bound to preserve. Afterwards, on the 4th September, on the occasion of the incident at Rumelange, M. de Thile addressed to M. Föhr a letter couched in the following terms:—

“In accordance with the promise I made to you during our last conversation concerning the involuntary violation of your territory by Prussian soldiers, I lost no time in putting myself into communication with the Ministry of War, and I think I can now give you the assurance that similar acts will not be repeated. That this incident can be thus settled without difficulty, is due, I am pleased to state, to the calm and just judgment of M. Servais, who has not departed from the conviction that it is very far from the views of the Prussian Government to authorize even the very slightest breach of the rights of neutral countries.”

After the end of November, and, therefore, a long time after the despatch concerning the train of provisions directed towards Thionville, another case occurred in which M. de Thile acknowledged, at least implicitly, that no blame was due to the Grand Duchy. A firm at Liege had applied to the Government to buy some old guns it wanted to get rid of, and offered a rather high price. I was quite sure that this sale could not constitute a breach of neutrality; fearing, however, that it might be represented as such, and that it might be alleged that the guns would be sent to France, I thought I ought to inform the Prussian Government, and ask them whether they had any objections to make to the proposed sale. M. Föhr informed me of the fulfilment of his mission by letter of the 28th November, in the following terms:—

“I have just left M. de Thile; he desired me to thank you for the attention you have shown towards the Prussian Government, in informing him of the intention of selling our old guns to a firm at Liège. He told me that, as far as our neutrality is concerned, we could not be prevented from giving up those guns to a third party, who is not a subject of the nation with which Germany is at war. He added, however, that he was convinced that guns are altered at Liège, in order to be delivered to France, either directly or by way of England. ‘Whatever the case may be,’ he said, ‘you may sell them without violating the principle of neutrality; but if the sale is not pressing, I should be glad if you would delay the conclusion of the transaction.’”

This recommendation was followed.

In presence of such testimonies your Excellency will acknowledge that I might well be reassured, and suppose that up to the 28th November last the Prussian Government had no complaints to make against the Grand Duchy, in consequence of the way in which it had observed its neutrality. I was, certainly, glad to think that such was the case.

I therefore, M. le Chancelier, became acquainted with your despatch of the 3rd instant with feelings of very painful disappointment. I am not, however, discouraged in entering on the examination of the grievances which that despatch alleges against the Grand Duchy, for I am conscious of having endeavoured to fulfil loyally the obligations which the Treaty of the 11th May, 1867, imposes upon us, as the interest of the country demanded.

Your Excellency first instances the hostile disposition of a part of the Luxemburg population, which appears to have been such as to cause ill-treatment to German functionaries, without their having led to sufficient measures of repression; you do not, however, hold the Government responsible for offences committed by private individuals.

I will not recriminate, and it is not for me to do so; I shall therefore only say, as concerns the hostile dispositions of part of the Luxemburg population, that they do not at least appear to result from the following facts:—In the first place the Germans, who, driven from France, crossed our country, and were frequently entirely without means, obtained from us all the assistance they required to continue their journey. Further, no country in Europe made comparatively so many sacrifices as the Grand Duchy in order to give assistance, especially to German wounded. The members of the “Comité de Secours” established at Luxemburg, and our doctors, have given proofs of the greatest devotion in the German ambulances, so that when they were the first to arrive, at the conclusion of a battle, people said in the army, “There are the good Luxemburgers again.” This charity which they showed contradicts peremptorily the accusations of some ill-disposed persons, and should at least be sufficient to compensate for faults which may have been committed by solitary individuals.

I know nothing of the acts of ill-treatment which are supposed to have been frequently committed against German functionaries by our countrymen. I regret that those which have been committed should not have been brought to the knowledge of the authorities appointed to repress crime, they would certainly have given rise to proceedings, and would do so still if the authors were pointed out. I can give your Excellency the assurance that the various authorities were particularly instructed to take good care that German subjects were protected, since we had more than one motive for avoiding any blame from that quarter; we had, besides, always made it a point of honour in our little country to protect strangers, since we feel the necessity of giving them a good opinion of us. I will add that the only offences which we have not caused to be repressed for some time are those committed on Luxemburg territory along the frontier by German subjects; they are sufficiently numerous, as the minutes of them which have been drawn up certify. We thought that they must be attributed to passing circumstances, and that there was no great occasion to take notice of them.

I now come to the facts which your Excellency considers as constituting a breach of neutrality. I will begin by making a general observation. The facts pointed out do not have reference to the commencement of the war, when the result of the latter might have appeared doubtful, but to the time when decisive victories had been gained by the German armies. The Luxemburg Government would have been unpardonably blind if at that moment they had attempted, in any way whatever, to favour France; they must have been sure that they could not escape the consequences which their conduct was calculated to involve. They thus had the most powerful motive for being extremely prudent. Now they were so when they had less to fear, as has been acknowledged. Is it possible to suppose that they should have ceased to be so, at a moment when by an act of imprudence they would compromise everything?

Your Excellency holds the Luxemburg Government responsible for the revictualling of the fortress of Thionville, which is supposed to have taken place by means of trains sent at night from the station at Luxemburg.

I have already replied on this point, in my despatch of the 15th October. I thought that I had done so in a satisfactory manner, for no error which I might have committed has been pointed out to me, either verbally or in writing. I must therefore again take up the question.

I take the liberty to remark in the first place that there can only be question of a single train sent, during the night of the 24th to the 25th of September. No other took place since the German military authorities decided on intercepting communications with France, by taking up the rails of the railway near the frontier, which took place towards the end of the month of August. Your Excellency, therefore, in your despatch of the 4th October, to which you refer on this subject in your despatch of the 3rd December, only alludes to the train sent during the night of the 24th to the 25th September.

I beg to state, moreover, that the train alluded to only consisted of provisions of food. It was at first reported to the Government that it contained gunpowder; this it was which induced them to announce the fact immediately to the Prussian Government, on account of its importance. Your Excellency was of the same opinion, as is proved by your despatch of the 4th October.

It has, however, been perfectly established, as is also implicitly acknowledged in the despatch to which I am replying, that during the night from the 24th to the 25th September none but provisions of food were transported. Hence, I think that the announcement made to the Prussian Government cannot be alleged against us as being an avowal of a breach of neutrality, since this announcement took place under the influence of a mistake as to the real character of the fact pointed out. I rather think that we may point to our line of conduct as a proof of loyalty, since we do not hesitate to acknowledge even matters which may appear prejudicial to us, before being certain that they exist.

I have besides to establish some circumstantial facts of importance. The trains by which the transportation was effected were not, as your Excellency appears to think, formed at the station at Luxemburg; they only crossed the Grand Duchy, as they crossed Belgium; they solely transported merchandize made up abroad; they carried absolutely none produced by the Grand Duchy. The conclusions to be drawn from these circumstances appear to me to be evident.

I now put the question whether the transport of provisions of food which was performed during the night of the 24th to the 25th September can be considered contrary to neutrality?

I could uphold the negative, by considerations drawn from the law of nations, and applied to the situation of Thionville at the time the transport took place, but I do not

think it necessary to dwell upon the subject. I will confine myself to remarking that, in case of provisions of food, one cannot enforce the rigorous principles which would be followed in case of munitions of war.

In upholding the cause of the Grand Duchy, I will found my arguments on considerations of fact.

During the war, not only several trains, but hundreds, I may say thousands of trains, laden with provisions have been sent along our railways for the revictualling of the German armies. Among these provisions there was a great deal which was produced by our country and which was provided by native purveyors. These facts are of public notoriety. The Government not only tolerated, but favoured them; in fact, when complaints were made on account of delays experienced by the trains, they intervened to remove them. They desired the Company which manages our railways to fulfil the obligations which it had contracted towards the State of carrying out the traffic with which it was charged.

Thus, during the war, we gave to Germany every facility she could desire for supplying herself with provisions of food. I do not, therefore, think that we can be accused of a violation of neutrality to her prejudice, on account of a transport to Thionville effected during the night from the 24th to the 25th of September.

If all this were not true, even then I think that I might maintain that the Luxemburg State has incurred no responsibility. It does not manage and does not assist in the management of the railways. A private foreign company manages them; they have officials whom they nominate without the interference of the Government, according to Article 23 of their table of charges, in the following terms:—"The paid functionaries will be elected and nominated by the Concessionaries, and may, as well as the engineers, be foreigners."

Your Excellency, in your despatch of the 4th October, expressed the opinion that Luxemburg officials had managed the expedition which took place during the night of the 24th to the 25th of September, and you repeat a similar idea in your despatch of the 5th December. No; they were officials, for the most part foreigners, belonging to a foreign company. The act of these officials cannot therefore bind the State unless the latter has any delinquency to reproach itself with. This is not the case. The trains laden with provisions of food, sent during the night of the 24th to the 25th September, presented nothing to prevent their being allowed to circulate freely on all our railways, and to allow them to be directed along the line of Luxemburg towards France, as others daily went along it. There was no reason to take measures, either at the station at Luxemburg or elsewhere, in order to stop them, unless warning had been given that there was a question of a project being put into execution, in the way of which obstacles ought to be placed. The Luxemburg Government were informed of nothing of the kind; it is impossible to blame them on that account, for the administration of the Custom-house of the Zollverein, directed by a Prussian functionary, whose zeal is well known, and the officials attached to the royal direction of the railways of Sarrebrück, who, at the Luxemburg station, are charged with the service of the line towards the Moselle, were no better informed than the Luxemburg Government: a want of vigilance for which they would have to answer, cannot further be imputed to them, when it is observed that the train of provisions of food in question was allowed, in going and returning, to cross the French territory from the frontier to Thionville, over an extent of several leagues, at a spot occupied by Prussian troops.

I allow myself one word more. The crossing of the French frontier as far as Thionville by the trains sent during the night of the 24th to the 25th September forms, in reality, the fact alleged against the Grand Duchy. How could the latter be declared responsible for that act, which was completed on foreign territory? I may add that one or two sentries placed in France near the frontier, on the railway, especially at the place where the rails had been taken up, would have prevented any transport from being effected. It is because these precautions were not taken, where it was expedient that they should be taken, that the Grand Duchy may be treated as if it had committed a breach of neutrality, even though there was only a question of an act not committed by the Government of the country. I may hope that such will not be the case, for it would be too severe.

I wish to state finally to your Excellency that we have never neglected to watch the management of the railways, so that it might not be abused in a manner contrary to the obligations which the neutrality of the Grand Duchy imposes on it. We thought that we ought to do so more particularly because the Company charged with this management is foreign. Thus, as early as the 4th of August, I wrote a letter to the Government

Commissioner attached to that company conveying the instructions repeated several times afterwards. Its tenor was as follows:—

“ I have not learnt that the administration of our railways have committed acts having for their object the favouring of either of the belligerents, and which might become to the other a motive for not respecting our neutrality. On account of the importance of the consequences which such acts might have, I think I ought to recommend you to take particular care that no agent of the administration of our railways should allow himself to commit an act which might be considered as being connected with the operations of war, and to inform me immediately if anything of the kind should happen. I will not shrink from the most severe measures in repressing any attempt of the kind.

“ The Government have no motive for thinking that either of the two belligerent nations wishes to violate our territory. They have, however, thought it right to charge the various administrations of the country to inform them immediately of any infraction of our independence which might take place, in order that they might take the steps which the circumstances demanded. I beg you to transmit to me in the same way any information of that kind which might reach you.”

Your Excellency will perceive by these last lines the proof of the pains we have taken to prevent impartially every infraction of our neutrality.

I now come to the question of the violation of neutrality resulting, according to your Excellency, from the line of conduct we have pursued as regards the French soldiers who crossed our territory after the capture of Metz.

I should have wished that we might have been warned if our conduct was not approved of; but in spite of a conversation which the Luxemburg Chargé d’Affaires had with M. de Thile, in which this question was alluded to; nothing was said to make us think that we were not satisfying the opinion which had been formed of our obligations, and that we were exposing the independence of the country. Whatever the case may be, I think I can prove that our proceedings were correct.

The first thing we are reproached with is, that we did not prevent the French soldiers from re-entering France in order to take service in the army of the North.

I think, in the first place, that the number of those to whom preventative measures would have been applicable has been exaggerated. Those soldiers who possessed safe-conducts must evidently not be included. These were chiefly officers, pupils of the School of Application, mobile guards, officials of administrations attached to an army, doctors and attendants of the ambulances, and, finally, wounded who had recovered. The greater part of the men of that category, belonging to the army of Metz, passed through Luxemburg, where many were not aware that they were at liberty to go where they pleased. Hence incorrect impressions and rumours.

Amongst those who escaped and reached the Grand Duchy there was a large number concerning whom we could not in any case be responsible. They are those who reached Belgium by employing the means which enabled them in France to escape from the German army; they could carry out their plan, for they were favoured by the broken and wooded nature of the country and by the shortness of the distance. To these fugitives must be added the prisoners of war who were permitted to escape as they declared, and as various indications seemed to confirm, and who were able to enter the Grand Duchy from the most distant places across the German provinces.

I will also remark that the French soldiers all crossed the Luxemburg territory without stopping on it, without in any way assembling on it, and without being in uniform, and without even obtaining the assistance which the State often grants to strangers without means.

I next bring forward a fact to which sufficient attention has not been paid, and which may be explained by the geographical situation of the Grand Duchy and by the positions which the German troops have constantly occupied: namely, that no French soldier has penetrated into France from our country. All, without exception, went into Belgium, a neutral State, whither we were under no obligations to prevent their directing their course, if one is to be guided by the answer of M. de Thile on the question of the sale of the guns; they ought there to have been treated according to the regulations regarding the soldiers belonging to the armies of the belligerent Powers. If any amongst them re-entered France, for the purpose of taking service there, the cause cannot be imputed to the Grand Duchy. But I must admit that, from all I have learnt, in Belgium such measures were not neglected as the respect of neutrality demanded.

Now supposing the whole of the above were without foundation; that numerous French soldiers, subject to imprisonment, had arrived in the Grand Duchy, that they had not passed into Belgium; that they had not been detained, if necessary; and that the Grand Duchy had to answer for this circumstance, then I will take the liberty of

appealing to the Treaty of London of the 11th May, 1867, which placed the Grand Duchy in a peculiar position. It results from Articles III and V of that Treaty, that "only the number of soldiers necessary to provide for the maintenance of good order can be kept up at Luxemburg and that no military establishment can either be maintained or formed there." According to these stipulations the Grand Duchy, which, moreover, consists only of a little country whose resources are limited, cannot be compared to another neutral State; it can neither be in a position nor can it be bound to detain the thousands of individuals who may have escaped, when entire armies, consisting of more than 100,000 men, are made prisoners of war. I think I may avail myself of these inevitable consequences of the Treaty of London with the more confidence in consequence of the care which the German armies have taken, since the war, to respect it.

Your Excellency makes a second complaint against the Luxemburg Government as regards the French soldiers; namely, the indulgence which they showed towards the French Consular Agent, who is supposed to have established in the Grand Duchy a regular recruiting office.

I will first point out on this subject that the Government is held responsible for the act of a third party, and of a third party who represents a foreign Power. The circumstances must have been very serious for such a decision to be justifiable. But I think I can declare that such circumstances do not appear, and that the Government have nothing to reproach themselves with.

The French Consular Agent has been in communication with the soldiers of his nation who have come to Luxemburg since the surrender of Metz; we have been informed of it; we could not, however, have had any doubt about it, even if we had not been informed of the fact.

What were these communications? According to the investigations we made at first they were not of a reprehensible nature. We knew that assistance was given to men exhausted by fatigue and hunger, that means were supplied to them to continue their journey to Belgium, generally as far as Arlon or Namur.

It was soon announced in the foreign newspapers that the French Consul had a recruiting office at Luxemburg, that he received the engagements of men who wished to take service in France. Although too frequently false reports are spread by the press concerning the Grand Duchy, the Government did not hesitate to take note of the information given concerning the conduct of the French Consular Agent, and took the greatest care to ascertain whether it had any foundation. But no discoveries were made to confirm it. We even knew that persons not belonging to the French nation, who addressed themselves to the Consular Agent to engage themselves, were refused. We did not confine ourselves to keeping strict watch to discover the truth and prevent an abuse which could not be tolerated. One of my colleagues and I saw the Consul, and made to him all the representations which the importance of the affair demanded. We received from him, both for the past and the future, every assurance we could require. I was not content with that; to make him feel that the matter was serious, I wrote to him on the 3rd December, by way of warning, the following letter:—

"I have had the honour to communicate with you on the question of the passage of French soldiers through the Grand Duchy; I have begged you to abstain from every act which could be considered as an infraction carried on on the Luxemburg territory against the neutrality which the Government of the country is bound to observe. You have given me all the assurances I could desire on this point. However, it is asserted, and the German papers above all state, that you have established in Luxemburg a sort of recruiting office for the French army, because you were furnishing the men who intend to join it with the means for carrying out their projects. We cannot tolerate acts which would bear a character of interference in the operations of the war without exposing ourselves to complaints. Consequently, Sir, I think it my duty to request you earnestly to commit no act which could be considered as calculated to support France in the war against Prussia. Your loyalty gives me the assurance that you will do nothing contrary to a recommendation which is dictated by the consideration of the greatest interests of my country."

The answer which I received denies the reports which had been spread, of which moreover we could not by other means establish the reality.

Such has been our course of action. We have attached all the importance necessary to the facts, and we have given all the attention requisite to ascertain them.

Your Excellency says that we have committed a fault by not protesting. It is evident that a protest could not lie, if a delinquency was not established against the Consular agent; it was even necessary that it should be well established, as it is a serious matter to attack the conduct of an agent of a foreign Power, a thing to which one rarely

has recourse. I will admit, however, that if the alleged facts had been proved, we had decided to make more even than a mere protest ; the exequatur would have been withdrawn.

It would no doubt be possible that we had not succeeded in our investigations in consequence of circumstances unconnected with our will ; if this was the case, I should regret that we did not obtain from any one information that would have enlightened us ; we should have accepted it with eagerness, as we should anything which might facilitate the accomplishment of our duty.

Thus, we have watched the French Consular agent, we have warned him very seriously even without having obtained any proof against him. Under these circumstances the State of Luxemburg could not have incurred, even had the agent really committed the acts imputed to him, the responsibility to which the consequences of a breach of neutrality attach. I sincerely believe the Grand Duchy would find itself in an utterly insecure situation, if the contrary could be admitted.

It remains for me to make a few final observations and I shall have completed my task ; they relate to the whole of the facts. They are as follows :—

The questions that can be raised with reference to the point whether certain acts do or do not constitute an infraction of neutrality cannot receive a solution regulated by the doctrines of an arbitrary theory, they depend upon the intentions which may be revealed by circumstances. This has been fully recognized by M. de Thile in his despatch above-mentioned of September 4. Nothing can be more just, for an infraction of neutrality conveys the idea of a hostile act, and supposes the wish to injure.

It is in accordance with the idea I have just expressed, that the Luxemburg Government have appreciated many events that have occurred in the existing war. Thus, it is admitted, that the soldiers of one belligerent Power cannot enter the territory of a neutral State without the latter incurring the obligation towards the other Power to detain them ; nevertheless, it has happened on several occasions that the Luxemburg Government has not felt itself bound to observe this rule in the case of German soldiers, because their arrival in the Grand Duchy could not destroy the effect of declarations expressing the desire to respect the neutrality of the country, nor the signification of a general line of conduct conformable to these declarations. Uhlans mounted and equipped have penetrated into various of our places without notice being taken of it ; the German detachments which arrived at Rumelange were allowed to rejoin their division without hindrance ; wounded soldiers at Audun-le-Tiche, received by our inhabitants, have been in like manner allowed to rejoin theirs ; straggling soldiers have pretty frequently crossed the Grand Duchy even in arms to repair either to the army in the field in France or to Germany. I could mention still more actions of the same nature.

We have not thought of raising complaints on the subject of all this. We were convinced that there was no intention of disregarding the independence of the Grand Duchy.

This is not all ; since the commencement of the war, the waggons serving for the working of the lines of railway of the Grand Duchy have been frequently retained in Germany. They were employed there for the transport of troops, of war material, and provisions necessary for the army, as authentic documents prove. The number of these waggons has sometimes risen to several thousands. The result has then been that the transport of merchandize has been with difficulty carried on or been completely stopped on our railways ; commerce and industry have suffered on this account.

I believe that railway waggons may be considered as war material when they serve for military traffic ; Germany has, therefore, profited by a material of war derived from the Grand Duchy and has profited by it to the detriment of the latter ; or in other words if the waggons ought not to be characterized as war material, she has taken advantage for her military operations of vehicles which she has procured in the Grand Duchy and of which the latter had need. The Government have naturally endeavoured to obtain the restitution of the waggons because the interests of the country required it ; but they have not felt it their duty to complain of a violation of neutrality, on account of the nature of the act, because they considered the circumstances and recognized that they did not indicate any thought of encroachment, especially considering the favourable manner in which their proceedings were received.

Hence, also, the conduct of the Grand Duchy during the war (if, in spite of my conviction, it was not fully justified by the considerations I have stated above) cannot be appreciated by the German authorities with a severity which would make no allowances. On the contrary, I am confident that no such judgment will be definitively formed without taking into account the good intentions of the Luxemburg Government which have been officially recognized, which result from the measures which they have taken on several occasions, even at the risk of compromising themselves with France,

and which they are still constantly taking, more especially in the interest of Germany, as well as from the care they take to abstain from acts which are not prohibited to them when they are merely susceptible of receiving a misinterpretation, as is proved by the facts recounted in this statement. I may still hope then that the Grand Duchy will escape the dangers that a violation of its obligations as a neutral State would entail upon it.

Finally, I think it my duty to observe to your Excellency that the determination you have notified to me does not appear to me consistent with the Treaty of May 11, 1867. The terms of that Treaty insure the neutrality of the Grand Duchy under the guarantee of the contracting Powers, amongst whom is the North German Confederation. Such a stipulation would have no force if each one of the Powers who have adhered to it could cease to recognize the neutrality and then take separate action as if a State were concerned whose position had not been regulated by an International Convention. The necessity that an agreement should take place as regards any action that would alter the conditions of the existence of the Grand Duchy consequently appears to me evident. I must make every reservation on this point.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I shall communicate the present despatch to the signatories of the Treaty of London of May 11, 1867.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) L. J. E. SERVAIS.

No. 13.

Vice-Admiral Harris to Earl Granville.—(Received December 26.)

My Lord,

The Hague, December 23, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of an address from the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg to the Grand Duke, which has obtained upwards of 40,000 signatures.

The Luxemburg Chamber of Representatives voted on the 21st instant the following Order of the day :—

“La Chambre a examiné de la manière la plus attentive la réponse faite par le Ministre d'Etat du Grand Duché à la note du Chancelier Fédéral, et c'est avec satisfaction qu'elle y puise la conviction que les faits allégués à l'appui de cette grave détermination n'existent pas ou n'ont pas la portée que les rapports privés, erronés ou exagérés, leur ont attribuée.

“Depuis le commencement de la guerre la Chambre, d'accord avec le Gouvernement, a voulu, et elle veut encore, la plus stricte observation des devoirs de la neutralité et le respect le plus absolu des relations internationales.

“Son concours est acquis à toute mesure pouvant faciliter l'accomplissement de cette tâche et étendre les relations amicales avec les Etats voisins. Mais en même temps elle doit exprimer la conviction que la situation garantie au Grand Duché par le Traité de Londres ne peut subir aucune modification sans le libre consentement constitutionnel du pays et sans l'assentiment de toutes les Puissances engagées à respecter et à garantir cette situation.

“La Chambre conserve l'espoir que l'Allemagne et les autres Etats, éclairés et satisfaits par les explications du Gouvernement Grand-Ducal, continueront à notre pays la bienveillance que tous lui ont témoignée jusqu'à ce jour.

“La déclaration de l'Allemagne que son Gouvernement se considère comme dégagé de l'obligation d'observer la neutralité du Grand Duché dans ses opérations militaires a produit dans le pays une impression profonde et douloureuse.

“La Chambre affirme de nouveau ses sentiments d'attachement au pays, à la Dynastie, et à ses institutions, et témoigne sa profonde reconnaissance pour le dévouement que le Grand Duc et le Prince montrent pour la défense des droits et les intérêts du Grand Duché.”*

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. A. J. HARRIS.

* For Translation, see Inclosure in No. 14, page 27.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Patriotic Address to the Grand Duke of Luxemburg by the Luxemburg Committee.

DANS une réunion extraordinaire tenue hier à l'Hôtel de Ville, le Comité Patriotique a arrêté l'adresse suivante :—

“ A Sa Majesté le Roi des Pays-Bas, Prince d'Orange Nassau, Grand Duc de Luxemburg, &c.

“ Sire,

“ C'est avec la plus profonde anxiété que les populations Luxembourgeoises viennent d'apprendre la teneur de la note Allemande qui nous accuse ouvertement d'avoir méconnu les devoirs de la neutralité, et qui déclare la Prusse déliée de l'obligation de respecter l'heureuse situation faite au Grand Duché par le Traité de Londres.

“ Sire,

“ Le Gouvernement de l'Union a été indignement trompé dans l'appréciation de la conduite des Luxembourgeois.

“ Son Altesse Royale Monseigneur le Prince Henri, le Représentant bien-aimé de votre Majesté, a été témoin des efforts incessants faits par notre Gouvernement pour sauvegarder la neutralité dont nous jouissons ; les nations voisines, la Prusse, la France, et la Belgique, peuvent certifier hautement d'avoir vu sans cesse le petit Luxembourg le premier au poste de la charité et de la bienfaisance, et l'Europe entière peut sceller de sa parole la déclaration que vous fait en ce moment solennel un malheureux peuple, qui n'a d'autre titre pour sa défense que le sentiment du droit, du devoir, et de la justice.

“ Sire,

“ Notre pauvre patrie est en ce moment plus menacée qu'à aucune autre époque de son histoire. C'est au milieu de cette crise suprême que nous venons supplier votre Majesté de sauver le Luxembourg, et de ne jamais permettre qu'on dispose de son existence politique sans le libre vote de ses populations.

“ Les Soussignés ont l'honneur de se dire de votre Majesté les très fidèles, les très dévoués, et les très respectueux serviteurs et sujets,

“ LE COMITÉ.”

(Translation.)

IN an extraordinary meeting held yesterday at the Hotel de Ville, the Patriotic Committee adopted the following Address :—

“ To His Majesty the King of the Netherlands, Prince of Orange, Nassau, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, &c.

“ Sire,

“ It is with the deepest anxiety that the inhabitants of Luxemburg have just learnt the tenor of the German Note, which openly accuses us of having disregarded the duties of neutrality, and which declares Prussia to be released from the obligation to respect the fortunate situation established for the Grand Duchy by the Treaty of London.

“ Sire,

“ The Government of the Confederation has been unworthily deceived in its appreciation of the conduct of the Luxemburgers.

“ His Royal Highness Prince Henry, the honored representative of your Majesty, has been witness to the incessant efforts made by our Government to preserve the neutrality we enjoy ; the neighbouring nations, Prussia, France, and Belgium, can distinctly testify to having constantly seen little Luxemburg foremost at the post of charity and benevolence ; and all Europe can confirm by its word the declaration made to you at this solemn moment by an unfortunate people, which has no other title for its defence than the sentiment of right, duty, and justice.

“ Sire,

“ Our unhappy country is in greater danger at this moment than at any other epoch of its history. It is in the midst of this supreme crisis that we implore your Majesty to save Luxemburg, and never to permit its political existence to be disposed of without the free vote of its people.

“ The undersigned have the honour to style themselves your Majesty's most faithful, devoted, and humble servants and subjects,

“ THE COMMITTEE.”

Vice-Admiral Harris to Earl Granville.—(Received December 26.)

(Extract.)

The Hague, December 24, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to transmit copy of the "Ordre du Jour Motivé" passed unanimously by the Chamber of Deputies of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg on the 21st instant, a précis of which was contained in my despatch dated yesterday.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Order of the Day passed by the Luxemburg Chamber of Deputies on the 21st December, 1870.

LA déclaration du Chancelier de la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord, que son Gouvernement se considère comme dégagé de l'obligation d'observer la neutralité du Grand Duché dans les opérations militaires des armées Allemandes, a produit dans tout le pays une impression profonde et douloureuse.

La Chambre a examiné de la manière la plus attentive la réponse faite par le Ministre d'Etat du Grand Duché à la note du Chancelier Fédéral, et c'est avec satisfaction qu'elle y puise la conviction que les faits allégués à l'appui de cette grave détermination n'existent pas, ou n'ont pas la portée que des rapports privés, erronés ou exagérés, leur ont fait attribuer.

Depuis le commencement de la guerre, la Chambre, d'accord avec le Gouvernement, a voulu et elle veut encore la plus stricte observation des devoirs de la neutralité, et le respect le plus absolu des égards internationaux.

Son concours est acquis à toute mesure pouvant faciliter l'accomplissement de cette tâche et étendre les relations amicales avec les Etats voisins.

Mais en même temps elle doit exprimer la conviction que la situation garantie au Grand Duché par le Traité de Londres ne peut subir aucune modification sans le libre consentement constitutionnel du pays, et sans l'assentiment de toutes les Puissances engagées à respecter et à garantir cette situation.

La Chambre conserve l'espoir que l'Allemagne et les autres Etats—éclairés et satisfaits par les explications du Gouvernement Grand-Ducal—continueront à notre pays la bienveillance que tous lui ont témoignée jusqu'à ce jour.

La Chambre affirme de nouveau les sentiments d'attachement que le pays porte à sa Dynastie et à ses institutions, et elle témoigne sa profonde reconnaissance du dévouement que le Roi Grand-Duc et le Prince Lieutenant mettent à la défense des droits et des intérêts du Grand Duché.

(Translation.)

THE declaration of the Chancellor of the North German Confederation, that his Government considers itself released from the obligation of respecting the neutrality of the Grand Duchy in the military operations of the German armies, has produced throughout the whole country a deep and painful impression.

The Chamber has examined, in the most attentive manner, the reply made by the Minister of State of the Grand Duchy to the note of the Federal Chancellor, and it is with satisfaction that it derives from it the conviction that the facts alleged in support of this grave determination do not exist, or have not the character that private reports, erroneous or exaggerated, have caused to be attributed to them.

Since the commencement of the war, the Chamber, in concert with the Government, has desired, and still desires, the strictest observation of the duties of neutrality, and the most absolute respect for international obligations.

Its concurrence is secured to every measure which may facilitate the accomplishment of this task, and contribute to friendly relations with neighbouring States. But, at the same time, it must express the conviction that the position guaranteed to the Grand Duchy by the Treaty of London can undergo no modification without the free constitutional consent of the country, and without the assent of all the Powers bound to respect and to guarantee that position.

The Chamber retains the hope that Germany and the other States, enlightened and satisfied by the explanations of the Grand Ducal Government, will continue to our country the good-will which all have manifested towards it up to the present moment.

The Chamber again affirms the sentiments of attachment which the country entertains for its dynasty and its institutions, and expresses its deep gratitude for the devotion shown by the King Grand Duke and the Prince Lieutenant for the defence of the rights and interests of the Grand Duchy.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received December 26.)

My Lord,

Berlin, December 23, 1870.

THE messenger Hare delivered to me on the morning of the 19th instant your Lordship's despatch of the 17th instant, in reply to Count Bismarck's Circular despatch of the 3rd instant, stating that the Prussian Government can no longer consider itself bound to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

I waited on the same day on Baron Thile, and having read to him your Lordship's above-named despatch, I placed a copy of it in his Excellency's hands, in conformity with your Lordship's instructions.

Baron Thile stated that of course it did not fall within his competency to express any opinion on the arguments set forth in your Lordship's despatch, but he might nevertheless observe that he could not consider that the proceedings of the Luxemburg Government, of which complaint was made in Count Bismarck's Circular despatch, could be regarded entirely as matters bygone, and as not likely to imperil for the future the security of the German armies.

His Excellency observed that at this moment the French army of the North, although apparently dispersed by General Manteuffel, was being recruited and strengthened by fugitives from different parts, who had escaped from capture or detention, and that facilities for traversing the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg enabled them to regain the French army.

I replied, that his Excellency must, however, admit that there could be no further occasion for furtively introducing provisions into Thionville by railway trains at night, nor could there be any further danger of fugitives from Metz traversing the Grand Duchy to re-enter the French army of the North.

Baron Thile begged me to consider that he had merely expressed a personal opinion without intending his observation to bear an official character.

His Excellency promised that your Lordship's despatch should be forwarded without delay to Count Bismarck.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received December 27.)

My Lord,

Brussels, December 23, 1870.

FROM the inclosed extracts from the "Indépendance Belge" of yesterday's date it appears that the petition to the King of Holland requesting His Majesty to save the country has been signed by 43,773 citizens of Luxemburg.

The Order of the Day voted by the Luxemburg Chamber expresses its satisfaction at the conviction derived from the examination of the reply of the Grand Ducal Government to the note of the Federal Chancellor, that the charges brought against it either do not exist or have not the importance attributed to them by exaggerated and erroneous private reports. It declares further that the Chamber, in connection with the Government, have done their best to uphold the neutrality of the country, and will continue to do so; and the belief is also expressed that the position guaranteed to the Grand Duchy by the Treaty of London will not be modified without the constitutional consent of the country and the assent of all the Powers engaged to guarantee and respect it, and that Germany and the other States will be satisfied with the explanation given by the Grand Ducal Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

Inclosure in No. 16.

Extract from the "Indépendance Belge" of December 22, 1870.

Luxembourg, Mercredi, le 21 Décembre, 1870.

ON parle ici d'un télégramme du Roi de Prusse au Prince Henri, disant qu'à Versailles on attend la justification du Gouvernement Luxembourgeois avec l'espoir qu'à l'avenir aucune complication ne surviendra.

L'Adresse populaire au Roi Grand-Duc provoquée par la note du Comte de Bismarck et suppliant le Roi de sauver le pays et de ne jamais permettre qu'on en dispose sans le libre vote de la population, a été couverte en quelques jours de 43,773 signatures toutes émanant de citoyens Luxembourgeois âgés de plus de 24 ans et jouissant de leurs droits civils.

Luxembourg, Mercredi, le 21 Décembre, 1870.

La Chambre a voté l'ordre du jour suivant :—

"La Chambre a examiné de la manière la plus attentive la réponse faite par le Ministre d'Etat du Grand Duché à la note du Chancelier Fédéral, et c'est avec satisfaction qu'elle y puise la conviction que les faits allégués à l'appui de cette grave détermination n'existent pas ou n'ont pas la portée que des rapports privés, erronés ou exagérés, leur ont attribuée.

"Depuis le commencement de la guerre, la Chambre, d'accord avec le Gouvernement, a voulu et elle veut encore la plus stricte observation des devoirs de la neutralité et le respect le plus absolu des relations internationales.

"Son concours est acquis à toute mesure pouvant faciliter l'accomplissement de cette tâche et étendre les relations amicales avec les Etats voisins.

"Mais en même temps elle doit exprimer la conviction que la situation, garantie au Grand Duché par le Traité de Londres ne peut subir aucune modification sans le libre consentement constitutionnel du pays et sans l'assentiment de toutes les Puissances engagées à respecter et à garantir cette situation.

"La Chambre conserve l'espoir que l'Allemagne et les autres Etats, éclairés et satisfaits par les explications du Gouvernement Grand-Ducal, continueront à notre pays la bienveillance que tous lui ont témoignée jusqu'à ce jour."

Luxembourg, Mercredi, le 21 Décembre, 1870.

L'ordre du jour, voté aujourd'hui, a été proposé à la suite de la communication du Ministre sur la réponse faite à la note Prussienne.

L'ordre du jour (voir dépêche précédente) dit encore :

"La déclaration de l'Allemagne que le Gouvernement se considère comme dégagé de l'obligation d'observer la neutralité du Grand Duché dans ses opérations militaires a produit dans le pays une impression profonde et douloureuse.

"La Chambre a affirmé de nouveau ses sentiments d'attachement au pays, à la dynastie et à ses institutions, et a témoigné sa profonde reconnaissance pour le dévouement que le Duc et le Prince montrent pour la défense des droits et des intérêts du Grand Duché."

(Translation.)

Luxembourg, Wednesday, December 21, 1870.

PEOPLE talk here of a telegram from the King of Prussia to Prince Henry, saying that they are waiting at Versailles for the Luxemburg Government's justification with the hope that for the future no difficulty will arise.

The popular Address to the King Grand Duke, elicited by Count Bismarck's note, and entreating the King to save the country and never to suffer it to be disposed of without the free vote of its inhabitants, has received in a few days 43,773 signatures, all emanating from Luxemburg citizens of over 24 years of age, and in the enjoyment of their civil rights.

Luxembourg, Wednesday, December 21, 1870.

The Chamber has voted the following Order of the Day :—

[See Translation of Inclosure in No. 14.]

Luxemburg, Wednesday, December 21, 1870.

The order of the day, voted to-day, was proposed upon the Ministerial communication of the reply made to the Prussian note.

The order of the day (see preceding despatch) goes on to say:—

The declaration of Germany that the Government considers itself released from the obligation of respecting the neutrality of the Grand Duchy in its military operations has produced a deep and painful impression in the country.

The Chamber again affirms its sentiments of attachment to the country, to the dynasty, and to its institutions, and expresses its deep gratitude for the devotion the Duke and Prince display for the defence of the rights and interests of the Grand Duchy.

No. 17.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received December 29.)

My Lord,

Brussels, December 28, 1870.

THE “*Indépendance Belge*” of this date contains a telegraphic report, copy of which I have the honour to inclose, of the reply of Prince Henry of the Netherlands to the Deputation of the Patriotic Committee on the presentation of the national petition to the King signed by 45,000 citizens of Luxemburg.

In this reply Prince Henry expresses his conviction that this manifestation of popular feeling, as well as the unanimous vote of the Chamber, will assist the Sovereign in his defence of the rights of the Duchy, and will prove that its inhabitants and the Grand Duke have faith in the justice of their cause and in the loyalty of the signatories of the Treaty of 1867.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY,

Inclosure in No. 17.

Extract from the “Indépendance Belge” of December 28, 1870.

Luxembourg, Mardi, le 27 Décembre, 1870.

LA députation du Comité Patriotique a remis hier au Prince Henri, pour le Roi, la pétition nationale Luxembourgeoise revêtue de 44,869 signatures.

Après une allocution du Président du Comité, le Prince Henri a répondu:—

“Je m’estime heureux et fier de la preuve de confiance des signataires de la pétition nationale au Souverain, provoquée par la grave communication faite au Gouvernement.

“En voyant l’unanimité et la spontanéité de 45,000 Luxembourgeois et l’ordre du jour éminemment patriotique voté unanimement par la Chambre, le 21 Décembre, j’ai la conviction que ces manifestations importantes faciliteront au Souverain la défense des droits du fidèle Duché, et prouveront à l’étranger que les loyaux Luxembourgeois avec le Grand Duc ont foi dans la justice de leur cause et dans la loyauté des signataires du Traité de 1867.

“Je suis heureux de faire parvenir la pétition au Roi et j’engage les habitants à la prudence pour faciliter l’aplanissement des difficultés du moment.”

(Translation.)

Luxemburg, Tuesday, December 27, 1870.

THE deputation of the Patriotic Committee transmitted yesterday to Prince Henry, for the King, the Luxemburg national petition, with 44,869 signatures.

After a speech from the President of the Committee, Prince Henry answered:—

“I consider myself fortunate and proud of the proof of confidence given by those who have signed the national petition to the Sovereign, elicited by the serious communication made to the Government.

“Looking to the unanimous and spontaneous act of 45,000 Luxemburgers, and to the highly patriotic order of the day unanimously voted by the Chamber, I am convinced that these important manifestations will facilitate for the Sovereign the defence of the rights of the faithful Duchy, and will prove abroad that the loyal Luxemburgers, together with the Grand Duke, have faith in the justice of their cause and in the loyalty of the signatories of the Treaty of 1867.

“I gladly undertake the transmission of this petition to the King, and I recommend prudence to facilitate the smoothing away of the difficulties of the moment.”

Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by Count Bernstorff, January 2, 1871.)

(Translation.)

Versailles, December 24, 1870.

YOUR Excellency receives in the inclosure a copy of the despatch which Lord Granville on the 17th of this month addressed to the Royal Ambassador at Berlin, respecting our declaration in regard to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, and which the Ambassador read to the Royal Secretary of State, Herr Von Thile, to whom he gave a copy of it.

The Royal British Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs states in the first part of that despatch that he will abstain from judgment on the facts adduced by us, as well as on the question whether they constitute a violation of the neutrality on the part of the French Government and the Grand Ducal Luxemburg Government itself, until he has before him the declaration or justification of those two Governments; but he adds that he would deeply regret if an actual violation should be made to appear.

I can assure your Excellency that we sincerely participate in that regret, the more so that for us the case which calls it forth has already occurred.

The Royal British Secretary of State then mentions that according to your Excellency's statements, he is glad to think himself justified in not considering the contents of the Circular of 3rd December as a denunciation of the Treaty of 11th May, 1867. I did not think that the Minister could have any doubt thereon, and no declarations of your Excellency were, as it appears to me, needed on that point, as the wording of my despatch alone affords no occasion for suppositions of the kind.

Lord Granville quotes the words himself, and I repeat them to prevent any misunderstanding.

We stated, while referring to our declaration made at the beginning of the war, "that the Allied Governments in the military operations of the German army and in the measures for securing the German troops against the injuries which were done to them out of Luxemburg, could not consider themselves any longer bound to any regard for the neutrality of the Grand Duchy."

For us the question is as to the military defence against military injuries which may be done to one of the belligerent Powers from the violation of the neutrality by the other; that every Power engaged in warfare is entitled to such a defence has hitherto been uncontested by international law, and that the defence, if it is to be effectual, must take place at the proper time, lies in the nature of war. We, however, have not proceeded at once to such military defence, but have confined ourselves for the time to communicating the facts and the legal state of affairs thereby created, to the Luxemburg Government and the Powers which have guaranteed the neutrality of the Grand Duchy.

But if Lord Granville expresses the opinion that even in such a case the course to be taken was that the Royal Government should bring its complaint of the violation of the neutrality before the other signatories of the Treaty, with the request that the operation of such a state of things should be taken into consideration, then I cannot admit the justice of the demand so made upon us.

In order to explain my view theoretically, I beg the Royal British Secretary of State just to consider an hypothesis which was very near becoming a reality at an earlier period of the present war.

If the army of Marshal MacMahon, when it found its movements on French territory for the relief of Metz hindered by the strategical combinations of our armies and was driven to Sedan, had resolved to pass the Belgian frontier and to proceed thence through Belgium and Luxemburg, behind the curtain of the neutral frontier, to Metz to relieve that fortress, and to attack us in the rear with the army of Marshal Bazaine—an intention which the Royal Belgian Government, even with the best inclination, was hardly then in a condition in due time to prevent that army of more than 100,000 men from carrying into effect,—does the Royal English Government consider that in such a case we should have applied to the Treaty Powers, and have settled with them by diplomatic negotiation what was to be done, and in the meantime have exposed our troops at Metz to the attack of the enemy's forces, doubled by the breach of neutrality? Would any English general be in doubt as to what he was to do in such a case?

The Luxemburg occurrences are exactly analogous to this example, and the lesser or greater extent of the bodies of troops which are concerned in no way alters the legal nature of the question. Even the laying down of their arms before entering the Luxemburg territory makes no alteration; so soon as the 2,000 French soldiers can pass

through neutral territory, without being detained in the interior, back to France, the French Government will be able to equip them again there without delay, from its stores of arms renewed by purchases abroad.

Lord Granville expresses indeed an opinion that the present state of military matters is such that no military necessities which could exercise an influence on the course of the war will now occur.

Against this I have to observe that neither has the resistance of the French forces in the North and at the frontier of the country ceased, nor have the French fortresses there been given up by the enemy, and that in case of a siege or investment of Longwy, from the immediate neighbourhood of the Luxemburg frontier to that fortress, quite similar circumstances might at any moment occur, in which, by a disregard of neutral territory, the enemy might evade our outposts at the wings, and attack our troops under circumstances in which all the disadvantages would be on our side, if we continued to bind ourselves to a neutrality for which the neutral Government cannot or will not procure the respect of our enemies. We wish and should be glad if the Grand Ducal Luxemburg authorities, taking warning and made attentive by recent occurrences and our declaration, should have the will and the power to avert such disadvantages by opportune interference; if they do not, we have reserved to ourselves the right and the liberty of guarding our own security.

I think these observations will suffice to convince the Royal British Secretary of State of the perfect loyalty as well as necessity of our declaration, and to remove from his mind any doubt as to our views, which are only directed to our own security, in no way beyond that, and not against the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.

The demands which we consider ourselves justified in making on the Grand Duchy will be the subject of future correspondence between us and the Grand Ducal Government.

I respectfully beg your Excellency to read this despatch to Earl Granville and to leave a copy of it in his hands.

(Signed) BISMARCK.

No. 19.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 2, 1871.

COUNT BERNSTORFF has this day placed in my hands the despatch inclosed herewith in translation,* containing Count Bismarck's reply to the observations made in my despatch to you of the 17th ultimo on his Excellency's Circular, relative to alleged breaches of neutrality by the Government of Luxemburg,

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 20.

Vice-Admiral Harris to Earl Granville.—(Received January 4.)

My Lord,

The Hague, January 2, 1871.

WITH reference to my despatch dated the 23rd ultimo, inclosing the address of the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg to the Grand Duke, I have now the honour to transmit copy of the answer of Prince Henry on the address being placed in his hands, which I extract from the "Union," Luxemburg newspaper.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. A. J. HARRIS.

Inclosure in No. 20.

Extract from the "Union" of December 30, 1870.

Messieurs,

JE vous remercie des plus sincèrement pour les paroles patriotiques que vous venez de prononcer en me remettant la pétition nationale adressée à Sa Majesté le Roi, Grand

• Duc de Luxembourg, provoquée par une grave communication faite récemment au Gouvernement Grand Ducal, et en exprimant le vœu qu'elle parvienne au Souverain par mon intermédiaire.

Je m'estime heureux et fier, Messieurs, de cette preuve de confiance que le Comité Patriotique Luxembourgeois et les signataires de cette pétition mettent en moi pendant la crise que traverse le Grand Duché.

Quand je vois l'unanimité et la spontanéité avec laquelle près de 45,000 de vos concitoyens se sont associés à votre initiative et que j'ai sous les yeux l'ordre du jour motivé, si éminemment patriotique, voté à l'unanimité le 21 de ce mois par la Chambre des Députés du Grand Duché, j'ai la ferme conviction que ces imposantes manifestations, tout en facilitant au Souverain la tâche de la défense des droits de son fidèle Grand Duché, donneront une fois de plus la preuve à l'étranger que les fidèles et loyales populations Luxembourgeoises ont, avec leur Grand Duc, foi dans la justice de leur cause et dans la loyauté des signataires du Traité de Londres du 11 Mai, 1867.

M'estimant heureux de faire parvenir votre patriotique pétition à Sa Majesté le Roi Grand-Duc, je ne saurais assez vous engager, Messieurs, à la prudence, afin de faciliter l'applanissement des difficultés du moment.

Le Lieutenant, Représentant du Roi, Grand-Duc de Luxembourg,
(Signé) HENRI, *Prince des Pays-Bas.*

(Translation.)

Gentlemen,

I THANK you most sincerely for the patriotic words you have just uttered in handing me the national petition addressed to His Majesty the King, Grand Duke of Luxemburg, elicited by a serious communication recently made to the Grand Ducal Government, and in expressing the desire that it might be forwarded to the King by my hands.

I think myself fortunate and proud, gentlemen, of this proof of the confidence which the Luxemburg Patriotic Committee, and those who have signed the petition, place in me during the crisis through which the Grand Duchy is passing.

Looking to the unanimity and spontaneousness with which nearly 45,000 of your fellow-citizens have joined in the movement originated by you; and having before me the order of the day, so eminently patriotic, unanimously voted on the 21st of this month by the Chamber of Deputies of the Grand Duchy, I am fully persuaded that these imposing manifestations, whilst facilitating for the Sovereign the task of defending the rights of his faithful Grand Duchy, will give yet another proof to foreigners that the faithful and loyal Luxemburg population have confidence, like their Grand Duke, in the justice of their cause and in the loyalty of the signatories of the Treaty of London of May 11, 1867.

Whilst deeming myself happy to forward your patriotic petition to his Majesty the King Grand Duke, I cannot too earnestly impress on you, gentlemen, prudence, in order to facilitate the smoothing away of the difficulties of the moment.

The Lieutenant Representative of the King, Grand Duke of Luxemburg.
(Signed) HENRY, *Prince of the Netherlands.*

No. 21.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received January 5.)

My Lord,

Brussels, January 3, 1871.

THE "Echo du Parlement" of this date contains the text, copy of which I have the honour to inclose, of a letter from Prince Henry of the Netherlands to the Patriotic Committee of Luxemburg, informing them that he had placed their address in the hands of the King Grand-Duke, who had desired him to express to the members of the Committee and the signatories of the address how deeply touched and grateful His Majesty was at this proof of the confidence his subjects placed in him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

Inclosure in No. 21.

Extract from the "Echo du Parlement" of January 3, 1871.

Luxembourg, Dimanche, le 1 Janvier, 1871.

LE Comité Patriotique s'empresse de faire savoir aux signataires de la pétition au Roi que Sa Majesté a reçu ce document.

Le Prince Henri a daigné de porter ce fait le 31 Décembre à la connaissance du Comité Patriotique par une lettre autographe ainsi conçue :—

"Il m'est agréable de vous faire part que le Roi a reçu l'Adresse des populations Luxembourgeoises qui m'a été remise dans ce but le 26 Décembre.

"Il m'a chargé de porter à votre connaissance, ainsi qu'à celle des signataires de ce document, combien le Roi est sincèrement touché et reconnaissant de cette preuve de la confiance que ses fidèles sujets mettent en lui.

"Dans les graves circonstances de ce moment je m'estime heureux d'être ainsi l'interprète du sentiment du Roi pour le Grand Duché.

(Signé) "HENRI."

(Translation.)

Luxembourg, Sunday, January 1, 1871.

THE Patriotic Committee hastens to inform those who signed the petition to the King that his Majesty has received that document.

Prince Henry has condescended to bring this fact to the knowledge of the Committee on the 31st December, by an autograph letter in the following terms :—

"I am happy to inform you that the King has received the Address of the Luxemburg people which was delivered to me for that object on the 26th December.

"He has desired me to convey to you, as also to those who signed this document, how sincerely touched and grateful the King is for this proof of the confidence which his faithful subjects repose in him.

"In the serious circumstances of the moment I deem myself fortunate to be thus the interpreter of the King's sentiments towards the Grand Duchy.

(Signed) HENRI.

No. 22.

*Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.**

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 7, 1871.

COUNT BERNSTORFF communicated to me a few days ago a despatch from Count Bismarck dated the 24th ultimo, replying to the observations contained in my despatch to your Excellency of the 17th ultimo, on the Prussian Circular of the 3rd, in which the complaints of Prussia against the conduct of the Grand Ducal Government of Luxemburg were set forth, accompanied with a declaration that Prussia no longer felt bound to respect the neutrality of the Grand Duchy.

I inclose a copy of Count Bismarck's despatch, and also a copy of a statement put forth by the Grand Ducal Government, contesting the validity of the Prussian complaints.

Her Majesty's Government are glad to see that Count Bismarck confirms the disclaimer, already made to me by Count Bernstorff, of any intention on the part of Prussia to denounce the Treaty of the 11th May, 1867, and presents the question raised by the Circular of the 3rd December merely as one of military defence against military injuries.

Count Bismarck thus adopts in substance the construction which, in my despatch of December 17, I said that Her Majesty's Government felt themselves justified in placing on the Circular, namely, that it was mainly intended as an evidence of displeasure at proceedings of which Prussia thought she was entitled to complain, and as a warning to the Grand Ducal Government not to pursue the like course in future.

Count Bismarck, in excepting against my observation that the proper course would have been that Prussia, before the issue of the Circular of the 3rd December, should have laid her complaints before the other Powers who, with her, were Parties to the Treaty of 1867, put forth an extreme case wherein the safety of the German armies might have been seriously compromised.

* A similar despatch was addressed to Mr. Odo Russell,

But I would call Count Bismarck's attention to the admission in my despatch of the 17th ultimo, that a pressing military emergency might possibly justify in some degree measures in the way of prevention or repression. Such a case might, indeed, arise; but the validity of any plea of justification furnished by such a case can only be tested when the emergency has actually occurred, and its importance is appreciable.

You will observe that the Grand Ducal Government, in the paper which I inclose, disputes the validity of the charges brought against it, of having acted in an unfriendly manner towards Prussia antecedently to the date of the Circular. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, hope that there may have been some misunderstanding as to what really did occur; and consequently, until the circumstances of the case are fully ascertained, it would probably be better to abstain from further discussion.

Her Majesty's Government gladly accept Count Bismarck's assurance that the views of the Prussian Government are only directed to their own security, and not against the Duchy of Luxemburg; and they sincerely hope that his Excellency's wish will be fully realized, that the Grand Ducal Government may have the will, which it doubtless has, as well as the power, to prevent the occurrence of any cause of complaint on the part of Prussia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 23.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 7, 1871.

M. TISSOT, in an interview which I had the honour of having with him on the 3rd instant, was good enough to communicate to me a despatch which he had received from his Government with reference to the attitude of the Prussian Government at this moment towards the Duchy of Luxemburg.

In this despatch the Count de Chaudordy observed, that amongst the complaints put forward by the Chancellor of the North German Confederation in the note which he has addressed to the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, Count Bismarck had remonstrated against the proceeding of the French Agent, who according to his Excellency's statement had established at Luxemburg a kind of recruiting office where enlistments were openly carried on.

It would appear, however, from official documents addressed by their Agent to the Delegate for Foreign Affairs dated the 9th of December last, and from a correspondence which had passed between him and the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the King Grand-Duke, that M. Cussy, from the time that he has entered upon the post confided to him, has, under delicate circumstances, striven to afford no pretext for any complaint, and has scrupulously confined himself to the performance of his Consular functions.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Grand Duchy, whilst admitting the exaggeration, and even the utter want of foundation, of the rumours circulated at Luxemburg, had recognized, in the note which he addressed to M. de Cussy on the 3rd of December, the loyalty of the explanations furnished by their Agent, and excuses himself, as it were, from not insisting upon a point on the subject of which he had no longer, as far as he was himself concerned, the smallest misgiving, whilst, in concluding his letter, he begs M. Cussy to do nothing in future contrary to what may be dictated by a consideration for the gravest interests of his country.

The despatch goes on to say that the only pecuniary aid which has been afforded by the French Agent to the necessitous French had for its object to provide means for the removal of these individuals to their own country. The smallness of the sum allowed to each indigent person (from $2\frac{1}{2}$ to 4 francs) sufficiently proves that these alms, which are further sanctioned by the Ministerial Circulars for the years 1838, 1844, 1849, and 1856, have no other object than to enable those who receive them to go and seek work in some French province not invaded by the enemy, or else to regain their proper country, which they may have been compelled to fly before the ravages of invasion.

In regard to the wounded French officers and soldiers arriving in the Grand Duchy, a certain number are furnished with passes delivered to them by the Prussian military authority to go with their baggage wherever they may please ("pour se rendre avec leurs bagages là où bon leur semble"). Others, sick and wounded, have been received and cared for by the inhabitants who were desirous of soothing their sufferings. Notwithstanding this, M. de Cussy, eager to justify the implicit confidence which the Minister for Foreign Affairs of the King Grand Duke has not ceased to exhibit towards him, has on

many occasions requested these soldiers to take off their uniforms, and even not to tarry in the town beyond a few hours.

The proceedings thus sought to be attributed by Count de Bismarck to the French Agent in the note addressed by his Excellency to the Luxemburg Government were very far, Count de Chaudordy's despatch affirmed, from the cautious conduct observed by M. de Cussy, and it was upon this point that M. de Chaudordy had requested M. Tissot to call my attention.

I expressed to M. Tissot my thanks for the communication of this despatch, and reminded him that I had already informed him of the views of Her Majesty's Government by telling him the substance of our despatch in answer to Count Bismarck's Circular.

I told him that I had subsequently received a rejoinder from Count Bismarck, which I had not yet answered.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 24.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville. (Received January 9.)

My Lord,

Brussels, January 8, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inclose the text, as published in the "*Indépendance Belge*" of this date, of the reply of the King of Holland to the addresses presented to His Majesty by the inhabitants of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg, in which he calls upon them to be reassured, notwithstanding the appearance of danger which had alarmed them. The independence of the country, the King Grand-Duke says, is placed under the guarantee of recent Treaties, signed by the principal Powers of Europe. These Treaties have been hitherto respected, and His Majesty expresses his conviction that they will be so for the future.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

Inclosure in No. 24.

Extract from the "Indépendance Belge" of January 8, 1871.

Luxembourg, Samedi, le 7 Janvier, 1871.

VOICI le texte de la Proclamation de Sa Majesté le Roi Grand-Duc:—

"Luxembourgeois !

"Les loyales adresses que j'ai reçues par l'entremise de mon bien-aimé frère, mon Lieutenant-Représentant dans le Grand Duché, par lesquelles vous m'exprimez toute l'entière confiance que vous mettez en moi, dans les circonstances actuelles, m'ont vivement touché.

"Comptez, de votre côté, sur mon dévouement absolu et sur les sentiments d'invariable attachement qui m'unissent à vous.

"Rassurez-vous malgré l'apparence des dangers qui vous inquiètent ! L'indépendance de votre patrie est placée sous la garantie des Traités récents qui ont été signés par les principales Puissances de l'Europe.

"Ces Traités ont été respectés jusqu'à ce jour ; j'ai la ferme conviction qu'ils le seront également à l'avenir.

"La Haye, le 5 Janvier, 1871.

(Signé) "GUILLAUME."

(Translation.)

Luxembourg, Saturday, January 7, 1871.

The following is the text of the Proclamation of His Majesty the King Grand Duke.

"Luxemburgers !

"The loyal addresses which I have received through my well-beloved brother, my Lieutenant Representative in the Grand Duchy, by which you all express to me the entire confidence which you place in me under the present circumstances, have deeply touched me.

"You may, on your part, count on my entire devotion and on the sentiments of unalterable attachment which bind me to you.

"Be reassured, notwithstanding the apparent dangers which disturb you. The independence of your country is placed under the guarantee of recent Treaties, which have been signed by the principal Powers of Europe.

"Those Treaties have been respected up to this moment; I am firmly convinced that they will equally be so for the future.

"*The Hague, January 5, 1871.*

(Signed) "WILLIAM."

No. 25.

Mr. Odo Russell to Earl Granville.—(Received January 13, 1871.)

(Extract.)

Versailles, December 27, 1870.

IN reply to your Lordship's despatch of the 15th instant I have the honour to state that both His Majesty the King and the Chancellor of the North German Confederation have assured me that the Circular of the 3rd instant respecting Luxemburg is a military measure for the security of the German army, and not a denunciation of the Treaty of 1867; nor is there any wish or intention on the part of Russia to annex the Grand Duchy.

These assurances were given to me in language calculated to convey conviction to my mind.

No. 26.

Count Bismarck to the Government of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by Count Bernstorff, January .)

(Translation.)

Versailles, January 6, 1871.

THE Undersigned, Chancellor of the German Confederation, has had the honour of receiving, by Dr. Föhr, the answer of his Excellency the Minister of State, M. Servais, dated the 14th ultimo, to our note of the 3rd ultimo. A great part of that document is devoted to the representation, that the Grand Ducal Government is not chargeable with fault or responsibility in the transactions against neutrality, spoken of in the note of the 3rd. In relation to this it is urged, that the officials domiciled in Luxemburg, who manage the railways there, are in the service of a foreign company, and therefore are not subject to the Grand Ducal Government; and that in the opinion of the Grand Ducal Government, the Grand Duchy, according to the Treaty of 11th May, 1867, may only maintain an insignificant military force, which is not sufficient for removing thousands of French soldiers into the interior.

The Undersigned refrains from entering further into that discussion here; it will be considered in the prosecution of the claims for indemnification reserved in the note of the 3rd ultimo; whilst at present the question is to avert the detriment to our military operations, against which we ought, according to Treaty, to be protected by the neutrality of Luxemburg, and should be protected, if the Luxemburg Government, according to the example of that of Belgium, took care that its neutrality should be as conscientiously respected by our enemies as it has hitherto been by us.

From the inability, asserted by itself, of the Luxemburg Government to redress the grievances complained of, we have, of course, a right to take the means of redress into our own hands for a time, in order to secure ourselves against injury. The Undersigned, therefore, limits himself to the remark, that not even an attempt to prevent those belonging to the French army from taking advantage of the neutral territory to evade our posts, and join the French army, has hitherto been known, or is mentioned in the letter of the Minister of State, M. Servais.

That letter leaves two facts uncontested, which are of a kind not to be expected from a neutral State. In order to deliver provisions secretly through the positions of the German troops, to a besieged French fortress—an undertaking which is a direct interference in military operations—a train of more than 100 carriages was dispatched by night, if not fitted out, in Luxemburg; and those concerned took with them from thence the materials and tools for the restoration of the railway connection in French territory broken off by the German troops for their security, and for the destruction of the works

constructed for that purpose;—a proceeding, for the judgment of which, by international law, it would make no difference if a part of the provisions which have been delivered to the German Army Administration had actually come out of Luxemburg territory, or had been brought through it. Deliveries of the latter kind would belong to the course of traffic; but the provisioning a besieged fortress, and breaking through the encompassment, belong to the province of military operations.

Secondly, a great number of French soldiers, who had mostly fled from the battle-field, or saved themselves from Metz, or were escaped prisoners of war, passed without hindrance through Luxemburg to France to re-enter the French army. That has been the case not only in the past months, but also since the note of the 3rd ultimo was received by the Grand Ducal Government. It has come to the knowledge of the Undersigned from a credible source that a Committee has been formed at Grevenmacher for the purpose of assisting French soldiers on to the French army; besides others, that Committee reckons among its members the merchant Joseph Keifer and the tanner Charles Beck, nephew of Dr. Föhr, and it holds its meetings at the Hotel Letall-Sohn, under the presidency of the Advocate Namür; that station-master Serta at Wasserbillig keeps a regular warehouse with civic clothing for French soldiers in store, and police officers at Grevenmacher have aided such French soldiers with advice and recommendation to procure them disguises, instead of endeavouring to arrest them and send them into the interior.

Letters which have fallen into the hands of the German troops from escaped prisoners of war, who are again with bodies of French troops, addressed to their comrades remaining behind in German fortresses, point out the way to be taken through Luxemburg, and praise the assistance given to the writers there to enable them to get off.

The Undersigned is directed by His Majesty his most gracious Master, to require of the Grand Ducal Government that the above-mentioned Committee at Grevenmacher be dissolved, and that all French military persons who enter the territory of the Grand Duchy be sent into the interior. Of course, German military men, if any such have passed the Luxemburg frontier, must have been subject to the same measure, and the Undersigned would have been thankful for any communication as to any refractoriness occurring on its application.

Looking for the favour of a communication respecting the fulfilment of his requirement, the Undersigned willingly indulges the expectation that he will have no further occasion to make complaint of the non-fulfilment, on the part of Grand Ducal Government, of the duties imposed by the neutrality.

He is instructed to declare that if, notwithstanding this repeated and last warning, it should happen that French military men enter the neutral territory of Luxemburg and are not sent into the interior, the Government of His Majesty the King would find itself under the necessity of adopting the fitting military measures for defence against such a proceeding, just as contrary to the neutrality of the Grand Duchy as it is to the interests of our own warfare, and of extending those measures, if necessary, even to the territory of the Grand Duchy.

In order to prevent as far as possibly such an undesirable eventuality, the Undersigned will propose to His Majesty the King that authority be given to enter, by means of a special Plenipotentiary to be sent to Luxemburg, into a consideration with the Grand Ducal Government as to the means by which a recurrence of the errors that have occurred may be prevented for the future.

The Undersigned has made this known to the neutral Governments, co-signatories of the Treaty of 11th May, 1867, and avails himself of this opportunity of renewing to the Grand Ducal Government the assurance of his distinguished consideration.

(Signed) VON BISMARCK.

No. 27.

Vice-Admiral Harris to Earl Granville.—(Received January 19.)

(Extract.)

The Hague, January 17, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship copy of a despatch from M. Servais, Minister of State of the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg and its inclosures, printed copies of his Excellency's answer to a despatch of Count Bismarck dated the 6th instant, copy of which, I am informed, has been communicated to your Lordship.

Inclosure 1 in No. 27.

M. Servais to Vice-Admiral Harris.

M. le Ministre,

Luxembourg, le 14 Janvier, 1871.

J'AI l'honneur de communiquer à votre Excellence ma réponse à la dépêche de M. le Chancelier de la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord. Le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine d'Angleterre verra dans cette réponse la preuve que le Gouvernement Luxembourgeoise ne met aucune hésitation à remplir les obligations que la neutralité lui impose.

Je crois au reste devoir informer votre Excellence que nous avons adopté les mesures suivies en Belgique en ce qui concerne les Français qui arrivent dans le Grand Duché. J'ajouterai aussi que l'instruction que M. de Rôbe a faite à Grevenmacher n'a pas révélé l'existence d'un Comité institué pour faciliter l'évasion des prisonniers Français ni en général la connivance des habitants de la localité dans ce but. Il est arrivé, en tout, à Grévenmacher quinze militaires Français en costume bourgeois, mais presque tous mal vêtus; on leur a donné des habillements plus chauds. Il y a plus de trois semaines que le dernier de ces militaires a passé. Il paraît qu'ils ont pu atteindre le Grand Duché, grâce à l'assistance qu'ils ont trouvée en Prusse. J'aurai l'honneur de communiquer à votre Excellence l'instruction de M. de Rôbe si elle le désire.

Agréé, &c.

(Signé) L. J. E. SERVAIS.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

Luxemburg, January 14, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to communicate to your Excellency my reply to the despatch of the Chancellor of the North German Confederation. The Government of Her Majesty the Queen of England will see in this reply the proof that the Luxemburg Government has no hesitation in fulfilling the obligations which neutrality imposes on it.

I think it right further to inform your Excellency that we have adopted the measures taken in Belgium as regards the French who arrive in the Grand Duchy. I will add also that the inquisition which M. de Rôbe has made at Grevenmacher has not revealed the existence of a Committee instituted to facilitate the escape of French prisoners, nor any general connivance of the inhabitants of the locality with this object. There have arrived in all at Grevenmacher fifteen French soldiers in peasants' dress, but almost all ill-clothed; warmer clothing has been given them. It is more than three weeks since the last of these soldiers passed through the place. It appears that they were enabled to reach the Grand Duchy, thanks to the assistance they met with in Prussia. I shall have the honour to communicate to your Excellency the account of M. Rôbe's investigation, if you desire it.

Accept, &c.

(Signed) L. J. E. SERVAIS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 27.

M. Servais to Count Bismarck.

M. le Chancelier,

Luxembourg, le 12 Janvier, 1871.

JE m'empresse de répondre à la dépêche de votre Excellence du 6 de ce mois, que je viens de recevoir.

Le Gouvernement Luxembourgeois a accueilli avec une grande satisfaction la proposition ayant pour objet la nomination d'un Commissaire qui se rendrait à Luxembourg pour amener une entente au sujet des mesures à prendre à l'effet de prévenir toute difficulté au sujet de la question de neutralité. Nous n'avons rien de plus à cœur que de ne donner lieu à aucune réclamation sous ce rapport. J'ai précédemment déjà chargé M. Föhr de faire des ouvertures au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi à Berlin pour connaître ses intentions.

Je remercie votre Excellence de m'avoir donné connaissance de l'existence d'un Comité qui serait établi à Grevenmacher, et qui aurait pour but de favoriser l'évasion des prisonniers Français et de faciliter leur rentrée dans l'armée Française. M. de Rôbe, Secrétaire-Général du Gouvernement, a été chargé de se rendre sur les lieux pour s'assurer des faits. Après leur constatation, nous ne manquerons pas de les réprimer et d'empêcher qu'ils ne se renouvellent.

Je ne pense pas devoir revenir aujourd'hui sur les griefs que la note du 3 Décembre

formule contre le Grand-Duché; je me bornerai seulement à faire remarquer que les points relevés par votre Excellence dans sa dépêche du 6 Janvier courant ne sont pas les seuls que j'ai fait valoir pour la justification du Grand Duché, et qu'ils ne constituent même que des moyens que je puis appeler subsidiaires.

J'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que je communiquerai la présente dépêche aux Puissances signataires du Traité de Londres du 11 Mai, 1867; et je saisis, &c.

Le Ministre d'Etat, Président du Gouvernement,
(Signé) L. J. E. SERVAIS.

(Translation.)

M. le Chancelier,

Luxemburg, January 12, 1871.

I HASTEN to reply to your Excellency's despatch of the 6th instant, which I have just received.

The Luxemburg Government has welcomed with great satisfaction the proposal having for its object the nomination of a Commissioner who should repair to Luxemburg to arrange an understanding on the subject of the measures to be taken in order to prevent any difficulty as regards the question of neutrality. We have nothing more at heart than to give no occasion for complaints on this head. I had already previously instructed M. Föhr to make overtures to the Government of His Majesty the King at Berlin, in order to learn their intentions.

I thank your Excellency for having given me information of the existence of a committee supposed to be established at Grevenmacher for the purpose of favouring the escape of French prisoners and facilitating their return to the French Army. M. de Rôbe, Secretary-General to the Government, has been instructed to proceed to the spot to ascertain the facts. When they have been substantiated we shall not fail to repress them and to prevent them recurring.

I do not think it necessary to revert on this occasion to the charges brought by the note of December 3 against the Grand Duchy; I will confine myself simply to remarking that the points adverted to by your Excellency in your despatch of the 6th of January instant are not the only ones which I advanced in justification of the Grand Duchy, and they merely form, indeed, what I may call subsidiary arguments.

I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I shall communicate the present despatch to the Powers who signed the Treaty of London of May 11, 1867.

The Minister of State, President of the Government,
(Signed) L. J. E. SERVAIS.

No. 28.

Mr. Odo Russell to Earl Granville,—(Received January 26.)

My Lord,

Versailles, January 19, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 7th instant, respecting the neutrality of Luxemburg, which I have submitted to the Chancellor of the German Confederation. His Excellency thanked me for the communication, and desired me to inform your Lordship, in reply, that he was about to send an Agent to Luxemburg, to negotiate personally and directly with the Grand Ducal Government, and try to come to some understanding in regard to the illegal proceedings he had been obliged to complain of, and which he regretted to say the Grand Ducal Government had not yet been able to put a stop to.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 29.

Vice-Admiral Harris to Earl Granville.—(Received January 30.)

My Lord,

The Hague, January 28, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to transmit copies of the report of the inquiry conducted by M. de Rôbe alluded to in the inclosure of my despatch dated the 17th instant, respecting charges of the infringement of neutrality by the Grand Duchy of Luxemburg in the case of certain French refugees.

Also a copy of the despatch addressed by M. Servais, Minister of State for the Grand Duchy, to Count Bismarck when forwarding the report.

These documents have been supplied to me by M. Servais.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. A. J. HARRIS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 29.

M. Servais to Count Bismarck.

(Translation.)

Luxembourg, January 16, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Excellency the report which M. Roebe has communicated to me as the result of the inquiries which he undertook at Grevenmacher, to enlighten the facts mentioned by your Excellency in the despatch of the 6th. This report appears to merit perfect confidence as M. Roebe is a very conscientious functionary, to whom, having lived ten years in Grevenmacher as District Commissioner, all facts and persons of that place are well known, and being the son of an officer who died in the service of Prussia, he cannot be accused of being influenced in the fulfilment of his duties by previously conceived opinions distorting the truth.

The Government further declares itself ready to pursue the inquiries with the co-operation of a Prussian subject, Herr Keller-Noll, Director of the Customs in the Grand Duchy, as the Government wishes that no one may have the slightest doubt as to the justice of the result of the inquiries made at Grevenmachten.

This business causes me to place before your Excellency the following remark. In my despatch of the 4th of December, I pointed out the danger impending over the Grand Duchy owing to several circumstances of which I heard from various sources. Every day I am more firmly persuaded that some persons never tire of lightly reporting things calculated to endanger and cast suspicion on the country, meanwhile keeping themselves out of all responsibility. I trust that the Government of His Majesty the King of Prussia will not be influenced in its opinions and decisions by reports of this kind, and in case you think it right to attach to them any importance you will give the Luxemburg Government, the opportunity of an explanation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. SERVAIS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 29.

M. Roebe to M. Servais.

(Translation.)

Luxemburg, January 14, 1871.

I DO myself the honour of respectfully reporting to your Excellency that from the investigation which I instituted at Grevenmacher yesterday respecting the complaint on the part of the Chancery of the North German Federal States against our Government, that in the said locality a Committee had been formed for the purpose of helping French soldiers through to the French army, and which numbered amongst its members the merchant, A. Keiffer, and the tanner, Charles Bech, nephew of Dr. Fœhr, and held its meetings at the hotel, Lettal the younger, under the presidency of the Advocate Namür, the following facts have been ascertained:—

There is at Grevenmacher only one single Committee for the relief of the wounded soldiers of the two belligerent nations, without distinction. Its action is exclusively devoted to the collection of charitable gifts, and the transmission of them to the Central Committee at Luxemburg. As an exception, a consignment was made direct to Metz, immediately after the surrender of that town. The Committee did not undertake the distribution of clothing or any other assistance to Frenchmen on their passage.

On the other hand, it cannot be denied that various private persons have afforded aid to Frenchmen passing through the place. It is here to be observed, however, that the number of all the Frenchmen seen in Grevenmacher, from the 3rd November to the present day, amounts to fifteen men altogether, of whom three were still there yesterday.

Of these latter two Parisians, who have been received by their relations, do not belong to the French army; they were employed as butchers at the military slaughter-house in Metz, and got away from thence unmolested.

The third, Mongeolle by name, born in the neighbourhood of Diedenhofen, escaped according to his statement, as a prisoner-of-war from Spandau. I have had him arrested and sent into the interior. The period in which the arrival or departure of these people took place extends from the capitulation of Metz (3rd November) to the 15th December. Two of them (the two butchers) came by Sierk, Schengen; eight by Temmels (Prussia); and five by Wasserbillig. Thirteen of them had only civil clothing; the other two wore uniforms under the civil clothing. Therefore their disguise had been already provided before they reached Luxemburg territory. The donations made to them in this country were alms, to protect them from the prevailing bitter cold.

Of the twelve who have passed through, only two stayed a whole day with the tavern-keeper Wener; six passed a night there, and four who had put up at the tavern, Lettal the younger, left after a stay of three hours.

They were not detained by the Communal Police, because their quiet behaviour, with nothing specially striking in their outward appearance, gave no cause for their arrest. Any matter-of-fact intervention of a Police officer in order to procure them a disguise, or any assistance whatever for escaping, must be wholly denied.

The ground of the special statement, giving the hotel Lettal as the meeting-place of these people, may be the following fact:—

Proprietor Musquart, of Buchholtz, went on November market-day to Treves, and there met with two captive French officers, his relations; probably an attempt at escape was agreed upon between them, and the tavern Lettal, where he generally alights, appointed for them by Musquart. Be that as it may, some days afterwards four Frenchmen came to Lettal's as night was coming on. According to their statement, they came from Treves by Conz, along the right bank of the Moselle to Temmels, where some one advised them to get taken over the river, and at the same time offered them a piece of money, which they declined with thanks, because they were not in want of cash. After three hours of rest and refreshment, they had themselves conveyed to Buchholtz House the same night.

These were the only Frenchmen who went to the so-called Hotel Lettal the younger; and neither the merchant A. Keiffer, nor the tanner C. Bech, nor yet the notary Namür (there is no advocate Namür at Grevenmacher), were concerned in this matter.

That this small number of fugitives, supposing them all really to have been disguised soldiers, should have been able to pass through a frontier locality like Grevenmacher without molestation by the police is, in my opinion, the less remarkable inasmuch as they arrived there without hindrance through a considerable portion of the Prussian territory.

It does not become me to question the trustworthiness of the sources which are at the command of his Excellency the Federal Chancellor, nevertheless, I cannot but remark that the statement in question, which is chiefly directed against Mr. Charles Bech and the family of Dr. Föhr, and in which the names of A. Keiffer and Namur are brought in as secondary gives cause for the most uncomfortable conjectures.

The statement that Railway Superintendent Serta keeps a regular storehouse of civil clothing, in order to effect the transformation of French soldiers, is likewise unfounded.

Mr. Serta is not Railway Superintendent but Building Overseer to the Eastern Railway Company. During the whole time mentioned, he has procured some articles of clothing for four Frenchmen passing through, none of whom had a uniform, and those articles he obtained from his acquaintances for each special case.

One soldier only arrived in uniform, by Conz through Oberbillig. According to his statement he had come upon a Prussian military post near Conz, which did not detain him but told him, in answer to his question, that he was still eight leagues from Luxemburg. This took place on the second Sunday after the surrender of Metz.

How far an excessive professional zeal may be carried in these excited times, is shown by the fact that, some weeks ago, the Prussian Field Guard Von Langsur demanded their identification papers of two Luxemburg traders in Luxemburg territory, at Clement Schartz's tavern, in Wasserbillig, where they had arrived from Treves.

I can forward the result of this investigation to your Excellency with full conviction of its truth, as the local circumstances of Grevenmacher are well known to me from my ten years' residence there as District Commissioner, and I have made my inquiries of persons long known to me as upright, impartial, and highly trustworthy, who could give direct testimony as to the alleged circumstances.

(Signed)

V. v. ROEBE,
Government Councillor, &c.

No. 30.

Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by Count Bernstorff, February 8.)

(Translation.)

Versailles, January 20, 1871.

HEREWITH I send your Excellency copy of a despatch dated 7th January instant, addressed by Lord Granville to Mr. Odo Russell, and communicated by the latter to me, in answer to my despatch to your Excellency of the 24th ultimo.

It affords me satisfaction to see that Lord Granville acknowledges that our despatch of the 3rd December last is not founded on any intention of denouncing the Treaty of 1867, and that it relates only to military measures of defence against the injuries arising from the violation of the neutrality, which measures, as the Royal British Secretary of State admits, may be justified by the state of affairs.

Under these circumstances I quite agree with Lord Granville that in the particular case the question only depends on the actual state of affairs, and further discussion would be superfluous.

I request your Excellency to tell the Royal British Secretary of State this, and to express my thanks for his communication.

(Signed) VON BISMARCK.

No. 31.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 8, 1871.

COUNT BERNSTORFF stated to me to-day that he had been instructed by Count Bismarck to express to me the satisfaction with which he had learnt that Her Majesty's Government were convinced that it was not his intention, in his Circular of the 3rd of December last, to denounce the Treaty of 1867, by which the position of Luxemburg was defined and secured, but that he had merely been actuated by the desire to take precautionary measures of defence, necessitated by the military position, against military injury to the Prussian cause from violation of the neutrality of the territory of Luxemburg. He alluded to my admission that an emergency might possibly arise which might justify, in some degree, the adoption of such measures; expressed his concurrence in the view that any such emergency must be judged upon its merits, and added that further discussion would be superfluous.


I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

LUXEMBURG. No. 1 (1871).

CORRESPONDENCE respecting the Alleged Violation
of the Neutrality of the Grand Duchy of Luxem-
burg: 1870-71.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Com-
mand of Her Majesty. 1871.*

LONDON :
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.



CORRESPONDENCE
RESPECTING THE
IMPRISONMENT OF MR. WORTH
BY THE
PRUSSIANS.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1871.

LONDON:
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No. 1.

*Dr. Abrath to Colonel Lindsay.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by Mr. Joyner,
November 8.)*

Dear Sir,

Epernay, November 2, 1870.

MR. WORTH, who has an office as a wine-merchant at 110, Cannon Street, London; he has been for the last two months at Paris, could not come out of the city, and paid 100*l.* to go with a balloon to Belgium. Last week, on Thursday, he left Paris in a balloon with three Frenchmen; they came as far as Verdun, when the balloon was shot on by Prussian soldiers; one man escaped in the woods; Mr. Worth and two other Frenchmen were taken prisoners and brought yesterday night through here by a Prussian officer. One of the Frenchmen had 60,000 francs money. I had only few minutes' time to speak to Mr. Worth, because the train was starting, and gave him the cigars which I had in my pocket. Mr. Worth's opinion was that one man was on a political mission in the balloon, and he begged me to let his friends in London know about his unfortunate expedition. Very likely Mr. Worth is, by the time when the letter reaches you, at the head-quarters, and set at liberty. Will you be so kind, and let Mr. Worth's friends know about this?

I remain, &c.

(Signed) DR. ABRATH.

No. 2.

Earl Granville to Colonel Walker.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 8, 1870, 6.15 P.M.

PLEASE inquire as to the situation of Mr. Worth, who left Paris in a balloon on the 27th of October, and is believed to have been captured at Verdun, and sent to Prussian head-quarters.

No. 3.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received November 9.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon Street, London, November 8, 1870.

REFERRING to the interview which took place with one of your Under-Secretaries and Mr. Alfred Batson Joyner, relative to Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth, an English gentleman carrying on business at the above address (also in Paris), who has been taken prisoner by the Prussians while attempting to escape from Paris in a balloon, and now being tried by court-martial at Versailles; may I earnestly entreat immediate intervention on his behalf by Her Majesty's Government, as I am in possession of facts which prove that Mr. Worth made application to pass out of Paris on the 22nd of October or thereabouts, and was refused by some Prussian officials? Therefore it would appear that the course adopted was justifiable.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

P.S.—I may inform your Lordship that Mr. F. G. Worth holds a British passport.

H. B. L.

No. 4.

Messrs. Smith, Payne, and Smiths to Earl Granville.—(Received November 9.)

My Lord, 1, Lombard Street, E.C., London, November 9, 1870.
 IT has been brought under our notice by Mr. Littlewood, that Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth, a British subject holding an English passport, has been taken prisoner while attempting to escape from Paris in a balloon, after having endeavoured to obtain a pass out of that city from the Prussian officials which was declined.
 We hear now that he is being tried by court-martial at Versailles.
 Mr. Worth is well known to us, and we entreat your Lordship to take such steps as the urgency of the case demands.

We are, &c.
 (Signed) SMITH, PAYNE, AND SMITHS.

No. 5.

*Mr. Otway to Messrs. Smith, Payne, and Smiths.**

Gentlemen, Foreign Office, November 9, 1870.
 I AM directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this days' date, relative to the case of Mr. Worth, a British subject, who has been taken prisoner while attempting to escape from Paris in a balloon; and I am to inform you that the matter is already engaging the attention of Her Majesty's Government, and that his Lordship has telegraphed to make inquiries as to Mr. Worth's position.
 I am, &c.
 (Signed) ARTHUR OTWAY.

No. 6.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.) Foreign Office, November 9, 1870, 4.45 P.M.
 APPREHENSIONS are entertained by the friends of Mr. Worth, a British subject who left Paris in a balloon on the 27th of October, and is believed to have been captured at Verdun and sent to Prussian head-quarters at Versailles to be tried by court-martial. Please make inquiries. I have telegraphed to Colonel Walker.

No. 7.

Colonel Walker to Earl Granville.—(Received November 10.)

(Telegraphic.) Versailles, November 9, 1870.
 I VISITED Mr. Worth yesterday and to-day with the permission of the Prussian authorities. He will be sent to Prussia as a prisoner of war, as will be all who leave Paris in an unauthorized manner. A letter to his mother leaves to-morrow. He is well. I have given him some assistance.

No. 8.

*Mr. Odo Russell to Messrs. Smith, Payne, and Smiths.**

Foreign Office, November 10, 1870.

MR. ODO RUSSELL presents his compliments to Messrs. Smith, Payne and Smiths, and, with reference to his letter of yesterday's date, is directed by Earl Granville to state that a telegram has just been received from Colonel Walker at Versailles, dated yesterday at noon, and reporting that he had visited Mr. Worth that day and the day before by permission of the Prussian authorities. Mr. Worth was to be sent to Prussia, like all who have left Paris in an unauthorized manner. He was well and had received some assistance from Colonel Walker. A letter to his mother leaves Versailles to-day.

* A similar letter was addressed to Mr. Littlewood.

No. 9.

Colonel Walker to Earl Granville.—(Received November 10.)

(Telegraphic)

Versailles, November 10, 1870.

I BEG you to have Mr. Worth's mother told that he is well, and in safety. She lives at 11, Sandfield Place, Lewisham.

No. 10.

Mr. Odo Russell to Mr. Littlewood.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 10, 1870.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to inform you that since my letter of this morning, a second telegram has been received from Colonel Walker at Versailles, dated to-day, at 9 A.M., and begging that Mr. Worth's mother may be informed that he is well and in safety. Mrs. Worth is stated to reside at No. 11, Sandfield Place, Lewisham.

Lord Granville will be obliged by your making this communication, which will probably alarm Mrs. Worth less, coming through her friends, than if it were sent direct to her from this Office.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 11.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 10, 1870, 4 P.M.

COLONEL WALKER telegraphs that he has seen Mr. Worth, who will be sent to Prussia, like others who have escaped from Paris in an unauthorized manner.

No. 12.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received November 10.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon Street, London, November 10, 1870.

I CONFIRM my letter of the 8th instant, and have now to thank you for your reply, also for your Lordship's communication as to Mr. Worth's safety, which I have just received.

I must now ask you, as Mr. Worth's representative, to demand the immediate release from custody of Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth.

I am, &c.

(Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

No. 13.

Messrs. Smith, Payne, and Smiths to Mr. Odo Russell.—(Received November 11.)

Sir,

Lombard Street, November 10, 1870.

WE beg to acknowledge the receipt of your two communications relative to Mr. Worth, and request you to express to Earl Granville our sense of the prompt attention he has been good enough to accord to our letter of yesterday.

We remain, &c.

(Signed) SMITH, PAYNE, AND SMITHS.

No. 14.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

(My Lord)

Foreign Office, November 12, 1870.

WITH reference to my telegrams to your Excellency of the 9th and 10th instant, I transmit to you herewith copies of correspondence* received from the friends of

* Nos. 1, 3, 4, 12, 15, and 16.

Mr. Worth, a British subject, who left Paris in a balloon, and has been captured at Verdun, and sent to the Prussian Head-quarters at Versailles, from whence, according to the telegram from Colonel Walker, also inclosed,* he is to be sent to Prussia with other persons who have left Paris in an unauthorized manner.

Assuming that Mr. Worth has not compromised his character as a non-combatant, and that he accompanied the French courier in the balloon for no other purpose than to effect his escape from the seat of war, Her Majesty's Government think that he should be allowed the immunity of a non-combatant. I have therefore to request that your Excellency will express to the Prussian Government a hope that, in case Mr. Worth is able to satisfy the German military authorities that he was a *bond fide* passenger without any unneutral object in view, the intention of sending him to Prussia will be abandoned, and that he will be set at liberty, if not at once, at all events after such reasonable detention as may be necessary, on military considerations, to prevent the disclosure of any discovery which he may have made in passing over the German lines.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 15.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received November 12.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon Street, London, November 11, 1870.

I CONFIRM my letter of yesterday's date, in which I request the release from the custody of the German authorities, of Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth, through the intervention of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, and am anxiously waiting your reply; since which I have received your Lordship's telegram and letter of the 10th instant. For these I tender my sincere thanks, especially for the consideration shown therein to Mrs. Worth's feelings.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

No. 16.

Mr. Otway to Mr. Littlewood.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 12, 1870.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of yesterday's date requesting his Lordship to demand the immediate release of Mr. Worth.

I am, in reply, to inform you that Lord Granville, not being in possession of information which could justify his making such a demand, has instructed Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin to represent to the Prussian Government that Mr. Worth should be allowed the immunity generally accorded to non-combatants, provided he can satisfy the German military authorities that he was merely endeavouring to effect his escape from the seat of war without any unneutral object in view.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR OTWAY.

No. 17.

Earl Granville to Mr. Odo Russell.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 12, 1870.

I TRANSMIT to you herewith copies of correspondence† received from the friends of Mr. Worth, a British subject, who left Paris in a balloon, and has been captured at Verdun and sent to the Prussian head-quarters at Versailles, from whence, according to the telegram from Colonel Walker, also inclosed,* he is to be sent to Prussia with other persons who have left Paris in an unauthorized manner.

* No. 7.

† Nos. 1, 3, 4, 12, 15, and 16.

-Assuming that Mr. Worth has not compromised his character as a non-combatant, and that he accompanied the French courier in the balloon for no other purpose than to effect his escape from the seat of war, Her Majesty's Government think that he should be allowed the immunity of a non-combatant. I have therefore to request that you will take any opportunity which may offer to intercede in Mr. Worth's favour, and to express a hope that, in case he is able to satisfy the German military authorities that he was a *bond fide* passenger, without any unneutral object in view, the intention of sending him to Prussia will be abandoned, and that he will be set at liberty, if not at once, at all events after such reasonable detention as may be necessary on military considerations to prevent the disclosure of any discovery which he may have made in passing over the German lines.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 18.

Colonel Walker to Earl Granville.—(Received November 14.)

(Extract.)

Versailles, November 8, 1870.

LATE yesterday I was informed that an English subject named Worth was in prison in Versailles, being one of three persons who were captured a week ago in a balloon near Verdun. As soon as I had dispatched my business this morning I visited the prison, where I found in a solitary cell a young man of this name, who informed me of the circumstances of his capture, which are contained in the accompanying letter, which I have the honour to request, after perusal, may be forwarded as directed to his mother. I had enough conversation with him to satisfy myself that there were no discrepancies in his story; but beyond sanctioning a supply of proper food and other comforts to him, as he informed me that his own funds were completely exhausted, I have taken no steps for his release, as I am desirous before doing so of obtaining the advice of Mr. Wodehouse, who, though hourly expected, has not yet made his appearance at Versailles. Mr. Worth informed me that he was, in the first instance, to have come out of Paris on the 27th, with the party expected on that day, but that becoming impatient at the delay he engaged a place in this balloon, for which he paid 100*l*.

I have just received your Lordship's telegram of yesterday evening respecting Mr. Worth, and shall now take such steps as I may find possible, and telegraph to the Foreign Office in the course of the day, further reporting my proceedings by letter. I cannot forward Mr. Worth's letter to his mother, it has not been returned to me from the Office of the Staff of the IIIrd Army, but I have been informed verbally that it has been "provided for." Mrs. Worth's direction is 11, Sandfield Place, Lewisham, and I think it might be as well to inquire whether she receives the letter, and when.

No. 19.

Colonel Walker to Earl Granville.—(Received November 14.)

(Extract.)

Versailles, November 9, 1870.

IN continuance of my despatch of 8th September, I have the honour to forward to your Lordship Mr. Worth's letter to his mother, which has been returned to me, there being no reason to hinder "the forwarding of the inclosed letter to its address." The perusal of this letter will save me a world of trouble and loss of time. I, this morning, with full permission of the Prussian authorities, again saw Mr. Worth in prison, and afterwards waited on the Commandant of Versailles and the Chief of the Staff of the IIIrd Army, who informed me that, as I have just had the honour of telegraphing to your Lordship, he will, like all persons who attempt to pass the Prussian outposts without permission, whether by land, water, or air, be deported to Prussia under suspicion of being a French spy. It will, therefore, be in the power of Lord Augustus Loftus to take further steps for his release, if considered advisable. I shall continue to furnish him with some small comforts, and advance him a little money on public account, which he has promised shall be repaid to Her Majesty's Treasury. His place of business is 110 Cannon Street, London.

I, yesterday afternoon, again visited Mr. Worth in prison. In view of his contem-

plated deportation to Germany, I have sanctioned his procuring some warm clothing, a second pair of boots, and a change or two of linen. He appears to be a respectable and intelligent young man, and has answered all my questions with readiness and apparent frankness. I answer for no one, not even for myself at times; but he certainly has not made the impression on me that he has anything to do with politics whatever. If he is a French spy, he is a very clever one; but up to the present time I have every reason to believe that he is just what he represents himself to be. He tells me that he is in business at 110 Cannon Street; that his mother lives at the address forwarded yesterday, and which I am now going to telegraph to your Lordship. He says, further, that if he had not been anxious to get back to his mother, and to his business, he would have remained in Paris, as he said himself, "just to see the affair out." He further tells me that meat was getting short before he left, on the 27th October, and that he does not believe that Paris can hold out after the end of this month. He does not appear to have been subjected to any examination since his arrival here, beyond the search of his person by a policeman; and had it not been for a fortunate accident I should not have learnt that he was in prison until the receipt of your Lordship's telegram yesterday morning. I have been very careful, both with the Chief of the Staff of the IIIrd Army and the Commandant, to make no remark as to my opinion of the justice or injustice of his treatment. He may be what they assume him to be; and as his papers have been taken from him, and are in the hands of Count Moltke, as I was informed by the Commandant, I have no other means of verifying the truth or falsehood of his statements to me than my habit of dealing with men, and his tone and manner while conversing with me.

Inclosure in No. 19.

Letter from Mr. Worth to his Mother.

The Prison, Versailles, November 5, 1870.

ON Thursday, October 27, I left Paris by balloon, in company with three others. We left with a north-east wind, which would have carried us into Belgium, but the wind changing to direct east, we were carried on to the Prussian lines.

We left Paris at 2 o'clock in the afternoon, and as at half-past 4 it was almost dark, we were obliged to come down to earth. Just as we emerged from the clouds, at about 250 yards from the ground, we were welcomed by a shower of Prussian bullets, some of which pierced the balloon, and in order to avoid being hit we were obliged to come down at a tremendous force. When we touched the ground there was, of course, a terrible shock. I, fortunately, did not lose my presence of mind, and held on by the cords, so that I did not feel it so much. In jumping from the balloon, however, I was thrown some 30 feet into the air, and fell all of a heap, without being hurt in the least. Two others jumped after me (M. Adin and M. Cuzon) neither of them hurt. The fourth, however, lost his presence of mind—a M. Mauciare—and did not follow our example, so that he was carried away in the balloon. During all this, which only occupied some seconds, the Prussians still continued their firing, and it is only by a miracle that we escaped. On waving a handkerchief, however, they at last ceased, and we were made prisoners. We fell just outside Verdun, which is still being defended by the French. From Verdun we have been brought to Versailles (it has taken us eight days to get here), and, although prisoners, we have been well treated. As none of us have any political mission, it is possible they may give us our liberty in a few days; but there is just a probability of our being sent into Germany as prisoners of war; in the latter event you will not hear from me for some time. The reason for my leaving by balloon was, that I wanted to get home and to my business.

No. 20.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received November 14.)

(Extract.)

Berlin, November 12, 1870.

ON the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 9th instant I instructed Mr. Dering to call on Baron Thile to inquire whether he had received any information on the subject of the arrest and detention of a British subject named Worth, who had descended in a balloon within the Prussian lines, and had been made prisoner.

Baron Thile stated that he had received no information on the subject, but that he would immediately make the necessary inquiries.

On seeing Baron Thile to-day I informed him of the substance of your Lordship's second telegram, stating that Colonel Walker had seen Mr. Worth, and that he was to be sent to Prussia like others who had escaped from Paris in an unauthorized manner.

I observed to Baron Thile that I could not understand on what grounds a British subject descending in a balloon should be subjected to arrest and detention.

Baron Thile replied that he had received no information on the subject, but he said it was probable that there were other grounds for his detention, and he presumed that papers had been found on his person of a compromising character.

With regard to Mr. Worth I observed that his escape by a balloon was an incident of so novel a character that it was quite beyond the existing provisions of the laws of war, but that I could not conceive it possible that a neutral subject could be arrested for the mere fact of descending in a balloon at a place where he had evidently not intended to alight.

Baron Thile promised to bring the subject before Count Bismarck.

No. 21.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received November 16.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon Street, November 15, 1870.

PERMIT me to thank you for your Lordship's communication of the 12th instant, in reference to Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth; and I trust by this time your Lordship is in receipt of further information from the German authorities. I also beg to thank your Lordship for your letter to Lord Augustus Loftus at Berlin, for which place I leave London to-night.

Will you allow all matters relative to this case to be handed to Mr. Alfred Batson Joyner, of 60, Cornhill, during my absence?

I am, &c.

(Signed)

HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

No. 22.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 16, 1870.

WITH reference to my despatch to your Excellency of the 12th instant, and to your despatch of the same date, respecting the case of Mr. Worth, a British subject, who has been captured at Verdun, after escaping from Paris in a balloon, I transmit herewith extracts of Reports from Colonel Walker on the subject;* and I have to request you to renew your representations to the Prussian Government in favour of Mr. Worth's speedy release, unless he should be proved to have been implicated in any unneutral proceeding.

Your Excellency's language to M. de Thile, as reported in your despatch above mentioned is entirely approved.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

GRANVILLE.

No. 23.

Colonel Walker to Earl Granville.—(Received November 18.)

My Lord,

Versailles, November 14, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to report that late last evening I received a note from Mr. Worth, in which he informed me that he was warned to leave Versailles for Germany at 3.30 A.M. to-day with a convoy of prisoners of war. He also requested me to advance him 100 francs, and informed me further of the articles of clothing which, in accordance with my instructions, had been purchased for him, and of the probable amount of the outlay for his food. I at once went to the prison, gave him the 100 francs, for which I took his receipt, and promised to write this morning to his mother and to Lord Augustus

* Nos. 18 and 19.

Loftus respecting him. I have not in any respect altered my opinion of Mr. Worth. If he is, as General von Blumenthal alleged to me, a French spy, he is one of the best I have ever seen, as his whole appearance and manner are calculated to disarm suspicion. I beg to remark that Mr. Worth has been subjected to no examination of any kind while in Versailles. I have been very careful in not expressing any opinion respecting this case, nor, in default of instructions from your Lordship, have I taken any steps beyond visiting and assisting my countryman in distress, and affording him the means of providing decent comforts. Mr. Worth only told me last night of some papers, valuable only to himself, which were taken from him at the time of his capture. If I can find in whose hands these papers are, I will endeavour either to reclaim them or to procure their transmission to Her Majesty's Embassy in Berlin.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BEAUCHAMP WALKER.

No. 24.

Colonel Walker to Earl Granville.—(Received November 18.)

My Lord,

Versailles, November 14, 1870.

SINCE Mr. Wodehouse left Versailles I have learnt that Mr. Worth has been sent to Minden, where he will be brought before a court-martial. The matter is therefore removed to the sphere of Her Majesty's Ambassador in Berlin, to whom I shall write to the same effect to-morrow. I have also ascertained that his papers are here, and have requested that they may, if possible, be separated from those of his companions, and that I may be allowed a sight of them. Whether I shall succeed remains to be proved.

I hope to find an opportunity of sending on this letter by a safe hand, so as to overtake Mr. Wodehouse before he leaves St. Germain. Mr. Wodehouse lunched with the Crown Prince to-day, which made him somewhat later in starting than he had at first intended.

I beg, &c.
(Signed) BEAUCHAMP WALKER.

No. 25.

Mr. Joyner to Earl Granville.—(Received November 18.)

My Lord,

60, Cornhill, London, E.C., November 18, 1870.

REFERRING to Mr. H. B. Littlewood's letter to your Lordship of the 15th instant, regarding the case of Mr. F. G. Worth, will you allow me to call your Lordship's attention to the inclosed copy of a letter received from Mr. F. G. Worth, and which appeared in the "Standard" of this morning?

Under the circumstances to which Mr. Worth alludes, viz., that they had no political mission, and, that he merely took the opportunity of endeavouring to escape per balloon, being very anxious to return to his home and business in London (the latter as I know requiring his immediate presence), I respectfully request your Lordship's earnest demands for his release from Prussian captivity.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. BATSON JOYNER.

Inclosure in No. 25.

Letter from Mr. Worth to his Mother.

[See Inclosure in No. 19.]

No. 26.

Mr. Joyner to Earl Granville.—(Received November 18.)

My Lord,

60, Cornhill, London, November 18, 1870.

SINCE I had the honour of addressing your Lordship, this morning I notice a paragraph, referring to Mr. F. G. Worth, in the letter of the "Times" correspondent, dated Versailles, 14th November, to which I beg to call your Lordship's attention.

It states that Mr. Worth is still in prison at Versailles, and that the Prussian authorities have offered to liberate him on his parole to return immediately to England, but that, as Colonel Walker refused to guarantee this, he remains a prisoner.

I would respectfully submit to your Lordship that a direct demand from Her Majesty's Government would obtain his immediate release.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. BATSON JOYNER.

No. 27.

Earl Granville to Colonel Walker.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 18, 1870, 3.15 P.M.

"TIMES" correspondent from Versailles states on the 14th that Prussian authorities had offered to liberate Worth on his parole to return to England on your guarantee, which you had refused; and on the 15th that he had been sent to Meudon to be tried by court-martial. Let me know how the case stands as regards each particular.

No. 28.

Mr. Hammond to Mr. Joyner.

Foreign Office, November 18, 1870.

MR. HAMMOND presents his compliments to Mr. Joyner, and begs leave to acquaint him that it appears, by a letter from Colonel Walker dated the 14th instant, that Mr. Worth is sent to Minden, not Meudon, as stated in the letter published in the "Times" of to-day.

No. 29.

Colonel Walker to Earl Granville.—(Received November 19.)

(Telegraphic.)

Versailles, November 19, 1870.

PRUSSIAN authorities made no offer to liberate Worth on my guarantee; I therefore could never have refused.

The statement of the "Times" correspondent is in this respect utterly devoid of truth. Worth, as I have reported to London and Berlin, has been sent to Germany. I hear now to Cologne. Minden was first named, for which Meudon has probably been mistaken. I request further particulars.

No. 30.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 19, 1870, 6 P.M.

COLONEL WALKER telegraphs that Mr. Worth has been sent to Germany. Minden was first named, but he now hears he is sent to Cologne.

No. 31.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 19, 1870.

WITH reference to my despatch to your Excellency, of the 16th instant, I transmit to you herewith copy of a further despatch and telegram from Colonel Walker,* relative to the case of Mr. Worth, who appears to have been sent to Germany as a prisoner of war.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

* Nos. 24 and 29.

No. 32.

*Mr. Hammond to Mr. Batson Joyner.**Foreign Office, November 19, 1870.*

MR. HAMMOND presents his compliments to Mr. Batson Joyner, and begs leave to acquaint him that it appears, by a telegram dated to-day, received from Colonel Walker, that the Prussian authorities made no offer to liberate Mr. Worth on his guarantee.

Colonel Walker says he has now heard that Mr. Worth's destination is Cologne. Any further particulars which may be received from Colonel Walker, will at once be communicated to Mr. Joyner.

No. 33.

Earl Granville to Colonel Walker.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 19, 1870.

I HAVE received your despatch of the 14th instant, relative to the case of Mr. Worth, the British subject who has been captured, after escaping from Paris in a balloon.

I have to express to you my approval of the course pursued by you in the matter, and of the steps you have taken to afford Mr. Worth assistance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 34.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received November 21.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, November 21, 1870, 4.10 P.M.

I HAVE addressed official note about Worth, and can do no more. Thile says that he does not expect an answer yet, but his family need be under no apprehensions about him. Mr. Littlewood has gone to Cologne to try to find him.

Why did not Mr. Worth come out with the other English, instead of taking flight in a balloon?

No. 35.

Mr. Otway to Mr. Joyner.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 21, 1870.

WITH reference to previous correspondence relative to the case of Mr. Worth, I am directed by Earl Granville to inform you that a telegram has been received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, stating that he has addressed an official representation to the Prussian Government on Mr. Worth's behalf, but that an answer cannot yet be expected. He is assured, however, that no apprehensions need be entertained about him. Mr. Littlewood has gone to Cologne to try to find him.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR OTWAY.

No. 36.

Colonel Walker to Earl Granville.—(Received November 22.)

(Extract.)

Versailles, November 19, 1870.

I HAVE now lying before me your Lordship's telegraphic message dated 18th November, 3.17 P.M., received at midnight, and have the honour to report that I have just replied to your Lordship in the following words:—

“Prussian authorities made no offer to liberate Worth on my guarantee; I therefore could never have refused.

"The statement of 'Times' correspondent is, in this respect, utterly devoid of truth. Worth, as I have reported to London and Berlin, has been sent to Germany. I hear now to Cologne. Minden was first named, for which Meudon has probably been mistaken. I request further particulars."

Your Lordship must by this time be in possession of full particulars respecting Mr. Worth, as contained in my despatches dated respectively 8th, 9th, and 14th November. I cannot understand how my letter of the 14th failed to reach your Lordship as soon as the "Times" correspondent's of the same date reached his employers. The persons with whom I communicated respecting Mr. Worth were Lieutenant-General von Blumenthal, Chief of the Staff of the IIIrd Army, whose answer to me on my first application respecting Mr. Worth was conveyed to your Lordship both by telegraph and despatch, the Commandant of Versailles, Major-General von Voigts Rhetz and his Adjutant, and with no other person whatever.

Considering the frank and open manner in which these officers intimated to me that there was no opening for a favourable hearing of any request for Mr. Worth's release, I did not consider myself justified (in default of any instruction from your Lordship) in embarrassing Her Majesty's Government by demanding what would have inevitably been refused.

Mr. Wodehouse, who is a member of the Diplomatic Corps, which I am not, and whom I gladly consulted in this matter, was, unless I completely misunderstood him, of the same opinion as myself. Mr. Wodehouse did not leave Versailles till eight hours after Worth's departure. Since Mr. Worth's removal, which took place early on the 14th instant, I have written three times to inform Lord Augustus Loftus—first, that he had started for Germany; secondly, that (as I was informed) he had been sent to Minden; and yesterday, that Cologne, and not Minden, was his destination. As the post travels very much quicker than trains with prisoners, I did not consider it advisable to draw more attention than was necessary to the fact of my having moved Lord Augustus Loftus in this matter by telegraphing.

As your Lordship's telegraphic message contains all I know in this matter, it would be premature in me to take any immediate steps in denying a report which is as mischievous as it is false. I have, however, the fullest confidence that, on receipt of my telegram of this morning, which was at once ordered to be forwarded by Lieutenant-General von Blumenthal, your Lordship will take the measures necessary for its repudiation.

No. 37.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received November 22, 9.16 P.M.)
(Given in November 21, 5.55 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.)

Victoria Hotel, Cologne.

MR. WORTH is not here or at Berlin. Will your Lordship kindly say where he is by telegraph here at once?

No. 38.

Mr. Otway to Mr. Littlewood.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 22, 1870.

WE know no more than Colonel Walker's report that Mr. Worth was to be sent to Cologne.

No. 39.

Mr. Joyner to Earl Granville.—(Received November 22.)

My Lord,

60, Cornhill, London, November 22, 1870.

I HAVE to thank your Lordship for the communication of yesterday relating to the case of Mr. Worth (an Englishman in the hands of the Prussians), and also for the steps taken in the matter.

I have just received a telegram from Mr. Littlewood in Cologne, in which he states

he cannot find Mr. Worth, although he has been there a whole day. He also says that Lord A. Loftus had remarked that, if he could get to Count Bismarck, Mr. Worth would be released immediately. From this remark would your Lordship allow me to suggest that a verbal demand might be made of Count Bismarck by Mr. Odo Russell for his immediate release? Also a request that Mr. Worth's exact whereabouts may be made known, as his friends are very anxious about him and naturally ask what right have the Prussians to detain him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) H. BATSON JOYNER.

No. 40.

Earl Granville to Colonel Walker.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 24, 1870.

I HAVE received your telegram of the 19th instant, and despatch of the same date, stating that there is no foundation for the assertion made by the "Times" correspondent, at Versailles, that you had refused an offer made to you by the Prussian authorities, to liberate Mr. Worth on his parole to return to England, under your guarantee.

I have much pleasure in repeating to you my entire approval of the steps which you have taken on Mr. Worth's behalf, as reported by you in your several despatches on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 41.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received November 25.)

My Lord,

Victoria Hotel, Cologne, November 23, 1870.

I CONFIRM my telegram of 21st and thank your Lordship for your reply, which, permit me to mention, I received late on the 22nd, although my telegram was dated Cologne, 12 o'clock on that day, the 21st instant.

In your reply I am surprised to find that "Colonel Walker hears that Mr. Worth is sent to Cologne." To save further anxiety in this case, allow me to ask your Lordship, What is actually being done on the part of Her Majesty's Government in this case? and further, if he is sent here, who will defend him, as a British subject, there being no representative of our Government at Cologne?

May I, as one of your subjects, ask the favour of your Lordship's reply by telegraph?

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

No. 42.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received November 25, 7.2 P.M.)

(Telegraphic.)

Victoria Hotel, Cologne, November 25, 1870, 2.35 P.M.

WORTH is here without any representative of the English Government.

No. 43.

Mr. Joyner to Earl Granville.—(Received November 25.)

My Lord,

60, Cornhill, London, November 25, 1870.

REFERRING to the case of Mr. Worth, I have to inform your Lordship that I have this morning a letter from Mr. Littlewood, at Cologne, in which he reports that the Commandant of that town had received the papers relating to Mr. Worth's case, and that he was expected immediately.

I was officially informed yesterday that, after consulting legal authority, Her

Majesty's Government found they had no power to stay the trial, but at the same time I would earnestly and respectfully entreat of your Lordship to dispatch a Mission to Cologne to represent Mr. Worth's case at the trial, he being an unprotected Englishman in the hands of an arbitrary people in a strange land, without the power to assist himself.

And if I might further entreat of your Lordship a demand of the Prussian authorities to allow an interview between Mr. Littlewood and Mr. Worth.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. BATSON JOYNER.

No. 44.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, November 26, 1870, 4 P.M.

ASK that Mr. Littlewood may be allowed to see Mr. Worth, who is expected at Cologne, and also to obtain for him any legal assistance which he may require.

No. 45.

Mr. Otway to Mr. Joyner.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 26, 1870.

WITH reference to your letters of the 22nd and 25th instant, I am directed by Earl Granville to inform you that his Lordship has instructed Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin by telegraph to apply to the Prussian Government for permission for Mr. Littlewood to see Mr. Worth, and also to obtain for him any legal assistance which he may require.

Mr. Odo Russell was provided on leaving this country with instructions to intercede in Mr. Worth's behalf if opportunity should offer. Lord Granville is, however, advised that Her Majesty's Government are not in the present state of the case entitled to deny the right of the Prussian authorities to bring Mr. Worth before a court-martial.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR OTWAY.

No. 46.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 28, 1870.

WITH reference to your telegram of the 21st instant, I transmit to your Excellency herewith copies of further correspondence relative to the capture and detention of Mr. Worth,* who appears by the latest intelligence to be expected forthwith at Cologne.

I have already instructed you by telegraph to apply for permission for Mr. Littlewood to see Mr. Worth, and to obtain for him any legal assistance which he may require.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 47.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received November 28.)

(Extract.)

Berlin, November 26, 1870.

WITH reference to your Lordship's various telegrams concerning the arrest of Mr. Worth, I have the honour to report that I have done all in my power to obtain his release.

I have spoken on several occasions to Baron Thile on his behalf, who stated that the note I had addressed to him had been immediately forwarded to Count Bismarck; that he had not yet received any reply to it, nor was he cognizant of the grounds on which

* Nos. 37, 39, 40, 43, and 45.

Mr. Worth had been arrested. His Excellency, however, stated that I might assure his relatives that they need be under no apprehensions for his safety.

On learning that he was to be brought before a Court-martial, and fearing the summary proceedings of such tribunals, I addressed Baron Thile, requesting his Excellency to provide that no sentence should be carried into effect against Mr. Worth without previous communication with him.

I have further, at the request of Mr. Littlewood, applied to Baron Thile requesting him to procure permission from the Ministry of War, addressed to the Commandant at Cologne, for Mr. Littlewood to communicate with Mr. Worth. Having already exchanged several telegrams with Mr. Littlewood, who is at Cologne, I have this day received the following telegram from him: "that Mr. Worth was at Cologne without any representative from our Government. Mr. Pepys is at present trying to see the Commandant."

This communication from Mr. Littlewood refers to a matter beyond my competency, but I think it right to bring it under your Lordship's cognizance in case that it may be considered advisable for me to send a Secretary of Her Majesty's Embassy to Cologne to watch the case of Mr. Worth, there being no English Consul in that town. Until the answer of Count Bismarck is received Baron Thile is ignorant of the charges laid against Mr. Worth, but he assures me that, unless any charges against him are fully proved, the military tribunal before whom he will appear will immediately release him.

No. 48.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received November 29.)

My Lord, 110, Cannon Street, London, November 29, 1870.

I REGRET to inform your Lordship that the Prussian authorities at Cologne refused me permission to see Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth, an Englishman, a prisoner in their hands at Cologne.

It is proposed that a deputation should wait upon your Lordship in reference to this, and other matters in connection with the case. The deputation consists of the following members of the House of Commons, who would be glad if your Lordship will kindly receive them to-morrow at half-past 4 o'clock, P.M.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

R. W. Crawford, London; W. Lawrence, London; H. W. Peek, Surrey; E. T. Gourley, Sunderland.

No. 49.

Mr. Otway to Mr. Littlewood.

Foreign Office, November 29, 1870.

MR. OTWAY presents his compliments to Mr. Littlewood, and, with reference to his letter of this day's date, begs to inform him, by direction of Earl Granville, that his Lordship will be happy to receive the deputation to which he alludes at the Foreign Office to-morrow (Wednesday) at half-past 4 o'clock.

No. 50.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, December 1, 1870.*

IN reply to your Excellency's despatch of the 26th ultimo, I have already instructed you by telegraph to send Mr. Petre, if he can be spared, to Cologne, to watch the proceedings in the case of Mr. Worth. I have also requested you to apply to Baron Thile for permission for Mr. Worth to have legal assistance.

Mr. Littlewood has returned to England, having, as he states, been refused permission to see Mr. Worth by the authorities at Cologne.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 51.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received December 2.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon Street, London, December 2, 1870.

I BEG to thank you sincerely for the kind reception given to the deputation on Wednesday last, also for the interest taken in this painful case, and now beg to hand your Lordship an exact copy of a letter received from Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth, an English subject, in the prison at Cologne; the original has been read by Mr. R. W. Crawford, M.P., also by Mr. H. W. Peek, M.P.

Your Lordship will doubtless perceive the reason why Mr. Worth left Paris, together with his sole object.

I may here remark that the only statement that has appeared at all implicating this unfortunate Englishman is to be found in a letter written by a German surgeon at Epernay, under date of the 2nd of November, which I forwarded to Mr. Odo Russell for perusal, so the correctness of which I am unable to vouch, but it certainly was not written by Mr. Worth.

Trusting soon to receive authority to see Mr. Worth, I have, &c.

(Signed)

HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

Inclosure in No. 51.

Mr. Worth to Mr. Littlewood.

My dear Littlewood,

Cologne Prison, November 29, 1870.

IN the several letters that I had written to my mother informing her of my balloon adventure, I requested her to send you all the details. These details I presume that you have by this time received, and you will therefore know how it is that I happen to be a prisoner in the hands of the Germans. It is a droll affair altogether; is it not? Had I known before I engaged my place in a balloon that the foreigners would have to leave Paris, I should, of course, have left with Mr. Wodehouse, of the British Embassy, who left some few days after I did. I made several inquiries, but I was informed "that if foreigners were in a besieged city so much the worse for them." They could not get out; and as my family reasons, as you know, were sufficiently pressing to induce me to get away, I tried the balloon trip.

My dear fellow, I shall never, I am sure, be able to thank you sufficiently for all the trouble you have taken, and the annoyance and the anxiety I, without doubt, have caused you, must have been something terrible. Think of your coming to Cologne to see after me, and bringing me clothing, &c. My dear boy, I must leave all my thanks till the moment when I can express them personally, I have not enough paper. You can't imagine how sorry I was not to be allowed to see you here.

There are certain formalities to be gone through, but I hope in the course of a few days to be free. I certainly see no reason why I should not be. Although a prisoner, I am tolerably comfortable and in excellent health; so please don't be anxious about me in that respect. My poor father is, I trust, well bodily. I am sure you see that he is comfortable, and has all that is necessary. My affairs will, I hope, hold over until my return. I am sure you will make them do so.

I don't write too many letters, as they have to be read by the officials here, and I don't want to give them too much trouble. Thank Dean for his note, and give him my kindest regards, as well as to any others who inquire. I can be written to here, but the letters must be addressed to the care of the Governor of Cologne. It will be necessary to mention on the envelopes that I am a balloon prisoner and an English subject.

Give my kindest regards to your wife, and, hoping soon to see you, believe me, &c.

(Signed)

F. G. WORTH.

No. 52.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received December 5.)

My Lord,

Berlin, December 3, 1870.

ON the receipt of your Lordship's telegram I instructed Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to go to Cologne, as Mr. Petre was prevented doing so by his family being laid up with the scarlet fever.

I obtained from Baron Thile a letter of introduction for Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to the Commandant, and I have instructed Mr. Harriss-Gastrell, if possible, to see Mr. Worth, and to render him any assistance he may require.

I am ignorant of the charges laid against Mr. Worth, but I imagine they rest more on suspicion than on any real fact. Baron Thile assures me that there need not be the smallest apprehension for his safety.

I shall forward to your Lordship Mr. Harriss-Gastrell's Report on Mr. Worth's case as soon as it reaches me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 53.

Mr. Odo Russell to Earl Granville.—(Received December 5.)

My Lord,

Versailles, November 19, 1870.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 12th instant, I have the honour to report that I find Mr. Worth has already been sent to Cologne, and that Colonel Walker, who left nothing undone to save and assist him while he was at Versailles, is now in communication with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin to try and obtain the unfortunate gentleman's release from prison.

I shall not fail to speak in his behalf to the proper authorities if anything further can be done for him here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 54.

Mr. Otway to Mr. Littlewood.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 5, 1870.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant, inclosing copy of one from Mr. Worth, in which he gives his reasons for leaving Paris by balloon.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR OTWAY.

No. 55.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received December 8.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon Street, London, December 7, 1870.

I CONFIRM my letter of the 2nd instant, and thank your Lordship for your acknowledgment thereof.

My object has been throughout this case to prove that Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth is entirely innocent of any political mission. This would plainly appear by the letter Mr. Worth wrote to me (a copy of which I forwarded your Lordship on the 2nd instant), under date of the 29th ultimo. I now send your Lordship another letter, written to Mrs. Worth, which has been inserted in the daily papers, and from which you will find that no doubt possibly can exist as to his reason for leaving Paris. The letter, I believe, is from Colonel Walker, although printed "Beauchamps Walker Colveill." May I now beg that your Lordship will inform me when Mr. Worth is to be tried; also, whether Mr. Worth's mother may be allowed to see him, as I need hardly mention that she is very anxious about him.

I regret to say that, up to the present, I have not received any authority to have an interview with him.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

Inclosure in No. 55.

THE IMPRISONED ENGLISHMAN.—Mrs. W. Worth presents her compliments to the editor, and will feel much obliged by his publishing the inclosed in Wednesday's paper, as her son is still in captivity. Having done nothing wrong, his detention causes her great anxiety and grief.

11, Sandfield Place, Lewisham, December 7, 1870.

"My dear Madame,

Versailles, November 28, 1870.

"I fear, from the tone of your letter just received, that you have not received a letter written by your son, previously to his leaving Versailles, and which was to have been forwarded to you, as promised to me, by the Prussian military authorities. I hope that before this time he will have been placed in communication with you, as I understood from Mr. Odo Russell that a relation was about to leave England to meet him at Cologne. I communicated as rapidly as was permitted to me, both to London and Berlin, all particulars of his removal, which I first understood was to Minden, but afterwards learnt that he had gone to Cologne, and I only did not write to you because I felt sure that my news would be passed on from the Foreign Office. I heard of his having passed Epernay on his journey. I am glad you have mentioned in your postscript the statement contained in the letter of the correspondent of the 'Times' newspaper of the 18th, and repeated in a much more offensive manner on the authority of this person (which is quoted by the writer), in another paper of the same date, the 'Manchester Guardian.' The statement is totally devoid of truth, as stated by me, in answer to a question from Her Majesty's Government. Further than this, I applied non-officially as soon as I became aware of your son's captivity, and was told that no interference in a matter of this nature would be endured. This being the case, I did not subject the English Government to a refusal, which would have been as embarrassing as it was certain. I have been so long in Prussia that I have acquired a certain standing here, and at any rate know pretty well when I can or cannot push a difficult point; and I can only assure you that in this instance I felt compelled to confine my efforts to procuring your son comforts in prison, and the means of writing to his friends. The letters have, in all probability, never been forwarded, but for this I am in no way answerable. I was not allowed to take charge of them, and I can do nothing secretly. Your son was visited by me every day, with the exception of one, when I asked my assistant, Captain Hozier, to take him some newspapers, as I was too busy to be able to get to the prison in visiting hours. This is the visit of which the newspapers have made so much capital for Captain Hozier, who never visited your son but in my company, or at my desire. Your son was furnished by me with as many newspapers as I could spare to him, and had my permission to order what food he pleased and a fair quantity of wine and cigars, as I did not consider it fair or right to confine him to prison diet.

"My visits to him were not confined to seeing that he was still alive, as I invariably gave him as long a time as I could spare from my other duties. Before his departure I took care that he was provided with such clothes as he wished, including a great coat; and I advanced him 100 francs for his expenses on the road, from a fund at my disposal. He wrote me two most grateful letters the evening before his departure, which I much regret not having kept, as I should certainly have asked you to publish them. They were so truthfully worded, that I handed them to the Prussian authorities as an additional proof of my assertion, that, however imprudent in the mode of exit from Paris, and whoever his companions may have been, your son was simply a young Englishman in business, who was anxious to get home to his mother and to his affairs. I regret to be obliged to appear egotistical; but, in justice to myself, I cannot allow you to remain in ignorance of the truth, and you are perfectly at liberty to make any use you please of this letter. I beg you to be assured of my deep and warmest sympathy, and to believe me, &c.

(Signed) "BEAUCHAMPS WALKER COLVEILL." [Sic.]

"To Mrs. Worth."

No. 56.

Mr. Otway to Mr. Littlewood.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 9, 1870.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 7th instant, relative to the case of Mr. Worth.

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Lord Granville has received a despatch from Mr. Odo Russell, stating that Colonel Walker, who left nothing undone to assist Mr. Worth while at Versailles, is now in communication with Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin to endeavour to obtain his release.

Mr. Russell adds that he will not fail to speak to the proper authorities in Mr. Worth's behalf, if he finds that anything further can be done for him at Versailles.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR OTWAY.

No. 57.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received December 12.)

My Lord,

Berlin, December 10, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Mr. Harriss-Gastrell on the detention at Cologne, under military arrest, of Mr. Worth.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell states that Mr. Worth's trial will probably not come on for three or four weeks.

He has made arrangements for his being properly defended by counsel, but he had not received permission to see or confer with him.

As there is no use in Mr. Harriss-Gastrell's remaining at Cologne, he will return here immediately, but he can repair again to Cologne when the trial comes on if there should be any necessity for him to do so.

I am inclined to think that the military authorities at Cologne have greatly exaggerated the nature of the charges to be brought against Mr. Worth, and the severity of the sentence to which he is liable. To calm the apprehensions of his relatives in England, should similar reports have reached them, I may confidently assure your Lordship that no sentence pronounced against him by the court-martial will be carried into effect without being previously referred to His Majesty the King of Prussia, in whose leniency they may place full confidence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 57.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Lord A. Loftus.

(Extract.)

Cologne, December 7, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to make to your Lordship the following report upon the case of Mr. Worth, into which I have, in conformity with your instructions, made every inquiry which is possible at its present stage.

I was met at the outset by an apparent resolve of the military authorities to hold no communication with me respecting this case, but this attitude was quickly changed into an attitude indicative of a courteous desire to meet my wish for information on various points, so far as such a concession could be carried without encroaching upon necessary official reticence. The Governor of Cologne, General von Falkenberg, to whom I presented my letter from the Secretary of State, Baron Thile, granted me interviews in which both his Excellency and his Adjutant, Captain von Altenbrück, showed me much courtesy.

In prosecuting my inquiries I specially directed my attention to the treatment of Mr. Worth as a prisoner of war under arrest, to the charges against him, and to the facilities of defence which he could receive.

Mr. Worth, who arrived in Cologne on the 25th ultimo, was not at first in as comfortable a position as he has latterly been. His Excellency the Governor informed me that he is now under arrest at the military prison in an officer's room of arrest, and that he is allowed to procure for himself everything which he requires. For this purpose Mr. Pepys, of this city, has been allowed to supply him with money, amounting at present to 15*l.* sterling. He has been allowed freedom of letter-writing, and I am not aware that he has had reason to make any complaint of his treatment, which seems to be considerate, and so far alleviated, in comparison with the usual treatment of prisoners, as is compatible with the alleged nature of the case against him.

The preliminary investigation ("Untersuchung") does not seem to be yet finished. Indeed, some documents in the case of importance are said to have only just arrived in this city. The bill of indictment is not yet drawn up, for the specific charges to be made are not yet ascertained. But there will probably be two chief or only counts. Mr. Worth will be accused of the act of spying, and of the fact of being directly or indirectly an agent of the French Government.

As regards the first of these accusations, I pointed out that there was no precedent for holding that the mere passage of a man in a balloon at the sole direction of the wind over the lines of an army was an act of spying; and I urged that, if it were desirable to stretch the usual laws of war so as to include amongst acts of spying the escape of individuals in balloons from a beleaguered city, it would be necessary and just on investing a city to publish a warning to that effect. But, I added, in the case of Mr. Worth, I could see no sufficient and just reason for dealing with the fact alone of his escape from Paris in a balloon as proof of an act of spying. The Governor acknowledged that there was diversity of opinion on that point, but he was personally of opinion that the act of escaping in an unauthorized manner from a beleaguered city did not constitute an act of spying. I admitted that, as persons passing over the lines of an army might obtain information which might be used by the enemy, there might exist good military reasons for detaining, with exclusion from all intercourse, such persons, until the information could no longer be useful; and I expressed the hope that this was the chief cause of the detention of Mr. Worth.

His Excellency did not confirm this hope, but stated his moral impression to be that, if there were only this first accusation against him, Mr. Worth would eventually be liberated.

As regards the second accusation, it is not clear on what grounds Mr. Worth can be charged with being an agent of the French Government. It appears that he and three Frenchmen (also in Cologne for trial) were captured, whilst a fourth Frenchman escaped in a balloon with the despatches of the French Government. The aeronaut, who escaped, would have been the chief defendant. In his absence, it will probably be difficult to prove any complicity between him and the captured passengers of the balloon. Moreover, I cannot find that any compromising correspondence has been found upon Mr. Worth or his companions. If, therefore, this accusation be founded on no better grounds than are now visible, the case will resolve itself into the fact of Mr. Worth escaping in an unauthorized manner from a disagreeable residence and possible famine in Paris. But, although I have not yet obtained direct official confirmation of the fact of the existence of a letter compromising Mr. Worth as an agent of the French Government, either as principal or accessory, in procuring arms for the French army, various rumours in this city as to the existence of a compromising letter have now taken the form of the allegations that such a letter, referring to Mr. Worth as having given an address to a French agent for procuring arms in England, exists; that it has been laid by the prosecution before Mr. Worth, and that he has explained that he merely gave the address, like any other address, to a Frenchman who called at his place of business. I cannot say whether or not the rumour has any kernel of truth in a shell of fiction, but unless such a letter, supposing it to exist, contain only evidence of some proceeding as little reprehensible as giving an address out of a post-office directory, Mr. Worth may run great risk of being condemned to death by a court-martial.

I have further inquired as to what facilities Mr. Worth could obtain for his defence. It may still require several days to draw up the bill of indictment, but, as soon as the charges shall be formulated, they will be made known to him. A reasonable period—two or three weeks—will be granted to him for the preparation of his defence. He has permission to employ a lawyer, who will be allowed to consult with him. There is no appeal from the sentence of a court-martial, and the law permits the sentence to be carried out within twenty-four hours. I think it might be desirable that a longer delay between the passing and execution of the sentence should be beforehand secured on behalf of Mr. Worth, in consideration of his being a foreigner and at a distance from his friends. But, although I begged the Governor to be kind enough, on the passing of any sentence upon Mr. Worth, to stay its execution till after an exchange of communications with the Government of His Prussian Majesty at Berlin, his Excellency stated that he could not, on his own responsibility, prolong the legal period, and could only defer the execution of the sentence during communications with Berlin or elsewhere in obedience to a direct order from the proper quarter.

Lastly, I have pressed upon the Governor my desire to be allowed to pay a visit to Mr. Worth. I have, however, failed in carrying my point. His Excellency declined to make, on his own responsibility, any exception in my favour to the rigid rule strictly

carried out in all such cases. My reference to the fact of Colonel Walker having been permitted to visit Mr. Worth at Versailles was met by the counter fact that the Governor of Cologne was not responsible for relaxation of the legal rule in Versailles. When I pleaded that it would be a satisfaction to Mr. Worth's friends, a pleasant break to himself in a long imprisonment, and a favour to the Government of a friendly nation, if I were allowed to pay him a visit, his Excellency regretted much the impossibility of complying with my wish.

Your Lordship will observe that, in raising a little the veil of strict official secrecy which had been firmly drawn between my inquiries and Mr. Worth's case, I have avoided any advocacy on behalf of Mr. Worth which might have even the appearance of defending a breach of the neutrality of England. I feel that, if there had been a certainty of only the first accusation being brought against Mr. Worth, I could have urged, on grounds of humanity, and in view of the lightness of his offence, his speedy liberation upon the Governor. But with such an accusation still impending as the second, which might involve both a breach of the neutrality of his country and a question of life or death to himself, I feel that I could not advocate the early liberation of Mr. Worth. I contented myself with expressing the hope that no such a grave charge would be eventually preferred against him, and with urging that he should have as long a period as possible for preparing his defence. In my ignorance of the laws of war, and of the varieties of offence and penalty therein set forth, I did not feel myself competent to discuss the lightness or the gravity of the guilt which might attach to Mr. Worth as an agent of the French Government. But I am informed that to supply arms to or to aid in procuring arms for the enemy is an offence punishable with death, and an offence of an aggravated character when committed by a neutral.

I am addressing to Mr. Worth a letter, of which I beg to inclose a copy.

Inclosure 2 in No. 57.

Mr. Harriß-Gastrell to Mr. Worth.

Sir,

Hotel du Nord, Cologne, December 8, 1870.

I HAVE been here a few days and I have, so far as is possible, inquired on behalf of Her Majesty's Government into the circumstances of your case. I am glad to find, as was naturally to be expected, that the hardships of imprisonment have been alleviated for you by the considerateness of the Governor of Cologne, so far as such alleviations are not incompatible with the nature of your case.

I am informed that your trial will take place as soon as possible. The charges against you will, as soon as they are formulated, be made known to you. In order to prepare your defence you will be allowed a reasonable period—two or three weeks—after the accusation is made and before the trial begins. I have obtained permission for you to employ for your defence a lawyer, should you think it necessary or desirable. You will, of course, be allowed to consult with your lawyer during the period allotted to you for the preparation of your defence.

Whatever the charges against you may eventually be, you may rest assured that your case will be tried by the Prussian military authorities with impartiality and fairness, and with every due regard to your position as a civilian and a neutral; and whatever those charges may be, I sincerely hope you will have a satisfactory defence and will easily obtain your release from imprisonment.

As I am unable to remain in Cologne I am begging Mr. Pepys to be so kind as to attend to any wish you may express in a letter to him, to employ a lawyer in your defence. I understand there are several competent lawyers here who speak either French or English as well as German.

I regret that the law, as stated to be applicable to your case, does not allow the Governor of Cologne to give me permission to pay you a visit to tell you what I have now written. You are, however, at full liberty to write in open letters to me or to Her Majesty's Embassy in Berlin, and I should be obliged if you would avail yourself of it to acknowledge the receipt of this letter to me either here, where I remain till to-morrow (Friday) morning, or at Berlin.

I am, &c.

(Signed) J. P. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

No. 58.

Lord Kesteven to Mr. Hammond.—(Received December 12.)

Dear Sir,

Cavewick, Stamford, December 10, 1870.

I AM greatly interested in the fate of the gentleman who is the subject of the inclosed Memorial, as he is a native of this county, all the family and his relatives being well known to me, who are in the deepest anxiety about him; and I trust that Her Majesty's Government will use every exertion to obtain his liberation from his prison at Cologne, as I am confident he has taken no part whatever in the war hostile to the North German Army, his desire being simply to escape from Paris to look after his commercial affairs.

I am, &c.
(Signed) KESTEVEN.

Inclosure in No. 58.

*Statement relative to the Imprisonment by the Prussian Authorities of
Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth, a British Subject.*

MR. FREDERICK GONNER WORTH is the junior partner in the firm of Messrs. Delattre and Worth, carrying on business in Cannon Street, London, and in Paris.

M. Delattre, the senior partner in the firm, is a Baron of France, and a French subject, and has hitherto managed that portion of the business which has been carried on in Paris.

Mr. Worth, who is the son of English parents, and himself a British subject, has managed that portion of the business which has been carried on in London.

Shortly before the investment of Paris M. Delattre, who had some years previously held a commission in the Imperial Guard, was ordered to join the National Guard, and he was enrolled accordingly. In this state of things Mr. Worth was compelled to leave London for Paris, with the intention of superintending the business of the firm there. He remained in Paris for some weeks after the investment for the purpose of taking care of a somewhat extensive stock in trade, the property of the firm, which was then in the capital. At length, fearing that his protracted absence would have the effect of injuring his business in London and elsewhere, and being especially desirous of returning to his mother, with whom he lived, and who is in delicate health, and of whom he is the only child.

Prior to the time when Mr. Wodehouse's party were granted permission to cross the Prussian lines Mr. Worth made several inquiries with a view of obtaining permission to leave Paris, but he was on all occasions informed that it was impossible to do so, and in consequence of such information he unfortunately was not included in the party taken out by Mr. Wodehouse. Ultimately he determined to risk the journey in a balloon, and accordingly entered himself as a passenger by a balloon shortly leaving Paris, and for his passage paid 100l.

Owing to an adverse wind this balloon was carried at a low distance above the Prussian forces then investing Verdun, and was fired upon by the soldiers, and descended in their midst.

Mr. Worth was taken prisoner and dispatched to Versailles, where he was detained nearly a month in prison. He was then sent in a cattle truck to Cologne, where he is confined in a small cell, and it is stated that he will be so confined until the German authorities shall think fit to summon a court-martial to try his case.

Mr. Worth's business is of an entirely peaceable description. His only object in going to Paris, and again in leaving it, was to take care of his business, and he was not in any way mixed up with any political questions:

Mr. Worth when he left England was the holder of a British passport.

No. 59.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received December 13.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon Street, December 12, 1870.

I CONFIRM my letter of the 7th instant, and have now to thank your Lordship for Mr. Otway's letter of the 9th instant.

I now inclose copy of letter received from Mr. W. H. Pepys, of Cologne, the contents of which appear to be of great importance, inasmuch as one of Her Majesty's Secretaries from Berlin has been refused permission to see Mr. Worth; also, that the Germans intend to try this Englishman at some indefinite date, certainly not before three weeks. Now as it is a matter of the highest importance that Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth's mother and relations should be kept no longer in anxiety, may I entreat your Lordship to inform them, through me, what the specific charge against Mr. Worth is, and further, whether he is to be detained in prison until such time as they the Germans may think fit to try him? as the poor fellow has already been confined since the 27th October, and for what reason no one knows.

Trusting your Lordship will accept my humble apology for thus troubling you, I am, &c.

(Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

Inclosure in No. 59.

Mr. Pepys to Mr. Littlewood.

Dear Sir,

Cologne, December 9, 1870.

YOUR favours of the 30th ultimo, 2nd and 6th instant, and telegram of that date, are in my hands. I have had two interviews with Mr. Harriss-Gastrell (Secretary to the Embassy at Berlin), who has obtained the permission that Mr. Worth have a lawyer to defend him, should he wish it, three weeks before the court-martial.

I have undertaken, at Mr. Gastrell's request, that upon Mr. Worth writing to me, I will furnish him with a fit and able man.

Mr. G. could not obtain permission to see Mr. Worth, not even for himself, therefore still less for you. At the present moment you cannot be of any service to him here.

I have not received the "Standard," which you write you had forwarded me. Should anything new transpire I will write you immediately.

Believe me, &c.
(Signed) W. H. PEPYS.

No. 60.

Mr. Littlewood to Mr. Otway.—(Received December 17.)

Sir,

110, Cannon Street, December 16, 1870.

I CONFIRM my letter to his Lordship Earl Granville of the 12th instant, to which I am without a reply.

I understood you to say, at our interview on Wednesday last, that you had that day written. This letter has not yet come to hand.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

No. 61.

Mr. Otway to Mr. Littlewood.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 17, 1870.

IN reply to your several communications in the case of Mr. Worth I am directed by Earl Granville to inform you that, according to the Report of Mr. Harriss-Gastrell, who had been sent from Her Majesty's Embassy at Berlin to Cologne, Mr. Worth is receiving considerate treatment at the hands of the Prussian authorities; and although Mr. Harriss-Gastrell was unable to obtain access to him, he understood that Mr. Worth enjoyed liberty of communication by letter. The charges against Mr. Worth were to be communicated to him as soon as they are drawn up after the conclusion of the preliminary investigation now going on. Mr. Worth will be allowed a reasonable time (two or three weeks) to prepare his defence before the trial begins, and permission has, as you are aware, been obtained for him to employ legal assistance if he should desire it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR OTWAY.

No. 62.

Mr. Hammond to Lord Kesteven.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 17, 1870.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to inform you, in reply to your letter of the 10th instant, that Her Majesty's Government are doing all in their power in behalf of Mr. Worth, and that a Secretary of Her Majesty's Embassy at Berlin has been sent to Cologne to report upon the case.

He states that Mr. Worth is considerably treated and is allowed freedom of letter-writing, although he has been unable to obtain access to him. It is understood that the charges against Mr. Worth will be communicated to him as soon as they are drawn up after the conclusion of the preliminary investigation now going on. Mr. Worth will be allowed a reasonable time (two or three weeks) to prepare his defence before the trial begins, and permission has also been obtained for him to employ legal assistance if he should desire it.

From the confidential assurances received from the Prussian Government, Mr. Worth's friends need entertain no apprehensions about his life.

I am, &c.

(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 63.

Mr. Otway to Mrs. Worth.

Madam,

Foreign Office, December 18, 1870.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to acquaint you that your son's life is perfectly safe.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ARTHUR OTWAY

No. 64.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received December 19.)

(Extract.)

Berlin, December 17, 18

I HAVE not thought it advisable to make any further appeal to Baron Thile on the case of Mr. Worth—because his Excellency is powerless in the matter.

I shall, however, provide that the sentence against Mr. Worth may be immediately reported to me by telegraph, and I shall then report it to your Lordship in the same manner.

No. 65.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received December 19.)

My Lord,

Berlin, December 17, 1870.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 10th December, and in order to complete the information with respect to the case of Mr. Worth, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship a letter of the 8th instant, and a letter of the 13th instant, addressed to me by Mr. Harriss-Gastrell with respect to the inquiries he recently made at Cologne into the case of Mr. Worth.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 65.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Lord A. Loftus.

(Extract.)

Cologne, December 8, 1870

IT appears that amongst the papers in this case, a letter, addressed to a Mr. Littlewood in London, is of great importance, for it contains an order for arms, or at any rate a reference to an order for arms, to be delivered to the French Government.

Inclosure 2 in No. 65.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord,

Berlin, December 13, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to report that I have received the inclosed letter from Mr. Worth and that, on the occasion of my taking leave of the Governor of Cologne, his Excellency referred to the case of Mr. Worth, by saying, that in all probability the case, in spite of its graver aspect, would be allowed to die out ("weglaufen").

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. T. HARRISS-GASTRELL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 65.

Mr. Worth to Mr. Harriss-Gastrell.

Sir,

Military Prison, Cologne, December 9, 1870.

AS I see that I am now permitted to write in open letters to Her Majesty's Government, I take the earliest opportunity of replying to your note of yesterday.

I am glad to find that my trial may shortly be expected to take place, and when I know what are the charges formulated against me I will instruct a lawyer for my defence if necessary. I do not think, however, that such will be the case. I must admit that I fully expected to be set at liberty immediately on my arrival in Cologne. Had it not been that I had paid for my place in the balloon at a moment when I believed that I could not get out of Paris by other means, I certainly should have left at the same time with Mr. Wodehouse at the commencement of November.

I regret excessively that it was impossible for you to pay me a visit here, but I have to thank you for doing all you could under the circumstances, and more especially for having spoken to Mr. Pepys on my account.

Lord A. Loftus and Earl Granville are still, I believe, exerting themselves on my behalf. I need not tell you that, if these exertions should shortly prove successful in procuring my liberty, I shall be more than glad, as for painful family reasons my presence in England is very necessary.

Again thanking you,

I am, &c.

(Signed) F. G. WORTH.

P.S.—If you would write me a line in reply to this I should be pleased. Here I am tolerably comfortable, thanks to the consideration of the Governor of Cologne; but still I am in prison.

F. G. W.

No. 66.

Mrs. Worth to Earl Granville.—(Received January 7, 1871.)

My Lord,

11, Sandfield Place, Lewisham, December 27, 1870.

I FEEL myself compelled at last to address you respecting my poor son, Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth, who was taken prisoner by the Germans for leaving Paris in a balloon. Colonel Walker has kindly written to me several times relative to his capture, which was on the 27th of October, and I find that during his long detention at Versailles he would have been treated as a common prisoner had not Colonel Walker supplied him daily with proper food and necessaries. He is now in captivity at Cologne, and it seems there has been time for Her Majesty's Government to find out why he, a gentleman, should be subject to such treatment; also why he is detained. No one has told me the cause of his imprisonment, or what will eventually become of him. This is indeed a great trial to me, his mother, for he is my only child. When I think of his blighted prospects, and myself, left almost without means, on account of his being so unjustly deprived of his liberty, I think your Lordship will not be surprised at my feeling weighed down with anxiety and grief.

Colonel Walker states that he believes my poor son quite innocent of any charge

whatever; therefore it is with that assurance I feel bound to ask Her Majesty's Government, through your Lordship, to adopt immediate measures on his behalf.

I have, &c.
(Signed) FRANCES WORTH.

No. 67.

Mr. Otway to Mrs. Worth.

Foreign Office, January 4, 1871.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 27th instant, on the subject of your son's capture by the German troops after leaving Paris in a balloon. I am to inform you in reply that Her Majesty's Government, acting under the advice of the Law Officers of the Crown, have done all that is in their power on your son's behalf. Both Mr. Odo Russell, at Versailles, and Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, have been instructed to represent that Mr. Worth should be released, provided that he can prove himself to be free from complicity in any unneutral proceeding.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell, Second Secretary in Her Majesty's Embassy at Berlin, has recently been sent to Cologne to report upon the case, and states that Mr. Worth is considerably treated, and is allowed freedom of letter-writing, although Mr. Harriss-Gastrell could not obtain permission to see him. It was understood that the charges against Mr. Worth will be communicated to him as soon as they are drawn up, after the conclusion of a preliminary investigation which was going on at the time of Mr. Harriss-Gastrell's visit. A reasonable time—two or three weeks—would then be allowed Mr. Worth to prepare his defence, and permission has been obtained for him to employ legal assistance if he should desire it.

I am to add that, from the confidential assurances received from the Prussian Government, Mr. Worth's relatives need entertain no apprehensions about his life.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ARTHUR OTWAY.

No. 68.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received January 13.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon-Street, London, January 12, 1871.

I HAVE refrained from addressing you since the 12th of December last, acting under the advice of your late Under-Secretary, Mr. Otway, who stated he thought the matter of Mr. Worth would be better if it were not pressed, but considering it is now one month since I troubled your Lordship, I doubt not that you will be able to give me now the reason of Mr. Worth's detention by the German authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

No. 69.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received January 16.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon Street, January 16, 1871.

I CONFIRM my letter of the 12th instant, which I fear has not reached your Lordship, as I am without a reply thereto. May I ask whether this is so?

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

No. 70.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 17, 1871.

I SHOULD be glad to learn from your Excellency whether any progress has been made in the proceedings against Mr. Worth, referred to in your despatch of the

10th ultimo, and in previous correspondence ; and whether you have any information as to when his trial may be expected to be brought to a conclusion.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 71.

Viscount Enfield to Mr. Littlewood.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 17, 1871.

I AM directed by Earl Granville, in reply to your letter of the 12th instant, to inform you that Her Majesty's Government do not feel that they would be justified in remonstrating with the North German Government upon the fact that Mr. Worth's trial has not yet been concluded.

The Secretary of Her Majesty's Embassy at Berlin, who was sent to Cologne last month to inquire into this case, reported that, after the indictment against Mr. Worth was completed, two or three weeks would be allowed to him to prepare his defence ; and, under these circumstances, it does not appear, so far as Her Majesty's Government are informed, that the delay has been unreasonable.

Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin has, however, been requested to report what stage the case has at present reached.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ENFIELD.

No. 72.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received January 20.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon Street, January 19, 1871.

I CONFIRM my letter of the 16th instant, and to-day (the 19th) have received your Lordship's reply to my communication of the 12th instant, dated the 17th.

I take due notice of your remarks regarding Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth's trial ; also that you have written to Berlin on the subject, for information on the state of the case.

Permit me to bring before your Lordship the facts of this case.

Mr. Worth has now been in prison since the 27th of October, 1870, making nearly three months ; his mother, father, relations, and friends do not know what he is detained for, more especially tried by court-martial. Therefore may I ask what information Her Majesty's Government has on these points.

I may inform your Lordship that, for a gentleman to be engaged in business, and without notice to be placed in confinement ; also being denied communication with the outer world, is complete ruin to him, and such is the case with this gentleman.

I heard from Cologne yesterday, when the letter stated he was to be tried on the 17th ; therefore I have no doubt your Lordship will be able to give me full particulars of the trial.

I am, &c.
(Signed) HENRY B. LITTLEWOOD.

No. 73.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received January 23.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon Street, London, January 23, 1871.

I CONFIRM my letter of the 19th instant, to which I am without any reply.

This morning I have advices from Cologne, which state, that Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth has been tried, and his papers have been submitted to the Emperor at Versailles.

With this information, allow me to suggest to your Lordship the advisability of communicating this fact to Mr. Odo Russell.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

No. 74.

Viscount Enfield to Mr. Littlewood.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 23, 1871.

IN acknowledging the receipt of your letter of this day's date, I am directed by Earl Granville to acquaint you that he has lost no time in taking the necessary steps by telegraph for obtaining from Versailles the information you desire relative to the trial of Mr. Worth.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ENFIELD.

No. 75.

Earl Granville to Mr. Odo Russell.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, January 23, 1871.

I HAVE been informed to-day that the trial of Mr. Worth at Cologne has been concluded, and that the papers respecting him have been sent to Versailles to be submitted to the Emperor.

The information is not official, and I cannot vouch for its accuracy; but I should wish you to ascertain whether the papers have reached Versailles, and if so, to inquire the result of the trial, and the nature of the sentence which has been passed.

No. 76.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received January 25.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon Street, January 24, 1871.

I CONFIRM my letter of yesterday's date, and am now in receipt of your Lordship's reply.

Allow me to offer your Lordship the thanks of Mr. Worth's relatives for the prompt manner in which you have sought the information required by them.

I need hardly say that I shall be thankful to receive any news that may arrive from Versailles.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

No. 77.

Viscount Enfield to Mr. Littlewood.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 27, 1871.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to acquaint you that Mr. Odo Russell has again been requested by telegraph to report, as soon as possible, any information which he may obtain at Versailles respecting the proceedings against Mr. Worth.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ENFIELD.

No. 78.

Earl Granville to Mr. Odo Russell.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, January 27, 1871.

I TELEGRAPHED to you to inquire into the case of Mr. Worth, as I am told that it has been referred to Versailles. Report to me upon it as soon as possible.

No. 79.

Mr. Odo Russell to Earl Granville.—(Received January 30.)

My Lord,

Versailles, January 25, 1871.

ON receiving your Lordship's telegram of the 23rd instant, I once more appealed to Count Bismarck on behalf of Mr. Worth, and hope that he will at last soon be released.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 80.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received January 30.)

(Extract.)

Berlin, January 28, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith copy of a report I have received from Mr. Harriss-Gastrell on the case of Mr. Worth, now under confinement in Cologne, having been made prisoner by Prussians out of a balloon from Paris.

From this report your Lordship will see that the trial has taken place, although the sentence has not been definitively pronounced, the decision having been referred to the higher military authorities at Versailles.

It appears that the offence of which Mr. Worth has been guilty is of a graver nature than was at first anticipated, and that he has acknowledged to have been the writer of a letter to Mr. Littlewood, which was captured previous to his own arrest, and which contained an order for the purchase of arms for the French Government.

Inclosure in No. 80.

Mr. Harriss-Gastrell to Lord A. Loftus.

(Extract.)

Cologne, January 26, 1871.

THE letter which so gravely compromised Mr. Worth, and to which I referred in my letter of the 8th December last, has been acknowledged by Mr. Worth to be in his handwriting. It is signed by him, is addressed to Mr. Littlewood, and contains a direct order for arms for the French Government. If this letter had been found on Mr. Worth, it appears that the laws of war would have permitted him to be forthwith shot by his captors. Luckily for Mr. Worth the letter was captured in another balloon about four weeks before he was himself captured. Of this fact Mr. Worth made use in his defence.

The necessary court-martial has already been held upon Mr. Worth, and a judgment passed. This judgment has been referred to Versailles for revision.

The Governor offered Mr. Worth the services of Herr Fischer, a well-known and experienced lawyer of Cologne, who is acquainted with the laws and procedure of military justice, and who is now acting as a Landwehr Adjutant. Mr. Worth accepted Herr Fischer for his defending counsel. The chief plea raised in the defence was, that Mr. Worth had endeavoured soon after writing the letter to obtain repossession of it, but that the holder of it caused it to be sent out of Paris by balloon, post, refusing to give it up. Others were the absence of proof that Mr. Worth had in any way actually contributed to the supply of any arms to the French Government, and also the absence of proof that he had himself dispatched the letter written during a momentary absence of reflection.

I am glad to add that Mr. Worth is still treated with the considerateness I had the honour to report in my letter of the 7th December last.

Your Lordship will understand how, under these circumstances, Mr. Pepys has not been called upon to find a defender for Mr. Worth.

No. 81.

Mr. Littlewood to Viscount Enfield.—(Received January 30.)

(Telegraphic.)

110, Cannon Street, London, January 30, 1871.

WILL you kindly telegraph me any news you have of Mr. Worth at once?

No. 82.

Viscount Enfield to Mr. Littlewood.

Sir, *Foreign Office, January 30, 1871.*
 I AM directed by Earl Granville to acquaint you that information has been received by telegraph from Mr. Odo Russell that Mr. Worth will shortly be set at liberty.

I am, &c.
 (Signed) ENFIELD.

No. 83.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received February 4.)

My Lord, *110, Cannon Street, February 4, 1871.*
 I BEG to thank you for the information contained in Lord Enfield's letter of the 30th ultimo, that Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth will be released from custody shortly. At the present moment he is in prison at Cologne, having been tried by court-martial on the 19th January, and evidently found innocent; or not guilty, of any act of complicity against the German Government. Therefore, will your Lordship kindly inform me why Mr. Worth has been in prison nearly four months; upon what charges he has been tried, and why he is now detained in prison.

These questions I trust your Lordship will admit are very naturally put forward by Mr. Worth's relations and friends; so may I beg your reply thereto at the earliest possible date.

I have, &c.
 (Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

No. 84.

Viscount Enfield to Mr. Littlewood.

Sir, *Foreign Office, February 8, 1871.*
 I AM directed by Earl Granville to inform you, in reply to your letter of the 4th instant, that the proceedings of the court-martial at Cologne, by which Mr. Worth was tried, were secret, and that their nature and result have not yet been communicated to Her Majesty's Government, but that a Secretary to Her Majesty's Embassy at Berlin, who was sent specially to Cologne, has ascertained that he had, as was promised, every facility accorded to him for conducting his defence. Her Majesty's Government have no information to warrant them in assuming that he was acquitted of whatever charges were brought against him, nor do they as yet know whether his approaching liberation, which has been announced by Mr. Odo Russell, is owing to his acquittal by the court-martial or to an act of clemency on the part of the Emperor. The fact, however, of his being still detained in prison naturally leads to the inference that it is due to the latter cause.

I am, &c.
 (Signed) ENFIELD.

No. 85.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received February 9.)

My Lord, *110, Cannon Street, February 8, 1871.*
 I LAST wrote you on the 4th instant, and am sorry to inform your Lordship that I am without a reply to that letter, more especially as continual inquiries are being made to me on the points I mention therein. May I ask the favour of your reply?

I am, &c.
 (Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

No. 86.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received February 9.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon Street, February 9, 1871.

THIS morning I received your reply to my letter of the 4th instant, for which I tender your Lordship my sincere thanks.

I shall be much obliged if your Lordship will have communicated to me the particulars of the charges against Mr. Worth, together with the result of the trial, so soon as they arrive, as I conclude from your letter that this information is only delayed for a time.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

No. 87.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received February 10.)

My Lord,

Berlin, February 8, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith, in translation, copy of a letter I have received from M. Fischer, the advocate employed for the defence of Mr. Worth at Cologne, in answer to my inquiry as to the result of the trial.

M. Fischer states, that although he is unable to report the sentence passed on Mr. Worth, he is of opinion that it is favourable to him.

I have requested M. Fischer to inform Her Majesty's Embassy of the sentence passed on Mr. Worth when officially made known.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 87.

M. Fischer to Lord A. Loftus.

('Translation.)

WITH reference to your communication of the 4th instant, I have the honour to inform you that I have heard nothing officially regarding the result of the court-martial against Mr. Worth, for whom I have acted as Counsel, as I was obliged to leave the Court immediately after the defence; and the other persons engaged in the court-martial are not permitted to make any communication before the sentence has been confirmed. At the same time, I think, I may safely assume that the sentence, confirmation of which may very shortly be expected, is extremely favourable to Mr. Worth.

If the Embassy desires it, I will, on the confirmation of the sentence, immediately inform them of it.

Yours, &c.

(Signed)

FISCHER, Lawyer.

No. 88.

Mr. Odo Russell to Earl Granville.—(Received February 13.)

My Lord,

Versailles, February 9, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the 9th instant, instructing me to ascertain from Count Bismarck the result of Mr. Worth's trial, the charges preferred against him, and when he will be set at liberty.

I have never ceased to appeal to Count Bismarck in behalf of Mr. Worth, ever since I have been at Versailles; and I have obtained a promise that his life would be spared, and assurances that he would be pardoned by the King, and released after his trial was over. Beyond that, all my exertions have failed, to my deep regret.

The result of his trial does not appear to be yet known at head-quarters. The charges preferred against him are contained in the inclosed despatch from Count Bismarck to Baron Thile; but when he will be set at liberty I have not been able to ascertain.

After all I have done and failed in, during nearly three months, I am convinced that the only way left to obtain his release would be an appeal from Her Majesty the Queen to the Emperor of Germany.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 88.

Count Bismarck to Baron Thile.

(Translation.)

Versailles, December 3, 1870.

WITH reference to my communication of the 23rd of last month respecting the English prisoner Worth, I have the honour to communicate to your Excellency the following particulars, which have been supplied to me by the military authorities:—

The British subject in question, inasmuch as he was captured in a balloon by which illicit correspondence, punishable in time of war, was forwarded, has brought upon himself, as well as the other passengers, the suspicion of being the bearer of such despatches.

The investigation which is about to be instituted against Worth on suspicion of spying and rendering secret services to the enemy will determine if he has been guilty of this offence or not. However, even if the above-mentioned suspicions regarding Worth should not be proved, if, for instance, illicit correspondence had not been found in the balloon, still his arrest and the judicial inquiry would have been justified, because he had spied out and crossed our outposts and positions in a manner which was beyond the control of the outposts, possibly with a view to make use of the information thus gained to our prejudice.

That such a proceeding cannot be tolerated by any Power at war requires no further explanation.

In order, however, to show the good-will of the Government towards a friendly Power, His Majesty has been pleased to command that the result of the inquiry respecting Worth should be communicated to him before the sentence is carried out, and the necessary instruction has been conveyed to the Governor of Cologne.

I request your Excellency to be so good as to bring the foregoing to the knowledge of Lord A. Loftus.

(Signed) VON BISMARCK.

No. 89.

*Earl Granville to Mr. Odo Russell.**

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 16, 1871.

I HAVE instructed you this day by telegraph to use your utmost endeavours to procure information as to the nature of the charges upon which Mr. Worth was tried at Cologne, as to the character of the sentence that was passed upon him if, as may be presumed from his continued imprisonment, he was condemned, and as to the time at which he may be expected to be liberated.

Her Majesty's Government are informed that the trial was concluded and the papers respecting it sent to Versailles nearly a month since, and on the 29th ultimo you informed me by telegraph that he was shortly to be liberated. No efforts have since been spared to obtain information respecting him, but up to the present time no information has been received. His friends are naturally anxious as to his fate, and I must request you to press urgently for an answer on the points to which I have directed your attention, and to state that Her Majesty's Government are most desirous to be made acquainted with the circumstances attending the trial, and the results, in order that they may communicate them to the persons who are interested in him.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

* A similar despatch was addressed to Lord A. Loftus.

No. 90.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received February 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Berlin, February 17, 1871.

M. DE THILE informed me last night that the Military Court at Cologne had acquitted Mr. Worth, and that he would be liberated at once, if he had not already been set at liberty.

No. 91.

Mr. Odo Russell to Earl Granville.—(Received February 17.)

(Telegraphic.)

Versailles, February 17, 1871.

MR. WORTH will be set at liberty immediately, in accordance with orders which have been sent to that effect.

No. 92.

Viscount Enfield to Mr. Littlewood.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 17, 1870.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to inform you that a telegram has this day been received from Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, in which he states that he has been officially informed by the Prussian Government that if Mr. Worth has not already been set at liberty he will be liberated immediately.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ENFIELD.

P.S.—Since the above was written a telegram has been received from Versailles, stating that orders had been sent for the immediate release of Mr. Worth.

E.

No. 93.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received February 18.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon Street, February 18, 1871.

IT is now my pleasure to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's letter of yesterday's date, informing me that Mr. Frederick Gonner Worth is to be set at liberty immediately.

Permit me to thank Her Majesty's Government through you, and also your Lordship personally, for the interest taken in this case.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

No. 94.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received February 20.)

My Lord,

Berlin, February 17, 1871.

ALMOST at the same time as I received your Lordship's telegram of yesterday evening I received a note from Baron Thile, of which I have the honour to inclose a translation, informing me in reply to my note of the 14th November last that Mr. Worth had been acquitted by the Military Court at Cologne, and that he would be liberated at once, if he had not been so already.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 94.

Baron Thile to Lord A. Loftus.

(Translation.)

Berlin, February 16, 1871.

THE Undersigned has the honour, in reply to his Excellency Lord Augustus Loftus' note of the 14th of December last, to inform him that the British subject Worth, who had left Paris in a balloon, has been acquitted by the Court-martial in Cologne. He will be at once set at liberty, if he has not already been so.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) VON THILE.

No. 95.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received February 20.)

(Telegraphic.)

Brussels, February 20, 1871, 2 p.m.

MR. WORTH is just liberated.

No. 96.

Mr. Odo Russell to Earl Granville.—(Received February 23.)

My Lord,

Versailles, February 17, 1871.

I RECEIVED your Lordship's telegram of yesterday respecting Mr. Worth this morning, and was enabled a few hours later to report that orders had been sent to Germany to release him at once.

My despatch of the 9th instant contains all I have been able to ascertain in regard to the character of the charges brought against him.

The letter and documents found in the balloon in which he and his companions were captured are said to have been for the French Government and led to his trial; and it is generally believed that his French companions have already been shot. But all the exertions I have made to penetrate the mystery of their fate have hitherto proved unsuccessful.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 97.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received February 28.)

My Lord,

Berlin, February 23, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith copy of a letter in translation from Dr. Fischer, the advocate employed by Mr. Worth, at Cologne, informing me that he has been acquitted and was set at liberty on the 20th instant.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 97.

M. Fischer to Lord A. Loftus.

(Translation.)

Cologne, February 20, 1871.

THE Council of War which was called together to give judgment in the case of Mr. Worth having acquitted him, and the decision having yesterday been confirmed by the Governor-General, Von Falkenberg, Mr. Worth was to-day set at liberty.

While hastening to notify this, I avail myself, &c.

(Signed) FISCHER, Advocate.

No. 98.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received March 6.)

My Lord,

Berlin, February 27, 1871.

WITH reference to my despatch of the 17th instant, in which I inclosed the copy of a note which I had received from M. de Thile, informing me that Mr. Worth had been acquitted by the Military Court at Cologne, I have now the honour to inclose a translation of a further note from his Excellency, stating that the verdict of the Court has been ratified by the supreme authorities.

I have, &c.

(Signed)

AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 98.

Baron Thile to Lord A. Loftus.

(Translation.)

Berlin, February 26, 1871.

THE Undersigned has the honour to inform his Excellency Lord A. Loftus, in addition to his note of the 16th ultimo, that the acquittal of the British subject, Worth, by the Court-martial in Cologne, has been approved by the supreme authorities.

This liberation, for which an order was immediately given, will have taken place by this time.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed)

THILE.

No. 99.

Mr. Worth to Earl Granville.—(Received March 15.)

My Lord,

Paris, 3, Chaussée d'Antin, March 13, 1871.

ON my release from prison by the Prussian Government on the 21st February last, I should have immediately requested an interview with your Lordship had it not been that I was compelled to start at once for Paris on very urgent business.

On Thursday next I shall be in London, and, if your Lordship will then favour me with an interview, I shall be greatly obliged.

Might I request that the reply to this be forwarded to 110, Cannon Street?

I am, &c.

(Signed)

F. G. WORTH.

No. 100.

Lord Enfield to Mr. Worth.

Foreign Office, March 16, 1871.

VISCOUNT ENFIELD presents his compliments to Mr. Worth, and, in reply to his letter of the 13th instant, received last night, stating that he requests the favour of an interview with Earl Granville this day, is directed to inform him that Lord Granville will be prepared to see him this day at 4 p.m.

No. 101.

Mr. Worth to Earl Granville.—(Received March 20.)

My Lord,

110, Cannon Street, London, March 18, 1871.

IN accordance with your Lordship's request I now beg to state in writing the facts which I verbally communicated on the 18th instant, and these facts will prove to your Lordship's satisfaction that my case merits particular consideration on the part of Her Majesty's Government.

I will commence by stating that I carry on a business both in Paris and London,

but by far the greater part of my fortune and interests are in the former city, and at the commencement of September last my presence there became actually necessary, as my partner was almost entirely occupied with his enforced military duties. Up to the moment of the investment of Paris by the Prussian armies I had been unable to leave, but I had not anticipated, nor had I seen any notice emanating from the British Embassy, that it would be impossible for English subjects to get out of the besieged city.

At the end of September, however, I began to get anxious, especially as I was given to understand that no foreign residents would be allowed to leave, and that from the disposition of the Parisians the siege appeared as if it would last longer than had been generally thought. I knew I should shortly be required in London to attend to business there, to meet payments, and to arrange painful family matters. I therefore decided to leave, although I was at a loss to know by what means.

After trying to get out in various manners, but without success, I heard that a private balloon was about to leave, and, after some difficulty, I obtained the promise of a place. I then went to the British Embassy, and told our Ambassador's Representative, Mr. Wodehouse, that I was about to start in a balloon, and said that if he or his friends had any letters for England I should be happy to take them. I was totally unaware, for my part, that I was leaving Paris in an unauthorized manner. Mr. Wodehouse availed himself of my offer, and several closed letters were sent me. I inclose copy of a note from this gentleman, dated 12th October, 1870. No mention was made to me of the possibility of being able to leave with the British residents.

An accident happened to this balloon, and I was unable to leave in it, and I of course despaired of getting out in any other manner. Consequently, I considered myself at that moment very fortunate indeed to be able to get a place, about the middle of October, for 100*l.* in another private balloon, which was to have started immediately. The departure was, however, daily postponed; and had there been any other means available I should certainly have taken advantage of them. I tried to get out with two or three foreign Ministers, without success.

On the 26th October the balloon had not yet left, and by accident I heard the same evening that the English were going out the following morning. At this I was very much astonished, as Mr. Wodehouse's letter was dated the 14th October, and he had made no mention to me either before or after that date of the proposed departure on the 27th October, nor had I seen any notice whatever respecting it; otherwise I should most certainly have availed myself of the opportunity in preference to the manner in which I left.

The same evening I used every effort possible to find either Mr. Wodehouse or Colonel Claremont, and it was not until 11 o'clock that I gave up all hopes of leaving with my countrymen, on being informed at the Colonel's private residence that he had left Paris for Charenton. I called several times at the Embassy, hoping to find some one, and was at last informed there by the porter that even if I got my name put down on the list it would be useless, as there was no time for its approval by Count Bismarck.

The day following I left in the balloon, as this was the only course now left open to me: the evening of the same day, the 27th October, I was captured by the Prussians. I at once informed them that I was a British subject; my passport, together with all my papers and letters, were taken from me, including those sent through Mr. Wodehouse. I stated that I had no political mission, and that I left Paris on purely personal matters. At Verdun, where the balloon fell, I was, with the two Frenchmen who were my fellow-travellers, in hourly expectation of being shot, as it was evident that we were treated as spies, and it subsequently appeared that we had a very narrow escape. Whilst here I managed to have a letter sent to my mother, informing her of my position. From Verdun we were, however, sent to Versailles, where we arrived on the 5th November, and there separately confined in criminal cells, without any possibility of communicating with the outside world. After having been there three or four days I received a visit from Colonel Walker, to whom I had managed surreptitiously to have a note conveyed, informing him of my position: when he came to see me he said that he had received a telegram from Her Majesty's Government respecting me, and consequently I was persuaded that I should immediately be set at liberty.

I informed Colonel Walker of the exact circumstances of the case, and complained strongly of being treated as a criminal and a spy. He ameliorated my pitiable condition in the cell by requesting the Prussian authorities that better food might be sent, with which request they complied. He also supplied me with a little money (100 francs) and some necessary clothing; in his private capacity he acted as kindly as he was permitted to do.

To my terrible disappointment I was neither liberated nor even questioned in any

way at Versailles, and during the ten days of confinement there, the only Prussian authority I saw was a Police official, who minutely searched me, expecting, I presume, to find something of a compromising nature.

On the 13th November I was told I was to be sent the following morning into Germany, and on hearing this I was naturally very much upset. I sent word through a Frenchman, an attendant in the prison, to Colonel Walker, begging him to come and see me: this he did, and re-assured me somewhat by saying that he had no doubt but that I should be liberated immediately on arrival in Germany.

I may mention that Colonel Walker informed me that the English had not then arrived from Paris, so whether they left at the stated date, the 27th October, I am unable to say.

On the 14th November we were sent off from Versailles on foot, in company with French soldiers, and *en route* another large batch of peasant prisoners was added to our number. I was ill in the prison with fever and diphtheria, and was not in a condition to walk; but I need not give a catalogue of my sufferings, which were of an extremely painful nature: suffice it to say that on the first day's march I was compelled to walk some thirty miles, of which twenty miles with naked feet, as I was unable to wear my boots owing to the inflammation which had come on in prison, and also that I was shut up with between thirty and forty prisoners during three days and three nights in a cattle-truck, with hardly any ventilation.

Nearly one month after capture we arrived at Cologne and were then incarcerated in cells. The food was bad, and, worse than all, the moral suffering in this solitary confinement was unbearable.

We petitioned the Governor to allow us a room in the prison, which he accorded at the expiration of a week.

We received permission to write and receive open letters, subject to the discretion of the authorities.

I wrote to Lord A. Loftus at Berlin, but was informed that my letter would not be forwarded.

As the days and weeks passed slowly away, I began to fear that no steps were being taken on my behalf, and I did not know what my imprisonment might result in, *i.e.*, whether I should be liberated or disposed of in a summary manner.

In December I received a letter from Mr. Harriss-Gastrell, one of the Secretaries at the British Embassy at Berlin, stating that he was not allowed to see me, but that he felt sure that my trial would be justly conducted, and that I should have three weeks to prepare my defence. This letter was not at all reassuring, as I had expected to be liberated, or, at any rate tried if it were necessary, immediately after capture, and nearly two months had already passed by. It was not until the 18th January, nearly three months after capture, that myself and fellow-prisoners were tried, at the same time, by a summary and secret Court-martial; the Prussian authorities procured us an advocate who had four days to prepare our defence, but it was not until a month later, on the 20th February, that we were informed of the result of this trial. This result was that we had all been found innocent and acquitted by the Court-martial held on the 18th January.

On the 20th February, after having undergone a secret imprisonment of four months, and having been declared innocent by the Prussians one month prior to this date, we were set at liberty. During the whole term of our long detention we did not know what our fate might be.

I have given to your Lordship a simple narrative of the facts as they took place, from which you will conclude that my sufferings, both morally and physically, were very great; my business, moreover, which required my presence in London was, as Mr. Littlewood said in his letter to your Lordship of the 19th January, completely ruined on account of my absence. It will be admitted that, as a matter of justice, I am fairly entitled to an indemnity.

I shall be happy to give your Lordship any further information that you may consider necessary.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. G. WORTH.

Inclosure in No. 101.

Mr. Wodehouse to Mr. Worth.

Dear Sir, *British Embassy, October 14, 1870.*
 I AM requested to ask you to be good enough to take charge of the inclosed for
 Mr. Ayrton, Her Majesty's Commissioner of Public Works.
 Yours faithfully,
 (Signed) HENRY WODEHOUSE.

No. 102.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received March 30.)

My Lord, 110, Cannon Street, London, March 29, 1871.
 MR. WORTH asked me, prior to his leaving town, to forward your Lordship's reply
 to his letter of the 18th instant, and, as this has not arrived, may I ask your kind consi-
 deration of the same.

I have, &c.
 (Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

No. 103.

Lord Enfield to Mr. Worth.

Sir, *Foreign Office, April 3, 1871.*
 I AM directed by Earl Granville to inform you that he has had under his considera-
 tion your letter of the 18th ultimo, representing your claims to indemnity on account of
 the imprisonment to which you have been subjected by the German authorities on your
 capture in an attempt to escape from Paris in a balloon.
 His Lordship regrets that, after consultation with the proper Law Adviser of the
 Crown, he does not feel justified in placing such a claim on your behalf before the
 German Government.

I am, &c.
 (Signed) ENFIELD.

No. 104.

Mr. Littlewood to Earl Granville.—(Received April 11.)

My Lord, 110, Cannon Street, London, April 8, 1871.
 MR. F. G. WORTH, who is at this moment very unwell, asked me to acknowledge
 your Lordship's letter of the 3rd instant in reply to his of the 18th ultimo.
 Mr. Worth had believed that, after reading his letter, your Lordship would
 immediately have afforded him redress for all he has undergone.

I have, &c.
 (Signed) HENRY BUCKNALL LITTLEWOOD.

**Correspondence respecting the Imprison-
ment of Mr. Worth by the Prussians.**

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Com-
mand of Her Majesty. 1871.*

LONDON :
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

FRENCH CLAIMS.

MEMORANDUM

RELATIVE TO

Conventions consequent upon the Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and France on 20th November 1815, with Accounts from the commencement of the Fund to January 1871.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.

FRENCH CLAIMS.

By a Convention (No. 7), dated Paris, 20th November 1815, between Great Britain and France, consequent upon the Treaty of Peace between the Allied Powers and France of that date, it was agreed that a capital producing a rente or annuity of 3,500,000 francs should be inscribed in the Great Book of the Public Debt of France, in the names of two or four Commissioners, half English and half French, to indemnify British subjects for property confiscated by the Republic in 1793.

See Parliamentary Papers, Vol. No. 17 of 1816, p. 179 (Art. 9).

It was further agreed that in case the 3,500,000 francs of rente should be found insufficient, inscriptions should be delivered for such an amount as should be necessary to pay all the debts adverted to in this Convention, and as soon as the whole of the payments due to the creditors should have been made, the surplus, if there should be any, of the fund not employed, with the proportion of interest belonging thereto, should be given up to the French Government.

In pursuance of this Convention the Mixed Commission established in Paris proceeded to adjudicate upon a considerable number of claims.

On the 25th April 1818 a new Convention was entered into at Paris; this was done when the Allied Powers and France were concerting measures for the evacuation of the French territory by the allied armies, in virtue of a clause in the definitive Treaty between all the Powers, of 20th November 1815, in which it is stated, that the military occupation, then fixed at five years, might terminate at the end of three years should the Sovereigns agree to acknowledge that the motives which led them to that measure had ceased to exist.

See Parliamentary Papers, Vol. No. 18 of 1819, p. 407 (Art. 1).

By this second Convention, also known as No. 7, it was agreed that, in order to effect the payment and entire extinction as well of the capital as of the interest due thereon to British subjects, there should be inscribed in the Great Book of the Public Debt of France a perpetual annuity of 3,000,000 francs (representing a capital of 60,000,000 of francs), which should bear interest from the 22nd March 1818, and what remained disposable out of the fund of 3,500,000 francs of rente created by the above-mentioned Convention of the 20th November 1815, should be equally applicable to the payment of the claims.

By an additional article to the last-mentioned Convention, dated 4th July 1818, a sum of 450,000 francs (*cash*) was paid by France in discharge of the sums due to British subjects on account of certain Bordeaux claims.

See Parliamentary Papers, Vol. No. 18 of 1819, p. 410 (Art. 1).

The further sum of 150,000 francs of rente or annuity was created under another Convention, also dated at Paris, 25th April 1818, in favour of the inhabitants of the Ionian Isles, the Isle of France, and other countries under the British dominion. This Convention is known as No. 13.

See Parliamentary Papers, Vol. No. 18 of 1819, p. 392 (Art. 7).

Under the Conventions of 1818, three of the Commissioners acting under the Convention of 1815 (Messrs. Mackenzie, Collingwood, and Hammond) were appointed Commissioners of Liquidation, Arbitration, and Award in London, and the other two (Messrs. Morier and Drummond) were appointed Commissioners of Deposit in Paris.

On the 19th May 1819 the Act 59 Geo. 3. cap. 31. passed, which directed the Commissioners to pay the several approved claims in full, if the sums to be received from

France were found to be sufficient, or in part, in rateable proportions if found insufficient. The Commissioners on receiving directions from the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and the Lords of the Treasury, were authorised to sell the whole or any part of the capital, and transfer the proceeds to England, to be invested in Exchequer Bills or other public securities to be applied in the liquidation of claims, or, when all paid and liquidated, for such purposes as the Commissioners of Liquidation should be directed by the Treasury to apply the same, such payment of claims, whether in full or in part, to be an entire discharge of the French and of the English Governments from any demands in respect of the claims.

The Commissioners of Deposit in Paris (Messrs. Morier and Drummond) rendered their final account on 5th March 1827, of the application of the inscriptions of 3,500,000, 3,000,000, and 150,000 francs of rente on account of Conventions 7 and 13, and of the dividends received therefrom, and also of the disposition of the 450,000 francs (*cash*) in respect of the Bordeaux claims. In continuation of these accounts, Mr. Morier and Baron James de Rothschild (to whom the balances of stock and cash, in the hands of Messrs. Morier and Drummond, were transferred at the termination of their proceedings in 1827) rendered accounts from time to time of amounts disposed of under the awards of the Commissioners of Liquidation.

The equivalent in consols of the sum of 1,000,000 francs of rente or annuity was transferred in 1823 from the Commissioners in Paris to the Commissioners in England, Messrs. Mackenzie, Collingwood, and Hammond. In the year 1824 the sum of 300,000 francs of rente was re-transferred to the Commissioners in Paris.

An advance of 250,000*l.* was made to the Commissioners of Woods and Forests on their request to the Treasury for a loan to defray expenses connected with the repairs of Buckingham Palace, but it was expressly stipulated that the advance should be refunded with interest as soon as it might be called for.

This Commission ceased on the 5th July 1828, and in accordance with Treasury directions handed over the balance in their hands (15,607*l.* 13*s.* 10*d.*) to Mr. Stewart, Secretary of the Treasury, and Mr. Bandinel of the Foreign Office.

The repayments by the Commissioners of Woods and Forests of the full amount of the loan, together with the sum of 34,822*l.* 10*s.* for interest, were made to the Agent for Commissariat Supplies, who disbursed the same in the purchase of Exchequer Bills, the payment of claimants, and the expenses incurred by a new Commission, consisting of Mr. W. Empson, Dr. Phillimore, and Mr. A. Martin, appointed on the 4th January 1833, in consideration of the numerous applications from a variety of claimants, who pleaded ignorance of a Treasury decision sanctioning the admittance of claims the proofs of which had not been presented in time.

The Paymaster of Commissariat Supplies became Paymaster of Civil Services in the year 1834, and the balances were consequently transferred from one name to the other.

The office of Paymaster of Civil Services was abolished in 1848, and the balances in the hands of the Paymaster of Civil Services were transferred to the Paymaster-General.

The balances in the hands of the Paymaster-General on 31st January last, as shown on page 10, are 21*l.* 16*s.* 9*d.* and 310*l.* 0*s.* 11*d.* cash and 600*l.* Exchequer Bills (page 9), but these amounts are not sufficient to pay the admitted claims of persons who have not yet presented themselves for payment by about 350*l.*

The whole transactions of the French claims fund from 1815 to the 31st January last, in an abstract form, are given in the accompanying accounts marked A, B, and C, comprising respectively the account of French rentes and the cash accounts in French and English currency. Further, these accounts have been re-cast and converted into sterling at 25 francs to the £, as shown in Accounts D., E., and F.

A summary of the transactions gives the following results :—

1. RENTE ACCOUNT.

The greater portion of the rentes received from the French Government was paid away to claimants, viz. :—

	£	s.	d.
<i>Charge</i> .—Amount of rentes received at 25 francs to the £	313,325	12	0
	£	s.	d.
<i>Discharge</i> .—Handed over to claimants	280,149	3	2
Transferred to cash account	33,176	8	10
	313,325	12	0

2. CASH ACCOUNT.

	£	s.	d.
<i>Receipts.</i> —1. Dividends, &c.	-	-	-
2. Two per cent. deduction fund for expenses of management	-	-	-
3. Interest on loan to Office of Woods	-	-	-
4. Bordeaux claims	-	-	-
	948,738	6	8
	115,519	12	11
	34,822	10	0
	18,000	0	0
	£ 1,117,080	9	7
<i>Payments.</i> —1. Loss by sale of stock*	-	-	-
2. Expenses of Commission	-	-	-
3. Paid to claimants	-	-	-
4. Balance	-	-	-
	219,568	7	4
	156,863	18	3
	740,316	6	4
	331	17	8
	£ 1,117,080	9	7

* 600*l.* Exchequer Bills are still in hand.

The above accounts relating to French claims are quite distinct from the French pecuniary Indemnity under Article 4 of the definitive Treaty signed at Paris on the 20th November 1815, the detailed particulars of which are set forth in the Protocol No. 12 of the same date, under which England received 125,000,000 of francs as her share of the war indemnity, the French claimants had no right to, or claim upon, any portion of this indemnity.

Parliamentary
Papers, Vol.
No. 17 of 1816,
pp. 160, 194,
and 195.

W. E. BAXTER.

Treasury Chambers, 15th May 1871.

A.—FRENCH CLAIMS.—ACCOUNT OF STOCK.

	—	Frances of Rente.	—	—	Frances of Rente.
Convention, No. 7, 20th November 1815 (Vol. No. 17 of 1816, p. 179).	Inscribed in the Great Book of the Public Debt of France in the names of the Mixed Commission, in accordance with the 9th Article of the Convention between Great Britain and France (No. 7), dated Paris, 20th November 1815 - - - - - Purchased by the above-named Commissioners with the dividends received by them, as per Account B. - - - - -	3,500,000 214,187	Convention, No. 7, 20th November 1815.	Transferred to claimants for principal under the awards of the Mixed Commission of Liquidation, per account of Messrs. Morier & Drum- mond as Commissioners of Deposit - - - - - Transferred to claimants for interest, per same account - - - - - Transferred to the two per cent. deduction fund for payment of expenses (see Account B. No. 1.) - - - - -	2,901,806 122,649 44,104
Convention, No. 7, 25th April 1818 (Vol. No. 18 of 1819, p. 407).	Inscribed in the Great Book of the Public Debt of France in the names of the Commissioners of Deposit, in accordance with the 1st Article of the Convention, dated Paris, 25th April 1818 - - - - - Purchased by the above-named Commissioners with the dividends received by them, as per Account B. - - - - -	3,000,000 968,953	Convention, No. 7, 25th April 1818.	Transferred to claimants for principal under the award of the Commis- sioners of Liquidation, per account of Messrs Morier & Drummond - - Transferred to claimants for interest and accumulation, per account of Messrs. Morier & Drummond - - - - - Transferred to claimants for principal and interest in exchange for Viagères, per account of Messrs. Morier & Drummond - - - - - Transferred to the two per cent. deduction fund for payment of expenses (see Account B. No. 2.) - - - - - Sold by Messrs. Morier & Drummond, as per cash account (see Account B. No. 3.) - - - - - Sold by Mr. Morier & Baron Jas. de Rothschild in the year 1835, and pro- ceeds remitted to Paymaster of Civil Services (see Account B. No. 4.) Transferred to the Commissioners in London, per Account C. No. 5. - - - - - Less amount re-transferred, see Account C. No. 5. - - - - -	2,301,502 1,085,807 447,764 78,381 701 526 700,000 }
Convention, No. 13, 25th April 1818 (Vol. No. 18 of 1819, p. 392).	Inscribed in the Great Book of the Public Debt of France in the names of the Commissioners of Deposit, in accordance with the 7th Article of the Convention, dated Paris, 25th April 1818 - - - - -	150,000	Convention, No. 13, 25th April 1818.	Transferred to claimants for principal under the awards of the Commis- sioners of Liquidation by Messrs. Morier & Drummond - - - - - Transferred to the two per cent. deduction fund for payment of expenses (see Account B. No. 6.) - - - - - Transferred to claimants for principal under the awards of the Commis- sioners of Liquidation by Mr. Morier and Baron Jas. de Rothschild - - Transferred to the two per cent. deduction fund for payment of expenses (see Account B. No. 7.) - - - - - Sold by Mr. Morier and Baron Jas. de Rothschild, as per cash account (see Account B. No. 8.) - - - - -	129,522 2,624 14,679 304 2,871
	Frances of Rente - - - - -	7,833,140		Frances of Rente - - - - -	7,833,140

* These sums may be popularly explained as representing the dividends on French stock handed over by the French Government to satisfy claimants for losses sustained.

6

* The particulars of M. Ladebat's case, fully reported to *Parliamentary Paper*, No. 268 of 1836, Vol. No. 37 of 1836, page 609.

* The particulars of M. Ladebat's case, fully reported to *Parliamentary Paper*, No. 268 of 1836, Vol. No. 37 of 1836, page 609.

The foregoing Accounts contain the result of the *actual* transactions of the Fund from the commencement thereof in 1815 down to January last; but in order to make the account more intelligible, that portion of it which shows transactions in French currency has been converted into sterling (reckoning exchange for the sake of convenience at 25 francs to the £), with this object the Accounts A, B, and C have been recast, and are given under the heads D, E, and F, and further an abstract has been made showing the receipts and expenditure of the Fund in English money. But it must be borne in mind that, an arbitrary rate of exchange having been necessarily adopted, the result is only approximate.

ACCOUNT D.

	Annuity equal at 25 francs to the £.		Annuity equal at 25 francs to the £.
—	£ s. d.	—	£ s. d.
Franks of Rente or Annuity.			
3,500,000		2,901,806	
3,000,000 } - - 6,650,000 inscribed by France.		122,649	
150,000		2,301,502	
214,187		1,085,807	
968,953		447,764	franks of Rente or annuity transferred to claimants - - - =
1,183,140 purchased with di- vidends.		129,522	280,149 3 2
7,833,140 francs of Rente or annuity.		14,679	
less ac- counted for below } 829,411		7,003,729	
7,003,729 - - - =	£280,149 3 2		£280,149 3 2
Accounted for in Account B.			
44,104		44,104	
78,281		78,281	
2,624 } Two per cent. deduction fund.		2,624	
304		304	Transferred to Account B., and therein accounted for.
701		701	
526 } Sold.		526	
2,871		2,871	
700,000 accounted for in Ac- count C.		700,000	Transferred to Account C., and therein accounted for.
829,411			
7,833,140		7,833,140	

ACCOUNT E.

			Equivalent at 25 francs to the £.			Equivalent at 25 francs to the £.		
fr.	c.	d.	£	s.	d.	fr.	c.	d.
4,598,746	50		=	183,949	17 2	1,914,277	00	
14,875,616	50		=	594,486	18 0	74,263	00	
937,604	50		=	35,386	12 9	769,783	50	
23,626	00		=	831	8 4	185,668	00	
			=	814,654	16 3	449,464	00	
						(Bordeaux)		
11,473	50					1,143,991	38	
4,471	00							
1,143,991	38							
14,205	55							
53,388	50							
661,950	29							
14,408	50							
120,888	36							
1,342,211	82							
13,181	00							
49,299	03							
311	00							
16,019	00							
5,653	10							
2,840	50							
450,000	00							
24,339,886	03							
Dividends			Dividends			Dividends		
Dividends, less 13,444fr. (263fr. and 13,181fr.), accounted for in Account C., 14,862,172fr. 50c.			Dividends, less 52,988fr. 50c. (36,919fr. 50c. and 16,019fr.) accounted for in Account C., 884,666fr.			Dividends, less 2,840fr. 50c., accounted for in Account C., 20,785fr. 50c.		
Total Dividends			Proceeds of sale of 526fr. of rente			Proceeds of sale of 64,607fr. of rente realized		
Proceeds of sale of 526fr. of rente			Proceeds of sale of 701fr. of rente, less 4,556fr. 05c., accounted for in Account C., 9,649fr. 50c.			Proceeds of sale of 2,871fr. of rente, accounted for in Account C.		
Proceeds of sale of 44,104fr. of rente on account of two per cent. deduction fund			Proceeds of sale of 44,104fr. of rente on account of two per cent. deduction fund			Proceeds of sale of 44,104fr. of rente on account of two per cent. deduction fund		
Dividends received on account of two per cent. deduction fund			Dividends received on account of two per cent. deduction fund			Dividends received on account of two per cent. deduction fund		
Cash received on account of two per cent. deduction fund			Cash received on account of two per cent. deduction fund			Cash received on account of two per cent. deduction fund		
Deduct amount accounted for in Account C.			Deduct amount accounted for in Account C.			Deduct amount accounted for in Account C.		
Leaving			Leaving			Leaving		
Proceeds of sale of 78,281fr. of rente on account of two per cent. deduction fund			Proceeds of sale of 78,281fr. of rente on account of two per cent. deduction fund			Proceeds of sale of 78,281fr. of rente on account of two per cent. deduction fund		
Dividends received, as per contra, on account of same fund			Dividends received, as per contra, on account of same fund			Dividends received, as per contra, on account of same fund		
Proceeds of sale of 2,624fr. of rente on account of same fund			Proceeds of sale of 2,624fr. of rente on account of same fund			Proceeds of sale of 2,624fr. of rente on account of same fund		
Dividends received on account of same fund			Dividends received on account of same fund			Dividends received on account of same fund		
Cash received, as per contra, on account of same fund			Cash received, as per contra, on account of same fund			Cash received, as per contra, on account of same fund		
Proceeds of sale of 304fr. of rente on account of same fund			Proceeds of sale of 304fr. of rente on account of same fund			Proceeds of sale of 304fr. of rente on account of same fund		
Dividends received, as per contra, on account of same fund			Dividends received, as per contra, on account of same fund			Dividends received, as per contra, on account of same fund		
Cash received on account of Bordeaux claims			Cash received on account of Bordeaux claims			Cash received on account of Bordeaux claims		

ACCOUNT F.

	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.	£	s.	d.
Dividends received in ENGLAND	11,924	15	4									
	12,143	4	9									
	8,773	1	9									
	8,914	0	5									
	9,056	5	6									
	9,205	15	3									
Dividends received in France 263 00 remitted to England (part of 4,471 00 £636 4s. 3d.) from Account B.	185	16	7									
Do. 36,919 50 remitted to England (part of £3,375 8s. 10d.) from Account B.	1,461	14	1									
Interest and premium on Exchequer Bills - £21,632 13 4												
	17,279	4	4									
	31,780	2	10									
	915	3	5									
	537	16	4									
	29	9	0									
Sale of Rente remitted to England, see Account B. (4,356 05)												
Do. part of £636 4s. 3d. (11,473 50)												
Do. part of £3,375 8s. 10d. (53,388 50)												
Proceeds of sale of 613,717 11s. 3d.* Consols -												
Proceeds of sale of Exchequer Bills, including Bills paid off:												
	40,600											
	212,000											
	25,000											
	2,500											
	280,100											
In hand of Paymaster-General 600												
280,700												
Received on account of two per cent. deduction fund:												
Cash as per contra												
From Account B.	5,653	10										
	2,840	50										
	8,493	60										
Ditto	793,559	85										
	1,355,392	82										
	65,629	03										
	2,214,581	70										
Dividends on Consols												
Proceeds of sale of 27,981 6s. 11d.												
Consols												
Repayment by Office of Woods of advances made to the Department												
Interest												
	1,871	11	0									
	24,511	12	11									
	250,000	0										
	34,322	10										
	1,312,247	13	2									
	3,889	2	1									
	50,811	7	9									
	289,312	6	5									
	156,316	8	5									
	250,000	0	0									
	310	0	11									
	1,312,247	13	2									

* Consols equivalent to 1,000,000 of francs of Rente from Account A.

Less " 300,000 " " re-transferred - - - - - £ 194,984 13 2

Add Consols purchased, as per contra - - - - - £ 556,489 5 3

- - - - - £ 57,928 6 0

- - - - - £ 613,717 11 3

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. No. 1 (1871).

FURTHER CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

WAR

BETWEEN

FRANCE AND GERMANY:

1870-71.

(In continuation of Correspondence presented to Parliament,
July 29, 1870.)

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1871.

LONDON:

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Further Correspondence respecting the War between France and Prussia: 1870—71.

No. 1.

Sir A. Paget to Earl Granville.—(Received August 6.)

(Extract.)

Florence, August 1, 1870.

IN the sitting of the Chamber of Deputies of the 25th of July, during the debate on the foreign and internal policy of the Government, Signor Sella presented a demand for an additional credit of 15,000,000 for the Army Budget, and 1,000,000 for that of the Navy.

This demand was referred to the Private Committee, which reported unanimously in its favour, and in the public sitting of the Chamber yesterday the credit was voted.

The sum for the Army is necessitated to meet the expenditure entailed by the calling out of the two classes of recruits, that for the Navy, for the equipment and manning of three iron-clads which are now being commissioned at Venice.

In an interview which I had with M. Visconti Venosta two days ago, I referred to a report which was current to the effect that two other classes were about to be placed under arms, and that other measures of military and naval preparation were being taken. I inquired of his Excellency whether such was really the case, and if so, whether the conclusion to be drawn was, that the policy of neutrality, which had been declared by the Italian Government was likely to change.

His Excellency replied, that no decision had yet been taken in regard to enrolling additional troops beyond those which had been already called out, that the policy of the Government continued to be the same, viz., a desire to remain neutral and to localize the war; but that no one could possibly foresee what turn events might take, and how far in certain contingencies it might be possible for any Power to adhere in the future to the policy which at present it might be their object to pursue. The fact was, he said, that Italy of all countries in Europe was perhaps the one where the state of disarmament had been pushed to the furthest lengths; the army, before the calling out of the two classes which had already been summoned, was even below what it ought properly to be in order to fulfil its ordinary duties in times of the most profound peace. It therefore seemed desirable that measures should be taken for placing the country in such a state of defence as might enable the Government to uphold their present policy, to be prepared for emergencies, or to give greater weight to their counsels when the moment should arrive for joining with other Powers in efforts to put an end to the war.

No. 2.

Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by Count Bernstorff, August .)

(Translation.)

Berlin, August 10, 1870.

MY telegraphic despatch to your Excellency, which Earl Granville communicated in the House of Lords on the 28th of last month, with reference to the Draft Treaty published in the "Times" of the 25th of the same month, has induced Count Benedetti to give, in the "Journal Officiel de l'Empire" of the 30th of July, an account of the origin of the Draft Treaty, and after I had made further remarks in my despatch of the 29th of the same month on the Treaty and its connection with the policy of the Empire, the Duc de Gramont's Circular of the 3rd instant has been published.

In recording these two publications I have no intention to reply to them. The welcome material they furnish to criticism has already been discussed by the press of all countries, France not excepted. The object of this communication is rather to furnish a new piece of

evidence to your Excellency and to Her Britannic Majesty's Government. I did not make any use of it before, because, even in a state of war, I did not like to draw the person of the Sovereign into the discussions of official acts of his Representatives and Ministers, and because, taking into consideration the system of government professedly existing in France before the 2nd of January of this year, I could not expect to meet with the assertion that an act like the proposal of the Draft Treaty and the other propositions and intimations, which I mentioned in my despatch of the 29th, should have taken place without previous knowledge of the Emperor Napoleon.

The assurance of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs,—“que jamais l'Empereur Napoléon n'a proposé à la Prusse un Traité pour prendre possession de la Belgique,”—and the statements of Count Benedetti that the proposal of the Treaty originated with me, and that, in order to obtain a clear conception of my combinations he had consented to put them on paper,—“en quelque sorte sous ma dictée,”—and that the Emperor Napoleon had only afterwards received knowledge of it, these assertions oblige me to make use of the means I have in my power to corroborate my views on the manner in which business was transacted between the Emperor and his Ministers, Ambassadors, and Agents, and to confirm my description of the French policy. In the archives of our Foreign Office is to be found the letter addressed to me by Count Benedetti on the 5th of August, 1866, and a Draft Treaty transmitted with it, of which I inclose copies. I have shown the originals, which are in Count Benedetti's handwriting, to the Representatives of the neutral Powers, and I shall have the honour of sending to your Excellency a photographic fac-simile of it. I beg to remind you that, according to the “Moniteur,” the Emperor was at Vichy from the 28th of July to the 7th of August, 1866. In the official conversation which I had with Count Benedetti in consequence of this letter, he supported the claims contained in it by threats of war in case of refusal.

After I had, nevertheless, refused, the demand for Luxemburg was put forward, and the failure of this affair was followed by the more extensive propositions comprising Belgium, which were drawn up in Count Benedetti's Draft Treaty published by the “Times.”

I beg your Excellency to read this despatch to the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, and to leave him a copy and translation, as well as copies of the inclosures, and to show him the photographic fac-simile which will follow.

For the Chancellor of the Confederation,
(Signed) VON THILE.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

M. Benedetti to Count Bismarck.

(Particulière.)

Mon cher Président,

Dimanche, le 5 Août, 1866.

EN réponse aux communications que j'ai transmises de Nikolsburg à Paris à la suite de notre entretien du 26 du mois dernier, je reçois du Vichy le projet de Convention secrète que vous trouverez ci-joint en copie. Je m'empresse de vous en donner connaissance afin que vous puissiez l'examiner à votre loisir. Je suis du reste à votre disposition pour en conférer avec vous quand vous en jugerez le moment venu.

Tout à vous,
(Signé) BENEDETTI.

(Translation.)

My dear President,

Sunday, August 5, 1866.

IN answer to the communications which I addressed from Nikolsburg to Paris after our interview on the 26th of last month, I receive from Vichy the draft of the Secret Convention, a copy of which you will find annexed. I hasten to bring it to your knowledge, in order that you may examine it at your leisure. I am, moreover, at your disposition to confer with you concerning it when you consider the moment arrived.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) BENEDETTI.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Draft Convention.

SA Majesté, &c., &c., et Sa Majesté, &c., &c.

ARTICLE I.

L'Empire Français rentre en possession des portions de territoire qui, appartenant aujourd'hui à la Prusse, avaient été comprises dans la délimitation de la France en 1814.

ARTICLE II.

La Prusse s'engage à obtenir du Roi de Bavière et du Grand Duc de Hesse, sauf à fournir à ces Princes des dédommagements, la cession des portions de territoire qu'ils possèdent sur la rive gauche du Rhin et à en transférer la possession à la France.

ARTICLE III.

Sont annulées toutes les dispositions rattachant à la Confédération Germanique les territoires placés sous la souveraineté du Roi des Pays-Bas, ainsi que celles relatives au droit de garnison dans la forteresse du Luxembourg.

(Translation.)

HIS Majesty, &c., &c., and His Majesty, &c., &c.

ARTICLE I.

The French Empire re-enters into possession of the portions of territory which, being now the property of Prussia, had been comprised in the demarcation of France in 1814.

ARTICLE II.

Prussia engages to obtain from the King of Bavaria and from the Grand Duke of Hesse, with the reservation to furnish compensation to these Princes, the cession of the portions of territory they possess on the left bank of the Rhine, and to transfer the possession of them to France.

ARTICLE III.

All the engagements connecting the territories placed under the sovereignty of the King of the Low Countries to the German Confederation are annulled, as well as those relative to the right of garrisoning the fortress of Luxemburg.

No. 3.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received August 12.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 11, 1870.

I HAVE, during the last two days, informed your Lordship by telegraph of the opening of the Extraordinary Session of the Chamber, of the resignation of the Ministry of M. Emile Ollivier, of the appointment of a new Ministry under the General Comte de Palikao, of the proceedings of the Corps Législatif yesterday, and of the continued maintenance of order in Paris.

The bulletins received from the seat of war, and copies of the Decrees and other Acts of the Government, have also been regularly transmitted to your Lordship.

The intelligence from the head-quarters of the army having consisted of little more than announcements that no engagement has taken place, public attention has been mainly directed to the Corps Législatif.

In my despatch of yesterday I inclosed the official Report of the proceedings on the opening day, the 9th instant; and in my other despatch of to-day I inclose a Report of the proceedings of yesterday.

On the first day M. Emile Ollivier, amidst a tumult of cries and noises of all kinds,

read a communication from the Government on the critical state of the country. It was apparent that the dismissal of the Ministry was a foregone conclusion. The Chamber passed, without a division, a resolution equivalent to a vote of want of confidence. M. Emile Ollivier retired for a short time, and on his return announced that the resignation of the Ministers had been accepted by the Empress Regent, and that Her Majesty had charged the General Comte de Palikao to form a new Ministry.

This announcement closed the sitting, which appears to have been one of the most tumultuous and disorderly ever witnessed in this country. In the course of it the Emperor was openly taken to task as an incompetent military commander and the cause of the military disasters: and not a voice was raised to defend him.

Revolutionary proposals were made, and language still more revolutionary was held, in spite of the earnest endeavours of the President to uphold the Constitution and maintain order.

Among the motions made was one by M. La Tour du Moulin, that General Trochu should be appointed President of the Council of Ministers.

M. Jules Favre moved that muskets should at once be given to all the inhabitants of Paris, and that a national guard should be reorganized throughout France.

He proposed also that the Chamber should take all power into its own hands and appoint an Executive Committee of fifteen members.

The motion of M. La Tour du Moulin does not appear to have been taken into serious consideration.

Of the proposals of M. Jules Favre, the first, that for arming the people, was declared to be urgent, without a division; while the motion to declare that for establishing an Executive Committee to be also urgent was rejected by 190 votes to 53.

A Bill brought in by the Acting Minister of War for the increase of the military forces, was declared to be urgent.

The sitting of yesterday was noisy and disorderly, but somewhat less so than that of the day before.

The law for increasing the military forces was passed, with amendments. It amounts, very nearly, to a levee *en masse* of the population.

The General Comte de Palikao announced the formation of the new Ministry. The list is composed almost exclusively of men who served under the old personal Government, or belong to the extreme Right of the Chamber. Nevertheless, it was not, on the whole, ill-received. The extreme unpopularity of the old Ministry at the moment rendered any change acceptable; and a hope was entertained that the new Ministers might be efficient and energetic in making military preparations.

A motion that the Chamber should sit permanently was made by M. Estancelin; and, on the question of its being taken up as urgent, there was an equal vote—117 to 117. The urgency, therefore, not having obtained a majority, was not carried.

I understand that, to-day, M. Jules Favre's motion for arming the population has been passed without a division. It has been put in the form of a law organizing and arming the National Guard throughout France, with a proviso that arms shall be first distributed in the Departments which are the seat of war. I cannot, however, give your Lordship a complete account of the matter until the Report of the proceedings appears.

A large crowd was collected outside the House on the first day, and was rather disorderly; but excitement inside and outside the House seems to have gradually subsided yesterday and to-day.

A less gloomy view of the military prospects of France appears to be taken; and there seems to be a sort of tacit understanding that strong measures shall be postponed until the result of the great battle which is supposed to be imminent shall be known. It is generally believed that, if France sustain another defeat, revolution will be inevitable.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 4.

Baron de Beaulieu to Earl Granville.—(Received August 12.)

My Lord,

Légation de Belgique, Londres, ce 12 Août, 1870.

SUIVANT les instructions dont votre Excellence avait bien voulu le munir, le Ministre de Sa Majesté Britannique à Bruxelles, M. Lumley, a confidentiellement communiqué à M. le Baron d'Anethan, Ministre des Affaires Étrangères, le projet de

Traité identique à conclure par le Royaume-Uni avec la Prusse et la France pour rappeler par un acte solennel, à l'occasion de la guerre qui vient d'éclater, leur ferme détermination de maintenir l'indépendance et la neutralité de la Belgique.

Je suis chargé, my Lord, de remercier votre Excellence de cette communication, que M. le Baron d'Anethan a reçue avec un intérêt particulier; et d'exprimer au même temps la profonde reconnaissance dont le Gouvernement du Roi est pénétré pour ce nouveau et éclatant témoignage de la vive sollicitude du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique envers la Belgique.

En m'acquittant de cette agréable mission, je saisis, &c.

(Signé) BEAULIEU.

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Belgian Legation, London, August 12, 1870.

IN pursuance of the instructions with which your Excellency was good enough to furnish him, Mr. Lumley, Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Brussels, has confidentially communicated to M. le Baron d'Anethan, Minister for Foreign Affairs, the identic draft Treaty to be concluded by the United Kingdom with Prussia and with France, in order to record by a solemn act, on the occasion of the war which has just broken out, their firm determination to maintain the independence and neutrality of Belgium.

I am charged, my Lord, to thank your Excellency for that communication, which M. le Baron d'Anethan received with especial interest, and to express, at the same time, the deep obligations which the Government of the King feels for this new and striking testimony of the lively solicitude of the Government of Her Britannic Majesty towards Belgium.

In performing this agreeable duty, I avail, &c.

(Signed) BEAULIEU.

No. 5.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received August 13.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 12, 1870.

IN my other despatches of to-day I have had the honour to inclose to your Lordship the authentic reports taken from the "Journal Officiel," of the proceedings in the Senate and Corps Législatif yesterday.

The Bill for organizing and arming the National Guard was passed by both Chambers.

A Bill was passed unanimously by the Corps Législatif increasing the amount which the Government is authorized to borrow from 500,000,000 francs to 1,000,000,000 (from 20,000,000*l.* sterling to 40,000,000*l.* sterling), and empowering the Minister of Finance to raise the money in whatever way he may deem most advantageous.

A Bill giving forced currency to the notes of the Banks of France and Algeria was passed, and a Bill introduced postponing for thirty days the payment of bills of exchange.

A motion was made by M. Estancelin to repeal the law banishing the Princes of Orleans, and was referred in the usual form to a Committee.

The most exciting part of the proceedings occurred near the beginning of the sitting, when M. de Keratry proposed that a Committee should be appointed, which should call to its bar Marshal Le Bœuf, the late Minister of War, who is, or was, Major-General or Chief of the Staff of the Army, and should inquire into the administration of the army.

This gave rise to a discussion, in which, under colour of censuring Marshal Le Bœuf, attacks of considerable violence were made upon the Emperor and the whole system of Government. With regard to the recent military defeats, M. Thiers declared that the world attributed them to those who governed France: "A ceux qui nous ont gouvernés, et dont l'incapacité a été sans égale." He wound up his speech by begging that the world might be allowed to persevere in attributing these disasters to their true causes:—"Insuffisance de nos préparatifs, incapacité absolue de la direction."

The General Comte de Palikao, was pressed to declare whether Marshal Le Bœuf was still Major-General of the army, the real drift of the question being to ascertain whether the Emperor had actually given up the command.

The Comte de Palikao answered rather ambiguously. He simply declared that Marshal Bazaine was Commander-in-chief of the Army of Metz. This answer appears to have been accepted by the Chamber as meaning that the Emperor had given up the command, and it has certainly been so understood by the public. What is actually the precise state of things with regard to the command of the whole army I am unable to say.

The proposal of M. Estancelin, that the Corps Législatif should sit permanently, was withdrawn on an assurance that the Government would not adjourn the Chamber, but simply propose to them to suspend their sittings from time to time, the Members remaining at Paris ready to assemble at any moment.

It is thought probable that a suspension on this footing of the sittings will be agreed to to-day.

I have informed your Lordship by telegraph that the official bulletins from Metz declare that no fighting has taken place, and I have forwarded to your Lordship copies of these bulletins, and of the various acts of the Government. I have also assured your Lordship by telegraph that Paris has remained quiet.

The hopes of a French victory appear to grow among the people, but this will only render a disappointment of them more bitter and more dangerous. The universal feeling is that a defeat would be absolutely and immediately fatal to the dynasty. On the consequences of a victory opinions are divided, and it is by no means considered certain that even the success of the army in the field would now suffice to avert a revolution.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 6.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received August 13.)

My Lord,

Berlin, August 9, 1870.

AT an interview I had yesterday with Baron Thile, I communicated to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch of the 3rd instant,* responding to the complaint of Count Bismarck, and of the German press, against England, for the manner in which her neutrality was exercised towards Germany.

Baron Thile listened with great attention to the very conciliatory and conclusive arguments of your Lordship's despatch.

His Excellency said that no advantage would arise from entering into a discussion of the various points referred to, but he would take this opportunity to state that Count Bismarck had regretted exceedingly the violent tone of the German press against England on this subject; that he had expressed his disapproval of it, and had used his influence, as far as was possible, to restrain and moderate it.

His Excellency added that the ill-feeling had within the last few days considerably subsided, and he trusted that it would rapidly pass away.

I have taken steps (in accordance with the wish expressed in your Lordship's despatch) to give publicity to the arguments contained in it in a newspaper of this city which has a very large circulation, and especially among the commercial community.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 7.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received August 13.)

My Lord,

Berlin, August 9, 1870.

IN conformity with your Lordship's instruction I read to Baron Thile yesterday your Lordship's despatch of August 3,† referring to the communication made to me by his Excellency on the subject of the restriction reported to exist to the exportation of horses from Hull to Germany, whilst a large exportation of horses was permitted to France.

His Excellency stated that he had made no formal complaint to me on this subject, and had merely communicated to me the letter from Mr. Robert Smith to a correspondent in Prussia, "à titre d'information."

His Excellency begged me therefore to exculpate him from the supposition of having made a formal complaint against Her Majesty's Government, which was furthest from his intentions.

In justice to Baron Thile I must add that, in the conversation I had with his Excellency on this subject, there was no formal complaint addressed by his Excellency, who, on showing me the letter referred to, stated that he had no positive information on the subject to which it referred.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

* See Part III of 1870. No. 87.

† Ibid., No. 86.

No. 8.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received August 13.)

My Lord,

Berlin, August 9, 1870.

I TOOK occasion, in making the communication to Baron Thile referred to in my despatch of this date, to read to his Excellency your Lordship's despatch of the 4th instant,* giving the statistics as to the exportation from England of horses to Germany and France.

His Excellency seemed rather surprised by the statement that more horses had been sent during the past month to German, Belgian, and Dutch ports than to French, but his Excellency made no observation, and merely thanked me for the communication.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 9.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received August 13.)

(Extract.)

Brussels, August 12, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith to your Lordship an address which has been voted by the Mayor and Communal Council of Brussels to the Queen and people of England, for the measures taken by Her Majesty's Government for the defence of the neutrality of Belgium during the war.

Yesterday morning the Mayor and Council of St. Josse-ten-Noode, one of the largest and wealthiest communes of Brussels, also called on me with an address, thanking Her Majesty's Government and the people of England for the attitude taken by them in defence of Belgian neutrality; this address I have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Address of the Mayor and Communal Council of Brussels to the Queen and People of England.

A son Excellence M. J. S. Lumley, Envoyé Extraordinaire et Ministre Plénipotentiaire de Sa Majesté la Reine d'Angleterre à Bruxelles.

Excellence,

LA Commune de St. Josse-ten-Noode, dévouée aux libres institutions de la Belgique et pénétrée du sentiment de l'indépendance de la patrie, exprime sa vive reconnaissance au Gouvernement et au peuple Anglais pour les démarches qui ont été faites afin de garantir efficacement la neutralité de la Belgique.

Chaque peuple a droit à une vie indépendante. Il importe que ce droit soit fixé dans les relations internationales et ne puisse être altéré par les vicissitudes qui surviennent dans les rapports des Etats voisins. Le Gouvernement et le peuple Anglais ont proclamé ce grand principe et manifesté hautement leurs sentiments d'estime pour la nationalité Belge.

Honneur et gratitude à la nation Anglaise!

Délibéré en séance du 10 Août, 1870.

Le Conseil Communal,

(Signé)

FRITZ BOTTRAND.

MINALLY.

ED. DE MEREN.

A. DE RASSY.

T. N. VAN LOIR.

J. BOSCA.

L. GENIE.

FELIX TASSON.

CHELVROUND.

RAYM. DEDEYN.

Par ordonnance:

Le Secrétaire Communal,

(Signé)

CH. HATTEGE.

* See Part III of 1870, No. 96.

(Translation.)

To his Excellency Mr. J. S. Lumley, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of Her Majesty the Queen of England at Brussels.

Excellency,

THE Commune of St. Josse-ten-Noode, devoted to the free institutions of Belgium and penetrated with the sentiment of the independence of the Fatherland, expresses its heartfelt gratitude to the Government and people of England for the steps which have been taken in order to guarantee effectually the neutrality of Belgium.

Every people has a right to an independent life. It is of importance that this right should be determined in international relations, and not altered by the vicissitudes which may arise in the intercourse of neighbouring States. The Government and the people of England have proclaimed this grand principle, and manifested in a high degree their feelings of esteem for the Belgian nationality.

Honour and gratitude to the English nation !

Discussed in the sitting of the 10th of August, 1870.

The Communal Council,

(Signed)

FRITZ BOTTRAND.

MINALLY.

ED. DE MEREN.

A. DE RASSY.

T. N. VAN LOIR.

J. BOSCA.

L. GENIE.

FELIX TASSON.

CHELVROND.

RAYM. DEDEYN.

By order :

The Communal Secretary,

(Signed)

CH. HATTEGE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Extract from the "Indépendance Belge."

LE Conseil Communal, convoqué d'urgence, avait à délibérer hier sur un projet d'Adresse à Sa Majesté la Reine Victoria et au peuple Anglais. Il a voté l'Adresse dont suit le texte, en décidant qu'elle serait immédiatement remise par M. le Bourgmestre, seul, à M. le Ministre d'Angleterre à Bruxelles :—

"Madame,

"Le grand et noble peuple aux destinées duquel votre Majesté préside vient de donner une preuve nouvelle de ses sentiments de bienveillance pour notre patrie.

"Au milieu des événements si graves qui ébranlent le sol de la vieille Europe, le Gouvernement de votre Majesté, pénétré des obligations contractées par les signataires du Traité de 1839, a pris auprès des Puissances qui ont répondu à cet appel l'initiative d'une consécration nouvelle et efficace de la neutralité de la Belgique.

"La voix de la nation Anglaise a dominé le bruit des armes ; elle a proclamé la justice et le droit.

"Aussi, après l'inaltérable attachement que les Belges portent à leur indépendance, le sentiment le plus vif qui éclate en leurs cœurs est celui d'une impérissable reconnaissance.

"Nous pensons que votre Majesté et le peuple de la Grande Bretagne attacheront quelque prix à en recevoir le témoignage ; il leur est offert au nom d'une nation libre et prospère qui pratique avec sagesse et modération, depuis bientôt un demi-siècle, des institutions semblables à celles du Royaume Uni.

"Le Conseil Communal de la capitale exprime le sentiment unanime de la population, en assurant votre Majesté de sa profonde et respectueuse gratitude.

"Fait à l'Hôtel de Ville de Bruxelles; le 40 Août, 1870.

"Le Conseil,

(Signé)

"J. ANSPACH.

"Par le Conseil :

"Le Secrétaire,

(Signé)

"A. LACOMBLE."

(Translation.)

THE Communal Council, specially convoked, had to deliberate yesterday on the draft of an Address to Her Majesty Queen Victoria and to the English people. It voted the Address of which the following is the text, deciding that it should be immediately transmitted by the Burgomaster alone to the Minister of England at Brussels:—

“Madame,

“The great and noble people over whose destinies your Majesty presides have just given a new proof of their feelings of good will for our country.

“In the midst of the grave events which shake the foundations of old Europe, the Government of your Majesty, sensible of the obligations contracted by the Signatories of the Treaty of 1839, have taken the initiative with the Powers, who have answered to that appeal in a new and efficacious consecration of the neutrality of Belgium. The voice of the English nation has overcome the noise of arms: it has proclaimed justice and right.

“Also, after the unalterable attachment which the Belgians bear to their independence, the most lively feeling which arises in their hearts is that of an undying gratitude.

“We think that your Majesty and the people of Great Britain will attach some value to receive the testimony of it; it is offered to them in the name of a free and prosperous nation, which has enjoyed with wisdom and moderation for nearly half a century institutions similar to those of the United Kingdom.

“The Communal Council of the capital expresses the unanimous sentiment of the population, in assuring your Majesty of our profound and respectful gratitude.

“Done at the Hôtel de Ville of Brussels, the 10th August, 1870.

“The Council,
(Signed) “J. ANSPACH.

“By the Council;

“The Secretary,
(Signed) “A. LACOMBLE.”

No. 10.

Mr. Thornton to Earl Granville.—(Received August 15.)

(Extract.)

Newburyport, July 30, 1870.

I HAD the honour to inform your Lordship that my Prussian colleague, Baron Gerolt, had announced to Mr. Fish the intention of his Government during the impending war between France and North Germany to respect private property on the high seas without regard to reciprocity.

I now inclose a printed copy of a note addressed by Mr. Fish to Baron Gerolt, in reply to the announcement made by the latter, and of Baron Gerolt's answer. Mr. Fish in his note enlarges upon the support which has always been given by the United States to the principle of respect for private property on the high seas during war, and Baron Gerolt expresses his hope that the Government of the United States will use their position and influence to insure the universal acknowledgment of the above principle.

Inclosure 1 in No. 10.

Mr. Fish to Baron Gerolt.

Sir,

Department of State, Washington, July 22, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 10th instant, communicating to this Government the text of a despatch from Count Bismarck, to the effect that private property on the high seas will be exempt from seizure by the ships of His Majesty the King of Prussia without regard to reciprocity. In compliance with the request further contained in your note, that communication has been officially made public from this Department. It is now nearly a century since the United States, through Thomas Jefferson, Benjamin Franklin, and John Adams, their Plenipotentiaries, and Prussia, under the guidance of the Great Frederick, entered into a Treaty of Amity and Commerce, to be in force for ten years from its date, whereby it was agreed that if war should unhappily arise between the two Contracting Parties, all merchant and trading vessels

employed in exchanging the products of different places, and thereby rendering the necessities, conveniences, and comforts of human life more easy to be obtained and more general, should be allowed to pass free and unmolested, and that neither of the Contracting Powers should grant or issue any commission to any private armed vessels, empowering them to take or destroy such trading vessels, or interrupt such commerce. The Government of the United States receives with great pleasure this renewed adherence of the great and enlightened German Government to the principles temporarily established by the Treaty of 1785, and since then advocated by this Government whenever an opportunity has offered.

In 1854 President Pierce, in his annual Message to Congress, said :—

“Should the leading Powers of Europe concur in proposing as a rule of international law to exempt private property upon the ocean from seizure by public armed cruisers as well as by privateers, the United States will readily admit them on that broad ground.”

In 1856 this Government was invited to give its adhesion to the Declaration of Paris. Mr. Marcy, then Secretary of State, replied, The President proposes to add to the first proposition in the Declaration of the Congress at Paris the following words : “and that the private property of the subjects or citizens of a belligerent on the high seas shall be exempted from seizure by public armed vessels of the other belligerent, unless it be contraband.” Thus amended, the Government of the United States will adopt it, together with the other three principles contained in that Declaration. And again, in 1861, Mr. Seward renewed the offer to give the adhesion of the United States to the Declaration of the Congress of Paris, and expressed a preference that the same amendment should be retained. Count Bismarck’s despatch, communicated in your letter of the 10th instant, shows that North Germany is willing to recognize this principle, even without reciprocity, in the war which has now unhappily broken out between that country and France. This gives reason to hope that the Government and the people of the United States may soon be gratified by seeing it universally recognized as another restraining and humanizing influence imposed by modern civilization upon the art of war.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) HAMILTON FISH.

Inclosure 2 in No. 10.

Baron Gerolt to Mr. Fish.

*Legation of the North German Union,
Washington, July 25, 1870.*

THE Undersigned, Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the North German Union; has the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note of the Honourable Hamilton Fish of the 24th instant, and to express at the same time his particular satisfaction with the contents of said note, in which so gratifying a mention is made of the harmony which has existed since 1784 between Prussia and the United States in regard to their constant policy and principles in favour of the freedom of private property on the high seas in time of war. The Undersigned will hasten to communicate this note to his Government, and he cherishes the hope that the Government of the United States, on the present occasion of a destructive war now waged in Europe, by which the commercial interests of both the United States and Germany are so seriously endangered, will use their high position and influence to obtain, as a principle of international law, the universal acknowledgment of the liberal policy of the United States in regard to private property on the high seas.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) BARON GEROLT.

No. 11.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received August 15.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 14, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith the Report of a conversation which took place the day before yesterday in the Corps Législatif respecting the expulsion from the French territory of subjects of countries at war with France.

The Minister of the Interior stated that, at the beginning of the war, the Government had thought it proper to prohibit the departure of enemies’ subjects, lest they should,

on their return home, be incorporated in the hostile armies; but that, in the present circumstances, the new Ministry, thinking that the presence of a large number of Germans would be injurious to the defence of the country, had removed the prohibition, and had, in fact, expelled a large number. He said that 1,200 had quitted Paris the day before, and as many the day before that.

In answer to a question, the Minister said that exceptions would be made in favour of peaceable persons who had become, as it were, naturalized by a long residence in the country.

The Minister mentioned incidentally the number 20,000, but the general impression is, that there are many more than 20,000 Germans in Paris.

The protection of the subjects of the North German Confederation in France is entrusted to Mr. Washburn, the Minister of the United States, and it could not be in better hands. The distance of Mr. Washburn's Government from Europe places him in an impartial and independent position with regard to matters relating to the war; and he defends the interests of the North German subjects with remarkable energy and judgment.

The Swiss Legation has, your Lordship is aware, undertaken the protection of the subjects of Bavaria and Baden, and the Russian Embassy that of subjects of Wurtemberg.

I have, &c.
(Signed) • LYONS.

No. 12.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received August 15.)

My Lord,

Berlin, August 11, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith from the Prussian "Official Gazette" a translation in English and French from the "North German Correspondence" and the "Correspondance de Berlin," of a further project of a Secret Treaty prepared by Count Benedetti and Count Bismarck in August 1866.

This additional chapter to the revelations already made by Count Bismarck may be considered as an answer to the last Circular of the Duc de Gramont. It has produced great sensation in the diplomatic and political circles here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 12.

Extract from the Prussian "Official Gazette."

THE original of the following letter from Count Benedetti to the President of the Prussian Ministry, Count Bismarck, dated 5th August, 1866, as well as that of the Treaty of Alliance, are deposited in the archives of the Prussian Foreign Office. Both are, from beginning to end, in the handwriting of Count Benedetti:—

[See Inclosures 1 and 2 in No. 2.]

No. 13.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 16, 1870.

M. DE LAVALETTE informed me to-day that the French Government had reason to suppose that Prince Gortchakoff had informed the Russian Chargé d'Affaires in Paris that England had agreed with Italy that neither Party should abandon its neutrality without announcing its determination to the other; and that the British Government proposed that similar arrangements should be made between the great neutral Powers and those of the second order. The Emperor of Russia, the telegram went on to say, had given his complete adhesion to this proposal.

M. de Lavalette asked me whether the fact stated by Prince Gortchakoff was true; what was the nature of the engagement referred to; whether it was made; and whether

it was proposed afterwards to make it general? I replied that the statement was substantially true; that the nature of the engagement was what it purported to be; that there was to be no Treaty nor Protocol, but merely an interchange of despatches, which, however, had not yet taken place, and that it was under consideration to make such an arrangement general.

I told M. de Lavalette that I answered these questions, although I did not admit the right of either of the belligerents, who had not kept me informed of what proposals they had made to neutral Powers, to ask explanations from me as to what communications I had held with them; but in my desire to maintain the friendly feeling which existed between England and France, I would tell him how the proposal arose.

Several Powers, I said, since the beginning of the war have proposed that a combined neutrality should be formed of all the neutral Powers. Her Majesty's Government have always objected to any formal compact, although expressing their desire to exchange freely ideas which would tend to circumscribe the war, or which would lead to any prospect of peace.

The Italian Government last week informed me that it was still desirous of maintaining neutrality. I replied that I still objected to any formal engagement, but that if the Italian Government wished to interchange an assurance that Great Britain and Italy would not depart from their neutrality without announcing to each other their intention, I was ready to do so.

I told M. de Lavalette further, that I had informed the Russian Government of what had passed between Her Majesty's Government and that of Italy, and had asked it whether some such arrangement between neutral Governments might not be useful to the lesser Governments who desired to maintain their neutrality; and that the Russian Government had assented, but there had not been time to take any further step.

I added that I had invited M. de Lavalette to meet me to-day in order that I might communicate to him what had been done.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 14.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received August 17.)

(Extract.)

Paris, August 16, 1870.

THE Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne arrived at Paris from Vienna the night before last. I saw him this morning for the first time since his arrival.

He told me that he learned from a despatch from the Marquis de Lavalette that Her Majesty's Government were taking part in establishing a league or agreement between the neutral Powers, that no one of them should abandon its neutral position without previous concert with the rest. No objection was, he said, felt by the French Government to an understanding between the neutral Powers. On the friendship of England he was sure France might rely; for certainly never had relations between two countries been so intimate and cordial as they had been during the reign of the present Emperor. He had reason to believe that the Emperor of Russia had friendly feelings towards France, and a strong desire to maintain the balance of power in Europe. Austria had not been urged by him, during the Embassy to Vienna from which he had just returned, to side with either party in the present war; but he had found there a decided sympathy with France. The good-will of Italy might also be counted upon. France had, therefore, no reason to feel alarm on account of an understanding between these Powers as to the course they should pursue.

At the same time it was, the Prince went on to say, evident that, under present circumstances, France could listen to no offer of mediation from any quarter. She had met with reverses at the opening of the campaign, but she had no reason to despair of retrieving them. She could not treat while she had the means of continuing the war upon equal terms and driving the Prussians out of France. If the fortune of war should again declare against her, she must still resist foot by foot, if only to afford her friends an opportunity of aiding her in obtaining equitable terms of peace. There were two conditions which he regarded as indispensable, under all circumstances, namely, the preservation of the integrity of the territory of France, and the maintenance of the dynasty.

He had never, he said, listened with patience to those Frenchmen who had talked of marching to Berlin and totally destroying the Prussian monarchy. He had always been

convinced that the other Powers would intervene in order to prevent either France or Prussia from becoming the uncontrolled mistress of Europe.

No. 15.

Earl Granville to the Chevalier Cadorna.

M. le Ministre,

Foreign Office, August 17, 1870.

HER Majesty's Government have received at different times, with great satisfaction, through Her Majesty's Minister at Florence, the assurances of the Government of the King of Italy of their desire to maintain strict neutrality in the war that unhappily prevails between France and Prussia, and of their readiness even to enter into engagements with this country for the maintenance of the common neutrality of both.

Those assurances, M. le Ministre, have been repeated by you in conversations that I have had the honour to hold with you.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would not be expedient, at all events at the present moment, to enter into any formal and combined engagement for the maintenance of neutrality. They are, however, prepared, and indeed would think it very desirable to do so, to agree with other neutral Powers, and specifically with Italy, that neither party to such arrangement should depart from its neutrality without a previous communication of ideas and an announcement to one another of any change of policy as regards their neutrality.

I have therefore to request that you will make this known to your Government, whose acceptance of the proposal through you, in the same form as it is made, will constitute the agreement between the two countries without the necessity of any more formal Act in which it should be recorded.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 16.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 17, 1870.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of yesterday, reporting a conversation with the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne.

Her Majesty's Government are much pleased with the friendly tone by which his Excellency's language was characterized, and I have to authorize you to assure him that he does right to count on the friendship of England, whose desire to see France prosperous and happy has not been at all weakened by the fact that she is now plunged in war, however deeply Her Majesty's Government regret the calamity and distress which, even under the most favourable circumstances, war must ever leave in its train.

Her Majesty's Government have certainly no intention or desire to obtrude their mediation either on France or on Prussia; but Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne may be assured that, if at any time recourse should be had to their good offices, they will be freely given, and zealously exerted for the restoration of peace between Her Majesty's allies.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 17.

Earl Granville to Sir A. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 17, 1870.

YOUR telegrams of the 15th and 16th instant indicate a disposition on the part of the Russian Government to prepare for an offer of mediation to be made to the belligerents, with a view to the conclusion of peace between them. Prince Gortchakoff, however, appears to be conscious that the time has not yet arrived for taking any step in that direction, and Her Majesty's Government fully coincide in that opinion. They are convinced that any suggestion of the kind would be now disregarded by the two belligerents;

and this would make it a matter of greater delicacy and difficulty hereafter for neutral Powers who might be anxious to exert themselves for the restoration of peace.

Prince Gortchakoff cannot doubt that his wishes in that respect are sincerely shared by the Government of Her Majesty; but as he is himself convinced that the Prussian Government does not desire a termination of the war, and as the information received by Her Majesty's Government tends to show that the French Government on its part does not desire it, it seems clear to Her Majesty's Government that the only course for neutral Powers to pursue is firmly to abide by their neutrality, and thus prevent the war from assuming larger proportions, and to await the appearance of any disposition on the part of the belligerents to avail themselves of the friendly offices of neutral and impartial Powers for a reconciliation of their differences.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 18.

*Earl Granville to Musurus Pasha.**

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, August 17, 1870.

HER Majesty's Government have received with much satisfaction the intelligence of the determination announced by your Government to observe a strict neutrality during the war which has unfortunately broken out between France and Prussia, and it appears to Her Majesty's Government that this determination, which is shared in by themselves, would be confirmed and secured if all neutral Powers should enter into agreement severally with each other with a view to the maintenance of their common neutrality.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would not be expedient, at all events at the present moment, that the neutral Powers should enter into any formal or combined engagement for the maintenance of their neutrality, neither do they think it necessary or desirable that the separate agreement to which I have referred should assume the form of a solemn Treaty, or even be recorded in a Protocol; but they deem that it will be sufficient, and indeed preferable, that it should be merely set forth in letters to be interchanged between the several Parties, and stating that neither of the two Powers between whom such interchange of letters is made shall depart from its neutrality in the present war without a previous communication of ideas, and an announcement to one another of any change of policy as regards their neutrality.

I request you, therefore, to submit this proposal to your Government on the part of that of Her Majesty, and to add that I am prepared, if you should be authorized by your Government to adopt it, at once to interchange such letters with you.

I would add that the Governments of Russia and of Italy, with whom Her Majesty's Government have been in communication on the subject, have signified their assent to this course of proceeding.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 19.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Granville.—(Received August 18.)

(Extract.)

*St. Petersburg, August 12, 1870.**

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 4th instant,† I have the honour to inform you that I communicated yesterday to Prince Gortchakoff the text of the Draft of Treaty proposed by Her Majesty's Government to France and Prussia for the purpose of maintaining the neutrality of Belgium. His Excellency said that the Emperor would not have declined to sign a Convention, as proposed in your Lordship's identic despatch to Lord Lyons and Lord Augustus Loftus of July 30,‡ of which a copy was inclosed in your Lordship's despatch to myself of the 30th ultimo, recording the determination of Russia, in common with the other signatories of the Treaty of 1839, to maintain the neutrality of Belgium; but His Majesty could not engage to take part in the coercive measures which Her Majesty's Government are prepared to adopt, in concert with either France or Prussia, in the event of one of those Powers violating the territory

* Similar notes were addressed to the Representatives of Austria, Portugal, Spain, Greece, The Hague, Belgium, and Sweden.

† See Part III of 1870, No. 93.

‡ Ibid., Nos. 63 and 64.

of Belgium ; nor did he believe that it would be possible to draw a line, in the event of the stipulation to that effect in the Treaty being carried out, which would enable Her Majesty's Government to co-operate with one of the belligerents for the defence of Belgium, without becoming a party in general to the war existing between them.

I answered that, as the Russian Government had expressed a desire to come to an understanding with Her Majesty's Government with a view to confining the war to its present limits, I regretted that they could not join Her Majesty's Government in a Convention which would not only prevent the extension of hostilities to Belgium, but would manifest an identity of action between the two Governments, which could not fail to exert an important moral influence on the solution of other questions arising out of the war.

No. 20.

Señor Rances to Earl Granville.—(Received August 19.)

(Translation.)

My Lord,

London, August 19, 1870.

WITH reference to my note of yesterday, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have just received by telegraph the intimation that the Government of His Highness the Regent accepts with satisfaction the proposal contained in your Excellency's note of the 17th instant, and authorizes me to verify the exchange of notes to which the said proposal refers.

Your Excellency will be pleased to make known to me when I may have the honour to see you, in order to confer upon the subject.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) M. RANCES Y VILLANUEVA.

No. 21.

Vice-Admiral Harris to Earl Granville.—(Received August 20.)

My Lord,

The Hague, August 18, 1870.

THE Treaty concluded by Her Majesty's Government with France and Prussia for the further security of the neutrality of Belgium has caused general satisfaction in this country.

My Belgian colleague, Count van der Straaten, called upon me to express his grateful sense of the friendly spirit of Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. A. J. HARRIS.

No. 22.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received August 20.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 19, 1870.

I SPOKE this afternoon to the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne in the sense of your Lordship's despatch of the day before yesterday, and, in particular, assured him that, while Her Majesty's Government had certainly no desire to obtrude their mediation either on France or Prussia, their good offices would be freely given and zealously exerted for the restoration of Peace, if at any time recourse should be had to them.

The Prince thanked me warmly for the friendship I expressed on behalf of Her Majesty's Government. The present, he went on to say, was evidently a moment at which France could not with propriety, or indeed honour, accept any mediation. She must, on the contrary, strain every nerve to drive the invader out of the country by her own means. It had been insinuated that she was endeavouring to induce Austria or Italy to come to her assistance. This was entirely untrue. The present conjuncture was one in which any appeal for material aid to a foreign Power would be peculiarly inopportune and undignified.

There were, the Prince proceeded to observe, two conditions on which France must absolutely insist,—whatever might be the fortune of war, she could never consent to any cession of territory, and she must insist on the maintenance of the dynasty.

Speaking for himself only, he would say that, if signal success should attend the French arms, he should be very moderate. All he should urge was that, with the concurrence of Europe, some settlement should be made which should prevent the state of antagonism between France and Prussia which had led to the war, and would, by placing matters on a fair and reasonable footing, render a lasting peace possible, and put an end once for all to the costly and dangerous armaments which were injurious to all who resorted to them, and kept Europe in a chronic state of disquiet and alarm.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 23.

The Chevalier Cadorna to Earl Granville.—(Received August 21.)

M. le Comte, 20, Hill Street, Berkeley Square, le 19 Août, 1870.
JE me suis empressé de communiquer à son Excellence le Chevalier Visconti Venosta la note que votre Seigneurie m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 17 courant, par laquelle, en rappelant les déclarations faites par le Gouvernement Italien de sa stricte neutralité, et ses dispositions à conclure un accord pour le maintien de la neutralité dans la guerre qui malheureusement existe entre la France et la Prusse, elle a bien voulu m'autoriser à porter à la connaissance du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine, tout en croyant qu'il ne serait pas expédient pour les Puissances neutres de prendre, au moins pour le moment actuel, un engagement formel et commun pour le maintien de la neutralité, est pourtant disposé à se mettre d'accord, et que même il le considère comme très désirable, avec les autres Puissances neutres, spécialement avec l'Italie, afin qu'aucune des Parties Contractantes du présent engagement ne puisse se départir de sa neutralité sans un échange préalable d'idées et sans s'informer réciproquement de tout changement de politique relatif à leur neutralité. Votre Seigneurie ajoutait que l'acceptation de cette proposition par mon entremise, dans la même forme qu'elle m'était faite, constituerait l'engagement entre les deux pays, sans qu'il fût nécessaire de l'enregistrer dans un acte plus formel.

En exécution des ordres que j'ai reçu de son Excellence le Chevalier Visconti Venosta, j'ai l'honneur de déclarer à votre Seigneurie que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté le Roi se félicite de la notification de la proposition sus-énoncée, laquelle atteint le but qu'il s'était proposé dès le commencement de la guerre. Il l'accepte par conséquent avec beaucoup de satisfaction, et il considère comme entendu et convenu qu'aucune des Parties Contractantes du présent engagement ne pourra se départir de sa neutralité sans un échange préalable d'idées et sans s'informer réciproquement de tout changement de politique relatif à leur neutralité.

La présente communication et la note sus-énoncée de votre Seigneurie du 17 courant constituent l'engagement entre les deux pays sans qu'il soit nécessaire de l'enregistrer dans aucun acte plus formel.

Je saisis, &c.
(Signé) C. CADORNA.

(Translation.)

M. le Comte, 20, Hill Street, Berkeley Square, August 19, 1870.
I HASTENED to communicate to his Excellency le Chevalier Visconti Venosta the note which your Lordship did me the honour to address to me on the 17th instant, in which, while recalling the declarations made by the Italian Government of their strict neutrality, and their wishes to conclude an agreement for the maintenance of neutrality in the war which unhappily exists between France and Prussia, your Lordship was good enough to authorise me to bring to the knowledge of the Government of His Majesty the King that the Government of Her Majesty the Queen, with the full belief that it would not be expedient for the neutral Powers to take, at least at the present time, a formal and common engagement for the maintenance of neutrality, is, nevertheless, disposed to come to an agreement, and which they even consider very desirable, with the other neutral Powers, especially with Italy, in order that neither of the Contracting Parties in the present engagement can depart from her neutrality without a previous interchange of ideas, and without reciprocally informing each other of every change of policy with reference to their neutrality. Your Lordship added that the acceptance of this proposition through me in the same form as it was made to me, would constitute the engagement between the two countries without making it necessary to record it by a more formal act.

In execution of the orders which I have received from his Excellency le Chevalier Visconti Venosta, I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the Government of His Majesty the King congratulate themselves on the notification of the proposition announced above, which meets the aim they have had in view since the commencement of the war. They accept it consequently with much satisfaction, and consider as understood and agreed that neither of the Contracting Parties in the present engagement can depart from her neutrality without a previous interchange of ideas, and without informing each other reciprocally of every change of policy with reference to their neutrality.

The present communication, together with your Lordship's above-mentioned note of the 17th instant, constitute the engagement between the two countries without it being necessary to record it by a more formal act.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) C. CADORNA.

No. 24.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received August 22.)

My Lord,

Vienna, August 6, 1870.

YOUR Lordship's despatch of the 30th ultimo* reached me this morning, and I saw Count Beust shortly afterwards. His Excellency told me that he had already received from Count Apponyi a copy of the identic despatch which your Lordship had addressed to Her Majesty's Ambassadors at Paris and Berlin, instructing them to acquaint the respective Governments to which they were accredited with the readiness of Her Majesty's Government to record in a Protocol or Convention, to be signed with each of them, their common determination to maintain the neutrality of Belgium. He seemed entirely to approve of the project, and said he should have no objection to join in such a Convention provided France and Prussia agreed to it. He added that he had already written to Count Apponyi on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 25.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received August 22.)

My Lord,

Vienna, August 11, 1870:

AT an interview which I have just had with Count Beust we spoke of the Convention regarding the inviolability of Belgian territory, which Her Majesty's Government had just signed with France and Prussia,—a copy or outline of which appears to have been forwarded to him by Count Apponyi.

His Excellency asked if I had received any instructions on the subject. I told him that your Lordship had informed me by telegraph of the substance of this Convention, and nothing more.

He added that, as far as he was at present informed, the Convention was one to which he thought Austria could agree; and he expressed the same willingness to accede to it as on the occasion of our first conversation on the subject recorded in my despatch of the 6th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 26.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received August 22.)

My Lord,

Vienna, August 11, 1870.

WHEN I was with Count Beust to-day his Excellency said that Count Apponyi had informed him of your Lordship's anxiety to profit of the first opening to suggest propositions of peace to France and Prussia; and he begged me to assure you of his desire to aid in establishing an understanding amongst the neutral Powers for this purpose. At present he saw no chance of entering upon any negotiations with either belligerent; and he added that, if fortune continued to favour the arms of Prussia as it had done up to the present

* See Part III of 1870, No. 64.

time, he apprehended there could be no expectation of treating of peace until the German armies were under the walls of Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 27.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received August 22.)

My Lord,

Vienna, August 18, 1870.

AT an interview which I had yesterday with Count Beust, he asked me if I had heard from your Lordship by the messenger, who he understood had just arrived from London, anything concerning a question of combined neutrality, said to have originated at Florence; and he read me a telegram from St. Petersburg, containing the substance of a communication which had been made on this subject to Prince Gortchakoff.

I replied, that I had received by the messenger a copy of your Lordship's telegram to Sir Andrew Buchanan, dated the 10th instant, which coincided with the one he had read to me, that it was unaccompanied by an instruction from your Lordship, and merely sent for my information.

I said, that I presumed he must approve of the idea of Her Majesty's Government, that the Powers, great and small, should agree severally to pursue a neutral policy without actually entering into any formal combination respecting it, and that none were to depart from the arrangement without previous communication on the subject.

Count Beust seemed to approve of your Lordship's idea, and to be quite willing to come to an understanding with other Powers in the sense of your telegrams.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 28.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received August 22.)

My Lord,

Vienna, August 18, 1870.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch inclosing a copy of the Treaty for the defence of Belgian neutrality.

I availed myself of the opportunity of an interview which I had yesterday with Count Beust to inquire if he was in possession of the text of this Treaty, and if he had taken into consideration the question of acceding to it, observing, that I was not instructed to invite him to take any steps in the subject; but as he had originally signified his approval of the negotiations undertaken by Her Majesty's Government, I did not hesitate to speak to him respecting this affair.

His Excellency replied, that looking to the form in which the Treaty was drawn up, the terms could hardly apply to Austria; and he understood, moreover, from St. Petersburg, that the Russian Government were no longer inclined to become a party to it.

Count Beust seems entirely to approve of this fresh guarantee of the independence and neutrality of Belgium; but, under present circumstances, he does not see any urgent reason for Austria-Hungary entering into any similar engagement.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 29.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received August 22.)

My Lord,

Brussels, August 21, 1870.

I LEARN that M. de Balan, the Prussian Minister at Brussels, has informed the Belgian Government that, in consequence of the vast accumulation of wounded in the neighbourhood of Metz, the Prussian commanders are anxious to move them as quickly as possible to Aix-la-Chapelle, and that they would be very glad to be able to send them there by the shortest route: this, however, would necessitate their passing through Belgian territory; and the Prussian Government asks whether, in the cause of humanity, the passage of wounded soldiers through Belgium would be permitted. I believe the Belgian Government will reply, that in the case of French wounded prisoners this would not be

possible, since they would be free as soon as they entered Belgian territory, but that they should be glad to be able to permit the transit through Belgium of the Prussian wounded; before replying on this point, however, it would be necessary to take the opinion of the French Government, to whom they would declare their readiness to offer the same facilities for French wounded soldiers should it be required.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

No. 30.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received August 22.)

My Lord,

Brussels, August 21, 1870.

AS it seems not improbable, in consequence of the position of the French army under Marshal Bazaine, that some of the troops which have not retired into Metz may be driven to the north, and may be compelled to enter Belgian territory, the necessary orders have been given by the Belgian Government to meet such an eventuality.

Should French troops be compelled to take refuge in Belgium, they will be required to lay down their arms on entering Belgian territory, and the men and officers will be detained till the conclusion of the war, when their arms will be returned to them. In such an event the troops would, I believe, receive their pay from the Belgian Government, who would settle the matter with the French Government after the war.

In the event of troops of either of the belligerents attempting to march through Belgian territory with their arms, energetic military measures will be taken to enforce respect for the neutrality of Belgium.

In consequence of the news contained in the King of Prussia's telegram of the 19th instant, the main body of the Belgian army under General Chazal has moved to Namur, which place it reached at 2 P.M. to-day.

The province of Luxemburg being scantily and poorly populated, the difficulty of finding quarters for the troops has limited the numbers of the corps of observation sent into that province; but I learn that now, at the risk of some inconvenience to the population, the force of the column of observation will be considerably increased, and that it will be disposed along the whole frontier.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

No. 31.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

(Telegraphic.)

Foreign Office, August 22, 1870.

THE following telegram, dated Berlin, August 20, has been communicated to me by Prussian Embassy:—

“So very great numbers of wounded have been announced from Saar Louis that great difficulties, perhaps calamities, may ensue, and it would be very important if the greater part of the wounded could be transported from Saar Louis through Luxemburg to Aix-la-Chapelle. Between Conz and Wasserbillig, it is true, the railway is interrupted, but it might easily be restored, or the communication might be effected by waggons. We have inquired at Brussels and at Luxemburg whether this would be considered compatible with neutrality, but we wish to know also the opinion of the British Government.”

Your Excellency will show the above at once to Prince de la Tour, and you will say that we are prepared, with a view to alleviate the miseries of the war, to state to the Belgian Government, and to the King Grand Duke, that we have no objection, and we will inform Austria and Russia accordingly. But before doing so we wish to know the opinion of the French Government. The measure seems compatible with the spirit of the first Article of the Geneva Convention. It is, however, indispensable that it should be arranged that no armed German soldier should accompany the trains; and it must be taken for granted that the French wounded would receive a full share of the benefit. We do not hesitate to lay this matter without delay before the French Government, being sensible of the great responsibility which would be incurred by throwing any difficulty in the way of an arrangement so imperatively called for in the interests of humanity.

Note-Verbale communicated by M. de Lavalette, August 20, 1870.

Londres, le 20 Août, 1870.

UN Décret du Roi de Prusse du 24 Juillet dernier* vient d'ordonner la création d'une Marine Volontaire.

D'après les dispositions de ce Décret, il est fait appel aux particuliers pour le mettre, eux et leurs navires, à la disposition du Gouvernement. Le but à atteindre, le but apparent du moins, consisterait à attaquer et à détruire nos navires de guerre, et pour prix de ce service, des primes plus ou moins fortes, variant de 10,000 à 50,000 thalers, seraient accordées suivant l'importance des bâtiments.

Le commerce maritime s'est ému de cette Ordonnance, et nous n'avons pu que nous associer à des appréhensions que justifie le caractère anormal d'une institution qui paraît être, sous une forme déguisée, le rétablissement des corsaires.

En effet quand on lit le Décret avec attention, on remarque que les navires mis en réquisition sont des navires privés, et qu'une prime est acquise à l'équipage capteur : deux points de ressemblance frappante avec les corsaires.

D'autre part, pour que ces navires pussent être considérés comme navires de guerre au point de vue du personnel, il faudrait au moins qu'ils fussent commandés par des officiers de la flotte fédérale dûment commissionnés. Or, aux termes de l'Ordonnance, ces officiers, comme les équipages, sont engagés par les soins des armateurs ; il est vrai qu'ils reçoivent des brevets et portent l'uniforme, mais ils n'appartiennent point à la marine fédérale, puisqu'on promet de les y admettre plus tard, sur leur désir et en cas de services exceptionnels. Les équipages, formés par les armateurs, ne doivent évidemment pas être soumis à d'autres règles que celles qui sont édictées pour l'armement des bâtiments de commerce, et il pourrait s'ensuivre que la majorité des équipages et, dans certains ports, les officiers fussent étrangers,—les Puissances maritimes qui se sont fondues dans la Confédération du Nord n'imposant, pour la plupart, aucune condition à la composition des équipages. Bien plus, cet appel à l'initiative des particuliers constitue un encouragement à l'achat en pays étranger de navires susceptibles d'être ensuite transformés, avec plus ou moins de facilités, en bâtiments propres à l'attaque, suivant la pensée de l'Ordonnance.

Cette conséquence est d'autant plus grave que nous savons qu'on cherche à acheter en Angleterre et aux Etats-Unis des navires dans un but hostile.

Quant aux primes, le dixième de la valeur du bâtiment payé à ce titre par le Gouvernement Prussien pourrait, à la rigueur, être considéré comme un prix de fret, et le remboursement de cette valeur, en cas de perte, comme une indemnité ; mais il est

* *Royal Prussian Decree of the 26th July, 1870, relative to the Constitution of a Voluntary Naval Force.*

On your representation I have approved the formation of a voluntary naval force under the following form :—

1. To issue a summons to all German seamen and shipowners to place themselves, and their forces and ships suitable thereto, at the service of the Fatherland, and under the following conditions :—

(a.) The vessels to be placed at the disposition of the service will be examined and taxed by a Commission composed of two naval officers and one naval contractor as to their capabilities for the intended purpose. In this case the owner receives one-tenth of the price taxed as deposit, whereupon he has to hire the necessary volunteer crews.

(b.) Officers and crews enrolled in this way enter into the Federal navy for the continuance of the war, and wear its uniform and badge of rank, acknowledge its competency, and take oath to the Articles of War. The officers receive a patent of their rank, and the assurance that, in case of extraordinary service rendered, she can, at their request, be permanently established in the navy. Officers and men who are rendered, by this service, unfit to acquire a livelihood, without any fault on their side, receive a pension calculated at the standard of the Royal Federal Navy.

2. The hired ships sail under the Federal flag.

3. These will be armed by the Federal Royal Navy, and fitted out for the service allotted to them.

4. The ships destroyed in the service of their country will be paid for to their owners at the price taxed. If at the end of the war they can be restored to the owners uninjured, the sum paid as deposit is reckoned as hire.

5. A premium will be paid to such ships as capture or destroy ships of the enemy, according to the following standard :—For an iron-plated frigate 50,000 thalers, an iron-plated corvette or ram 30,000 thalers, an iron-plated battery 20,000 thalers, a large screw-vessel 15,000 thalers, a screw-vessel 10,000 thalers. These premiums will be paid to the owners of the ships, to whom will be confided the distribution in proper proportions amongst the crew.

6. The authorities for all communications on the subject are those of—

(a.) The docks of Wilhelmshaven, Kiel, and Danzig.

(b.) The marine depôts at Geestemünde and Stralsund, and

(c.) The sea captain Weickmann, at Hamburg.

Further details must be hereafter elaborated.

(Signed) WILHELM.

(Countersigned) VON BISMARCK.
VON ROON.

Berlin, July 24, 1870.

expressément dit que les primes dépendant de la prise ou de la destruction de navires ennemis, selon le Tarif annexé, seront versées entre les mains des armateurs, qui auront dû, lors de l'engagement, s'entendre avec leur équipage sur la part de prise à attribuer à ce dernier.

Cette clause établit d'une manière formelle le caractère essentiellement privé des opérations auxquelles est appelée à prendre part cette prétendue marine auxiliaire.

La Prusse, qui a eu soin de combiner les prescriptions apparentes de l'Ordonnance de manière à pouvoir répondre aux critiques, prétendra probablement que ces prescriptions ne s'appliquent qu'à la capture des navires de guerre, et que, d'autre part, elle a proclamé au début des hostilités le respect de la propriété privée sur mer. Mais il n'est pas seulement question de bâtiments de guerre; l'Ordonnance parle de navires à hélice, et il paraît évident que la force des choses, les entraînements de la guerre, porteraient inévitablement cette marine auxiliaire, quand même le but immédiat de son institution serait autre, à s'attaquer aux bâtiments marchands.

Les navires armés dans les conditions de l'Ordonnance Royale du 24 Juillet sont donc de véritables corsaires, avec cette aggravation que le cautionnement, garantie habituellement exigée, ne leur est point imposée ici.

La Prusse ayant adhéré à la Déclaration de 1856, la création de cette prétendue marine auxiliaire paraît contraire aux engagements souscrits par elle, et nous devons signaler le fait aux Puissances Contractantes en nous réservant d'appliquer, s'il y a lieu, à ces nouveaux bâtiments telles mesures rigoureuses que comporte le droit de guerre.

Nous serions reconnaissants au Gouvernement de la Reine de nous transmettre, le plus tôt possible, sa réponse à ce sujet.

(Translation.)

London, August 20, 1870.

A DECREE of the King of Prussia, of the 24th July last, orders the creation of a Volunteer Marine.

According to the provisions of this Decree an appeal is made to private individuals to place themselves and their ships at the disposition of the Government. The aim to be attained—the apparent aim, at least—would consist in attacking and destroying our ships-of-war, and, as a reward for this service, premiums more or less high, varying from 10,000 to 50,000 thalers, would be granted, according to the importance of the vessels.

Our commercial marine has been alarmed by this order, and we could not but share in apprehensions which were justified by the abnormal character of an institution which appears to be, under a disguised form, the re-establishment of privateers.

In fact, if the Decree is read with attention, it will be remarked that the vessels placed under requisition are private ships, and that a premium is gained by the captor—two points of striking resemblance to privateers.

Furthermore, for these vessels to be considered as ships-of-war, as far as regards their crews, it would be at least necessary that they should be commanded by officers of the Federal fleet, properly commissioned. Now, according to the terms of the order, these officers, like the crews, are engaged by the persons fitting them out; it is true they receive commissions and wear the uniform, but they do not at all belong to the Federal navy, since they are promised to be admitted into it later, on their desire, or in case of exceptional services. The crews, formed by the owners, evidently ought not to be submitted to other rules than those which are published for the equipment of merchant-vessels; and it might follow that the majority of the crews, and in certain ports the officers, were strangers—the naval Powers, which are amalgamated in the Confederation of the North, imposing generally no condition on the composition of the crews. Much more, this appeal to the initiative of private individuals forms an encouragement to the purchase, in a foreign country, of ships capable of being afterwards transformed, with more or less facility, into vessels fit for attack, according to the purport of the order.

This consequence is much the graver, since we know that they are seeking to buy vessels in England and the United States with a hostile intention.

As regards the premiums, the title of the value of the ship paid under this title by the Prussian Government might, strictly, be considered as a freightage, and the reimbursement of this value, in case of loss, as an indemnity; but it is expressly stated that the premiums depending on the capture or destruction of the enemy's ships, according to the annexed Tariff, will be placed in the hands of the owners, who ought to have come at the time of the engagement to an understanding with their crew on the share of the prize to be granted to the latter.

This clause establishes in a formal manner the essentially private character of the operations in which this pretended auxiliary marine is called to take part.

Prussia, who has taken care to combine the apparent prescriptions of the order in such a manner as to be able to answer criticisms, will probably contend that these prescriptions only apply to the capture of ships-of-war, and that, moreover, she proclaimed at the commencement of hostilities respect for private property at sea. But it is not only a question of vessels-of-war, the order speaks of screw steamers; and it appears evident that the force of circumstances, the impulses of war, would inevitably lead this auxiliary marine, even if that were not the immediate aim of its constitution, to attack merchant-vessels.

The vessels armed under the conditions of the Royal Order of 24th July are, then, true privateers, with this aggravation, that the security, a guarantee habitually required, is not imposed on them in this instance.

Prussia having adhered to the Declaration of 1856, the creation of this pretended auxiliary marine appears contrary to the engagements subscribed by her, and we ought to note the fact to the Contracting Powers, reserving to ourselves to apply, if there is need, to these new vessels such vigorous measures as the right of war entails.

We should be obliged to the Government of the Queen to transmit to us, as soon as possible, their answer on this matter.

No. 33.

Earl Granville to the Marquis de Lavalette.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, August 24, 1870.

YOUR Excellency, in your letter of the 3rd of August, requested to be made acquainted with the opinion that the Law Officers of the Crown might give on a Notification issued by the Prussian Government on the 24th of July last, for engaging ships privately armed in the war service of the North German Confederation.

At that time I was not in possession of a copy of that Notification, and I informed you that I would call upon Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin to procure one.

In the meantime, however, and indeed on the same day, namely, the 20th of this month, that your Excellency left at this office a *note verbale* on the same subject, one of the members of the Diplomatic Body at this Court gave me a copy of the notification, and I thereupon referred the matter without delay to the Law Officers of the Crown.

I have now received their opinion, of which, in compliance with your request, I have the honour to state to you the substance.

They advise me that there are, in their opinion, substantial distinctions between the proposed naval volunteer force sanctioned by the Prussian Government, and the system of privateering, which, under the designation of "la course," the Declaration of Paris was intended to suppress.

The Law Officers say that, as far as they can judge, the vessels referred to in the Notification of the 24th of July, will be for all intents and purposes in the service of the Prussian Government, and the crews will be under the same discipline as the crews on board vessels belonging permanently to the Federal navy.

This being the case now, and as long as it continues to be so, the Law Officers consider that Her Majesty's Government cannot object to the Decree of the Prussian Government as infringing the Declaration of Paris.

Her Majesty's Government will, however, with reference to the Prussian notification, call the attention of the Prussian Government to the Declaration of Paris, and will express their hope and belief that Prussia will take care to prevent by stringent instructions any breach of that Declaration.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 34.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 24, 1870.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of correspondence which I have had with the Marquis de Lavalette on the subject of a Notification issued by the Prussian Government with regard to the employment of ships privately armed in the war service of the North German Confederation.*

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

* Nos. 32 and 33.

No. 35.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 24, 1870.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of correspondence with the Marquis de Lavalette,* respecting the notification of the Prussian Government of the 21st of July last, for engaging ships privately armed in the war service of the North German Confederation; and, in conformity with what is stated in the last paragraph of my letter to the Marquis de Lavalette of this day, I have to request your Excellency, with reference to that notification, to call the attention of the Prussian Government to the Declaration of Paris, and to express the hope and belief of Her Majesty's Government that Prussia will take care to prevent, by stringent instructions, any breach of that Declaration.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 36.

Musurus Pasha to Earl Granville.—(Received August 25.)

My Lord,

Ambassade Impériale Ottomane, Londres, le 24 Août, 1870.

EN me référant à ma note du 19 de ce mois, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que, ayant communiqué par télégraphe à mon Gouvernement le contenu de la note de votre Excellence du 17, je viens de recevoir de son Altesse Aali Pacha une dépêche télégraphique par laquelle Sa Majesté Impériale le Sultan m'autorise à adhérer, au nom de son Gouvernement, à la proposition qui fait l'objet de la note précitée de votre Excellence; et je suis dès à présent en position d'échanger avec votre Excellence, suivant cette proposition, les lettres destinées à établir une entente entre les Puissances neutres par rapport au maintien de leur neutralité pendant la guerre actuelle.

J'ai, &c.

(Signé) MUSURUS.

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Imperial Ottoman Embassy, London, August 24, 1870.

WITH reference to my note of the 19th of this month, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that, having communicated by telegraph to my Government the contents of your Excellency's note of the 17th, I have just received from his Highness Aali Pasha a telegraphic despatch by which His Imperial Majesty the Sultan authorizes me to adhere, in the name of his Government, to the proposition which was the subject of the above-mentioned note of your Excellency; and I am henceforth in a position to exchange with your Excellency, according to that proposition, the letters destined to establish an agreement between the neutral Powers with regard to the maintenance of their neutrality during the present war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) MUSURUS.

No. 37.

Vice-Admiral Harris to Earl Granville.—(Received August 27.)

(Extract.)

The Hague, August 25, 1870.

M. D'OLIMART, Secretary to the Grand Duke of Luxemburg, and resident here, informed me to-day that, on the 21st instant, Count Perponcher, the Prussian Minister at the Hague, made on behalf of his Government application to that of the Grand Duchy for permission for the Prussian wounded to pass through the territory of Luxemburg on their way to Aix-la-Chapelle. The Government of the Grand Duchy took some time to consider the matter, and finally gave their consent. On this coming to the knowledge of the French Government, they instructed their Minister here, M. Baudin, to make representations against the proceeding as a breach of neutrality.

Yesterday the Prussian Envoy received instructions from his Government to withdraw his application. No wounded of either nation have as yet been admitted in the territory of the Grand Duchy.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received August 27.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 26, 1870.

ON the morning of the 22nd instant I left at the French Foreign Office, for Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, who was at the moment attending a Council at the Tuileries, a copy of your Lordship's telegram, dated 5.5 P.M. the day before, and reciting the request of the Prussian Government that wounded men might be sent from Saarlouis to Aix-la-Chapelle, through Luxemburg. My doing so was of course a mere formality, as the telegram, being *en clair*, had as usual been communicated to the French Government from the telegraph office, and it was, in fact, considered at the Council at the Tuileries.

In the afternoon I saw the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, and spoke to him on the subject. As I reported immediately to your Lordship by telegraph, he said that the Minister of War had strongly objected to the proposal, and had represented that the Prussians would derive very great facilities for bringing up men and stores to their armies in France by a measure which would free their line of communication from the encumbrance of the wounded.

I observed that the proposal had been submitted to the French Government by the Government of Her Majesty, solely from motives of humanity, and from an anxious desire to alleviate the dreadful sufferings of the wounded men of both belligerents.

The Prince said that he did not doubt this, and added that a formal answer to the proposal would be sent to your Lordship through the French Ambassador in London.

Yesterday, the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne told me that the notion that the Prussians had transported or might transport the wounded through Belgium and Luxemburg had produced extreme irritation both in the Senate and the Corps Législatif. He had, in both Chambers, been beset by members calling for explanations and information in very strong language, and threatening him with immediate "interpellations." He had with difficulty so far appeased them that they had consented to postpone the formal interpellations. He had fortunately been able to inform them that the Belgian Government had positively prohibited the passage through Belgium. He had not, however, been in a position to give them an equally positive assurance respecting Luxemburg.

The Prince expressed regret that the question had been raised, and said that he was very desirous of preventing the use of violent language, and the adoption of violent resolutions respecting it in the Chamber. The fortune of war had not hitherto been favourable to the French arms. No one admitted this more frankly than he did. But France was still France, and would continue to be France; and very great embarrassment might be caused hereafter if it should be believed that the neutrality of Belgium and Luxemburg had been violated or abused to the military disadvantage of the French. For the moment however, the important point was, that he should be able to announce as soon as possible, that Luxemburg had followed the example of Belgium, and prohibited the proposed passage through its territory. In conclusion, he begged me to point out to Her Majesty's Government the urgency of the question as regarded Luxemburg.

Accordingly, on leaving the Prince, I did myself the honour to report this to your Lordship by telegraph.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

P.S.—Since I wrote what precedes, I have seen the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, who has informed me that the Government of Luxemburg having also refused to allow the passage of the wounded, he considered the whole affair to be at an end.

L.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received August 27.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 26, 1870.

IN the authentic report of the proceedings of the Corps Législatif on the 24th instant, which is published in the "Journal Officiel" of yesterday, the General Comte de Palikao, Minister of War, is reported to have spoken as follows:—

"J'ai déclaré à la Commission que nous ne nous refusions à aucune espèce de marché pour l'acquisition d'armes à l'étranger, sous certaines conditions de sécurité, et c'est sous ces conditions que j'ai acheté depuis hier 40,000 fusils. . . . La maison qui doit les fournir c'est chargée de les livrer à Paris dans trois jours et dans huit jours."

In the unofficial reports given in the ordinary newspapers on the evening of the sitting, the Minister of War is represented as having said that the house which was to furnish the 40,000 muskets was English.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 40.

Earl Granville to Lord Bloomfield.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, August 27, 1870.

I INCLOSE, for your Excellency's information, copies of the Treaties respecting the neutrality of Belgium recently concluded by Her Majesty with the Emperor of the French and with the King of Prussia, the ratifications of which were exchanged on the 26th instant.

In communicating to Count Beust copies of these Treaties, you will express to his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have felt some surprise at the course of the Austrian Government. Count Beust had told you, as reported in your despatch of the 6th instant, that he should have no objection to join in such a Treaty as that which you had informed him Her Majesty's Government had proposed to France and Prussia, recording their common determination to maintain the neutrality of Belgium, provided France and Prussia agreed to it. But now, after the only condition for which he had stipulated, namely, the agreement of those two Powers, had been fulfilled, he declines to act up to his assurance, on the ground, as stated in your despatch of the 18th of August, that he did not see any urgent reason for Austria-Hungary entering into any similar engagement, the terms of which, he said, could hardly apply to Austria, and to which, he understood from St. Petersburg, the Russian Government were no longer inclined to become a party.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 41.

Earl Granville to Sir A. Paget.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 27, 1870.

M. DE CADORNA called upon me yesterday, and said that he had been instructed by M. Visconti Venosta to inform me that, in his opinion, the time was come for a joint effort being made by the neutral Powers to put a stop to the terrible war now raging between France and Prussia.

I replied that Her Majesty's Government were of a contrary opinion. They had every reason to believe that any offer now made with that object would not be acceptable to either belligerent, and would do more harm than good; and that I had been lately informed by Prince Gortchakoff and Count Beust that such was their present opinion.

M. de Cadorna did not insist on this point. He repeated, in the most formal manner, the declaration that Italy had no engagements of any kind, excepting that which she had recently contracted with England; and he added that he hoped to receive an assurance from me that Italy would have her proper place in any attempts at mediation, or in any Congress called together for the restoration of peace. He concluded with very friendly expressions on the part of his Government as to their desire to act in concert with that of Her Majesty.

I acknowledged these expressions with thanks, and said that they were entirely reciprocated by Her Majesty's Government. England had certainly not been the last Power to show her wish that Italy should hold her proper place in Europe. It had been very satisfactory to Her Majesty's Government to conclude with her the recent engagement: they intended to continue in free and frank communication with Italy, as well as with other neutral Powers; but with regard to any arrangements as to mediation, they thought it undesirable to enter now into any discussion on the matter. Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that the time for mediation had not arrived, and, indeed, it might never be required at all. Her Majesty's Government had no jealousy of the action

of any neutral Power in the matter, but they intended not to enter into any agreement upon an hypothetical case.

I begged M. de Cadorna to understand that the answer which I thus gave him was not an answer for Italy alone; but that Her Majesty's Government would hold the same language to any other Power who communicated with them on the matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 42.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Granville.—(Received August 29.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, August 16, 1870.

AT an interview which I had this morning with Prince Gortchakoff, his Excellency requested me to inform your Lordship by telegraph that he was anxiously expecting Her Majesty's Government to take the necessary steps for carrying out the suggestion which I was instructed to submit to his Excellency by your Lordship's telegram of the 11th instant, as to the expediency of a general understanding being come to between the neutral Powers, that no party to it would abandon its neutrality without previous communication with the other parties to it.

His Excellency said that the expediency of some arrangement of the kind having already occurred to the Emperor, he had adopted at once the suggestion of Her Majesty's Government, and, to promote its general acceptance, had immediately notified by telegraph to the Governments of Austria, Italy, Sweden, Denmark, the Netherlands, Spain, Portugal, and Turkey, that the Government of the Emperor had accepted it.

He hoped, therefore, that Her Majesty's Government would lose no time in making a proposal on the subject to those Powers, and if they accepted it (of which there could be no doubt), the general concert established among them would greatly increase the moral influence which the neutral Powers would be entitled to exercise in any Conferences which might take place for the restoration of peace.

His Excellency said it was impossible to foresee when mediation would be expedient, as France might be unwilling to accept it until she had obtained some military successes, and on the other hand Prussia did not wish for an immediate termination of the war. He had, however, told Prince Reuss, that if one of the great Powers should make a practical proposal for the restoration of Peace, Russia would adhere to it, as Europe requires the early re-establishment of peace on a just and durable basis.

His Excellency said that he meant by a just and durable basis, arrangements which both parties could accept without an intention of disturbing them as soon as they might be strong enough to do so, and he considered that humiliating concessions extorted from France would be quite inconsistent with such a peace as is essential to the permanent interests and welfare of Europe. It was premature, he said, to speak of the terms on which a satisfactory arrangement might be made; but when Conferences took place, Russia would doubtless be represented by a person who could be trusted by the Emperor to conciliate the opinion of the Russian Government with those of other Powers, and that, as to the place where the Conferences should be held, Paris and Berlin were the only capitals to which the Emperor would object.

No. 43.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Granville.—(Received August 29.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, August 18, 1870.

IN conformity with the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's telegram of yesterday, I informed Prince Gortchakoff this morning that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that it would neither be expedient nor useful to offer mediation at present to either of the belligerents, as Her Majesty's Government have reason to believe, from the reports which they receive from France, that the French Government have no wish to terminate the war; and his Excellency has himself expressed an opinion that the feeling of the Prussian Government is unfavourable to an immediate cessation of hostilities.

Prince Gortchakoff said he entirely concurred in this view of the case.

No. 44.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Granville.—(Received August 29.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, August 18, 1870.

I HAVE communicated to Prince Gortchakoff the substance of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday informing me that you had been about to instruct me to ask for Prince Gortchakoff's opinion as to the course of proceeding to be adopted towards other neutral Powers respecting the proposal of Her Majesty's Government to that of Italy, in regard to the mutual maintenance of neutrality, when your intended application to his Excellency was forestalled by his direct communication on the subject to the Powers in question.

He said that the communication which he had addressed to the Governments had been made with a view to promote the general acceptance of the proposal which might be addressed to them by Her Majesty's Government, as he considered it desirable that they should know, without delay, in case circumstances might be changed by the events of the war, that Russia had acceded to the agreement entered into by Great Britain and Italy.

He said he had received a telegram from Baron Brunnow, from which it appeared that your Lordship wished that the proposed understanding between the neutral Powers should be recorded by an interchange of notes, which his Excellency thought would be a less convenient mode of doing so than by a Protocol.

He would not, however, he said, object to the form of record which Her Majesty's Government might consider the most expedient; but, as Baron Brunnow had also stated that a despatch containing the details of the proposal of Her Majesty's Government had been forwarded to me by a messenger, he would await the arrival of your Lordship's despatch before expressing any decided opinion on the subject.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 45.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received August 29.)

My Lord,

Berlin, August 27, 1870.

IN conformity with the instructions of your Lordship's despatch of the 24th instant, I have communicated to Baron Thile the substance of the correspondence between your Lordship and the Marquis de Lavalette respecting the notification of the Prussian Government of the 24th July, for engaging ships privately armed in the war service of the North German Confederation.

Baron Thile expressed his thanks for the communication, and also his appreciation of the frank and impartial course which your Lordship had taken in the matter. His Excellency added that I may assure your Lordship that the Prussian Government will take special care to prevent any breach of the declaration given by them at the Conference of Paris.

His Excellency requested me to communicate this correspondence to M. Delbrück, to whose department questions of this nature more specially belonged.

I accordingly waited on M. Delbrück, and read to him the *note verbale* of the Marquis de Lavalette, and your Lordship's reply to it.

His Excellency observed that the opinions expressed by the Law Officers of the Crown in England were perfectly just.

With reference to the apprehensions expressed in the *note verbale* that these private ships, although destined to operate against vessels of war, might be used against merchant-vessels, his Excellency stated that at the commencement of the war the North German Government had at once declared their intention of not seizing merchant-ships of the enemy; consequently the apprehension entertained might be at once allayed.

His Excellency further observed that, as regarded the supposition of these private ships bearing the character of privateers, it must be known to the French Government that the act of privateering had been abolished in Prussia by law, in conformity with the Declaration given at Paris, and that consequently any act of the nature referred to would be in violation of the Prussian law and liable to a severe penalty.

Under these circumstances no fears need be entertained that these private ships, which

were merely intended as means of defence, would contravene the laws of Prussia, or act in violation of the declaration against privateering given by Prussia at the Conference of Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 46.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received August 29.)

My Lord,

Brussels, August 27, 1870.

ON Sunday, the 21st instant, M. de Balan, the Minister of the North German Confederation at Brussels, inquired of the Belgian Government whether, in the interests of humanity, they would allow the passage through Belgium to Aix-la-Chapelle of the wounded, who had accumulated to such an extent as made it impossible to attend to them properly, and rendered the danger of infectious disease imminent.

The Belgian Government declared their readiness to accede to this request, but referred the question to Paris for the opinion of the French Government.

On Monday, not having received a definitive reply, M. de Balan insisted on the immediate necessity of the Belgian Government taking a decision. Baron d'Anéthan then gave his consent to the transport of wounded Prussian soldiers through Belgium, and sent M. Fassiaux, the Director-in-chief of the Belgian State Railways, to M. de Balan, to make the necessary arrangements.

M. Fassiaux, however, pointed out to M. de Balan that it would be necessary to obtain the consent of the Grand Ducal Government to the transit of the wounded through Luxemburg, through which territory the railway passed before reaching the Belgian frontier.

M. de Balan at once telegraphed on the subject to Berlin, and the Prussian Government obtained the consent of the Grand Ducal Government.

But on Tuesday, the 23rd instant, the French Chargé d'Affaires informed Baron d'Anéthan that the French Government would consider the transit of wounded soldiers through Belgium as a violation of its neutrality; and on Wednesday the Belgian Government acquainted M. de Balan officially with the reply of the French Government, expressing at the same time their regret that, under these circumstances, they were compelled to withdraw the consent they had given.

On the following day M. de Balan received a telegram from M. de Thile, stating that, in the face of such a declaration, they abandoned their intention; but that the decision of the French Government, which they could not consider otherwise than inhumane, would fall upon the French wounded. The Germans had hitherto taken French and German wounded indiscriminately from the field of battle, and had made no difference between the treatment of friends and foes; but now, of necessity, the Germans would be compelled to carry off and attend to their own wounded, before they could assist the French who might fall into their hands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

No. 47.

Earl Granville to Mr. Lumley.

Sir,

Foreign Office, August 29, 1870.

M. DE BEAULIEU called on me the other day, and informed me that the Belgian Government had not been able to accede to the request of Prussia to allow the wounded to be transported through the Belgian territory, in consequence of the declaration made by France that such a proceeding would be considered by her as a breach of neutrality on the part of Belgium. The Belgian Government, he said, would have been glad if it had been possible for it to bring into harmony its duties as a neutral Power with what was owing to humanity, and had offered to afford similar facilities to France for the transport of her wounded.

The question, however, she said, was now closed by the refusal of France.

I agreed with M. de Beaulieu that the question was settled; but I took the opportunity of remarking that it was very desirable, particularly after the engagements in

regard to the neutrality of Belgium recently entered into by this country, which entailed upon it obligations of a most pressing character, that no measure which could in any way be considered as affecting the neutrality of Belgium should be adopted by the Belgian Government without previous communication with Her Majesty's Government, if there was time for it.

M. de Beaulieu at the same time communicated to me a letter dated August 6, from Baron d'Anéthan to the Belgian Minister of War, in which, speaking of the possibility of the troops of either belligerent being forced by those of the other to cross into Belgium, he lays down the rule that, in such a case, the refugees must be disarmed, if necessary by force, the non-commissioned officers and soldiers removed into the interior, and officers only allowed to be without restraint on giving their parole that they would not recross the frontier; the arms only to be restored after the conclusion of peace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 48.

Earl Granville to Señor Rances.

M. le Ministre,

Foreign Office, August 29, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, acquainting me that the Government of His Highness the Regent accepts the proposal which I had requested you, by my letter of the 17th instant, to lay before it, for an interchange of letters between us respecting the neutrality which our two Governments have proposed, severally, to observe in the war, which unhappily exists between France and the North German Confederation and its allies.

It only, therefore, remains for me now formally to submit, through you, M. le Ministre, to the Government of the Regent, that neither England nor Spain shall depart from its neutrality in the present war, without a previous communication of ideas, and an announcement to one another of any change of policy as regards their neutrality.

Not doubting, after what I have heard from you, that you will feel yourself empowered to accept this proposal in the same formal manner, I have, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 49.

Earl Granville to Viscount de Seisal.

M. le Ministre,

Foreign Office, August 29, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th instant, acquainting me that you are authorized by your Government to exchange with that of Her Majesty, letters on the subject of their respective neutrality in the present war, in conformity with the proposal to that effect, which I addressed to you on the 17th instant.

It remains, therefore, for me to state to you formally, that Her Majesty's Government are, for their part, prepared to enter into an arrangement with the Government of Portugal in the following terms, viz. :—

That neither England nor Portugal shall depart from its neutrality in the present war, without a previous communication of ideas, and an announcement to one another of any change of policy as regards their neutrality.

A letter from you, M. le Ministre, formally announcing that your Government, on its part, will enter into this engagement, will suffice to make it binding on both Governments.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 50.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received August 30.)

My Lord,

Brussels, August 28, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose an extract from the "Indépendance Belge" of this date, containing the text of a circular addressed by Baron d'Anéthan to the Belgians

Diplomatic Agents, on the position and the policy to be held by Belgium during the war, as well as of a letter addressed to the Minister of War with reference to the measures to be taken in the event of violations of Belgium territory by troops of the belligerents.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

Inclosure in No. 50.

Extract from the "Indépendance Belge" of August 28, 1870.

VOICI la circulaire adressée, le 21 Juillet dernier, à nos Agents Diplomatiques :—

"Bruxelles, le 21 Juillet, 1870.

"La guerre est déclarée entre deux Puissances voisines de nos frontières.

"Quelle sera, dans ces graves conjonctures, l'attitude des Etats liés avec la Belgique par des engagements de droit public, quelle sera celle de la Belgique elle-même ?

"Les Puissances signataires des Traités de 1831 et de 1839 n'ont pas seulement consacré par un texte clair et précis l'indépendance et la neutralité de la Belgique ; elles ont pris soin de définir la pensée même dont cette clause n'était que la formule :— 'Agissant avec un parfait désintéressement dans les affaires de la Belgique, les cinq Puissances n'ont eu en vue que de lui assigner dans le système Européen un place inoffensive, que de lui offrir une existence qui garantit à la fois son propre bonheur et la sécurité des autres Etats.'

"Le Traité qui fixa définitivement la position politique de la Belgique venait d'être conclue lorsque la situation générale de l'Europe parut un instant se troubler. Une voix auguste, qui a longtemps et sûrement guidé la Belgique, s'exprimait ainsi en ouvrant la Session Législative de 1840 :— 'La position de la Belgique a été déterminée par les Traités, et la neutralité perpétuelle lui a été solennellement assurée. Mon Gouvernement n'a négligé aucune occasion de faire connaître l'importance qui attache à cette garantie. Partout, je le dis avec satisfaction, nous n'avons rencontré que des sentiments de bienveillance et de respect pour le principe inscrit dans notre droit public. La neutralité, nous ne pouvons trop nous en convaincre, est la véritable base de notre politique ; la maintenir sincère, loyale, et forte, doit être notre but constant.'

"C'est dans ces conditions que la Belgique, durant une période déjà longue, a traversé toutes les crises par lesquelles l'Europe a passé.

"Dans aucune circonstance, les Puissances ne se sont écartées des engagements qu'elles ont contractés envers nous. En 1840 comme en 1848, en 1853 comme en 1866 et 1867, nos droits ont été formellement partout reconnus.

"La Belgique, de son côté, a rempli dans toute leur étendue ses obligations internationales. Sa neutralité n'a pas cessé un seul instant de garder le caractère d'une impartialité absolue, et le pays s'est invariablement montré résolu à tous les sacrifices pour la préserver de toute atteinte.

"Le programme tracé par l'Europe et accepté par la Belgique a donc été loyalement exécuté de part et d'autre, et l'on peut dire, l'histoire en fait foi, que l'Europe et la Belgique ont eu à s'en féliciter.

"Nous n'avons donc pas à chercher notre voie. Le passé nous l'indique et les faits témoignent qu'elle est comprise par les Gouvernements étrangers comme par nous-mêmes.

"Les dispositions manifestées à notre égard par les Puissances belligérantes répondent de tous points à notre attente, et nous avons pris les mesures nécessaires pour attester, en fait comme en droit, notre intention franche et ferme de rester fidèles à tous nos engagements. C'est ainsi que, conséquents avec les principes et les précédents que je rappelais plus haut, nous avons mis notre armée sur le pied de guerre en apprenant le conflit actuel ; c'est ainsi que nous gardons avec toutes nos forces les routes qui empruntent notre territoire, tenus d'honneur que nous sommes de n'en permettre l'usage à aucune des forces belligérantes.

"Telle est notre situation ; telle sera notre politique au milieu d'un conflit dont la fin n'arrivera jamais assez tôt au gré de nos vœux. Les vœux que je viens d'exprimer ne seront pour vous ni pour personne une révélation, mais pour avoir été éprouvées par une expérience plusieurs fois renouvelée et toujours bienfaisante, elles n'en paraîtront que plus dignes de l'attention du Gouvernement et des hommes d'Etat du pays dans lequel vous résidez.

"Agréez, &c.

(Signé) "D'ANETHAN."

A la suite de cette circulaire, M. d'Anethan écrit à M. le Ministre de la Guerre la lettre suivante, sous la date du 6 Août :—

"M. le Ministre,

"*Bruxelles, le 6 Août, 1870.*

"La guerre qui se poursuit entre deux Etats voisins de nos frontières pourrait donner lieu à des éventualités qu'il convient de prévoir.

"Le territoire de la Belgique est inviolable de droit, aucune force étrangère ne peut prétendre à y pénétrer ou à la traverser malgré nous ; et si une tentative de ce genre était faite, notre armée, se trouvant en état de légitime défense, aurait à repousser l'agresseur par tous les moyens en son pouvoir.

"Mais en dehors de ce cas, qui, j'aime à le croire, ne se réalisera point, il faut peut-être s'attendre à voir soit des soldats isolés, soit des corps de troupes refoulés par l'ennemi jusque sur notre sol.

"Laisser ces soldats ou ces troupes regagner leur patrie serait leur permettre de recommencer la lutte, alors que, si notre territoire ne leur avait pas servi d'asile, ils eussent été faits prisonniers ; ce serait donc indirectement augmenter l'armée de l'un ou l'autre des belligérants, contrairement aux obligations qui découlent de la neutralité.

"En semblable occurrence, il faudrait désarmer, même par la force, les bandes qui chercheraient un refuge chez nous, interner les soldats et sous-officiers, et ne laisser circuler les officiers que s'ils donnent, par écrit, leur parole d'honneur qu'ils ne passeront point la frontière.

"Quant aux armes, elles ne pourraient être restituées qu'après la conclusion de la paix.

"Je vous prie de bien vouloir donner aux chefs de corps des instructions dans le sens des principes qui viennent d'être exposés, et qui sont, du reste, conformes au droit des gens.

(Signé)

"D'ANETHAN."

(Translation.)

THE following is the Circular addressed on the 20th of July last to our Diplomatic Agents :—

"*Brussels, July 21, 1870.*

"War is declared between two Powers bordering on our frontiers.

"What will be, under these grave circumstances, the attitude of the States allied to Belgium by engagements of public law ; what will be that of Belgium herself ?

"The signatory Powers of the Treaties of 1831 and of 1839 have not only sanctioned, by a clear and precise text, the independence and neutrality of Belgium ; they have taken care to define the very thought of which that clause was but the formula :—' Acting with a perfect disinterestedness in the affairs of Belgium, the five Powers have only had in view to assign to her an inoffensive place in the European system, to offer to her an existence which guarantees at the same time her own happiness and the security of the other States.'

"The Treaty which definitively fixed the political position of Belgium had only just been concluded when the general situation of Europe appeared for an instant to be troubled. An august voice, which long and safely guided Belgium, thus expressed itself in opening the Legislative Session of 1840 :—' The position of Belgium has been determined by Treaties, and perpetual neutrality has been solemnly assured to her. My Government has not neglected a single opportunity to make known the importance which is attached to this guarantee. Everywhere, I say it with satisfaction, we have met with nothing but feelings of sympathy and of respect for the principle written in our public law. Neutrality, we cannot convince ourselves too much of it, is the true basis of our policy ; to maintain it sincerely, loyally, and firmly, ought to be our constant aim.'

"It is under these conditions that Belgium, during a very long period, has passed through all the crises which Europe has undergone.

"In no case have the Powers departed from the engagements which they have contracted towards us. In 1840 as in 1848, in 1853 as in 1866 and 1867, our rights have been everywhere formally recognized.

"Belgium, on her side, has fulfilled to their full extent her international obligations. Her neutrality has not ceased for a single moment to preserve the character of an absolute impartiality, and the country has invariably shown itself resolved to preserve it at all sacrifices from every attack.

"The programme traced by Europe, and accepted by Belgium, has therefore been loyally followed out by both sides, and it may be said, with history for witness, that Europe and Belgium have had reason to congratulate themselves upon it."

"We need not therefore seek our path. The past points it out for us, and facts testify that it is understood by foreign Governments as well as by ourselves.

"The dispositions manifested on our behalf by the belligerent Powers answer our expectations on all points, and we have taken the measures necessary to testify, in fact as in right, our frank and firm intention to remain faithful to all our engagements. It is thus that, consistent with the principles and the precedents which I recalled above, we placed our army on the war footing on learning of the present conflict; it is thus that we guard with all our power the roads which lead through our territory, held by honour as we are not to permit the usage of them to either of the belligerent forces.

"Such is our situation; such will be our policy in the midst of a conflict the termination of which will never arrive soon enough to meet our wishes. The views which I have just expressed will not be a revelation for you or anybody; but having been proved by beneficent experience several times renewed, they will but appear worthier of the attention of the Government and of the Statesmen of the country in which you reside."

"Agrééz, &c.

(Signed) "D'ANETHAN."

Following this circular, M. d'Anethan wrote to the Minister of War the following letter, under date of the 6th of August:—

"M. le Ministre,

"Brussels, August 6, 1870.

"The war which continues between two States neighbouring our frontiers might give rise to eventualities which it is suitable to foresee.

"The territory of Belgium is by right inviolable; no foreign force can pretend to penetrate into it or to cross it against our will; and if an attempt of this nature was made, our army, being in a state of lawful defence, would have to repulse the aggressor by all the means in its power.

"But irrespective of this case, which I like to believe will never occur, one must perhaps expect to see either isolated soldiers or corps of troops driven back by the enemy to our soil.

"To allow these soldiers or these troops to regain their country would be to permit them to recommence the struggle, whilst, if our territory had not served them as an asylum, they would have been made prisoners; it would therefore be indirectly to increase the army of one or other of the belligerents, contrary to the obligations which flow from neutrality.

"In a like occurrence it would be necessary to disarm, even by force, the bands who sought refuge with us, to intern the soldiers and non-commissioned officers, and not to allow the officers freedom of movement unless they give, in writing, their word of honour never to cross the frontier.

"As regards the arms, they are only to be returned at the conclusion of peace.

"I beg you to be good enough to give to the chiefs of corps instructions in the sense of the principles just set forth, and which are, moreover, conformable to the Law of Nations.

(Signed) "D'ANETHAN."

No. 51.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received August 30.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 29, 1870.

I HAD the honour to transmit to your Lordship by telegraph the text, *in extenso*, of a notice issued by the Acting Prefect of this Department, advising the inhabitants of Paris to lay in provisions against the apprehended siege, and recommending all persons not capable of facing the enemy to leave the place.

I inclose herewith copies of the notice taken from the "Journal Officiel."

It has been placarded on the walls of the Mairies, and in other places by the French authorities; and I have requested Messrs. Galignani to publish an English translation of it in a conspicuous part of their newspaper.

I have, moreover, had it placed in English and French in the waiting-room of the Embassy, and directed that the attention of all British subjects coming to the Chancery may be called to it.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS:

Inclosure in No. 51.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel."

AVIS.

DES réserves considérables destinées à l'approvisionnement de Paris sont faites par les soins de l'Administration ; elles s'accroissent encore tous les jours. Toutefois, le Préfet de la Seine croit devoir engager les habitants à se pourvoir eux-mêmes à l'avance, dans la mesure de leurs besoins et de leurs ressources, des diverses denrées alimentaires susceptibles de conservation et de durée.

L'intérêt de la défense, plus encore que celui des subsistances, demande aussi que les personnes hors d'état de faire face à l'ennemi s'éloignent de Paris.

Le Conseiller d'Etat, Secrétaire-Général, faisant fonctions de Préfet,
(Signé) ALFRED BLANCHE.

(Translation.)

NOTICE.

SOME considerable stores destined for the provisioning of Paris are collected by the care of the Administration ; they are still increasing every day. The Prefect of the Seine, however, thinks it his duty to urge the inhabitants to provide for themselves in advance, in proportion to their wants and resources, with the different alimentary provisions capable of preservation and duration.

The interests of the defence, even more than those of maintenance, demand that those persons incapable of facing the enemy should depart from Paris.

The Councillor of State, Secretary-General, performing the duties of Prefect,
(Signed) ALFRED BLANCHE.

No. 52.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received August 30.)

My Lord,

Vienna, August 23, 1870.

I CALLED to-day on Count Beust, when he informed me that he had received from Count Apponyi the letter addressed to him by your Lordship, inviting the Austrian Government to enter into an engagement, similar to that already agreed to with Italy and Russia, to maintain neutrality during the present war ; the parties to such engagement binding themselves by an interchange of letters not to depart from neutrality without previously communicating such intention to the others. His Excellency said that he had no objection to the course proposed by Her Majesty's Government, but he remarked that he had not been officially informed of the project until it had been actually accepted and agreed to by Russia and Italy, and he expressed surprise that some communication on the subject had not been sooner made to the Austrian Government.

Count Beust then observed that he would be ready to agree to the proposal which your Lordship had made through Count Apponyi, on the condition, which the Ambassador would insert in his answer to your communication, that the Powers did not act separately in the future work of mediation between France and Germany, and that if any one of them did so act, the others would thereby be liberated from their engagement.

I replied that I had not been charged with any proposition to the Imperial Government in regard to this affair, and that I probably should hear nothing from your Lordship for another week, by which time the regular messenger would have arrived from the Foreign Office.

His Excellency said that he should himself dispatch a messenger to London to-morrow, who would be the bearer of instructions to Count Apponyi, and that he hoped the two Governments would come to an understanding as to the common course to be followed whenever the time arrived for opening negotiations and mediating between the belligerents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

*Instructions addressed by the Belgian Minister of War to the Chief of the Staff, Brussels.—
(Communicated to Earl Granville by Baron Beaulieu, August 31.)*

M. le Lieutenant-Général,

Bruxelles, le 27 Août, 1870.

PAR ma lettre du 10 Août courant j'ai eu l'honneur de vous communiquer les principes généraux d'après lesquels il y a lieu de rédiger des instructions pour les troupes qui gardent nos frontières.

Aujourd'hui qu'un corps d'armée est en route pour protéger notre neutralité contre l'invasion possible de quelques corps des belligérants, je crois devoir vous prier de compléter les instructions précédentes d'après les règles indiquées ci-après :—

1. Si un corps de troupes acculé à la frontière se réfugiait sur notre territoire sans être poursuivi, il faudrait procéder à son désarmement et à son internement.

Si un corps était poursuivi jusqu'à sur notre territoire, il faudrait s'interposer entre les belligérants, et repousser au besoin par la force tous ceux d'entre eux, poursuivants ou poursuivis, qui ne consentiraient pas à évacuer le pays ou à déposer leurs armes.

2. Si un corps de troupes voulait entrer sur notre territoire pour faciliter une manœuvre ou la rendre plus rapide, ou pour tourner l'ennemi, nos troupes devraient barrer le passage et envoyer un parlementaire pour réclamer la retraite volontaire.

Dans tous les cas, M. le Lieutenant-Général, il importe de recommander la plus grande prudence et de prévenir les excès de zèle de la part des commandants de détachements. On ne devra faire usage de la force qu'à la dernière extrémité, et en cas de nécessité résultant du refus d'obtempérer aux sommations de respecter la territoire. Une incursion, un simple passage de l'une des parties saillantes de la frontière, peut n'être qu'une simple erreur d'un officier subalterne ; il est essentiel d'éviter un conflit sanglant, si la violation du territoire n'est pas un acte prémédité, accompli en force et maintenu malgré les invitations faites par un parlementaire.

Il serait bon que les employés de la douane reçussent pour consigne d'avertir les détachements de troupes des belligérants qu'ils rencontreraient ; il serait également utile de multiplier les poteaux indicateurs de la frontière sur les routes, chemins, sentiers.

Vous comprendrez, M. le Lieutenant-Général, combien il est nécessaire que tous les officiers soient bien pénétrés des recommandations que je viens d'avoir l'honneur de vous faire ; vous voudrez donc bien prendre les mesures pour atteindre ce résultat.

Le Ministre de la Guerre,

(Signé) GUILLAUME.

(Translation.)

M. le Lieutenant-General,

Brussels, August 27, 1870.

BY my letter of the 10th of the present month of August I had the honour to communicate to you the general principles, according to which some instructions were drawn up for the troops who guard our frontier.

Now that a corps d'armée is on its road to protect our neutrality against the possible invasion of some corps of the belligerents, I think it my duty to beg you to complete the former instructions according to the rules indicated below.

1. If a corps of troops hemmed in on the frontier took refuge on our territory without being pursued, it would be necessary to proceed to their disarmament and internment.

If a corps was pursued as far as our territory it would be necessary to interpose between the belligerents, and repulse, if needs be, by force all those among them, pursuers or pursued, who would not consent to evacuate the country or to lay down their arms.

2. If a body of troops wished to enter our territory to facilitate a manœuvre or to render it more rapid, or to turn the enemy, our troops ought to bar the passage, and send a parlementaire to demand a voluntary retreat.

In every case, M. le Lieutenant-Général, it is important to recommend the greatest prudence and to prevent excesses of zeal on the part of commanders of detachments. Force ought not to be used except at the last extremity and in case of necessity resulting from a refusal to obey the summons to respect the territory. An incursion, a simple passage of one of the projecting parts of the frontier, might be nothing but a simple error of a subaltern officer ; it is essential to avoid a sanguinary conflict, if the violation of the territory is not a premeditated act, accomplished in force, and maintained, notwithstanding the invitations made by a parlementaire.

It would be well that the officers of Customs should receive orders to warn the

detachments of the troops of the belligerents whom they may meet; it would be equally useful to increase the posts which mark the frontier on the high roads, roads, and paths.

You will understand, M. le Lieutenant-Général, how necessary it is that all the officers should thoroughly comprehend the recommendations which I have just had the honour to give to you; you will therefore be good enough to take measures in order to attain this result.

The Minister of War,
(Signed) GUILLAUME.

No. 54.

Señor Rances to Earl Granville.—(Received August 31.)

(Translation.)

My Lord,

August 30, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note, dated yesterday, in which you communicate to me the formal acceptance by Her Majesty's Government of the proposal which, in your note of the 17th instant, you addressed through me to the Government of His Highness the Regent, to which he assented, and which relates to the neutrality which both Governments have resolved to observe in the war which unfortunately exists between France and the North German Confederation and its allies.

In reply to the said note I have the honour to certify to your Excellency that the Government of His Highness has authorized me to accept the formal declaration contained in it, and to make in its name, and in the same formal manner, a corresponding notification to Her Majesty's Government. It is accordingly understood between both Governments that neither Spain nor England shall depart from her neutrality in the present war without previously communicating to each other its ideas, and without respectively making known any change whatever in its policy in this respect.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) M. RANCES Y VILLANUEVA.

No. 55.

The Viscount de Seisal to Earl Granville.—(Received August 31.)

My Lord,

Légation de Portugal, Londres, le 31 Août, 1870.

J'AI l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que j'ai reçu du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Très Fidèle l'ordre de répondre à la proposition contenue dans votre lettre du 17 courant, et confirmée par celle que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date du 29 de ce mois, par la déclaration formelle suivante :

Le Portugal ne se départira pas de sa neutralité pendant la guerre actuelle entre Sa Majesté l'Empereur des Français et Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, sans avoir au préalable communiqué ses idées au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique, et sans lui avoir annoncé tout changement dans sa politique pour ce qui touche à la dite neutralité, le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique ayant pris le même engagement vis-à-vis de celui de Sa Majesté Très Fidèle.

En adressant cette communication à votre Excellence, au nom et par ordre de mon Gouvernement, je saisis, &c.

(Signé) VICOMTE DE SEISAL.

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Portuguese Legation, London, August 31, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Excellency that I have received from the Government of His Most Faithful Majesty the order to answer the proposition contained in your letter of the 17th instant, and confirmed by that which your Excellency did me the honour to address to me under date of the 29th of this month, by the following formal declaration.

Portugal will not depart from her neutrality during the present war between His Majesty the Emperor of the French and His Majesty the King of Prussia, without having previously communicated her ideas to the Government of Her Britannic Majesty, and without having announced to them every change in her policy as regards that which

touches the said neutrality, the Government of Her Britannic Majesty having taken the same engagement towards that of His Most Faithful Majesty.

In addressing this communication to your Excellency, in the name and by order of my Government, I avail, &c.

(Signed) . VICOMTE DE SEISAL.

No. 56.

Earl Granville to Baron Brunnow.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, August 31, 1870.

YOUR Excellency has communicated to me a telegram from Prince Gortchakoff, dated August 22, authorizing you to exchange with the Government of Her Majesty letters on the subject of the respective neutrality of England and Russia in the present war, to the same effect as those exchanged between England and other neutral Powers.

It remains, therefore, only for me to state to you, formally, that Her Majesty's Government are, for their part, prepared to enter into an engagement with the Government of the Emperor in the following terms, namely:—

“That neither England nor Russia shall depart from its neutrality in the present war without a previous communication of ideas, and an announcement to one another of any change of policy as regards their neutrality.”

A letter from you, M. l'Ambassadeur, formally announcing that your Government, on its part, will enter into this engagement, will suffice to make it binding on both Governments.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 57.

Baron Brunnow to Earl Granville.—(Received August 31.)

M. le Comte,

Londres, le $\frac{19}{31}$ Août, 1870.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la note que votre Excellence a bien voulu m'adresser en date du 31 Août.

Elle constate l'engagement réciproque contracté par la Russie et par la Grande Bretagne de ne point dévier de leur neutralité, durant la guerre actuelle, sans un échange d'idées et sans un avis préalable de leurs intentions, si elles venaient à modifier leur politique en ce qui regarde leur neutralité.

Conformément aux instructions du Cabinet Impérial, je suis autorisé à déclarer que l'Empereur mon auguste Maître se plaît à donner sa plus complète adhésion au présent engagement, qui répond entièrement à la pensée exprimée par Sa Majesté Impériale dès le début de la guerre.

J'ai, &c.

(Signé) BRUNNOW.

(Translation.)

M. le Comte,

London, August $\frac{19}{31}$, 1870.

I HAVE had the honour to receive the note which your Excellency was good enough to address to me under date of the 31st of August.

It states the reciprocal engagement contracted by Russia and Great Britain not to deviate from their neutrality during the present war without an exchange of ideas, and without a previous notice of their intentions, if they should modify their policy in regard to neutrality.

In conformity with the instructions of the Imperial Cabinet, I am authorized to declare that the Emperor my august Master is pleased to give his most complete adhesion to the present engagement, which entirely answers the thought expressed by His Imperial Majesty at the commencement of the war.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BRUNNOW.

Earl Granville to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, August 31, 1870.

THE language that I have held to Baron Brunnov, and to which your Excellency should conform your own, is, that France declares formally that she does not need the good offices of others, or wish for them; and that Prussia, without making any official declaration on the subject, is determined not to admit of any interference. If the Prussian intentions are moderate, the King and Count Bismarck are not unlikely to wish to have the sole credit for their magnanimity; if the reverse, they will not encourage other Powers to interfere whom they would suspect of desiring to moderate their pretensions.

It appeared, therefore, I said, to Her Majesty's Government that England and Russia should see their way very clearly to success before committing themselves, in concert with other neutral Powers, to any attempt at negotiation which, if without result, could only do harm.

*Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.**

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 1, 1870.

THE rapidity with which events succeed each other on the northern frontier of France is calculated to inspire neutral Powers, parties to the Treaties of 1839, and more especially Great Britain, who has so recently concluded an Additional Treaty with France and with Prussia for securing the neutrality of Belgium, with a fear lest the military operations now in progress should lead one or other of the belligerents either to seek refuge from the enemy in neutral territory, or to pursue into it the enemy who has sustained reverses.

Her Majesty's Government feel confident that neither as victors nor vanquished would the Commanders of the Imperial forces deliberately disregard the neutral character of the Belgian territory; but in the same manner as that neutral character would be infringed by the pursuit of a vanquished army in Belgium, so would it also be infringed by any attempt to make use of the asylum obtained in the Belgian territory to retain the semblance of an armed force prepared to take advantage of any favourable opportunity for resuming the offensive.

Great allowance might naturally be made for irregular proceedings taken at the spur of the moment, and in hot blood; but Her Majesty's Government can scarcely doubt that the attention of the Imperial Commanders will have already been called to these important points, and that neutral Powers may rely with confidence on any effort being made to preserve inviolate the neutral character of Belgium.

Your Excellency will take an early opportunity of speaking to Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne in the sense of this despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 1, 1870.

HER Majesty's Government approve the steps taken by your Excellency for making known to British subjects the notice issued by the Prefecture of the Seine with regard to the apprehended siege of Paris, as reported in your despatch of the 28th ultimo.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

* A similar despatch was addressed to Lord A. Loftus.

Memorandum communicated by Count Bernstorff to Earl Granville, September 1, 1870.

IT would be waste of time at the present crisis to enter upon an exhaustive juridical examination of the existing neutrality laws, and their ultimate bearing and scope. It is not too late, however, to glance in a practical manner at a question which every hour may cause fresh and momentous complications, especially as affecting national susceptibilities.

In the first instance there is no question but France has wantonly made war on Germany. The verdict of the world, and especially the verdict of the statesmen as well as of the public of England, has unanimously pronounced the Emperor of the French guilty of a most flagitious breach of the peace. Germany, on the other hand, entered into the contest with the consciousness of a good cause. She was therefore led to expect that the neutrality of Great Britain, her former ally against Napoleonic aggression, however strict in form, would at least be benevolent in spirit to Germany, for it is impossible for the human mind not to side with one or the other party in a conflict like the present one. What is the use of being right or wrong in the eyes of the world, if the public remains insensible to the merits of a cause? Those who deny the necessity of such a distinction, forego the appeal to public opinion, which we are daily taught to consider as the foremost of the Great Powers.

In examining from this point of view whether the neutrality of Great Britain has been practically benevolent as regards Germany, it is best to reverse the question and to put it in this shape: If Germany had been the aggressor, and consequently condemned by public opinion, in what way could the Government and the people of the United Kingdom have been able to avoid taking an active part in the struggle, and, at the same time, to prove to France their benevolent intentions? Being short of coal, the French would have been allowed to find here all they needed for their naval expeditions. Their preparations for war not being so far advanced and not so complete as they first thought, the French would have found the manufacturers of arms and ammunition in this country ready to supply them with, and the British Government willing not to prevent their obtaining here, all the material they wanted. This, we think, would have been the utmost aid which Great Britain could have granted to France, without transgressing the letter of the existing neutrality laws, had the parts of aggressor and attacked, of right and wrong, been the reverse of the present condition.

In the face of the continuous export of arms, ammunition, coal, and other war material from this country to France; in the face of facts openly made a boast of by the French Minister of War, and not denied by the British Government, it is not necessary to prove that the neutrality of Great Britain, far from being impartial towards that party, which has been pronounced to be in the right, is, on the contrary, such as it might possibly have been, if that party had been wrong in the eyes of the British people and Government. When defending the new Foreign Enlistment Act in Parliament, the Representatives of the Government declared, that the law empowered the Executive to prevent the export of contraband of war, but that in order to make it effectual towards the belligerents, it ought to be generally enforced, and would thus even affect the commerce of this country with other neutrals. This statement, however, cannot be admitted, for there is no necessity to hamper the trade with neutral countries by preventing the exportation of contraband of war to the belligerents. Had the Government declared such exportation to the belligerents to be illegal, it would have remained an exception, subject to penalty if detected. The *bonâ fide* trade with neutrals would not in the least have been affected thereby. But the Government, far from doing this, refused even to accept such propositions as might have prevented direct or clandestine exportation of contraband of war to France; besides, it can not be admitted that such prohibitive measures could in reality damage the regular and lawful trade of the English people at large. They would merely prevent some rapacious individuals from disregarding the verdict of the nation, and realizing enormous profits, which never would have legitimately been made under ordinary circumstances. The rapid increase of the private fortunes of a few tradesmen by such ventures could not appreciably add to the national wealth of the country. But, on the other hand, the nation will be held morally responsible for the blood which is being shed through the agency of those individuals. It will be said that the war would have ended sooner, and that less German soldiers would have been killed and wounded, had not the people and Government of England permitted such abuses.

It hardly could be seriously meant to say that the Germans are at liberty to bring each case before their Prize Courts, for it would be out of place thus to taunt Germany with not being mistress of the seas. The question is, whether England may escape the

just reproach on the part of Germany of having greatly increased the advantage France already possesses at sea, by fitting out her navy with the requisite material to attack the seaboard of Germany and annihilate its commerce, as well as of arming the French Garde Mobile with English breech-loaders, to be used against the German soldiers in the field.

England will thus be accused of feeding a war, which would have ended sooner had France been left dependent on her own resources. Hence the policy of the British Government, notwithstanding the verdict of public opinion in this country in favour of the German cause, is, if not intentionally, at least practically, benevolent to France, without there being any real foundation for the excuse that the commercial interests of this country would be seriously affected by a different course.

There is still another reason put forward by the British Government in reference to their line of action. It is the allusion to Prussian neutrality during the Crimean war. Germany is told to consider that, at that time, "arms and ammunition were freely exported from Prussia to Russia; and arms of Belgian manufacture found their way to the same quarter through Prussian territory, in spite of a Decree issued by the Prussian Government prohibiting the transport of arms coming from foreign States."

Lord Granville says, in his circular of the 11th instant, "that reflection upon these points may make the German nation inclined to take a juster view of the position now occupied by Her Majesty's Government."

All who recollect the political aspect of that time will admit that there is no real analogy between the two cases. At the period alluded to, public opinion in Germany was very doubtful as to the wisdom of helping a Napoleon to become once more the arbiter of Europe. Besides, it was not a struggle for life and death between two nations equally matched, but it was a war waged in remote regions for remote interests by four Powers against one, without the national existence of England being the least endangered.

Had England alone been the enemy of Russia, the comparison of the two cases would be less wanting in point.

However, it will be remembered how strongly Great Britain remonstrated at the time against the alleged wrong of Prussia. There is but one possible alternative. Either the complaints of the British Government were founded, or they were not. If they really were, how can it be maintained at present that the complaints of Germany are unfounded, should even the great difference of the two cases be entirely disregarded? By declaring the present grievances of Germany devoid of foundation the British Government disavow implicitly the bitter charges they preferred at the time, and condemn the ill-feeling created by them, and partly entertained ever since in this country against Prussia.

It is absolutely impossible to conciliate, with any show of reason and logic, defending the justice of those charges on one side, and refusing on the other to acknowledge the present grievances of Germany to be well-founded.

This being true, there is but one motive which might be alleged as an excuse for the present policy of the British Government towards Germany. That is to apply the principle of retaliation for an alleged wrong done a long time ago under circumstances completely different from the present situation in every possible respect.

To establish in our times such a principle as a rule for the policy of a great nation would be too inconsistent with the general feeling and moral disposition of this country to admit of its being the intention of the British Government.

Should the position now occupied by the British Government in regard to Germany, notwithstanding the admitted justice of her cause, continue to be maintained, it would be difficult even for the staunchest advocate of friendship between England and Germany to persuade the German nation that they have been fairly dealt by.

Prussia House, August 30, 1870.

No. 62.

Señor Rances to Earl Granville.—(Received September 2.)

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Spanish Legation in London, September 2, 1870.

THE proposition which your Excellency did me the honour to address through me to the Government of His Highness the Regent, in your note of the 17th of August last, has given rise to the question, whether the exchange of notes proposed therein is to be effected only between England and the other neutral Powers, or whether those Powers should also do so among themselves?

For myself, I have no doubt of the meaning of the proposition, which from the first appeared to me clear and definite.

Your Excellency's note of the 17th of August said, in fact, "It appears to Her Majesty's Government that this resolution (that of observing neutrality in the present war), in which it takes part, would be confirmed and assured, if all the neutral Powers were to enter into an agreement separately one with another, for the purpose of maintaining their common neutrality."

Further on, in shaping the proposition of Her Majesty's Government, your Excellency said in the same note, "that it would be sufficient and preferable (to any other means of an understanding of the Powers among themselves) that the agreement should be made by an exchange of notes among the different parties, by which it should be expressed that neither of the two Powers between which the said exchange took place would abandon its neutrality in the present war, without a previous communication of ideas, and without announcing to each other respectively any change of their policy in the matter."

It appears clear, then, that the spirit as well as the express wording of the proposition was, that the exchange of notes to which it referred would have to be effected separately by all and each of the Powers who should accept it. But as, notwithstanding what is deduced from the explicit terms of the note of the 17th of August, doubts have been raised upon this point, I beg that your Excellency will be pleased to tell me, for the information of His Highness's Government, whether the meaning that I have given to the proposition of Her Majesty's Government, and which I have explained above, is correct.

I avail, &c.

(Signed) M. RANCES Y VILLANUEVA.

No. 63.

Count Bernstorff to Earl Granville.—(Received September 2.)

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Prussia House, September 2, 1870.

IN continuation of my note of yesterday, relative to the transport of arms to France, I have the honour of informing your Excellency, most respectfully, that, as I have been given to understand, with perfect certainty, there are at this moment about twenty-four cases, marked ^A_{B D M}, at the Willow-Street Station, which contain guns for France, and are consigned to an agent at Newhaven for Dieppe and Calais. The railway carriage in which they lie is said to be numbered 3601, and to belong to the London, Brighton, and South Coast Line; which, as I am distinctly assured, has been continually forwarding similar consignments for France for about the last ten days.

Your Excellency will be convinced that I spare no pains to give the Royal British Government an opportunity of interfering in special cases, if, notwithstanding my repeated representations, it does not yet find itself in a position to adopt a decisive general measure for preventing the exportation of arms and ammunition to France.

Requesting that your Excellency will be kindly pleased to enable me to report to my Government, as soon as possible, on the decision of Her Britannic Majesty's Government in this matter, I have, &c.

(Signed) BERNSTORFF.

No. 64.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 3.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 2, 1870.

THIS afternoon, in obedience to your Lordship's orders, I spoke to the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, in the terms of your Lordship's despatch of yesterday, of the danger that the military operations now going on close to the Belgian frontier may lead to violations of the neutrality of the Belgian territory.

The Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne begged me to assure your Lordship that no precautions would be omitted by the French Government to guard against any breach of Belgian neutrality being committed by French troops by seeking refuge from the enemy on the neutral territory, by pursuing him into it, or by any other proceedings. The French commanders were, he said in conclusion, most distinctly ordered to respect the neutrality of Belgium under all circumstances.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

Count Bernstorff to Earl Granville.—(Received September 3.)

My Lord,

Prussia House, September 3, 1870.

IN pursuance of my notes of the 1st and 2nd instant, respecting the exportation of breech-loaders and ammunition to France, I have the honour to inform your Excellency—

(1.) That about thirty cases with breech-loaders, marked *B. & M.*, have been forwarded from Willow Street Station last night to Newhaven, with the destination of Dieppe and Calais.

(2.) That the Small Arms Factory of Edward Bond, Bow, London, have at present 12,000 rifles ready to be forwarded to France.

(3.) That J. E. Barnett and Sons, 134, Minories; are ready to send 70,000 Enfield rifles to France.

(4.) That M. Ballot des Minières, Charing-Cross Hotel, is the French Agent for part of these transactions. The initials of his name seem to be those marked on the above-mentioned cases.

(5.) That Mr. Thomas Christy, 155, Fenchurch Street, is an English agent for the same purpose.

(6.) That Mr. John Hall, 23, Lombard Street, E. C., Sole Agent for the Chassepôt rifles, &c., furnishes the gunpowder to Mr. G. Dowler, Birmingham.

(7.) That the firm of Dowler, and Messrs. Kynnock, manufacturers of cartridges, have contracted with the French Agents for the wholesale fabrication, during the present war, of the Chassepôt cartridges, of which I have the honour to inclose hereby a packet of ten rounds.

(8.) That the Birmingham firms,—Wilson and Deely, Hughes, Price and Redman, Williamson and Brothers, and the Small Arms Company, have undertaken and in a great part executed French orders, the French Consul-General being in person in that city to superintend the delivery. Two French Agents are also in Birmingham to examine the rifles.

(9.) Eighty-two cases of this Birmingham fabrication were yesterday ready for expedition at Midland Railway Station in that city.

(10.) That, according to most reliable sources, quantities of cases with rifles are expected at Gravesend.

All these informations not being, at present, of any practical use to us, unless the officers of the Custom-houses and the employés in the harbours receive, on the part of Her Majesty's Government, the necessary instructions in order to prevent such open infractions of real neutrality, I beg to request your Excellency to be good enough to take this matter into immediate consideration, so as to have the requisite orders issued without further delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERNSTORFF.

Earl Granville to Baron Beaulieu.

M. le Ministre,

Foreign Office, September 3, 1870.

I HAVE to express to you my thanks for the communication which you made to me on the 31st ultimo, of the measures taken by the Government of His Belgian Majesty for maintaining the neutrality of Belgium; and I have to express to you, in reply, the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for the communication of the instructions, which seem to them to be very judicious.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Sir E. Thornton to Earl Granville.—(Received September 4.)

My Lord,

Washington, August 23, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies of a Proclamation which was issued yesterday by the President of the United States, and published in yesterday's evening papers, enjoining neutrality upon citizens of the United States during the present war between France on one side, and the North German Confederation and its allies on the other. The duties of the citizens are laid down in detail, and the President also alludes to the Treaty between Prussia and the United States, by which it is stipulated that vessels of war of each party may freely take their prizes into the ports of the other. Mention is also made of the Declaration communicated by Prussia that property on the high seas will be respected, and by France that she will be guided during the present war by the Declaration of the Congress of Paris of April 16, 1856, even with regard to vessels of the United States, although this country did not adhere to that Declaration.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. THORNTON.

Inclosure in No. 67.

Extract from the "Washington Chronicle" of August 23, 1870.

PROCLAMATION OF THE PRESIDENT.

Citizens of the United States required to observe Strict Neutrality in the Pending War between France and Prussia.

THE following important Proclamation of neutrality of the United States in the contest now waging between France and Prussia was issued by President Grant yesterday:—

By the President of the United States of America.

A Proclamation.

Whereas a state of war unhappily exists between France, on the one side, and the North German Confederation and its allies on the other side ;

And whereas the United States are on terms of friendship and amity with all the contending Powers, and with the persons inhabiting their several dominions ;

And whereas great numbers of the citizens of the United States reside within the territories or dominions of each of the said belligerents, and carry on commerce, trade, or other business or pursuits therein, protected by the faith of Treaties.

And whereas great numbers of the subjects or citizens of each of the said belligerents reside within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, and carry on commerce, trade, or other business or pursuits therein ;

And whereas the laws of the United States, without interfering with the free expression of opinion and sympathy, or with the open manufacture or sale of arms or munitions of war, nevertheless impose upon all persons who may be within their territory and jurisdiction, the duty of an impartial neutrality during the existence of the contest ;

Now, therefore, I, Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States, in order to preserve the neutrality of the United States and of their citizens, and of persons within their territory and jurisdiction, and to enforce their laws ; and in order that all persons be warned of the general tenor of the laws and Treaties of the United States in this behalf, and of the law of nations, may thus be prevented from any unintentional violation of the same, do hereby declare and proclaim that, by the Act passed on the 20th day of April, A.D. 1818, commonly known as the "Neutrality Law," the following acts are forbidden to be done, under severe penalties, within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States, to wit:—

1. Accepting and exercising a commission to serve either of the said belligerents by land or by sea against the other belligerent.

2. Enlisting or entering into the service of either of the said belligerents as a soldier, or as a marine or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer.

3. Hiring or retaining another person to enlist or enter himself in the service of either of the said belligerents, as a soldier, or as a marine, or seaman on board of any vessel of war, letter of marque, or privateer.

4. Hiring another person to go beyond the limits or jurisdiction of the United States with intent to be enlisted as aforesaid.

5. Hiring another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent to be entered into service as aforesaid.

6. Retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with intent to be enlisted as aforesaid.

7. Retaining another person to go beyond the limits of the United States with the intent to be entered into the service as aforesaid. (But the said Act is not to be construed to extend to a citizen or subject of either belligerent who, being transiently within the United States, shall, on board of any vessel of war, which, at the time of its arrival within the United States, was fitted and equipped as such vessel of war, enlist or enter himself or hire or retain another subject or citizen of the same belligerent, who is transiently within the United States, to enlist or enter himself to serve such belligerent on board such vessel of war, if the United States shall then be at peace with such belligerent.)

8. Fitting out and arming, or attempting to fit out and arm, or procuring to be fitted out and armed, or knowingly being concerned in the furnishing, fitting out, or arming of any ship or vessel with intent that such ship or vessel shall be employed in the service of either of the said belligerents.

9. Issuing or delivering a commission within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States for any ship or vessel to the intent that she may be employed as aforesaid.

10. Increasing or augmenting, or procuring to be increased or augmented, or knowingly being concerned in increasing or augmenting the force of any ship-of-war, cruiser, or other armed vessel, which at the time of her arrival within the United States was a ship-of-war, cruiser, or armed vessel in the service of either of the said belligerents, or belonging to the subjects or citizens of either, by adding to the number of guns of such vessels, or by changing those on board of her for guns of a larger calibre, or by the addition thereto of any equipment solely applicable to war.

11. Beginning or setting on foot, or providing or preparing, the means for any military expedition or enterprise to be carried on from the territory or jurisdiction of the United States against the territories or dominions of either of the said belligerents.

And I do further declare and proclaim that by the 19th Article of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce, which was concluded between His Majesty the King of Prussia and the United States of America, on the 11th day of July, A.D. 1799, which Article was reviewed by the Treaty of May 1, A.D. 1828, between the same parties, and is still in force, it was agreed that "the vessels of war, public and private, of both parties, shall carry freely, wheresoever they please, the vessels and effects taken from their enemies, without being obliged to pay any duties, charges, or fees to officers of Admiralty, of the Customs, or any others; nor shall such prizes be arrested, searched, or put under any legal process, when they come to and enter the ports of the other party, but may freely be carried out again at any time by their captors to the places expressed in their commissions, which the commanding officer of such vessel shall be obliged to show."

And I do further declare and proclaim that it has been officially communicated to the Government of the United States by the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of the North German Confederation, at Washington, that private property on the high seas will be exempted from seizure by the ships of His Majesty the King of Prussia, without regard to reciprocity.

And I do further declare and proclaim that it has been officially communicated to the Government of the United States by the Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary of His Majesty the Emperor of the French, at Washington, that orders have been given that, in the conduct of the war, the commanders of the French forces on land and on the seas shall scrupulously observe towards neutral Powers the rules of international law, and that they shall strictly adhere to the principles set forth in the declaration of the Congress of Paris of the 16th of April, 1856; that is to say: 1st. That privateering is, and remains abolished; 2nd. That the neutral flag covers enemy's goods, with the exception of contraband of war; 3rd. That neutral goods, with the exception of contraband of war, are not liable to capture under the enemy's flag; 4th. That blockades, in order to be binding, must be effective—that is to say, maintained by a force sufficient really to prevent access to the coast of the enemy; and that, although the United States have not adhered to the declaration of 1856, the vessels of His Majesty will not seize

enemy's property found on board of a vessel of the United States, provided that property is not contraband of war.

And I do further declare and proclaim that the statutes of the United States and the law of nations alike require that no person within the territory and jurisdiction of the United States shall take part, directly or indirectly, in the said war, but shall remain at peace with each of the said belligerents, and shall maintain a strict and impartial neutrality, and that whatever privileges shall be accorded to one belligerent within the ports of the United States, shall be in like manner accorded to the other.

And I do hereby enjoin all the good citizens of the United States, and all persons residing or being within the territory or jurisdiction of the United States, to observe the laws thereof, and to commit no act contrary to the provisions of the said statutes, or in violation of the law of nations in that behalf.

And I do hereby warn all citizens of the United States, and all persons residing or being within their territory or jurisdiction, that, while the free and full expression of sympathies in public and private is not restricted by the laws of the United States, military forces in aid of either belligerents cannot lawfully be originated or organized within their jurisdiction; and that while all persons may lawfully and without restriction, by reason of the aforesaid state of war, manufacture and sell within the United States arms and munitions of war, and other articles, ordinarily known as "contraband of war," yet they cannot carry such articles upon the high seas for the use or service of either belligerent; nor can they transport soldiers and officers of either, or attempt to break any blockade which may lawfully established and maintained during the war, without incurring the risk of hostile capture, and the penalties denounced by the law of nations in that behalf.

And I do hereby give notice that all citizens of the United States, and others who may claim the protection of this Government, who may misconduct themselves in the premises, will do so at their peril, and that they can in no wise obtain any protection from the Government of the United States against the consequences of their misconduct.

In witness whereof I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington this 22nd day of August, in the year of our Lord 1870, and of the Independence of the United States of America the 95th.

(L.S.) (Signed) U. S. GRANT.

By the President :
(Signed) HAMILTON FISH, *Secretary of State*.

No. 68.

Earl Granville to General Bulow.

M. le Ministre,

Foreign Office, September 4, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 1st instant, acquainting me that you are authorized by your Government to exchange with that of Her Majesty, letters on the subject of their respective neutrality in the present war, to the same effect as those exchanged between England and other neutral Powers, in conformity with the proposal to that effect which I addressed to you on the 17th ultimo. It remains, therefore, only for me to state to you formally that Her Majesty's Government are, for their part, prepared to enter into an engagement with the Danish Government in the following terms, viz. :—

"That neither England nor Denmark shall depart from its neutrality in the present war without a previous communication of ideas, and an announcement to one another of any change of policy as regards their neutrality."

A letter from you, M. le Ministre, formally announcing that your Government, on its part, will enter into this engagement, will suffice to make it binding on both Governments.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 69.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received September 5.)

My Lord,

Vienna, September 1, 1870.

AT my last interview with Count Beust he inquired if I had heard anything more about the neutrality question. I replied that I had received copies of correspondence that had passed on the subject; and that I must apply to him for the latest news in this matter. I hoped all the Powers would act steadily together, and hold to their declarations, in which case the neutral party in Europe would become a powerful one, and have a right to be listened to hereafter.

Count Beust has not yet received any answer to his communication to Count Apponyi, in which he sends his instructions as to the answer to be returned to your Lordship's Circular of the 17th ultimo, and he seems anxious to know what reception it has met with from Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 70.

Mr. Morier to Earl Granville.—(Received September 5.)

(Extract.)

Darmstadt, September 2, 1870.

A VERY general impression prevails in Germany to the effect that Her Majesty's Government has taken the initiative in the organization of a Neutral League which, when the time for concluding peace comes, shall insist upon Germany not making any demands for territorial cessions on the part of France.

No. 71.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 5, 1870.

HER Majesty's Government are in possession of your Excellency's telegraphic communications announcing the grave events that have occurred in Paris since the surrender of the Emperor Napoleon to the King of Prussia, and I have to instruct you to remain at your post as long as any of the Corps Diplomatique are able to do so, with a view to protect as efficiently as possible the interests and the property of Her Majesty's subjects residing in France. You will, to that effect, communicate with any *de facto* Government (but without any formal acknowledgment of such) that may hold power for the time being, until you receive further instructions from me.

In the event of Her Majesty the Empress deciding to retire from Paris with a view to maintaining the Imperial Government with even a mere shadow of power, you will under no circumstance follow Her Majesty, but you will do everything in your power that may contribute to Her Majesty's safety and comfort if called upon to offer your advice and assistance.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 72.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, September 5, 1870.

AS your Excellency's note of the 2nd instant contained precise details as to the mode in which a cargo of arms was being transmitted to France, Her Majesty's Government lost no time in causing inquiries to be made; and I now have the honour to inform your Excellency that it has been clearly ascertained that the truck numbered 3,601, belonging to the London, Brighton, and South Coast Railway, on which you had been informed that the cases of arms had been placed, was loaded with cases containing not arms, but bacon,

consigned to Honfleur. Some of the cases were opened at the Willow Walk Station, and the truck was duly dispatched to Littlehampton.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 73.

Count Bernstorff to Earl Granville.—(Received September 6.)

My Lord,

Prussia House, September 6, 1870.

WITH reference to my former communications about the shipment of arms and ammunition for France, I am able to state further to your Excellency that a waggon loaded with rifles arrived at Southampton yesterday afternoon, and is lying now in the docks near the shipping place with destination for Havre, and that twelve more waggons arrived there this morning for the same purpose. The rifles are packed up in boxes containing twenty rifles each, and marked B. They were sent from here by waggons of the London and South Western Railway Company, without the knowledge of the Directors of the Company, who have declared that they would hitherto refuse to forward any contraband of war.

As the steamers going to Havre belong to the same Company, this noble and loyal conduct of the Directors prevents, at present, any harm. But as another mode of shipment to France may easily be procured, I will not lose any time in bringing the above-stated facts to the knowledge of your Excellency in order to enable Her Britannic Majesty's Government to prevent the exportation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERNSTORFF.

No. 74.

Count Bernstorff to Earl Granville.—(Received September 6.)

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Prussia House, September 6, 1870

PRINCE WILLIAM OF HESSE, Rear-Admiral awaiting orders, who was sent on the 18th ultimo with a flag of truce to the commander of the French fleet near Heligoland, saw three English steam colliers there, which were unloading coals into the ships of war, and went away apparently as they noticed the arrival of the ship with the flag of truce.

Having the honour of acquainting your Excellency herewith, I remain, &c.

(Signed) BERNSTORFF.

No. 75.

M. de Lavalette to Earl Granville.—(Received September 7.)

M. le Comte,

Londres, le 6 Septembre, 1870.

CETTE lettre vous sera remise par M. Tissot, Premier Secrétaire d'Ambassade, que M. Jules Favre, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, me charge d'accréditer officieusement près de vous au moment que je quitte l'Ambassade de Londres.

Croyez, &c.
(Signé) LAVALETTE.

(Translation.)

M. le Comte,

London, September 6, 1870.

THIS letter will be handed you by M. Tissot, First Secretary of Embassy, whom M. Jules Favre, Minister for Foreign Affairs, charges me to accredit officially to you at the moment of my leaving the Embassy of London.

Believe, &c.
(Signed) LAVALETTE.

No. 76.

Count Bernstorff to Earl Granville.—(Received September 7.)

My Lord,

Prussia House, September 7, 1870.

I HEAR that the boxes of rifles I had the honour to mention in my note of yesterday have been shipped to Havre last night, as the London and South Western

Railway Company, notwithstanding their generous resolution for the future, found themselves under legal obligation to forward the boxes, which had already been accepted by their agent. I should not think it necessary to draw the attention of your Excellency to this fact, now that preventive measures are no more possible, were it not for bringing to your knowledge that, according to the reports I received, the rifles were dispatched with the full knowledge of Her Majesty's Custom-house agents. The boxes were opened at the Custom-house at Southampton, and were described "rifles" in the Custom-bill of entry.

In this case, therefore, should it prove to be true, it was not through any difficulty on the part of the British authorities to find out the contraband of war, that the rifles were suffered to pass to France.

Part of the rifles came from the "Small Arms Company" at Birmingham; others bore the name of the maker, "E. and W. Bond, Hooper Square, London." They have been dispatched by Lebeau and Co., Billiter Street, London.

At the same time I am able to inform your Excellency that 170 cases of rifles, marked "B 1 to 170," left Birmingham last night for Southampton, to the order of Lebeau and Co., London, and that 56 other cases were to be delivered this morning at the City Station, ^{T.L.}_{C.L.}

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERNSTORFF.

No. 77.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, September 7, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of yesterday, and to assure you that immediate inquiry shall be made as to statement that has reached you respecting the export of arms to France from Southampton.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 78.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, September 7, 1870.

WITH reference to your Excellency's note of yesterday, in which you state that information has reached the North German Government that, on the occasion of the visit of Prince William of Hesse under a flag of truce on the 18th ultimo to the French fleet near Heligoland, three English steam-colliers were noticed unloading coals into the ships of war, I have the honour to request that you will be good enough to inform me whether you can give me any particulars which would show how the ships in question were known to be English, or whether you can supply me with any information by which the vessels in question might be identified.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 79.

Earl Granville to Señor Rances.

M. le Ministre,

Foreign Office, September 7, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 2nd instant, requesting certain explanations with respect to the course proposed in the note which I had the honour to address to you on the 17th ultimo, with respect to an interchange of notes between the neutral Powers in the present war; and I have to inform you that Her Majesty's Government would be glad to see carried out the interpretation placed by you on the wording of that note, but do not wish to press their views upon any of the Powers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 80.

Earl Granville to Mr. Lumley.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 7, 1870.

THE various communications received from you have led Her Majesty's Government to consider with great attention the questions whether the transit of sick and wounded belligerents through a neutral country to their own country, or to that of the other belligerents, would be a violation of the neutrality of the Power through whose territory they passed, and whether a neutral might, without breach of neutrality, receive into its own territory sick and wounded belligerents, to be tended within the neutral limits.

As regards the first point, I gather from your telegram of yesterday that the Belgian Government are anxious to be informed what are the views of Her Majesty's Government; and I have therefore to request you to state to Baron d'Anethan that Her Majesty's Government are clearly of opinion that the transit of sick and wounded would be a breach of neutrality if either belligerent objected to it.

As regards the second question, however, I should wish you to state that Her Majesty's Government consider that a neutral country is fully justified in receiving into its own territory the sick and wounded of a belligerent on the understanding that they remain within the limits of the neutral territory, or are dismissed only on condition of their not serving again during the war. The permission for the entry of disabled soldiers would not however, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, extend to the establishment of hospitals for the cure of them by the belligerents, and under their actual superintendence.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 81.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 7, 1870.

I HAVE received your Excellency's telegram of the 6th instant, reporting the substance of a conversation which you had just had with M. Jules Favre, in which he stated to you that France would certainly agree to an armistice if a neutral Power were to propose it, and that he would be glad that an offer of mediation, on the basis of the integrity of the French territory, should be made to Prussia, even though it might be rejected by her.

Your Excellency will have the goodness to inform M. Favre that Her Majesty's Government consider that they would be more likely to do harm than good to the cause of peace if they attempted to mediate, unless they had reason to believe that both parties would receive their mediation, and that there was a basis of negotiation which both would accept.

Your Excellency will, however, add that, in the same manner as Her Majesty's Government have been the channel of communications between the belligerents in regard to minor matters, so they would be happy to be the channel of any communication that is thought likely to lead to peace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 82.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 7, 1870.

I INCLOSE herewith, for your Excellency's information, a copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Her Majesty's Minister at Brussels,* stating the views of Her Majesty's Government as to the proposed transport of wounded soldiers through Belgium and their reception in that country on condition of their not serving again during the war; and I have to request your Excellency to communicate to the French Government the views of Her Majesty's Government on these points as expressed in this despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

*M. Jules Favre to M. Tissot.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by M. Tissot,
September 8.)*

M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

Paris, le 6 Septembre, 1870.

LES événements qui viennent de s'accomplir à Paris s'expliquent si bien par la logique inexorable des faits qu'il est inutile d'insister longuement sur leur sens et leur portée.

En cédant à un élan irrésistible trop longtemps contenu, la population de Paris a obéi à une nécessité suprême, celle de son propre salut.

Elle n'a pas voulu périr avec le pouvoir criminel qui conduisait la France à sa perte.

Elle n'a pas prononcé la déchéance de Napoléon III et de sa dynastie; elle l'a enregistrée au nom du droit, de la justice, et du salut public.

Et cette sentence était si bien ratifiée à l'avance par la conscience de tous que nul parmi les défenseurs les plus bruyants du pouvoir qui tombait ne s'est levé pour le soutenir.

Il s'est effondré de lui-même sous le poids de ses fautes aux acclamations d'un peuple immense sans qu'une goutte de sang ait été versée, sans qu'une personne ait été privée de sa liberté.

Et l'on a pu voir, chose inouïe dans l'histoire, les citoyens auxquels le cri du peuple conférait le mandat périlleux de combattre et de vaincre, ne pas songer un instant aux adversaires qui la veille les menaçaient d'exécutions militaires; c'est en leur refusant l'honneur d'une répression quelconque qu'ils ont constaté leur aveuglement et leur impuissance.

L'ordre n'a pas été troublé un seul moment; notre confiance dans la sagesse et le patriotisme de la Garde Nationale et de la population toute entière nous permet d'affirmer qu'il ne le sera plus.

Délivré de la honte et du péril d'un Gouvernement traître à tous ses devoirs, chacun comprend que le premier acte de cette souveraineté nationale, enfin reconquise, est de se commander à soi-même et de chercher sa force dans le respect du droit.

D'ailleurs le temps presse; l'ennemi est à nos portes, nous n'avons qu'une pensée—le repousser hors de notre territoire.

Mais cette obligation, que nous acceptons résolument, ce n'est pas nous qui l'avons imposée à la France; elle ne la subirait pas si notre voix avait été écoutée.

Nous avons défendu énergiquement, au prix même de notre popularité, la politique de la paix; nous y persévérons avec une conviction de plus en plus profonde.

Notre cœur se brise au spectacle de ces massacres humains dans lesquels disparaît la fleur de deux nations qu'avec un peu de bon sens et beaucoup de liberté on aurait préservées de ces effroyables catastrophes.

Nous n'avons pas d'expression qui puisse peindre notre admiration pour notre héroïque armée sacrifiée par l'impéritie du commandement suprême, et cependant plus grande par ses défaites que par les plus brillantes victoires.

Car malgré la connaissance des fautes qui la compromettaient, elle s'est immolée, sublime devant une mort certaine et rachetant l'honneur de la France des souillures de son Gouvernement.

Honneur à elle! La nation lui ouvre ses bras! Le pouvoir Impérial a voulu les diviser. Le malheur et le devoir les confondent dans une solennelle étreinte. Scellée par le patriotisme et la liberté, cette alliance nous fait invincibles.

Prêts à tout, nous envisageons avec calme la situation qui nous est faite.

Cette situation je la précise en quelques mots; je la soumets au jugement de mon pays et de l'Europe.

Nous avons hautement condamné la guerre, et protestant de notre respect pour le droit des peuples nous avons demandé qu'on laissât l'Allemagne maîtresse de ses destinées. Nous voulions que la liberté fût à la fois notre lien commun et notre commun bouclier; nous étions convaincus que ces forces morales assuraient à jamais le maintien de la paix. Mais, comme sanction, nous réclamions une arme pour chaque citoyen, une organisation civique, des chefs élus. Alors nous demeurions inexpugnables sur notre sol.

Le Gouvernement Impérial, qui avait depuis longtemps séparé ses intérêts d'avec ceux du pays, repoussait cette politique. Nous la reprenons, avec l'espoir qu'instruite par l'expérience la France aura la sagesse de la pratiquer.

De son côté le Roi de Prusse a déclaré qu'il faisait la guerre non à la France mais à la Dynastie Impériale. La Dynastie est à terre; la France libre se lève.

Le Roi de Prusse veut-il continuer une lutte impie qui lui sera au moins ainsi fatale qu'à nous?

Veut-il donner au monde du dix-neuvième siècle ce cruel spectacle de deux nations qui s'entre-détruisent, et qui, oublieuses de l'humanité, de la raison, de la science, accumulent les ruines et les cadavres ?

Libre à lui qu'il assume cette responsabilité devant le monde et l'histoire !

Si c'est un défi nous l'acceptons.

Nous ne céderons ni un pouce de notre territoire ni une pierre de nos forteresses.

Une paix honteuse serait une guerre d'extermination à courte échéance.

Nous ne traiterons que pour une paix durable. Ici notre intérêt est celui de l'Europe entière, et nous avons lieu d'espérer que, dégagée de toute préoccupation dynastique, la question se posera ainsi dans les Chancelleries.

Mais fussions-nous seuls nous ne faiblirons pas.

Nous avons une armée résolue, des forts bien pourvus, et l'enceinte bien établie, mais surtout les poitrines de 300,000 combattants décidés à tenir jusqu'au dernier. Quand ils vont pieusement déposer de couronnes au pied de la statue de Strasbourg, ils n'obéissent pas seulement à un sentiment d'admiration enthousiaste, ils prennent leur héroïque mot d'ordre. Ils surent d'être dignes de leurs frères d'Alsace et de mourir comme eux.

Après les forts, les remparts ; après les remparts, les barricades. Paris peut tenir trois mois et vaincre ; s'il succombait, la France, debout à son appel, le vengerait ; elle continuerait la lutte, et l'agresseur y périrait.

Voilà, Monsieur, ce que l'Europe doit savoir. Nous n'avons pas accepté le pouvoir dans un autre but. Nous ne le conserverions pas une minute si nous ne trouvions pas la population de Paris et la France entière décidées à partager nos résolutions. Je les résume d'un mot. Devant Dieu qui nous entend, devant la postérité qui nous jugera, nous ne voulons que la paix. Mais si on continue contre nous une guerre funeste que nous avons condamnée, nous ferons notre devoir jusqu'au bout ; et j'ai la ferme confiance que notre cause, qui est celle du droit et de la justice, finira par triompher.

C'est en ce sens que je vous invite à expliquer la situation à Lord Granville, entre les mains duquel vous laisserez copie de ce document.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) JULES FAVRE.

(Translation.)

M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

Paris, September 6, 1870.

THE events which have recently been accomplished at Paris are so well explained by the inexorable logic of facts that it is useless to urge at length their significance and their bearing.

In giving way to an irresistible impulse too long held back, the population of Paris has obeyed a supreme necessity, that of its own safety.

It did not wish to perish with the criminal power which was leading France to her ruin.

It has not pronounced the fall of Napoleon III and of his dynasty ; it has recorded it in the name of right, of justice, and of public safety.

And this judgment was so well ratified beforehand by the conscience of all, that none amidst the most noisy defenders of the power which was falling has risen up to sustain it.

It has sunk of itself beneath the weight of its faults amidst the rejoicings of a great people, without a drop of blood having been shed, without a person having been deprived of his liberty.

And we have seen what is unheard of in history, how citizens, on whom the cry of the nation conferred the perilous mandate to fight and to conquer, did not give a moment's thought to the antagonists who the day before threatened them with military executions ; by refusing them the honour of any repression whatever, they proved how blind and powerless they were.

Order has not been for a single moment disturbed ; our confidence in the wisdom and patriotism of the Garde Nationale, and of the whole population, allows us to declare that it will not be.

Rescued from the shame and from the peril of a Government which betrayed its duties, every one will understand that the first act of this national sovereignty, at length regained, is to control itself, and to seek its strength in respect for the law.

Time, too, presses ; the enemy is at our gates ; we have but one thought—to drive him out of our territory.

But this obligation, which we resolutely accept, has not been imposed upon France by us ; she would not be submitting to it, had our voice been listened to.

We have energetically defended the policy of peace, at the price even of our popularity ; we persist in it with a conviction which grows daily deeper.

Our heart breaks at the sight of those human massacres, in which there is perishing the flower of two nations, who, with a little good sense and much liberty, could have been saved from those frightful catastrophes.

We have no expression which can paint our admiration for our heroic army, sacrificed by the unskilfulness of the chief command, and withal, nobler in its defeats than in its most brilliant victories.

For, in spite of the knowledge of the faults that were compromising it, it has sacrificed itself, sublime in the presence of certain death, and redeeming the honour of France from the stain of her Government.

Honour be to it ! The nation opens its arms to it ! The Imperial Power wished to divide them. Misfortune and duty unite them in one solemn embrace. Sealed by patriotism and liberty, this alliance makes us invincible.

Ready for everything, we look calmly on the situation in which we find ourselves placed.

I will specify this situation in a few words. I will submit it to the judgment of my country and of Europe.

Boldly did we condemn the war, and, with protestations of our respect for the rights of nations, we asked that Germany should be left the mistress of her destinies. We wished that liberty should be at once our common bond and our common shield. We were convinced that those moral forces would assure for ever the maintenance of peace. But, as a sanction, we demanded an arm for every citizen, a civic organization, chosen chiefs. Then we might remain impregnable on our soil. The Imperial Government, which had for a long time separated its interests from those of the country, rejected this policy. We are resuming it, with the hope that, taught by experience, France will have the wisdom to practise it.

The King of Prussia, on his side, has declared that he was making war not against France, but against the Imperial dynasty. The dynasty is laid low ; free France is rising up.

Does the King of Prussia wish to continue an injurious struggle, which will be at least as fatal to him as to us ?

Does he wish to give to the world of the nineteenth century the cruel spectacle of two nations destroying one another, and heaping up ruins and corpses, forgetful of humanity, of reason, of science ?

Let him, if he will, assume this responsibility before the world, and before history.

If it is a challenge, we accept it.

We will yield neither an inch of our territory, nor a stone of our fortresses.

A shameful peace would mean a war of extermination at no far distant period.

We will only treat for a lasting peace. In this our interest is that of all Europe ; and we have reason to hope that, relieved from every dynastic bias, the question will thus present itself in the Chanceries.

But should we be alone, we will not give way. We have a resolute army, well-supplied forts, and a well-formed "enceinte ;" but, above all, we have the breasts of 300,000 combatants, determined to hold out to the last. Whenever they devoutly go to lay crowns at the foot of the statue of Strasburg, they obey not only a feeling of enthusiastic admiration, they go to seek their heroic watch-word. They knew that they were worthy of their brothers of Alsace, and of dying like them.

Behind the forts are the ramparts ; behind the ramparts are the barricades. Paris can hold out three months, and conquer ; if it gave in, France would rise at its appeal, and avenge it ; she would continue the struggle, and the aggressor would perish in it.

That, Sir, is what Europe must know. We have not accepted power with any other aim ; we would not retain it a minute if we did not find the population of Paris, and the whole of France, determined to share our resolves. I will sum them up in one word. Before God who hears us, before posterity who will judge us, we only wish for peace. But if a fatal war, which we have condemned, is still carried on against us, we will do our duty to the end ; and I have the firm conviction that our cause, which is that of right and of justice, will have a triumphant issue.

It is in this sense that I ask you to explain the situation to Lord Granville, with whom you will leave a copy of this document.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) JULES FAVRE.

No. 84.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 8.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 7, 1870.

I AM informed by Prince Metternich, the Austrian Ambassador, that he has received a telegram from Count Beust directing him to point out to the Minister for Foreign Affairs and to Chiefs of Missions at Paris the great inconvenience, and indeed impropriety, of allowing the Diplomatic Body to be shut up in Paris during a siege, and thus deprived of the means of communicating with their respective Governments.

Prince Metternich tells me that he has spoken in consequence to M. Jules Favre, and represented to him that it is incumbent on the Minister for Foreign Affairs to give notice to the Diplomatic Body in time to enable them to leave Paris without undue haste or inconvenience. He adds that M. Jules Favre appears to take the same view.

The Nuncio and the Spanish and Turkish Ambassadors, as well as other Chiefs of Missions, have also come to-day to speak to me on the subject.

I have said to all that, in principle, Count Beust's view appears to me just and reasonable: but that, for my own part, I do not desire to hasten my departure from Paris without very good cause. I shall, I have said, be disposed to act in concert with my colleagues in the matter, and shall feel no difficulty about leaving Paris if I am requested or advised to do so by the French Government; but I shall be content to leave the matter as it stands without making any special representation to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

I should add that it is thought to be probable that some of the Government functionaries, and among them the Minister for Foreign Affairs, may determine upon removing from Paris. In this case the Diplomatic Body would naturally follow the Minister through whom they communicate with the Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 85.

Earl Granville to M. de Lavalette.

M. le Marquis,

Foreign Office, September 8, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 6th instant, informing me that M. Tissot is officiously accredited to Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 86.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 8, 1870.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency, in reply to your despatch of the 7th instant, that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you have held with reference to the question of the departure of the Diplomatic Body from Paris and the course that you are yourself disposed to adopt.

Her Majesty's Government would wish you to to concert as much as possible with your colleagues, but to remain in Paris as long as possible with the Government, except in case of immediate bombardment.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 87.

*Earl Granville to Baron Brunnov.**

My dear Baron,

Bruton Street, September 8, 1870.

IN the course of conversation with Count Bernstorff, I asked him whether, in case the French Government wished to transmit a message regarding peace, the Prussian Government would desire me to do so in the same manner as I have forwarded communications from each belligerent to one another on less important matters.

I have informed Lord Lyons of Count Bernstorff's assent, and of my readiness to do so, adding that Her Majesty's Government would not attempt, either alone or with the other neutral Powers, to offer mediation unless they had reason to believe that it would be acceptable to both parties, and that there was a basis upon which both would agree to negotiate.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 88.

*Earl Granville to Baron Brunnov.**

My dear Baron,

Walmer Castle, September 8, 1870.

I AM now free to tell you all I know on the subject of my letter of this day.

* On the 6th instant I was informed by Lord Lyons, in a letter marked Secret and Confidential, that he had been asked by M. Jules Favre to call on him, and that M. Favre had told him that it was desirable that a neutral Power should propose an armistice to Prussia, with a view to a peace, based on a pecuniary indemnity, and without any sacrifice of French territory.

I instructed Lord Lyons to tell M. Favre that Her Majesty's Government were desirous of promoting peace, but that we could not alone, or with other neutral Powers offer mediation, unless we had reason to believe that it would be acceptable to both Parties, and that there seemed to be a basis on which both belligerents would agree to negotiate.

In a conversation the next day with Count Bernstorff, I asked him whether his Government would wish that I should transmit messages from France on the subject of peace in the same way as I had forwarded communications from both belligerents on matters of minor importance.

He at once assented, and I instructed Lord Lyons by telegraph and by letter to tell M. Favre that I was ready to do so. Lord Lyons was to repeat what I had already said about mediation.

I added that it was my intention, if I had taken any step, to inform you and other neutrals.

I did not feel at liberty to tell you the French views which had been communicated to me secretly and confidentially, but I wrote to-day to tell you the part I had taken.

Shortly before my leaving the Foreign Office, I learnt by telegraph that Prince Metternich had informed Count Beust that the French Government were ready to accept an armistice with a view to a peace based on the maintenance of the French territory, and that Count Beust had immediately informed the Russian Government.

Soon after my arrival here, another telegram arrived from Lord Lyons, in which I was informed that he had seen M. Favre, who told him that since their last conversation he had found an anxious desire on the part of the Representatives of neutral Powers to assist France in coming to satisfactory terms with Prussia. He hoped England would not now be displeased if he took advantage of the good feeling manifested by other Powers. Lord Lyons properly replied that Her Majesty's Government would not feel any jealousy, and that any measures likely to lead to a satisfactory peace would have their warm sympathy.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

* A similar letter was addressed to Baron Brunnov, Count Apponyi, and M. Cadorna.

No. 89.

Count Bernstorff to Earl Granville.—(Received September 8.)

My Lord,

Prussia House, September 8, 1870.

I AM now enabled to give to your Excellency a proof for the facts I had the honour to state in my note of yesterday. The inclosed shipping bill leaves no doubt that the rifles were shipped to France with the full knowledge of the Custom-house Agents.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BERNSTORFF.

Inclosure in No. 89.

Shipping Bill.

No. 6.

Denomination of Entry.

BRITISH GOODS.

Ship "Fannie," Master Mortimer, for Havre.

British Ship

F. R. CORKE, *Exporter.*

Marks and Numbers.	No. of Packages.	Description of Packages.	Particulars of Goods.	Value.*
B	170	1/170	3,400 of rifles	£ 5,100
G G	57	1/55	3,400 bayonets and cases	1,500
		1000/1	1,112 of rifles	1,700
			1,112 bayonets and cases	560
	227			8,860

We declare the value of the British goods above described to be

(Signed) E. R. CORKE.

Southampton, September 6, 1870.

I certify that the above goods were shipped per "Fannie" to Havre, September 6, 1870.

(Signed) C. F. WILLIAMS, Jun., Dr.,
Bill Entry.

Custom House, Southampton,
September 7, 1870.

No. 90.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 9.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 8, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the "Journal Officiel" of this day a note received by the Minister for Foreign Affairs from the United States' Minister at Paris.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 90.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of September 8, 1870.

Paris, le 7 Septembre, 1870.

LE Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a reçu de la Légation des Etats Unis la note suivante :—

" Monsieur,

" J'ai reçu la nuit dernière, à onze heures, la communication que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser à la date du 5 courant, et par laquelle vous me faisiez savoir que, en vertu d'une résolution adoptée par les membres du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale, le Département des Affaires Etrangères vous avait été confié.

" J'ai à mon tour la satisfaction de vous annoncer que j'ai reçu de mon Gouvernement un télégramme par lequel il me donne mission de reconnaître le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale comme le Gouvernement de la France.

" En conséquence, je suis prêt à entrer en relations avec ce Gouvernement, et, si vous le voulez bien, à traiter avec lui toutes les affaires ressortissant aux fonctions dont je suis revêtu.

" En faisant cette communication à votre Excellence, je la prie d'agréer pour elle-même et pour les membres du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale les félicitations du Gouvernement et du peuple des Etats Unis ; ils auront appris avec enthousiasme la proclamation de cette République qui s'est instituée en France sans qu'une goutte de sang ait été versée, et ils s'associeront par le cœur et sympathiquement à ce grand mouvement qu'ils espèrent et croient devoir être fécond en résultats heureux pour le peuple Français et pour l'humanité tout entière.

" Jouissant depuis près d'un siècle des innombrables bienfaits du Gouvernement Républicain, le peuple des Etats-Unis ne peut assister qu'avec le plus profond intérêt aux efforts de ce peuple Français auquel le rattachent les liens d'une amitié traditionnelle et qui cherche à fonder les institutions par lesquelles on assurera à la génération présente, comme à sa postérité, le droit inaliénable de vivre en travaillant au bonheur de tous.

" En terminant, je tiens à dire à votre Excellence que je me félicite d'avoir pour intermédiaire entre le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale et moi l'homme si distingué dont on apprécie tant, dans mon propre pays, le caractère élevé, et qui a consacré avec dévouement toutes les forces de son intelligence à la cause de la liberté humaine et des Gouvernements libres.

" Agréez, &c.
(Signé) " WASHBURNE."

(Translation.)

Paris, September 7, 1870.

THE Minister for Foreign Affairs has received from the United States' Legation the following note :—

" Sir,

" I received last night, at 11 o'clock, the communication which you did me the honour to address to me on the 5th instant, and in which you informed me that, in virtue of a Resolution adopted by the Members of the Government of National Defence, the Department of Foreign Affairs had been intrusted to you.

" I have in my turn the satisfaction to announce to you that I have received from my Government a telegram, in which it commissions me to recognize the Government of National Defence as the Government of France.

" I am accordingly ready to enter into relations with that Government, and, if you are willing, to transact with it all the business within the jurisdiction of the post which I fill.

" In making this communication to your Excellency I ask you to accept for yourself and for the Members of the Government of National Defence the congratulations of the Government and of the people of the United States. They will have heard with enthusiasm of the Proclamation of this Republic, which has been founded in France without one drop of blood having been shed ; and they will join heartily and sympathetically in that great movement which they hope and believe will be productive of happy results for the French people and for mankind in general.

" Having been for nearly a century in the enjoyment of the numberless benefits of a Republican Government, the people of the United States cannot but look on with the deepest interest at the efforts of the French people, to whom they are bound by the

ties of traditional friendship, and who are seeking to found institutions by which the inalienable right to live in working for the happiness of all will be assured to the present generation and to its descendants.

"In conclusion, I must tell your Excellency that I congratulate myself on having, as a medium between the Government of National Defence and myself so distinguished a man, whose high character is so much appreciated in my own country, and who has bestowed with devotion all the strength of his mind on the cause of human liberty and of free Governments.

"Accept, &c.
(Signed) "WASHBURNE."

No. 91.

Earl Granville to M. Tissot.

Foreign Office, September 9, 1870.

LORD GRANVILLE presents his compliments to M. Tissot, and has the honour to thank him for the communication of the despatch from M. Jules Favre of the 6th of September, which M. Tissot was good enough to leave with him.

Lord Granville requests M. Tissot to accept, &c.

No. 92.

Count Bernstorff to Earl Granville.—(Received September 9.)

My Lord,

Prussia House, September 9, 1870.

I HEAR from a reliable source that fifty cases for France containing rifles from Messrs. Wilson, Deeley, and Co., at Birmingham, marked V 1 to 50, have been forwarded yesterday from there by the London and North Western Railway to Wapping Station, London,

I will lose no time in bringing also this fact to the knowledge of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, so that the further transport of the said arms may be prevented, if necessary, by telegraph.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERNSTORFF.

No. 93.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, September 9, 1870.

YOUR Excellency's notes of the 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th instant contained such full particulars of information that had reached you as to an extensive supply of arms and ammunition from this country to France, that Her Majesty's Government have been enabled to make the most searching inquiry into the truth of the reports. The result of these inquiries, which have been made simultaneously, but independently, by the Police, the Customs Officers, and the authorities of the War Department, shows that the information is in one or two cases correct; but that in the majority of the cases, as I propose to show you in detail, there was no foundation for the statements that had been made to you.

The truth appears to be that, at the outbreak of the war, or soon afterwards, French agents bought up a limited stock of Snider rifles which was then in the market, but that their operations have hitherto been confined to this transaction. There has been no unusual activity in the gun trade; no orders for manufacture of arms for France appear to be in course of execution; and no contracts would seem to have been entered into for future supply. Of the arms actually purchased and paid for, the number of which is too insignificant to have had any appreciable effect on the war, even if they had been delivered, none are known to have left this country before the 6th instant, when, as your Excellency is aware, between 4,000 and 5,000 rifles were shipped at Southampton for Havre. The further reports that have since reached your Excellency probably refer to additional consignments in execution of the same order.

It is not surprising that exaggerated rumours should have reached your Excellency, which led you to fear that arrangements had been made for a steady and continuous supply of material of war to France.

Rumours of a similar character, and equally without foundation, have reached the French Embassy as to transactions of a similar character conducted by Prussian agents.

The cases circumstantially detailed to your Excellency doubtless require special investigation; and in order to show you that I am justified in assuring you of the groundlessness of the majority of them, I will proceed to deal with them in the order in which they reached me from your Excellency.

In the note received from you on the 2nd instant three cases were specified :—

1. Relating to the consignment of arms by Messrs. Pearse and Son, of Birmingham, to Mr. Frederic Brown, of Rockferry, Birkenhead.

No trace can be discovered of this transaction. There is no gunmaking firm of the name of Pearse and Son at Birmingham, and no Mr. Frederic Brown can be discovered at Birkenhead.

It was remarked incidentally by experienced persons engaged in the investigation that the direction on a case that "it was not to be lifted with dog-hooks" would in itself show that it was not loaded with arms.

2. The case of Messrs. Mark Whitwell and Co., of Bristol.

This firm are shipowners and brokers of high standing, and they have satisfactorily shown that they have not shipped any munitions of war for France.

It seems to be quite certain that no exports of war material to France have taken place from Liverpool or Bristol. It is thought that your Excellency's informants must have been misled by the exportation of arms from Birmingham by these ports to Africa. This export is a regular and brisk trade, about 3,000 flint-lock muskets being on the average sent weekly.

3. The case of Mr. Cumming.

It appears that this person occupies two small rooms at 135, Fenchurch Street, and is agent for certain gunmakers and cartridge manufacturers, but he positively denies that he has received any orders for France.

I will next proceed to deal with the cases enumerated in your Excellency's note of the 3rd instant :—

1. The cases referred to, marked ^(a) B.D.M., duly arrived at Newhaven from Willow Walk Station. They were opened and examined by a police officer, sent specially from London for the purpose, in conjunction with the Customs officials, and were found to contain bacon and salted meat.

2. Mr. Edward Philip Bond is managing director of the small-arms factory at Bow. This firm had in hand, at the outbreak of the war, a small stock of Snider rifles, which was bought up; and, as part of the cargo taken by the "Fannie" from Southampton was shipped in Mr. Bond's name, it is probable that the purchase was made by French agents.

3. Messrs. Barnett have not 70,000 Enfield rifles ready to send to France. They have in stock 13,000 muzzle-loading Enfield rifles, bought some time ago at a Government sale, which are not sold. The only large order they have in hand is one of flint firelocks for South Africa.

4. There are two brothers of the name of Ballot des Minières, who stay frequently at the Charing Cross Hotel. They are well-known provision merchants, in a large way of business, but have never been suspected of dealing in arms, and are unknown to the gunmaking trade.

5. Mr. Christy was the original agent in this country for the sale of Chassepôt rifles, but has never at any time been engaged in making purchases.

6. Mr. Hall is a well known gunpowder manufacturer at Dartford. He has sold no powder to Mr. Dowler, nor to any other person, for the purpose of loading cartridges for export to France.

7. Messrs. Dowler have no contract with any persons whatever for the supply of Chassepôt cartridges to France.

They made some time ago 35,000 Chassepôt cartridges for Japan, which they have still in hand, and do not expect to sell, as it has been found that they do not explode readily.

Messrs. Kynnock have done very little business lately, and none with French agents.

8. The firms of Messrs. Wilson and Deely, Mr. Hughes, Messrs. Price and Redman, and Messrs. Williamson, Brothers, state that they have neither executed nor undertaken any French orders; their business has been confined of late to small sales. Messrs. Wilson and Deely are said to have only one contract, and that with a respectable London firm. Mr. Hughes has only sold six rifles since the outbreak of the war; and the transactions of the other two firms have been quite unimportant.

The Birmingham Small Arms Company are under no engagement to manufacture Snider rifles for France, and do not intend to enter into one. This Company, however, having on hand at the outbreak of the war a limited stock of old rifles, have, it seems, sold a certain number for export to France, and 3,400 are stated to have left their works for delivery.

These are, as far as can be ascertained, the rifles which have left Southampton on board the 'Fannie,' to which your Excellency's notes of the 6th, 7th, and 8th instant refer.

9. The police authorities report that there were not 82 cases of arms at the Midland Railway Station at Birmingham on the 2nd ultimo.

It appears, however, that on the 3rd ultimo 30 cases of arms for the African trade were carried from that station to Bristol, and that there are at present 60 similar cases lying there destined for the same route.

10. The Customs, Police, and Railway authorities can ascertain nothing respecting the expected arrival of arms at Gravesend, but are confident that no such arrival has yet taken place.

Your Excellency will see from this examination that from these ten cases the only fact that can be elicited is that to which I have referred at the beginning of this note, that French agents would appear to have purchased from the Small Arms Companies at Birmingham and in London the stock of Snider rifles which they had in hand at the outbreak of the war. It is to these arms that your Excellency's more recent notes relate. The transaction does not appear to have been secret. The portion of them shipped on board the "Fannie" at Southampton were, as you have pointed out, cleared as rifles, and the Customs authorities were fully aware of the nature of the cargo, which they had no power to stop.

I will not at present enter into a discussion of your Excellency's demand that the Customs authorities should be instructed to prohibit such exports. I shall enter into this question fully in the answer which I propose shortly to send to the Memorandum on the subject which your Excellency has placed in my hands. In the present note I have confined myself to dealing with the specific cases to which your Excellency had drawn my attention.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 94.

M. Jules Favre to M. Tissot.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by M. Tissot, September 10.)

Paris, le 9 Septembre, 1870, 7·25 P.M.

PLUSIEURS Gouvernements se montrent sympathiques à notre désir d'une paix honorable. La condition absolue pour nous, je l'ai dit dans mon circulaire, c'est le maintien de notre intégrité territoriale, sans laquelle nous sommes résolus à faire une guerre à outrance. L'indemnité pécuniaire resterait à fixer.

Veillez vous exprimer dans ce sens avec M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, et lui faire comprendre qu'il est de l'intérêt de tous que le Cabinet de Londres se joigne aux autres Puissances afin d'amener la signature d'un armistice, qui servirait de point de départ pour la conclusion de la paix.

(Translation.)

Paris, September 9, 1870, 7·25 P.M.

SEVERAL Governments sympathize with our desire for an honourable peace.

An absolute condition for us, as I have stated in my Circular, is the maintenance of our territorial integrity, without which we are determined to carry on a war "à outrance." The pecuniary indemnity would remain to be settled.

Have the goodness to express yourself in these terms to the Minister of Foreign Affairs, and to make him understand that it is for the interest of all that the Cabinet of London should join the other Powers in order to bring about the signature of an armistice, which would serve as a starting-point for the conclusion of peace.

No. 95.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 10.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 9, 1870.

I HAD yesterday the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch of the 7th instant, inclosing a copy of a despatch to Mr. Lumley, in which your Lordship has stated the views of Her Majesty's Government as to the proposed transport of wounded soldiers through Belgium, and as to their reception in that country, on condition of their not serving again during the war.

In pursuance of your Lordship's instructions I communicated the views of Her Majesty's Government, as stated in the despatch to Mr. Lumley, verbally to M. Jules Favre. He said that the question had been satisfactorily settled by the present French Government with the Government of Belgium.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 96.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 10.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 9, 1870.

I HAVE already had the honour to inform your Lordship by telegraph that M. Jules Favre accepts your offer to transmit any communication which may tend to peace, and requests you to convey for him to Count Bismarck the following question :—

“Le Comte de Bismarck veut-il entrer en pourparlers pour arriver à un armistice et à une conférence sur les conditions de la paix ; et avec qui entend-il engager cette conversation ?” *

I have herewith the honour to inclose a copy of an autograph letter from M. Jules Favre to me containing the request. The letter was brought to me by Prince Metternich, who had gone from my house to speak to M. Jules Favre, and had mentioned that he was coming back to me. This explains the allusion to the Prince in the beginning of the letter.

On receiving it I went immediately to M. Jules Favre. As I mentioned in my telegram, he asked me to beg your Lordship very particularly to forward the question by telegraph direct to the Prussian head-quarters to Count Bismarck himself.

He said that it appeared from an answer made to a communication from Italy, that M. Thiele had no authority to treat at Berlin questions relative to the conditions of peace ; and he added that it was extremely important to avoid delay.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 96.

M. Jules Favre to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Paris, le 9 Septembre, 1870.

LE Prince de Metternich veut bien se charger d'être mon intermédiaire près de vous pour vous demander, conformément à l'offre que vous m'en avez faite, de poser pour moi au Comte de Bismarck cette question : Veut-il entrer en pourparlers pour arriver à un armistice et à une Conférence sur les conditions de la paix ; et avec qui entend-il engager cette conversation ?

Je suis, &c.
(Signé) JULES FAVRE.

* (Translation.)—“Is Count Bismarck willing to enter into verbal negotiations for an armistice and for a conference upon the conditions of peace ; and with whom does he propose to hold this conversation ?”

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 9, 1870.

THE Prince de Metternich is kind enough to undertake to act as my intermediary with you to ask you, in accordance with the offer which you have made, to put the following question to Count Bismarck on my behalf: Is he willing to enter into verbal negotiations for an armistice and for a Conference upon the conditions of peace; and with whom does he propose to hold this conversation?

I am, &c.

(Signed) JULES FAVRE.

No. 97.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, September 10, 1870.

AS Her Majesty's Government have no means of communicating directly by telegraph with the head-quarters of the Prussian army, I have the honour to request that your Excellency will convey to Count Bismarck, with as little delay as possible, the following question, which they are requested by M. Jules Favre to submit to his Excellency on his behalf. I state the question in M. Jules Favre's own words:—"Veut-il entrer en pourparlers pour arriver à un armistice et à une Conférence sur les conditions de la paix; et avec qui entend-il engager cette conversation?"

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 98.

Count Bernstorff to Earl Granville.—(Received September 9.)

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Prussia House, September 9, 1870.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Excellency's note of the 7th instant, and have lost no time in asking the King's Government for further particulars as to how the colliers at Heligoland were recognized as English, and in what manner the ships can be identified.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BERNSTORFF.

No. 99.

Count Apponyi to Earl Granville.—(Received September 10.)

M. le Comte,

Belgrave Square, 10 Septembre, 1870.

EN réponse à la note que vous avez bien voulu m'adresser en date du 17 Août dernier, j'ai l'honneur d'informer votre Excellence que j'ai été autorisé par le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal d'échanger avec celui de Sa Majesté Britannique des lettres au sujet du maintien de la neutralité pendant la guerre actuelle, semblables à celles échangées entre l'Angleterre et d'autres Puissances neutres, dans le but mentionné dans votre note précitée.

Je saisis, &c.

(Signé) APPONYI.

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Belgrave Square, September 10, 1870.

IN reply to the note which you have had the goodness to address to me, dated the 17th of August last, I have the honour to inform your Excellency that I have been authorized by the Imperial and Royal Government to exchange with that of Her Britannic Majesty letters on the subject of the maintenance of neutrality during the present war, of the same

nature as those exchanged between England and other neutral Powers, with the object mentioned in your note referred to above.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) APPONYI.

No. 100.

Earl Granville to Count Apponyi.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, September 10, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's letter of this day's date acquainting me that you are authorized by your Government to exchange with that of Her Majesty letters on the subject of their respective neutrality in the present war, to the same effect as those exchanged between England and other neutral Powers, in conformity with the proposal to that effect which I addressed to your Excellency on the 17th ultimo.

It remains, therefore, only for me to state to you formally that Her Majesty's Government are, for their part, prepared to enter into an engagement with the Austro-Hungarian Government in the following terms :—

“That neither England nor Austria shall depart from its neutrality in the present war without a previous communication of ideas and an announcement to one another of any change of policy as regards their neutrality.”

A letter from you, M. l'Ambassadeur, formally announcing that your Government, on its part, will enter into this engagement, will suffice to make it binding on both Governments.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 101.

Count Apponyi to Earl Granville.—(Received September 10.)

M. le Comte,

Belgrave Square, le 10 Septembre, 1870.

PAR la note que votre Excellence m'a fait l'honneur de m'adresser en date de ce jour, elle veut bien m'informer que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique est prêt à conclure avec celui de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique un arrangement suivant lequel—

“Ni l'Angleterre ni l'Autriche-Hongrie n'abandonneront leur neutralité pendant la présente guerre, sans s'être préalablement communiqué leurs idées et avoir annoncé l'une à l'autre tout changement que pourrait subir leur politique, en ce qui concerne leur neutralité.”

Votre Excellence ajoute qu'il suffira d'une lettre de ma part, vous informant officiellement que le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal adhère à cet engagement, pour le rendre obligatoire pour les deux Gouvernements.

Conformément à l'autorisation que j'ai reçue à cet objet, je m'empresse de vous annoncer, M. le Comte, que le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique donne son complet assentiment à l'arrangement énoncé ci-dessus et s'engage à l'observer en tous points.

Agréé, &c.
(Signé) APPONYI.

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Belgrave Square, September 10, 1870.

IN the note of this day's date which your Excellency has done me the honour to address to me, you have the goodness to inform me that the Government of Her Britannic Majesty are ready to conclude with that of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty an arrangement according to which—

“Neither England nor Austria-Hungary will abandon their neutrality during the present war without having previously communicated their ideas and having announced to

one another every change that their policy could undergo, in so far as concerns their neutrality."

Your Excellency adds that a letter from me, informing you officially that the Imperial and Royal Government adheres to this engagement, will be sufficient to render it binding on the two Governments.

In accordance with the authorization which I have received for this object, I hasten to announce to your Lordship that the Government of his Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty gives its entire assent to the arrangement expressed above, and engages to observe it in all points.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) APPONYI.

No. 102.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 10, 1870.

M. TISSOT called on me this morning and stated that he had been instructed by M. Jules Favre to represent to Her Majesty's Government that various Governments sympathized with the desire of France to obtain an honourable peace. The indispensable condition of peace, however, M. Favre stated, was set forth in his Circular, the maintenance of the territorial integrity of France, and unless that was secured she was resolved to continue the war to the last extremity. As for pecuniary indemnity, the amount of that would remain to be settled.

M. Tissot was further directed to point out that it was important for the common interest of all that the British Cabinet should unite with other Powers in order to bring about the signature of an armistice, which might serve as a preliminary towards the conclusion of peace.

M. Tissot having made to me this communication, as directed by M. Favre, proceeded to impress upon me, on the grounds of humanity and general policy, how important it was that Great Britain should act upon the suggestion thus thrown out by M. Favre.

I explained to M. Tissot, as your Excellency has already explained to M. Favre himself, the motives which induced Her Majesty's Government to adhere to the opinion that it is not desirable for them to offer mediation unless it has reason to believe that it was acceptable to both parties, and that there seemed to be a basis on which both parties would consent to negotiate, because Her Majesty's Government believe a departure from it would weaken and not strengthen the chance of success.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 103.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 10, 1870.

I RECEIVED this morning your despatch of yesterday, inclosing a copy of a note from M. Jules Favre, stating a question which he desired might be put to Count Bismarck, with a view to ascertain the disposition of the Prussian Government to agree to an armistice, and to negotiate for peace.

Your Excellency will have the goodness to inform M. Favre that I lost no time in applying to the Prussian Ambassador to forward the question, and I inclose, for your information, and for communication to M. Favre, a copy of my letter to Count Bernstorff on the subject.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 104.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 11.)

(Extract.)

Paris, September 10, 1870.

IN execution of the instructions which I had received from your Lordship, I said to M. Jules Favre that Her Majesty's Government were very desirous to do all in their power to promote the restoration of peace; but that they feared that they should do harm instead of good if they put themselves forward unless they had reason to believe that both Parties would be ready to receive their mediation, and that there was a basis for negotiation which both would accept. I added, however, that Her Majesty's Government, who had already shown their willingness to be the medium of communication between the belligerents on less important matters, would be very happy to transmit any communication calculated to lead to peace.

M. Jules Favre replied that, since his previous conversations with me, he had spoken on the subject to the Representatives of some of the most important Powers, and had received from them assurances of their warm desire to assist France in coming to an agreement with Prussia. He had, he said, addressed himself in the first instance to England; but he trusted that Her Majesty's Government would not be displeased if he now took advantage of the friendly disposition manifested by other Powers.

I assured him that he need not entertain the least fear of any sort of jealousy on the part of Her Majesty's Government; and that any measure likely to lead speedily to a satisfactory peace would have their most cordial sympathy.

M. Jules Favre told me yesterday that he had authorized the Russian Chargé d'Affaires here to ask the Cabinet of St. Petersburg to inform the Prussian Government that France was ready to treat on the basis of the integrity of the territory and of a pecuniary indemnity to Prussia.

M. Jules Favre mentioned also that the Italian Government had made at Berlin a communication respecting an armistice similar to that made by Count Beust. It appeared that he had received no information from Austria respecting the reception of Count Beust's communication had met with; while he had heard that, in answer to Italy, M. de Thile had said that Count Bismarck had reserved to himself the discussion of all questions concerning the conditions of peace.

Finally, as I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch of yesterday, M. Jules Favre begged me to ask your Lordship to convey for him to M. de Bismarck a question as to his disposition to enter into communication with a view to an armistice, and to a conference on the conditions of peace.

No. 105.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 11.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 10, 1870.

I HAVE lost no time in informing M. Jules Favre that your Lordship has without any delay caused the question which the French Government desires to be put to Count Bismarck to be forwarded to him through the Prussian Ambassador at London.

M. Jules Favre desires me to thank your Lordship for the promptitude with which you have complied with his request. He expresses an earnest hope that he shall receive an answer very speedily.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 106.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Granville.—(Received September 12.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, September 5, 1870.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 31st ultimo, I have acquainted Prince Gortchakoff with the language which your Lordship has held to Baron Brunnow as to the improbability of any offer of mediation being accepted by France and Prussia with a view to promote the termination of the war, in which these Powers are at present engaged; and I also stated to him that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that England and Russia should see their way very clearly to success before committing themselves, in concert with other neutral Powers, to any attempt at negotiation which, if without result, could only do harm.

Prince Gortchakoff said he entirely concurred in the opinions of Her Majesty's Government on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 107.

M. Tissot to Earl Granville.—(Received September 12, 10.30 A.M.)

M. le Comte,

Londres, le 10 Septembre, 1870.

JE reçois à l'instant même de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères une dépêche qui m'invite à transmettre tous ses remerciements à votre Excellence pour l'appui qu'elle nous donne en consentant à nous servir d'intermédiaire dans les conditions précédemment indiquées par le Gouvernement de la Reine.

M. Jules Favre me charge toutefois de dire à votre Excellence le prix qu'il attacherait à un concours plus actif du Cabinet de Londres. Il constate que l'opinion publique, en France, attend ce concours, et a été péniblement émue en apprenant que l'Angleterre, dans les cruelles épreuves que traverse sa plus fidèle alliée, hésite à faire un pas plus décisif pour arriver à une pacification, qui n'est pas seulement dans l'intérêt de la France, mais dans celui de tous les peuples civilisés, et particulièrement dans celui de l'Angleterre, dont la mouvement industriel et commercial a surtout besoin de la paix.

M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères me prie de faire remarquer à votre Excellence que ce n'est plus une dynastie, mais une nation dont il s'agit de défendre la cause, et que cette nation, qui désormais cherche ses forces dans des institutions libres, sera toujours l'amie de l'Angleterre. L'ancien Gouvernement lui-même n'avait pas fait une guerre de conquêtes, mais de prépondérance. Aujourd'hui que cette question de prépondérance est tranchée contre nous, aller plus loin, de la part de la Prusse, serait vouloir amener la France à une nouvelle lutte. M. Jules Favre exprime donc encore une fois l'espoir que votre Excellence voudra bien agir plus efficacement. Votre Excellence a un grand acte à accomplir, et plus que tout autre le Gouvernement Anglais est en mesure de le réaliser.

M. Jules Favre m'annonce d'ailleurs que toutes les dispositions sont prises en vue de la défense, tant à Paris qu'en province. Le Gouvernement, en cas de siège, l'enverra à Tours comme Vice-Président et Ministre des Affaires Etrangères. Il restera ainsi en communication avec les Cabinets.

Veillez, &c.
(Signé) CH. TISSOT.

(Translation.)

My Lord,

London, September 10, 1870.

I HAVE just received a despatch from the Minister for Foreign Affairs, asking me to convey to your Excellency his thanks for the support which you are lending to us in consenting to act as our intermediary in the terms before indicated by Her Majesty's Government.

M. Jules Favre directs me, however, to communicate to your Excellency the value which he would attach to a more active co-operation on the part of the Cabinet of London. He states that public opinion in France looks for this co-operation, and has been painfully affected on learning that England, amid the cruel trials which her most faithful ally is undergoing, hesitates to take a more decisive step to bring about a pacification which is not only for the interest of France but for that of all civilized nations, and particularly

for that of England, to whose industrial and commercial movement peace is essentially necessary.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs begs me to bring to your Excellency's notice the fact that it is no longer a dynasty but a nation whose cause we have to defend, and that this nation, which henceforth seeks its strength in free institutions, will ever be the friend of England. The former Government itself did not make a war of conquest, but of supremacy. Now that this latter question is decided against us, for Prussia to go farther would show a wish to lead France on to a fresh struggle. M. Jules Favre expresses, then, once more the hope that your Excellency will think fit to act more efficaciously. Your Excellency has a noble deed to perform, and the English Government, more than any other, is in a position to carry it out.

M. Jules Favre communicates to me, likewise, that every arrangement has been made with a view to defence, as well in Paris as in the provinces. In the event of a siege the Government will send him to Tours as Vice-President and Minister for Foreign Affairs. He will thus remain in communication with the Cabinets.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) CH. TISSOT.

No. 108.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 12.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 11, 1870.

THIS afternoon, in obedience to the instruction contained in your Lordship's despatch of yesterday, I gave to M. Jules Favre a copy of the letter of the same day, by which you requested Count Bernstorff to forward to Count Bismarck the question which the French Government desired to put to him.

M. Jules Favre said that it was of the greatest importance to him to know as soon as possible whether Count Bismarck was in fact disposed to enter into communication with him in order to arrive at an armistice and a Conference on the terms of peace. As I have already informed your Lordship by telegraph, he affirmed that, if an answer did not arrive by 2 o'clock to-morrow afternoon, he must conclude that Count Bismarck did not intend to send one at all.

I reminded M. Jules Favre of the uncertainty and delay which attended all communication with the Prussian head-quarters, and begged him not to be hasty in concluding that an answer to his question would not be sent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 109.

Earl Granville to Mr. Morier.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 12, 1870.

YOU report, in your despatch of the 2nd instant, that a very general impression exists in Germany, that Her Majesty's Government has taken the initiative in the organization of a League of neutral Powers with the view of preventing Germany from demanding territorial cessions from France; and I think it right to acquaint you with the attitude of Her Majesty's Government.

At the outbreak of the war Her Majesty's Government decided to maintain strict neutrality; and they have fully adhered to that determination. They have declined to entertain any proposals for a combination of the neutral Powers with the view of localizing the war, or with regard to the eventuality of combined mediation. They have, as you are aware, concluded Treaties with France and Prussia, with the object of securing respect for the independence and neutrality of Belgium; and they have interchanged notes separately with the majority of the neutral Powers, containing mutual assurances against the departure of one Power from an attitude of neutrality, without a previous communication to the other of the contemplated change of policy; finally, they have conveyed to the Prussian Government *verbatim*, without comment, a message from the French Government, inquiring whether Count Bismarck was disposed to enter into negotiations with the view of concluding an armistice and conferring respecting conditions of peace.

These are all the steps that have been taken by Her Majesty's Government since the commencement of the war; and you will consequently see that there is no truth whatsoever in the rumours to the contrary effect which you have found to be current in Germany.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 110.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 13.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 12, 1870.

I HAD this morning the honour to inform your Lordship, by telegraph, that a notice had appeared in the "Journal Officiel," that M. Thiers was to set out immediately on a special mission, first to London, and then to St. Petersburg and Vienna.

Soon afterwards I received a visit from M. Jules Favre, who said that this measure had been decided upon last night, and that the Government and the country had reason to be deeply grateful to M. Thiers for undertaking, at his advanced age, this important mission. His long experience, his great reputation, and the pre-eminent position he occupied in France, would, it was hoped, add great weight to the information he would give Her Majesty's Government, on the real condition and prospects of the country; and his name would, it was trusted of itself, suffice to bespeak for him respect and attention.

Later in the day M. Thiers himself called upon me. As your Lordship will have almost immediately an opportunity of hearing him in person, I will not weaken his language by an imperfect attempt to make a report of it.

At M. Thiers' request I have informed your Lordship, by telegraph, this afternoon, that he expects to be in London early to-morrow, and is very desirous of having, as soon as possible, an interview with you.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 111.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 13.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 12, 1870.

I HAD, early this morning, the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram of last night, informing me that Count Bernstorff thought that an answer to M. Jules Favre's question to Count Bismarck could hardly be expected before Tuesday, although he had received information that the telegram conveying it had been sent forward from Frankfort.

I lost no time in communicating the substance of this information to M. Jules Favre. He acknowledged the communication in person, and said he would have patience a little longer, although it was extremely important to him to know, as soon as possible, whether Count Bismarck was, or was not, willing to enter into communication with a view to an armistice and a conference on the conditions of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 112.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 13.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 12, 1870.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 8th instant, I have the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a note which has been addressed to me by M. Jules Favre, stating that facilities will be placed at the disposal of any members of the Diplomatic Body who may desire to withdraw from Paris to Tours.

I have also the honour to inclose a copy of a note in which I have thanked M. Jules Favre for the offer of facilities; but have informed him that I do not, at present, intend to leave Paris.

M. Jules Favre came to see me this morning and spoke to me of the intention he had

at one time entertained of going himself to Tours and establishing the Foreign Department there. He said that he had now abandoned this intention, because he had reason to believe that he could be of more use, with regard to the internal as well as the external affairs of France, by remaining with his colleagues at Paris.

I told M. Jules Favre that I had, of course, heard of the plan of going to Tours; but that I had purposely abstained from speaking to him on the subject. I would confess that I was, personally, disinclined to leave Paris; but nevertheless I had been willing to remain entirely passive, and await a communication on the subject from him. I would, however, now, as he had introduced the subject, ask him whether it was in truth the wish of the Government that the Diplomatic Body should retire from Paris. He answered that, on the contrary, the Government would much prefer our remaining here for the present. If the place were actually besieged or bombarded the case might, he said, be different; but due notice would, of course, be given by the enemy before proceeding to any such extremities.

I observed to M. Jules Favre that I should probably see many of my colleagues in the course of the day, and I inquired whether he authorized me to say to them that, so far from wishing us to go at this moment, the Government, on the contrary, would be glad that we should stay. He replied that I might not only say this, but that I might add that he particularly begged us to remain.

I have, in fact, since my interview with M. Jules Favre, seen the principal members of the Diplomatic Body, and I have no doubt that most, if not all of them, will stay for the present; and I trust that your Lordship will approve of my doing so also.

I have not, however, thought it advisable to keep any more members of the Embassy than are indispensable for the performance of the work; and as, from the force of circumstances, some of the business will, in all probability, be suspended, I have desired Mr. Atlee and Mr. Lascelles to leave Paris, but to remain within reach in case I shall need their services if I am myself obliged to withdraw.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 112.

M. Jules Favre to Lord Lyons.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Paris, le 11 Septembre, 1870.

J'AI l'honneur de vous annoncer que les circonstances m'obligeant à rester à Paris, j'ai dû renoncer à la pensée de me transporter quant à présent à Tours. Mais je m'empresse de vous faire savoir que ceux de MM. les Membres du Corps Diplomatique qui désireraient s'y rendre, trouveront auprès du Gouvernement toutes les facilités pour assurer leur départ. Je me suis concerté dès aujourd'hui à cet effet avec M. le Préfet de Police.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) JULES FAVRE.

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 11, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to announce to you that, as circumstances compel me to remain at Paris, I have been obliged to give up for the present my intention of proceeding to Tours. But I hasten to inform you that those Members of the Corps Diplomatique who wish to go there will meet with every facility on the part of the Government to secure their departure. I have to-day taken measures with the Prefect of Police to that effect.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) JULES FAVRE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 112.

Lord Lyons to M. Jules Favre.

M. le Ministre,

Paris, September 11, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note dated to-day, by which your Excellency is so good as to offer facilities for quitting Paris to any members of the Diplomatic Body who may desire to withdraw to Tours.

K 2

I beg leave to express to your Excellency my thanks for this considerate offer. I am disinclined to quit Paris at this moment, and as I gather from the conversation which I was so fortunate as to have with your Excellency this morning, that the Government has no desire that I should do so, but on the contrary would rather I should remain, I have no hesitation in informing you that I do not at present propose to move.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 113.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 13, 1870.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatch of the 12th instant, inclosing copies of correspondence which has passed between your Excellency and M. Jules Favre, on the question whether the members of the Diplomatic Body should remain in Paris or withdraw to Tours; and I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government entirely approve the course which you have followed in this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 114.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 13, 1870.

I HAVE received and laid before the Queen your Excellency's despatch of the 10th instant, relative to the views of the French Government with regard to the proposed negotiations for an armistice; and I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve your language to M. Jules Favre, as reported in this despatch.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 115.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 13, 1870.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the answer which, as reported in your despatch of the 11th instant, you gave to M. Favre, with the view of moderating his impatience at the delay in the arrival of the Prussian answer.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 116.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, September 13, 1870.

THE Prussian Secretary of Embassy, in the absence of Count Bernstorff, placed in my hands this afternoon the following reply received from Count Bismarck to the question which M. Favre requested might be put on his behalf to his Excellency, and which Count Bernstorff forwarded to him on the 10th instant:—

“Quelle garantie y a-t-il que la France, ou même, pour le moment, les troupes à Metz et à Strasbourg, reconnaîtront des arrangements sur lesquels on tomberait

d'accord avec le Gouvernement actuel à Paris, ou avec un de ceux qui probablement le succéderont ?”*

I have lost no time in transmitting to you this answer by telegraph for communication to M. Favre; not waiting to make it known to M. Thiers, whom I had seen before I received it, but to whom I have lost no time in communicating it.

I saw M. Thiers at noon to-day; and I gathered from him that he was of opinion that M. Favre would be disposed to proceed to the head-quarters of the Prussian army. I should wish your Excellency at once to ascertain from M. Favre whether, if Count Bernstorff, with whom I would communicate on the point, should not be of opinion that his doing so would be useless, I should ask Count Bismarck, confidentially, if he would be treated with respect.

It appears to Her Majesty's Government that, in such a case, neither party need require as a preliminary to their meeting that any basis of negotiation should be first settled.

If M. Favre assents to this course, your Excellency will take care to settle with him the exact terms in which the communication shall be made to Count Bismarck.

No. 117.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, September 13, 1870.

M. THIERS arrived in London this morning. I called on him by appointment at 12 o'clock.

He said it was the desire of the Ministers to conclude an honourable peace, and for this purpose, at great inconvenience and with reluctance, but pressed, not only by the Government, but by all his conservative and liberal friends, he had undertaken to come first to this country and then to St. Petersburg and Vienna. He asked for no forcible intervention, but he appealed to England to exert her moral influence to obtain peace. It could not be for the interest of this country to abdicate her position as a Great Power. Although an island and a maritime Power, she belonged to Europe. In former times she had shown the interest she took in the balance of power. She had shown the world what colonies and sailors she could send out. She could not wish to see France—who for forty years had been her ally, who had fought by her side in the Crimea, who in times such as the Indian mutiny had taken no advantage of her difficulties—humiliated and weakened. It was not for the interest of England that a dishonourable peace should be patched up which would leave France weak and irritable, unable to assist us, but ready for every occasion to recover her lost prestige.

If England would only take the lead, all neutral nations would follow, and it would be impossible for Prussia to withstand the moral force of such public opinion in favour of humanity and the balance of European power.

M. Thiers was much fatigued, so I shortly recounted what had been our course. We had done all in our power to obtain peace; we went beyond what we had a right to do in urging Spain to abandon a candidate whom she had a right fully to choose. We succeeded in removing the ground of quarrel. But the French Government had not been satisfied, had left us on one side, and had hastened to declare hostilities. We declared to Parliament (and our declaration was approved) that we intended to maintain a strict neutrality, and to endeavour to keep up friendly relations with both countries. From the first, we told all who pressed us that it was not our intention to offer ourselves as mediators, unless we had reason to believe that mediation would be acceptable to both parties, and that there seemed to be a basis on which both belligerents would agree to negotiate; that by all we could learn such a state of things had not arisen.

We had some conversation as to the advantage of M. Favre going to head-quarters. I thought it would be of use, and M. Thiers was of opinion that M. Favre would not refuse to go.

* (Translation.)—"What guarantee is there that France, or even, for the moment, the troops at Metz and at Strasburg, will recognize the arrangement which may be agreed to with the existing Government at Paris, or with any Government which may probably succeed them?"

No. 118.

M. Jules Favre to Earl Granville.—(Received September 14.)

My Lord,

Paris, le 12 Septembre, 1870.

L'HONORABLE M. Thiers, ancien Député au Corps Législatif, est chargé d'une mission particulière diplomatique auprès de votre Excellence. Il lui en fera lui-même connaître l'objet et le caractère. Je me borne ici à vous prier de l'accueillir et de l'entendre avec les sentiments amicaux dont le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique s'est toujours montré animé envers la France. Investi de toute la confiance de mes collègues comme de la mienne, et j'ajouterai de celle du pays, nul mieux que M. Thiers ne saura se faire l'organe de la nation Française toute entière, et je suis prêt, en ce qui nous concerne, à ratifier tout ce qu'il aura l'honneur de vous dire au nom du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale.

Veuillez, &c.

Le Vice-Président du Gouvernement,

Ministre des Affaires Etrangères,

(Signé) JULES FAVRE.

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 12, 1870.

THE Honourable M. Thiers, formerly Deputy of the Corps Législatif, is charged with a private Diplomatic Mission to your Excellency. He will himself make known to you its object and character. I confine myself here to asking you to receive him and to hear him with the friendly feelings with which the Government of Her Britannic Majesty has ever shown itself animated towards France.

Entirely in the confidence of my colleagues and of myself, and I will add of the country, M. Thiers knows as well as anybody how to make himself the organ of the whole French nation, and I am ready, as far as concerns ourselves, to ratify all that he will have the honour of telling to you in the name of the Government of National Defence.

Accept, &c.

(Signed)

JULES FAVRE,

Vice-President of the Government, Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No 119.

Earl Granville to M. Jules Favre.

M. le Ministre,

Foreign Office, September 14, 1870.

I HAVE received from M. Thiers the letter which you did me the honour to address to me on the 12th instant, requesting me to receive that gentleman, and to hear what he was charged to impart to me.

Your Excellency may be assured that it has been a great satisfaction to me to see in this country a statesman of such a distinguished reputation, and with whom I have long had the honour of being on the most friendly terms; but I do so the more gladly as seeing in his mission a notable proof of the friendly feelings towards this country by which your Excellency and your colleagues are animated, and which I can assure your Excellency are, as regards the well-being and happiness of France, fully shared in by Her Majesty's Government.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

GRANVILLE.

No. 120.

General Bülow to Earl Granville.—(Received September 14.)

M. le Comte,

Londres, le 12 Septembre, 1870.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre par laquelle votre Excellence a bien voulu me communiquer la déclaration formelle que prend le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine

avec celui de Sa Majesté le Roi mon auguste Souverain, quant à sa neutralité pendant la guerre actuelle; et ayant eu l'autorisation nécessaire de mon Gouvernement, je suis à même d'adhérer en son nom au même engagement et dans les mêmes termes, savoir :—

“Que ni le Danemark ni l'Angleterre ne se départira de sa neutralité dans la guerre actuelle sans un échange préalable d'idées et sans que les deux Puissances aient annoncé l'une à l'autre tout changement de politique par rapport à leur neutralité.”

En faisant au nom de mon Gouvernement cette déclaration formelle, j'ajoute que, d'accord avec votre Excellence, l'engagement ainsi pris doit être regardé comme liant les deux Gouvernements.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) F. BÜLOW.

(Translation.)

My Lord,

London, September 12, 1870.

I HAVE had the honour to receive the letter in which your Excellency has been so good as to communicate to me the formal declaration which Her Majesty's Government is making, together with the Government of my august Sovereign the King, with regard to its neutrality during the present war; and having had the necessary authorization from my Government, I am in a position to adhere in its name to the same engagement and in the same terms, to wit :—

“That neither Denmark nor England will depart from their neutrality in the present war without a previous exchange of ideas, and without the two Powers having announced to one another every change of policy in respect to their neutrality.”

In making this formal declaration in the name of my Government, I add that, with the concurrence of your Excellency, the engagement thus undertaken shall be considered as binding both Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) F. BÜLOW.

No. 121.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 14.)

(Extract.)

Paris, September 13, 1870.

IF all other means fail, I believe the present intention of M. Jules Favre is to go himself, either alone or accompanied by one or more Members of the Provisional Government, to Count Bismarck. He would be disposed to say frankly and fairly that the Government did not shut its eyes to the results of the campaign; that it was well aware that the defeat of the French armies rendered it necessary for the country to make great sacrifices; that there were some sacrifices so dishonourable and so repugnant to French feeling that resistance, however desperate, was preferable to them; but that short of these, the Government was prepared to agree to any tolerable terms.

In short, so far as I can judge, the determination of the Government at this moment is to yield almost anything that may be demanded, provided the integrity of the territory be preserved; but rather than cede any portion of the territory, to resist to the last extremity.

No. 122.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 14.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 13, 1870.

I HAD early this morning the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram of last night, by which, in consequence of the uncertainty which had recently attended telegraphic communication with the head-quarters of the King of Prussia, you authorized me to send a messenger through the lines to convey to Count Bismarck a copy of the message from M. Jules Favre, which Her Majesty's Government had already transmitted by telegraph to his Excellency through the Prussian Ambassador in London.

I lost no time in communicating the substance of the telegram to M. Jules Favre.

He expressed his gratitude for the consideration for the French manifested by your Lordship, and said that he entirely concurred in your suggestion. He added that he would at once go himself to the Minister of War to beg that an officer might be provided to escort my messenger, and every means be taken to ensure the safety and rapidity of his journey.

I have accordingly prepared a letter for Count Bismarck, inclosing a copy of your Lordship's note to Count Bernstorff of the 10th instant, and explaining the reasons for my sending it to him; and I shall dispatch Mr. Malet, one of the Second Secretaries of the Embassy, to the German head-quarters with it, as soon as the French authorities complete the necessary preparations for the journey.

I have the honour to inclose copies of my letter to Count Bismarck, and of the instructions which I have given to Mr. Malet.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

P.S.—6 P.M. Mr. Malet has just started.

L.

Inclosure 1 in No. 122.

Lord Lyons to Count Bismarck.

M. le Chancelier,

Paris, September 13, 1870.

BY desire of Earl Granville, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to transmit herewith to your Excellency a copy of a letter which he addressed to Count Bernstorff, the North German Ambassador in London, on the 10th instant.

In compliance with the request contained in the letter, Count Bernstorff transmitted to your Excellency by telegraph the question recited in it, which Her Majesty's Government have been requested by M. Jules Favre to communicate to you.

Lord Granville has, however, since been informed that telegraphic communication with the Royal head-quarters has lately been uncertain, and he has therefore, in order to avoid delay, sent me a telegraphic order to transmit to your Excellency, by a special messenger, a copy of his letter to Count Bernstorff.

I accordingly forward the present despatch to your Excellency by Mr. Edward Malet, one of the Secretaries of this Embassy, who will bring back such answer as you may be pleased to make to it.

I beg leave to recommend Mr. Malet to the good offices of your Excellency.

I pray, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 122.

Lord Lyons to Mr. Malet.

Sir,

Paris, September 13, 1870.

YOU will set out at once for the head-quarters of the King of Prussia, and deliver the accompanying despatch to Count Bismarck, and you will offer to bring back any answer to it, or other communication which his Excellency may wish to send to me.

You will be accompanied through the French lines by an officer of the French army, who is directed by the Government to make every arrangement for the speedy and safe prosecution of your journey outwards and your return hither.

You will understand that your mission has no other object than to deliver my despatch to Count Bismarck as speedily as possible, and to bring back without delay any answer which he may make to it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, September 14, 1870.

I CALLED on M. Thiers again this morning, when he observed that, in order to make the proposal of M. Favre going to head-quarters useful, it would be necessary that it should have the strong moral support of the English Government; that we should urge it upon the ground of humanity and of the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.

M. Thiers repeated the arguments why England should not remain quiescent.

I told M. Thiers that these arguments were not new to me, as they had been all urged upon me by Germans, who pressed on me that it was contrary to our interest and our dignity to take no part when the French had begun an unjustifiable and aggressive war against our advice, and in despite of our successful efforts to remove the cause of quarrel.

M. Thiers thought that at the outset of the war the Prussians had some ground for what they then said, but there was now a change. The Government which had desired war was no longer in existence; those now at the head of affairs had always required peace, and this was the moment for England to show her sense of her long alliance, and to assert her own place in the Councils of Europe.

I said that of course we must judge what was best for ourselves; that if we changed our policy it must be either for one of threatening neutrality, to which we were not disposed and which he did not ask, or for an offer of mediation or of good offices. We objected to that for the reasons which I had given yesterday, and I added that I believed it would be much easier for the King and Count Bismarck to agree to conditions which the army and Germany would not consider to be ample, if the concession was made spontaneously and not upon the advice of a neutral, who had taken no part in the difficulties of the war.

I could, therefore, only accompany the message, if the French Government wished me to send it, with words of satisfaction which I felt in doing that which would afford the best means of making each party acquainted with one another's demands, and the best chance of arriving at an honourable peace.

M. Thiers suggested our immediate recognition of the Republic.

I said it would be contrary to precedent to do so at present; that I wished to be in the most friendly relations with the Government, and that the best proof of our being so was our present conversation; but that Government had had no legal sanction; that it called itself a Government only for a special object; and that it had announced the summoning of a Constituent Assembly, which would decide on the future Government of France.

That I believed Her Majesty's Government would advise the Queen to acknowledge the Government as soon as the nation had formally recognized it, but till then I believed all practical ends in a time of crisis would be obtained by the good existing relations.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, September 14, 1870.

M. DE KUSSEROW, in your Excellency's absence from town, placed in my hands yesterday afternoon the answer received from Count Bismarck to your Excellency's telegram of the 10th instant.

That answer was couched in the following terms:—

“Quelle garantie y a-t-il que la France, ou même pour le moment les troupes à Metz et à Strasbourg, reconnaîtront les arrangements sur lesquels on tomberait d'accord avec le Gouvernement actuel à Paris, ou avec un de ceux qui probablement le succéderont?”

I lost no time in forwarding that answer to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris for communication to M. Favre, and I have now received from Lord Lyons a telegram stating that M. Favre requests me to communicate as quickly as possible to Count Bismarck the following reply:—

“The guarantees justly demanded by Count Bismarck can be furnished in a double point of view—political and military. In the political point of view the Government of National Defence will sign an armistice, and will immediately convoke an Assembly

which will ratify the Treaty of Peace which shall be agreed upon between French and Prussian Governments. In the military point of view the Government of Defence offers the same security as a regular Government, since all the orders of the Minister of War are obeyed. Whatever should be settled in this respect by armistice would therefore be punctually executed without delay."

I request your Excellency to have the goodness to forward M. Favre's reply to Count Bismarck with the least possible delay; but if you think that the direct communications between your Excellency and the Prussian head-quarters may be attended with difficulty and delay, I shall be most happy to forward a duplicate of your Excellency's despatch to Her Majesty's Ambassador at Paris, with instructions to obtain facilities from M. Favre for the passage through the French lines of an English messenger who can convey it to Count Bismarck, and for whom in that case your Excellency might perhaps be willing to grant a recommendation to the Prussian Commanders.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 125.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur, *Foreign Office, September 14, 1870, midnight.*

HER Majesty's Government have had the honour of being entrusted by both belligerents with messages to one another of different degrees of importance. The three last which passed through their hands referred to the possibility of negotiations for peace. It appeared to Her Majesty's Government that the chance of putting an end to this great war would be much increased if both parties could be placed in more direct communication.

I therefore authorized Lord Lyons to ascertain from M. Favre whether he was prepared to enter into personal communication with Count Bismarck, if assured that he would be treated with due respect if he did so.

I have received this evening the following Memorandum which M. Favre placed in Lord Lyons' hands. It would seem to afford an opportunity, without any official recognition of the existing Government in France, and without any admission of a basis of negotiation, to give to each belligerent the means of becoming better acquainted with each other's views, and thus possibly to prepare the way for an honourable peace.

I therefore request your Excellency to convey it to Count Bismarck with the least possible delay. It is to this effect:—

"I accept with satisfaction the offer of Lord Granville to facilitate for me an interview with Count Bismarck, desirous as I am to learn from him his conditions for an armistice, and, in case of need, for the basis of a Treaty of Peace."

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 126.

Señor Rances to Earl Granville.—(Received September 15.)

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Spanish Legation in London, September 14, 1870.

IN confirmation of the communication which I had the honour of making to your Excellency verbally yesterday, I have now the honour of acquainting you that Her Majesty's Minister at Madrid, having informed the Minister of State of the action taken, at the request of the Minister for Foreign Affairs of France, by Her Majesty's Government in favour of an armistice for the sake of peace, and the French Chargé d'Affaires at Madrid having, by order of his Government, given thanks to the Regent's Government for its good wishes to that effect,—expressing at the same time, in the name of the French Government, the hope that Spain would, as a neutral Power, co-operate efficiently to the end that the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government might lead to a favourable result,—the Regent's Government has directed me to second the action of Her Majesty's Government in concurrence with your Excellency, its wish being to join in the noble mission which, at the request of M. Favre, Her Majesty's Government have undertaken.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) M. RANCES Y VILLANUEVA.

No. 127.

Earl Granville to M. Tissot.

M. le Chargé d'Affaires,

Foreign Office, September 15, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note, dated the 10th instant, stating the substance of a despatch addressed to you by M. Jules Favre on the subject of the action of Her Majesty's Government in regard to negotiations for peace.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 128.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 15, 7.30 P.M.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 14, 1870.

I HAD early this morning the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram of last night, conveying the answer of Count Bismarck to M. Jules Favre's question as to his willingness to enter into a communication with a view to arriving at an armistice and a Conference to settle the terms of peace.

I took the answer immediately to M. Jules Favre, and while I was with him he drew up a reply in the following terms:—

"Les garanties justement réclamées par M. le Comte de Bismarck peuvent être fournies à un double point de vue, politique et militaire. Au point de vue politique, le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale signera un armistice et réunira de suite une Assemblée qui ratifiera le Traité de Paix qui sera convenu entre le Gouvernement Prussien et celui de la France. Au point de vue militaire, le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale offre la même sécurité qu'un Gouvernement régulier, puisque le Ministre de la Guerre est obéi dans tous les ordres qu'il donne. Tout ce qui serait réglé à cet égard par un armistice serait donc punctuellement exécuté sans aucun retard."*

M. Jules Favre put a written copy of this reply into my hand, and begged me to ask your Lordship to communicate it as speedily as possible to Count Bismarck. On my return home I forwarded it without a moment's delay to your Lordship by telegraph.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

No. 129.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 15, 7.30 P.M.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 14, 1870.

IN execution of the instruction which I received from your Lordship this morning, I observed to M. Jules Favre that the willingness which he had expressed to go himself to the Prussian head-quarters to confer with Count Bismarck had been mentioned to your Lordship by M. Thiers, and that you had authorized me to ask him whether it would be agreeable to him that your Lordship should inquire confidentially of Count Bismarck whether he would be well received.

M. Favre answered that he thanked your Lordship very cordially for this suggestion, and that he should be very much obliged if you would give effect to it without delay. He was, he said, most anxious to have a personal interview with Count Bismarck, for his conscience would not allow him to neglect any possible means of preventing more blood being shed, and saving his country from the miseries with which it was threatened. In comparison with this object no false delicacy or personal pride could have any weight with him.

I begged him to let me know the exact answer which he wished me to convey to your

* (Translation.)—"The guarantees justly required by Count Bismarck can be given in a two-fold respect—political and military. From the political point of view, the Government of the National Defence will sign an armistice, and convoke an Assembly without delay, which will ratify the Treaty of Peace to be concluded between the Prussian and the French Governments. From the military point of view the Government of the National Defence affords the same security as a regular Government, inasmuch as all orders of the War Minister are obeyed. Whatever in this respect should be settled by means of an armistice would therefore without delay be punctually carried out."

Lordship, and he wrote on a sheet of paper, which he put into my hands, the following words:—

“J’accepte avec satisfaction l’offre de Lord Granville de me faciliter une entrevue avec M. le Comte de Bismarck, désireux que je suis de savoir de ce dernier ses conditions pour un armistice et au besoin pour les bases d’un Traité.”

I lost no time in communicating this answer to your Lordship by telegraph.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 130.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 15, 7.30 P.M.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 14, 1870.

IN my despatch of the 29th ultimo I reported to your Lordship the steps I had taken to call the attention of British subjects to the notice issued by the Acting Prefect of Police, recommending all persons not capable of facing the enemy to leave Paris, and in your despatch of the 1st instant your Lordship informed me that Her Majesty’s Government approved of the steps I had thus taken.

Further notices of the same kind have been issued by the French authorities, and I have on my part done all in my power to warn British subjects of the dangers to which they expose themselves by remaining in a town threatened with an immediate siege. Large numbers have departed; those who were unable to provide from their own means the expense of the journey having been aided by the British Charitable Fund, to which most liberal contributions have been made by the public in England.

Finding, however, that notwithstanding the near approach of the invading army many still linger, I have thought it right to insert in Galignani’s “Messenger” a notice, in my own name, reminding British subjects that if after the warnings given them they remain at Paris, they do so at their own risk and peril, and that if they delay their departure any longer they may not hereafter be able to get away.

I have also had copies of the notice printed separately for distribution among British subjects, and I have the honour to transmit some herewith to your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 130.

Notice to British Subjects.

HER Majesty’s Ambassador thinks it right to remind British subjects, that if after the warnings which have been issued by the French Government they remain at Paris, they do so at their own risk and peril; and that if they delay their departure any longer they may not hereafter be able to get away.

British Embassy, Paris, September 13, 1870.

No. 131.

Count Bernstorff to Earl Granville.—(Received September 15.)

My Lord,

Prussia House, September 15, 1870.

I HAVE had the honour to receive this morning your Excellency’s note dated September 14, midnight, and have lost no time in forwarding the contents by telegraph to Count Bismarck.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERNSTORFF.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, September 15, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to assure your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have not failed to consider most carefully the arguments contained in the Memorandum which you did me the honour to place in my hands on the 1st instant, and have studied them the more attentively as they contain matter which has not hitherto been imported into discussions upon the duties of neutrals.

The two principal positions assumed by your Excellency are, first, that the attitude of Great Britain towards Prussia in the present war should be that of a "benevolent neutrality;" and, secondly, that there is no analogy between the course adopted by Prussia when Great Britain was at war with Russia, and that adopted by Great Britain now that Prussia is at war with France.

In examining these propositions Her Majesty's Government are relieved from the necessity of entering at present into the question whether Great Britain is honestly fulfilling her duties as a neutral. The point now raised by you goes far beyond this. It amounts to a demand that her neutrality should be, both in spirit and in practice, benevolent towards Prussia, and consequently, as it would seem, unfavourable towards France.

Upon the declaration of hostilities, Her Majesty's Government publicly declared that they were desirous of maintaining their good relations with, and tendering their good offices to, both the belligerents, as far as was consistent with perfect neutrality. But the idea of a "benevolent neutrality," as explained by your Excellency, is new, and it consequently becomes necessary to consider what is its meaning, and what would be its practical effect.

It is obvious that your Excellency cannot intend to lay down a principle applicable only to the present war; rules of international law cannot be confined to individual or exceptional cases; and this principle, if accepted, can only be so as a principle of international law, and, as such, susceptible of general application. Thus applied, then, its effect would be as follows: that, on the outbreak of a war between two nations, it would be the duty of each neutral to ascertain which belligerent was favoured by the public opinion of its subjects, and to assume an attitude of neutrality benevolent towards that belligerent. But such neutrality should not, as I gather from your Excellency's Memorandum, be confined to sympathy, but should be exhibited in practice, that is to say, the measures adopted by each neutral should be favourable to one belligerent and proportionately unfavourable to the other. It seems hardly possible to push the examination further without finding ourselves met by insuperable difficulties. Where could the line be drawn between a departure from the usual practice, in order to confer material advantages on one belligerent State to the exclusion of the other and a participation in hostilities? The sympathies of nations, as of individuals, are not invariably influenced by abstract considerations of right or wrong, but are swayed by material interests and other causes. Neutrals would probably, therefore, be found ranged on different sides. What would be the mutual relations of such neutrals? What their relations with the belligerent to whom they were opposed? It seems hardly to admit of doubt that neutrality, when it once departs from strict impartiality, runs the risk of altering its essence, and that the moment a neutral allows his proceedings to be biassed by predilection for one of two belligerents he ceases to be a neutral. The idea, therefore, of benevolent neutrality can mean little less than the extinction of neutrality.

Passing to the second proposition laid down by your Excellency, that there is no real analogy between the conduct of Prussia in the Crimean War and that of Great Britain in the present war, I find that this proposition is mainly rested on the ground that Great Britain in the former war was not fighting singlehanded, and that public opinion in Germany was not enlisted in favour of the cause for which she was contending. These two reasons may be brought under the same head, as both can only be adduced with any weight in justification of a position of benevolent neutrality; but, as this justification was not preferred at the time by Prussian Statesmen in discussing this question, it will be useful to consider what was the attitude of Prussia during the war waged by Great Britain and her allies against Prussia, and what were the motives alleged at the time for her assuming that attitude.

During the whole of the war arms and other contraband of war were copiously supplied to Russia by the States of the Zollverein: regular agents for traffic were established at Berlin, Magdeburg, Thorn, Königsberg, Posen, Bromberg, and other

places, and no restraint was put upon their operations. But, besides this, although a Decree was published in March 1854, prohibiting the transit of arms from other countries, and a further Decree in March 1855, prohibiting also the transit of other contraband of war, the transit trade from Belgium continued in full activity throughout the war. The Prussian Government, when this state of things was brought to their notice, affirmed, not that it was justified in permitting these exports on the principle of "benevolent neutrality," but that it could not interfere with the course of trade; an answer which would seem to have been based rather on the principle that the first duty of Prussia, as a neutral, was to consider the interests of her own subjects, not those of the subjects of a country which had engaged itself in a war with which Prussia had no concern.

Such was the attitude of Prussia at that time, and such her justification of that attitude. In what point does the analogy fail? Prussia was neutral then as Great Britain is now. Your Excellency alludes to the magnitude of the respective wars. A war in which the energies of five European Powers were taxed to the utmost can, perhaps, hardly be justly described as a war waged in remote regions for remote interests; but this point seems scarcely worthy of contention. Your Excellency can hardly mean to say that principles of this importance are to be decided on questions of degree. If no weightier objection than this can be adduced, the analogy would appear to be complete.

I now come to the dilemma in which your Excellency would place Her Majesty's Government. You observe that Great Britain remonstrated strongly against the state of things above described, and you add that either those remonstrances were founded, or they were not. If founded, how, you ask, can the present complaints of Germany be held to be unfounded?

Her Majesty's Government do not complain of the Prussian Government making an effort to alter a state of things which they conceive to be at this moment disadvantageous to them; but Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the answers which the Prussian Government made during the Crimean war more than justify the reply which, to my great regret, I have been obliged on several occasions to make, and now again to repeat, to your Excellency. The nature of those answers will be seen on referring to the correspondence which passed at the time between the two Governments, which shows also the nature of the remonstrances addressed to Prussia by Great Britain. On ascertaining that the Prussian Government did not mean to restrict the export of arms or contraband of war of native origin, but intended to prohibit the transit of such articles, Her Majesty's Government consulted the Legal Advisers of the Crown as to the extent to which they would be justified in making representations founded on their rights as belligerents. The answer was clear—that Her Majesty's Government would be entitled to remonstrate only in the event of violation of Prussian law; and it will be found, on reference to the correspondence that, though the large direct exportations from the States of the Zollverein certainly formed occasionally the subject of representations and discussions, the strong remonstrances to which your Excellency alludes, were, with few exceptions, made on the subject of the continuous violation of the injunctions of the Decrees forbidding the transit of arms, which violation was so systematic that, in only one case, of the stoppage at Aix-la-Chapelle of some revolvers concealed in bales of cotton, were the Customs authorities successful in interposing a check on it. It is true that remonstrances were made on the receipt of a report, to which a full and complete contradiction was given, that rifles belonging to the Prussian Government had been sold to Russia, and of a report that waggons loaded with gunpowder had been escorted to the frontier by Prussian police: but the distinction is obvious between these cases and cases affecting private individuals.

I would, therefore, venture to remark that your Excellency's dilemma is more apparent than real. The course of Great Britain then and now is perfectly consistent. As she then remonstrated against infractions of Prussian law, so she now admits the justice of remonstrances against infractions of British law, such as storeships, enlistments, and others; and any cases of such infraction which your Excellency may bring under my notice shall receive the most prompt attention.

Your Excellency now requires alterations of practice and the creation of restrictions on trade in a sense favourable to Prussian interests. In face of these demands I would put to your Excellency this question: When did Prussia renounce the principles on which she acted in 1854 and 1855, to which she adhered, as far as I am aware, when she again occupied the position of a neutral in the war waged by Austria with France and Italy in 1859, and in the war between the Northern and Southern States of America, and to which she has formally given her sanction in the Treaties with the United States of 1799 and 1828?

So far I have confined my reply to the examination of what appear to me to be the novel elements in your Excellency's arguments ; but it now becomes my duty to address myself to the consideration of the statement made that the policy of Her Majesty's Government has been practically benevolent to France, and that the British nation, which has not prevented the export to France of contraband of war and supplies useful for warlike purposes, will be held morally responsible for the blood which is being shed.

I am glad to observe that your Excellency acquits Her Majesty's Government of adopting intentionally such a policy as you describe, and I have consequently only to deal with the practical point of view, which brings me to consider the following question : Did Great Britain, when she found herself in the position of a neutral in face of a sudden and unexpected war, adopt an unusual policy and one unwarranted by precedent ? Was her attitude in any way exceptional ? There can be but one answer to this question. She adopted the course for which she had the clearest and most unbroken precedent and authority, foreign as well as British ; and which Prussia herself, as I have shown above, has invariably adopted in similar cases.

I am ready to admit to the fullest extent the difficulty of defining the rights of belligerents and the duties of neutrals, and I fully recognize that the present feeling of the German nation is, under the circumstances, not unnatural. I could not deny it, considering the feelings which we ourselves entertained in times of great excitement ; but I do not for a moment doubt that Germany will, at a calmer season, readily admit that, even if it had been desirable, this country could not have been expected, without general consent, to have altered the hitherto received rules by which the duties of neutrals have been defined and regulated. Both belligerents entered on the war with a full knowledge of the rules of international law and of what has been the almost uniform practice of neutrals ; and each belligerent had consequently a right to expect that the existing rules and former practice would be maintained, and might with reason have complained if any change had been made.

It must be remembered that obligations upon neutrals have become more strict with the progress of civilization ; but the present question is one which was not raised or discussed at the Congress of Paris of 1856 ; and the Royal Commission, composed of some of the most eminent juriconsults in this country, who inquired into the Neutrality Laws in 1867, decided that to prohibit the export of munitions of war was impracticable and impolitic.

Your Excellency, turning from generality to details, has made certain specific demands as to the course which Great Britain should pursue. I think it right, therefore, to lay before you some considerations with reference to these demands which may convince you of the difficulty, if not impracticability, of acceding to them.

You demand that the export to France of arms, ammunition, coal, and other contraband of war should be prevented ; and you observe that Her Majesty's Government have declared that the law empowered the Executive to take this step.

There is no doubt that the Executive has, under the Customs Consolidation Act of 1853, the legal power to prohibit the export of contraband of war ; but the highest authority can be adduced to show that such exportation is not forbidden by our municipal law, and it has not been the practice to prohibit it except when the interests of this country, as in the case of self-defence, are directly and immediately concerned in the prohibition : and even in some of these cases, such as the Crimean war, considerable doubts arose during its continuance whether the prohibition, when actually attempted to be enforced, was as disadvantageous to the enemy as it was inconvenient to ourselves.

Such, then, being the state of the case as regards existing practice, I would venture to ask your Excellency's serious attention to the following specimens of the difficulties which would, at the outset, have to be met in an attempt to alter existing practice.

The export of arms and contraband of war may be open or clandestine. Her Majesty's Government, though they regret it, do not for a moment deny that there is at present a certain exportation of arms to France ; but this exportation is open and undisguised. Since the despatch of my note of the 9th instant, fuller Customs Returns have been received, from which it appears that in the week immediately following the declaration of war 11,000 rifles were shipped to France. None are known to have been shipped since, with the exception of the 4,512 taken by the "Fannie" from Southampton on the 6th instant ; but it is possible that further purchases have been made by French agents, though, from the reports received as to the number in the market and the state of the gun trade, it is certain that the purchases must have been very limited. But, whatever the amount, there has been no secrecy in the export, and the returns of every rifle shipped are as well known to your Excellency as to Her Majesty's Government. Exportations, if prohibited, would be entirely clandestine ; the nature of a cargo and the destination

of a vessel would be equally concealed. It would be necessary to alter the present system of exportation under which (except in the port of London) cargoes, in order to ensure rapidity of shipment, are not examined by the Customs authorities, who receive the account of them from the shippers, generally after the ship has sailed. It would require the establishment of an expensive, intricate, and inquisitorial Customs system, under which all suspicious packages, no matter what their assumed destination, would be opened and examined. Finally, though it might certainly diminish the profits of certain merchants with whose proceedings Her Majesty's Government, in common with your Excellency, have no sympathy, it would also cause infinite delay and obstruction to innocent trade.

Your Excellency would not interfere with the trade to neutral countries; but how would it be possible to avoid this? A ship carrying prohibited articles would invariably have a colourable neutral destination. How is this to be detected without interfering with the trade with neutrals, if even then? During the Crimean war Prussia had no such difficulty. There could be no doubt of the destination of goods arriving on the Russian frontier; and yet the Customs authorities were practically powerless. But Great Britain has no frontier; a ship leaving her ports may shape her course where she pleases. Your Excellency has suggested the exaction of a bond from shippers; but such a measure would be most onerous to the mercantile community, would be easily evaded, and at the best would be no security against ultimate destination. It would be necessary, too, to take these bonds, not only from foreign-bound ships but from coasting-vessels, which are at present subject to little or no Customs supervision; for what could hinder a coasting-vessel from crossing the Channel and delivering her cargo at a French port?

Again, your Excellency includes coal among the articles to be prohibited, on the ground that coal is more useful to France than to Germany during the present war. This raises the question of the prohibition of all articles, not contraband of war, which might be of service to a belligerent. But if this principle were admitted, where is it to stop? In the American war no cargoes would have been more useful to the Southern States than cloth, leather, and quinine. It would be difficult for a neutral, and obviously inadmissible for a belligerent, to draw the line.

It must be remembered, too, that the features of a war may change. Articles invaluable to a belligerent at one period may be valueless at another, and *vice versa*. Is the neutral to watch the shifting phases and vary his restrictions in accordance with them?

Again, the XIth Article of the Treaty of Commerce between this country and France expressly provides that the Contracting Parties shall not prohibit the exportation of coal. Can this solemn Treaty stipulation be lightly disregarded, as long as we remain neutral?

I have pointed out these difficulties to your Excellency, as the consideration of them may tend to efface the impression that Great Britain has hastily and inconsiderately, or upon grounds of a narrow selfishness, refused to accede to your demands; and I need hardly assure you that at the outbreak of hostilities Her Majesty's Government were actuated in the course adopted by them by no feeling of hostility towards a nation with which Great Britain has always been on terms of intimate friendship, and by no unworthy motive of retaliation for past conduct, but by the honest desire to maintain a strict and impartial neutrality, in accordance with precedent and in conformity with the law of nations.

I trust that I have shown that our conduct has been of the nature indicated. I have shown that we have conformed to existing practice, and I have pointed out the difficulties standing in the way of the alteration of existing practice. I have alluded to the difficulties which the Prussian Government encountered when placed in a position analogous to that now occupied by Great Britain, and I have shown that those difficulties were chiefly owing to their having so far departed from existing practice as to prohibit the transit trade,—a concession which gave Great Britain a standing ground for complaint which she would not otherwise have possessed, and which, notwithstanding, was powerless in its results. I have also fully recognized that the sensitiveness of the Prussian people and the complaints of the Government are natural.

Her Majesty's Government fear that no means could be devised for securing, at this moment, a calm discussion of the subject. They by no means desire to claim exceptional rights for this country. They would be prepared to enter into consultation with other nations as to the possibility of adopting in common a stricter rule, although their expectations of a practical result in the sense indicated by the North German Government are not sanguine.

We took the course which appeared to be according to the dictates of practice and precedent, at a time when it was impossible to know how the fortune of war would turn. Since then, France, notwithstanding the display of her usual courage and gallantry, has

met with nothing but reverses. Germany has, on the other hand, given extraordinary proofs of her military ability and power, accompanied, as it has been, by continuous success. Your Excellency, as the Representative of a great and chivalrous nation, must agree with me that it would not be possible that we should now change the policy which we declared to our Parliament to be usual, just, and expedient, because it was stated by the victorious belligerent to be in some degree favourable to the defeated enemy.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 133.

Mr. Layard to Earl Granville.—(Received September 16.)

(Extract.)

Madrid, August 17, 1870.

SENOR SAGASTA called upon me this morning to request that I would inform Her Majesty's Government that the Spanish Government were not only determined to maintain their neutrality in the present war, but that they were prepared to become parties to any arrangement which Her Majesty's Government might enter into with other neutral Powers for the localization of the war, and for obtaining peace when a fit opportunity should occur of mediating between the two belligerent States. His Excellency added, that he came to me with the entire concurrence of General Prim, and begged me to communicate to your Lordship, without delay, the decision of the Government. I accordingly informed your Lordship at once by telegram of the communication made to me by the Minister of State.

No. 134.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, September 16, 1870.

IN the course of my conversations with M. Thiers, of which I have given you an account in my despatches of the 13th and 14th instant, and while discussing with him the reception which any proposals that M. Favre might make in his interview with Count Bismarck (should it take place) might meet with, I suggested that it was worthy of M. Favre's consideration whether he should not at once negotiate the conditions of a peace, and not of an armistice.

One would not be much more difficult in its details than the other, and a proposal for an armistice would be looked on by the Prussian Government as a scheme for compromising the position they now held.

I also said that Germany described the impossibility of treating with the present Government, whose authority had no legal sanction, and whose provisional character precluded it from contracting on behalf of France a binding engagement.

It was, therefore, to be regretted that so distant a day as the 15th of October should have been named for the Constituent Assembly; and I asked M. Thiers whether it would not be possible to hasten its meeting.

A similar obstacle, too, I said, was alleged in Germany to have been created by the peremptory language in which M. Favre had excluded in his circular certain points from being admitted into any Treaty. I gave no opinion either on this or either of the other points to which I had adverted, but merely threw them out as matters which M. Favre, if he went to head-quarters, should be prepared to deal with.

M. Thiers thanked me for my letter to Count Bernstorff of the 14th instant, respecting the readiness of M. Favre to proceed to the Prussian head-quarters to confer with Count Bismarck. He, however, regretted my not having pressed the object of M. Favre's visit with more warmth on the Prussian Ambassador. In reply, I explained to him that any pressure of the kind would have been injudicious, and would have raised an obstacle to the success of M. Favre's journey.

In the further conversation which I have had to-day with M. Thiers, he informed me that he proposed on leaving this country to go to St. Petersburg by the way of France, Turin, and Vienna. By taking that route he would be within reach of telegraphic and other communications, and could be recalled if his presence was required, and if his concurrence was absolutely necessary to the conclusion of peace.

He had undertaken, he said, a sad task at his age to go from Court to Court to

solicit support to France: to which I replied, it was most honourable to him after his long public life to undertake at his age a task in which it was thought he might be of use to his country.

M. Thiers then reverted to the apathy shown by this country. He dwelt upon the loss to her dignity, upon the danger to her and to all Europe of the immense preponderance of Germany, and more immediately to Austria, who must lose her German Provinces; for there was nothing that North Germany, with a population of 60,000,000, could not do, acting as a machine, and led by Count Bismarck.

I told M. Thiers that I would not discuss that matter with him any more; that his arguments went further than his demands, and were in favour of armed intervention. On that point, however, there could be no doubt as to public opinion in this country. But, I said, I did not think he ought to be discontented with the result of his visit to England. He could hardly have hoped, even with his ability, to change the course of policy which Her Majesty's Government had deliberately adopted, and which they had announced to Parliament. But his second object, that of explaining the necessity at this moment of the present form of government in France, and the merits of M. Favre, General Trochu, and its leading members, had had much effect upon me and upon others with whom he had conversed.

We had, I said, during his presence in England, arranged the possibility of a meeting between M. Favre and Count Bismarck, which, if it took place, could hardly fail to be of use.

On parting, M. Thiers made an observation, which coming from an eminent statesman, it is tempting to a son to record.

He adverted to the time when he transacted business with my father, when the latter was Ambassador at Paris.

He himself had been brought up in the school of M. de Talleyrand, but he had always considered Lord Granville as the beau-ideal of a diplomatist—a proud Englishman, able, gentle, straightforward, and honest;—proud, indeed, as he had found when once he had a movement of vivacity with him.

No. 135.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 17.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 15, 1870.

I HAD this afternoon the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram informing me that you had asked the Prussian Ambassador in London to forward, as speedily as possible, to the Prussian head-quarters, M. Jules Favre's message respecting an interview with Count Bismarck.

I made this known immediately to M. Jules Favre, who happened to be with me when the telegram arrived. He begged me to convey his thanks to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

No. 136.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 17.)

(Extract.)

Paris, September 16, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a copy of a letter from Count Bismarck, which has been brought to me this evening by Mr. Malet.

I inclose also translations of German versions of the telegrams which passed between Count Bernstorff and Count Bismarck about M. Jules Favre's inquiry whether the latter would enter into communication with a view to an armistice and a conference on the conditions of peace. These versions were put into Mr. Malet's hand by Count Bismarck. His Excellency had apparently not received M. Jules Favre's proposal for a personal interview when Mr. Malet left the Prussian head-quarters.

I have told M. Jules Favre generally that, from the Reports made by Mr. Malet, I gather that Count Bismarck is disposed to enter into negotiations for a Treaty of Peace, but will not listen to any request for an armistice; and that he seems willing to receive a Representative of the French Government coming to the Prussian head-quarters to treat for peace.

M. Jules Favre said that he was still ready, painful as the step would be to him, to go to the Prussian head-quarters if he received a favourable answer to the proposal to do so, which he had conveyed to Count Bismarck through your Lordship. He thought, however, that it was essential to wait for that answer.

Inclosure 1 in No. 136.

Count Bismarck to Lord Lyons.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Meaux, September 15, 1870.

I BEG to thank your Excellency for the letter which you did me the honour to address to me on the 13th of this month, and which I received through Mr. Edward Malet. From the telegrams exchanged between me and the North German Ambassador at London, of which I have given a copy to Mr. Malet, your Excellency will please to perceive that the subject in question had been matter of direct communication between the head-quarters and London before your Excellency could be aware of it; and you will allow me to refer to the contents of my telegram.

Confidentially, I beg leave to inform your Excellency that we shall always be ready to enter into negotiations for peace, but not for an armistice.

I pray, &c.
(Signed) BISMARCK.

Inclosure 2 in No. 136.

Count Bernstorff to Count Bismarck.

(Telegraphic.)

(Received at Rheims, September 11, 1870.)

M. JULES FAVRE asks: Will Count Bismarck enter upon conversations, so as to arrive at an armistice and to a conference on the conditions of peace; and with whom does he think of holding this conversation?

Inclosure 3 in No. 136.

Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff.

(Telegraphic.)

September 12, 1870.

ALREADY said in previous telegram that you are to meet every overture of the Queen of England, but cannot attach to the overtures of the Government now acting in Paris the importance of an overture of the Government of France, because it is not yet recognized by France, and the Emperor Napoleon is still formally, for foreign Powers, the bearer of the sovereignty. I answer by the counter-question, What guarantee can the present Government, or one of those which will probably follow it in Paris, give that agreements with it would be recognized by France, or even immediately only by the troops at Strasburg and Metz?

Inclosure 4 in No. 136.

Count Bernstorff to Count Bismarck.

(Telegraphic.)

London, September 14, 1870.

FAVRE requests Lord Granville to reply to your Excellency:—

“The guarantees justly required by Count Bismarck can be given in a two-fold respect—political and military. From the political point of view the Government of the National Defence will sign an armistice, and call in an Assembly without delay, which will ratify the Treaty of Peace to be concluded between the Prussian and the French Government.

“From the military point of view the Government of the Defence affords the same security as a regular Government, inasmuch as all orders of the War Minister are obeyed. Whatever in this respect should be settled by means of an armistice would therefore without delay be punctually carried out.” Report follows.

No. 137.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 17, 1870.

I HAVE had a further conversation with M. Thiers at his own request.

After a philosophical, historical, and eloquent address, he approached the subject of my position before an English House of Commons, jealous of the honour of the country; and he asked me in various forms whether, if Russia were to take the initiative in addressing to Germany a friendly remonstrance in favour of France, the British Government would not object to be left behind.

I told him that we were following the policy which the House of Commons had approved by votes of money and legislative acts; that I had already told him what that policy was; that I would give no sort of answer as to hypothetical cases; that I reserved complete liberty of action for the future, but that it was fair to tell him that desirous as I was, of acting in concert with neutral Powers, I was not jealous of any action they might take which would lead to peace, but that, on the other hand, I should in each step consider what England ought to do irrespective of any initiative taken by others.

I cannot tell whether M. Thiers in asking this question was aware of the intention communicated by the Emperor of Russia to General Fleury, and reported by Sir A. Buchanan in his despatch of the 9th September, of which a copy was inclosed to you in my despatch of the

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 138.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, September 19, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acquaint your Excellency that inquiries have been made respecting the reports mentioned in your note of the 7th instant, that 170 cases of rifles left Birmingham for Southampton on the 6th instant, and that 56 cases were to be delivered on the 7th instant at the City Station. The statement contained in your Excellency's further note of the 9th instant, that 50 cases of rifles had been forwarded by Messrs. Wilson and Deely, of Birmingham, to the Wapping Station, London, has also been fully investigated.

As regards the 170 cases first mentioned, no information has as yet been received. It appears, however, that 56 cases, containing 1,008 Snider rifles, have been placed on board a vessel bound from London to Dunkirk; the second report, therefore, which reached your Excellency seems to have been correct.

With reference to the 50 cases said to have been forwarded by Messrs. Wilson and Deely, your Excellency seems to have been correctly informed as to their having been despatched from Birmingham, not to the Wapping Station, which is at Liverpool, but to the Poplar Station, London; but the result of the further inquiries made respecting them would seem to show that they were not destined for the French Government, as it is supposed that they formed part of a cargo of 1,520 rifles and over 1,000,000 cartridges, placed on board the "Middlesex," a vessel which has cleared from London for Rotterdam.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 139.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received September 19.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, September 3, 1870.

COUNT BEUST spoke to me to-day on the subject of your Lordship's Circular of the 17th ultimo to the neutral Powers, and said that he understood from Count Apponyi that you did not approve of the reservation he desired to insert in his intended answer to this communication. He regretted your disapproval of the course he desired to follow in this matter all the more as it would be hard for him to depart from it, or to alter his instructions to Count Apponyi, as the latter had been communicated to other Powers, and the Italian Government had already signified their approval of it.

His Excellency then observed that if the mediating Powers were to have any weight at all, and to be useful in the future negotiations for peace, they must act together. He therefore considered it the more necessary that there should be no isolated action; and if Her Majesty's Government thought a conference could be established, he would be ready to agree to one being held at any place that was agreeable to them.

No. 140.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received September 19.)

My Lord,

Vienna, September 6, 1870.

AT my interview to-day with Count Beust, his Excellency again referred to the question of the interchange of letters between the neutral Powers; respecting which he had spoken to me, as reported in my despatch of the 1st instant, and also in that of the 3rd instant, and remarked on the length of time required for communication with England, and that he had as yet only received a short telegram from Count Apponyi on the subject, according to which your Lordship still appeared ill-disposed to agree to the reservations he desired to insert in the Austrian answer, to the effect that there should be no isolated action on the part of any of the mediating Powers, and also that you had expressed dissatisfaction that Austria had not acceded to our Treaties with Prussia and France for the guarantee of Belgium.

Count Beust said that, much as he desired the maintenance and neutrality of Belgium, the geographical position of Austria incapacitated her from acting as England might do in favour of that country, and that, moreover, as Russia had declined, in spite of the good will which she also entertained for Belgium, to become a party to the engagement undertaken by Her Majesty's Government, he had not considered it advisable to enter into a fresh guarantee.

I reminded Count Beust that when the question of a Convention or Protocol was first discussed he seemed favourable to it, and to approve of the project; it was therefore natural that Her Majesty's Government should be disappointed that two of the great Powers who signed the original Belgian Treaty—Austria and Russia—should be now less willing to act with England in the further support of their original work.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 141.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received September 19.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, September 9, 1870.

COUNT BEUST told me to-day that in consequence of M. Jules Favre's having stated to Prince Metternich that the Republic were most desirous to put an end to the war, he had thought it advisable to telegraph in this sense to Berlin, and that his communication had been favourably received by the Prussian Government; he had at once informed the Provisional Government of France of the impression produced by this message, and has received from them their cordial thanks for the steps he has taken in the interests of peace.

No. 142.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received September 19.)

My Lord,

Vienna, September 9, 1870.

AFTER the language held by Count Beust, as reported in my despatches of the 3rd and 6th instant, and his apparent determination not to give way upon the question of his reservation respecting any isolated action of the neutral or mediating Powers in the future negotiations for the re-establishment of peace between France and Germany, I was agreeably surprised to hear from his Excellency to-day, that as your Lordship continued to desire the omission of the passage referring to isolated action in the answer to your circular of the 17th ultimo, he had given way out of consideration for your

Lordship's wishes, and instructed Count Apponyi to address a note in a form which would be agreeable to Her Majesty's Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 143.

Earl Granville to Señor Rances.

M. le Ministre,

Foreign Office, September 19, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your note of the 14th instant, informing me that you have received instructions from your Government to support the endeavours of Her Majesty's Government to procure an armistice with a view of bringing about a peace between France and Prussia; and in conveying to the Spanish Government the thanks of Her Majesty's Government for their offer of assistance, I have the honour to inform you that they have hitherto confined themselves simply to the transmission of messages from both belligerents.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 144.

Earl Granville to Lord Bloomfield.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 21, 1870.

IN a conversation which I had recently with Count Apponyi, his Excellency mentioned that Count Beust had expressed some surprise at my having, as he said, reproached him with having approved the Treaties concluded by Great Britain with France and Prussia for ensuring respect for the independence and neutrality of Belgium, but having declined to adhere to them. Her Majesty's Government had, he observed, made the Austrian Government acquainted with their intention to enter into negotiations with the view of concluding these Treaties, and had communicated them when they had been signed, but had never requested the participation of the Austrian Government in them, nor, indeed, was the participation of any Power, except those immediately concerned, contemplated in the Treaties themselves. He added that Russia took the same view of the question.

I replied that in the remarks which Count Beust had interpreted as a reproach I had referred to a conversation which he had had with your Excellency, which was reported in your despatch of the 6th ultimo, in which he had stated that he should have no objection to join in such a Convention, provided France and Prussia agreed to it, and to a consequent conversation (that reported in your despatch of the 18th ultimo), in which he had withdrawn this assurance, and stated, on the contrary, that, looking to the form in which the Treaty was drawn up, the terms could hardly apply to Austria; and that he understood, moreover, from St. Petersburg that the Russian Government were not disposed to become a party to it. As regards this latter statement I took the opportunity of observing to Count Apponyi that Russia, though she had never, like Austria, encouraged the expectation that she would join in the Convention, had subsequently conveyed to the Belgian Government assurances.

I think it as well that your Excellency should be much acquainted with the nature of this conversation in case Count Beust should allude to the subject; but if he should not do so, it will not be necessary for your Excellency to refer to it.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 145.

Earl Granville to Lord Bloomfield.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 21, 1870.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 9th instant, I have to request you to express to Count Beust the satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government

learned that he had no longer insisted on inserting in the notes which it was proposed to interchange between Great Britain and Austria, a reservation against the isolated action of either as regards mediation.

The notes, in the form originally suggested by Her Majesty's Government, have now been duly interchanged between Count Apponyi and myself.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 146.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 21, 1870.

I APPROVE the steps taken by your Excellency to warn British subjects in Paris that they would remain there at their own risk and peril, as reported in your despatch of the 14th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 147.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 21, midnight.)

My Lord,

Tours, September 19, 1870.

PRINCE METTERNICH, the Austrian Ambassador, came to me at Paris on the 17th instant and told me that the Comte de Chaudordy, the head of the Cabinet of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, had brought him a message from M. Jules Favre which made him think that it would be desirable that the Representatives of the principal European Powers should leave Paris at once, in order not to be cut off from communication with their Governments. M. de Chaudordy had, the Prince said, informed him that the French Government expected from one moment to another to hear that the enemy had rendered the only railroad still open (the Western) impassable; and that, this being the case, M. Jules Favre, knowing that Prince Metternich was particularly anxious not to have his communication with his Government interrupted, had thought it courteous to warn him that the danger of this occurring appeared to be imminent, and that, in fact, it would be prudent for him to leave Paris the following day at latest.

I told Prince Metternich that I had, personally, a great disinclination to leave Paris just then; but that, nevertheless, I should, of course, do so if it appeared that I should be more useful elsewhere: and I added that I should certainly be unwilling to act in the matter in a different way from my principal colleagues. I must, however (I said in conclusion), see M. Jules Favre before I came to any decision.

I went accordingly to M. Jules Favre the first thing in the morning and related to him what had passed between Prince Metternich and myself. I said that, for my own part, I thought that the Representatives of the principal European Powers might very well stay some time longer in Paris; I did not deny that it was probable that the last railroad would in a very short time be made impassable; but still it was, I observed, possible that the Prussian Commanders would give the Diplomatic Body some facilities for sending and receiving couriers; and I presumed certain that they would allow the Diplomats themselves, when they desired to leave Paris, to pass once for all through the lines. I would not, I added, conceal from him that, personally, I had reasons for desiring to stay a little longer; and I said in conclusion that, undoubtedly, I particularly wished to be at hand in order to deliver to him, as soon as possible, Count Bismarck's answer to his proposal for an interview, and, moreover, to learn without delay the result of the interview if it should take place.

M. Jules Favre answered that his message to Prince Metternich was specially intended for the Prince himself, who had expressed to him a very marked dislike to the prospect of being hemmed in by the Prussian troops. Nevertheless, he thought it only right that other Representatives of foreign Powers should know that the French Government was no longer in a position to secure their communications with the world outside Paris.

With regard to Count Bismarck's answer, M. Jules Favre said that, unless I thought it might be deemed discourteous by Her Majesty's Government, through whom the

question had been put to the Count, he would, painful as it would be to him, sacrifice all personal pride and reserve and, if the answer were any longer delayed, set out for the Prussian head-quarters without waiting for it.

I said that I would answer for Her Majesty's Government fully appreciating the devotion to his country and the ardent desire to obtain for her a tolerable peace which prompted him to undertake without delay a mission which could not but be very trying to his feelings. I added that I thought the willingness Count Bismarck had expressed in conversing with Mr. Malet to treat with any one whom the French Government might send for the purpose, removed much of the awkwardness of his presenting himself without waiting for an answer. At all events, I said, time was very pressing; and even if the step failed, it would, I thought, be a consolation to him hereafter to feel that he had left nothing undone to avert the bloodshed and destruction which appeared to be imminent.

M. Jules Favre said that he felt this very strongly; and that, whatever other results the step he contemplated might have, it would set his own conscience at rest. He added that he should be as anxious as I could be that we should meet as soon as possible after the interview (if interview there should be) with Count Bismarck had taken place, but that, perhaps, the most likely way to effect this would be for me to leave Paris, if, on doing so, I was willing to proceed to Tours. He would, however, beg me to defer coming to a decision respecting my departure until he had communicated with his colleagues in the Government, whom he was about to meet in Council.

As soon as the Council was over, M. Jules Favre came to see me. He told me that the information received by the Government obliged him to tell me that it was extremely doubtful whether the Western Railroad could be kept open a day longer, and that he had accordingly ordered a special train for Tours to be placed that evening at the disposal of those members of the Diplomatic Body who were willing to avail themselves of it. He proposed Tours as the destination, because, as I was aware, a member of the Provisional Government (M. Crémieux, the Minister of Justice) was already established there, with full powers to act in the name of the whole Government, if communication with Paris should be interrupted. Admiral Fourichon, the Minister of Marine, was also established there, and there were, moreover, delegations from the Staff of all the Governmental Departments, who would carry on the administration under all circumstances. The Foreign Department was, he added, represented for the present by M. de Geofroy, an experienced diplomatist; in short, every arrangement had been made to avoid all interruption of the functions of the Government, however closely Paris might be invested by the enemy.

For his own part, M. Jules Favre said, he certainly thought most seriously of setting out the next morning for the Prussian head-quarters, and he asked me to tell him as exactly as possible what Count Bismarck had said to Mr. Malet about receiving a negotiation from Paris.

I sent for Mr. Malet and desired him to repeat to M. Jules Favre, as nearly as he could, Count Bismarck's exact words. Mr. Malet repeated Count Bismarck's statement in the following terms:—"If the French Government wish to treat, they should send some one to do so; we will treat with any one they send."

M. Jules Favre asked Mr. Malet some questions as to the best mode of proceeding in order to pass the Prussian lines; and finally, after some further conversation with me alone, said that he would, if possible, set out for the head-quarters of the Prussian army on the following morning. In the mean time he would advise me to take advantage of the train he had ordered from Tours, as by doing so I should, perhaps, learn the result of his mission sooner than if I remained at Paris; and at all events he was far from thinking it desirable that the Representatives of the principal European Powers should run the risk of being shut up in Paris and deprived of free communication with their Governments.

I said that I still disliked the idea of leaving Paris just yet, but that of course I should not hesitate to proceed to any place in which I could have a better prospect of being useful; and that after what he had said, if I found that my principal colleagues thought it advisable that we should go off to Tours in the evening, I would no longer be an obstacle to their departure.

The result has been, as your Lordship is already aware, that the Austrian Ambassador, Prince Metternich; the Ottoman Ambassador, Djemil Pacha; the Italian Minister, Chevalier Nigra; the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, M. Okounneff, and I, left Paris the night before last, and arrived here yesterday.

Colonel Claremont considered that in a military point of view, Paris was the point of most interest accessible to him; and as I concurred with him in this view, I sanctioned his remaining there.

At the time I left Paris, Captain Hore was too unwell to move. I left a memorandum recommending that if able to do so, he should leave Paris as soon as he should be well

enough to travel ; and that if his health should not be quite re-established, he should go to England to recruit it : otherwise, that he should join me here, where he would find the Minister of Marine, and would consequently be at the main source of naval information.

Finding that a not inconsiderable number of British subjects still remained in Paris, notwithstanding my repeated warnings of the risk they might incur by so doing, and of the probability that when the danger was actually present they might not be able to get away, I have left Mr. Wodehouse at the Embassy to give them advice and, if possible, protection.

I have, moreover, placed the Embassy-house, and the Government property belonging to it, in Mr. Wodehouse's charge ; and I have desired him to take advantage of any opportunities he may have of sending direct to your Lordship, as well as to me, information of public interest.

A few hours before I left Paris I presented him to M. Jules Favre, who readily agreed to send and receive communications through him.

Lastly, I have ordered Mr. Wodehouse to come away from Paris if the place should be threatened with immediate bombardment or other imminent danger, and have directed him in this contingency to do his utmost to obtain a safe passage out of Paris for all British subjects.

Mr. Malet, Mr. Sheffield, Mr. Saumarez, and Mr. Lee Hamilton have accompanied me to this place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 148.

Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by Count Bernstorff, September 22.)

(Traduction.)

Rheims, le 13 Septembre, 1870.

LES opinions erronées que nous rencontrons même de la part de nos amis sur nos rapports avec la France, me font désirer de vous faire les observations suivantes sur les vues de Sa Majesté le Roi, complètement partagées par les Gouvernements de nos alliés Allemands.

Nous avons cru voir dans le plébiscite et l'état apparemment satisfaisant de la France qui le suivait, une garantie pour la paix et l'expression d'un sentiment pacifique de la part de la nation Française.

Les événements nous ont prouvé qu'il en était autrement ; au moins ont-ils montré avec quelle facilité cette disposition fait place au sentiment contraire chez les Français. La majorité presque unanime des Représentants du peuple, du Sénat, et des organes de l'opinion publique dans la presse, ont demandé la guerre de conquête contre nous si hautement et si décidément que le courage nécessaire manquait aux amis isolés de la paix, et que l'Empereur Napoléon n'aura pas manqué à la vérité en déclarant au Roi que l'état de l'opinion publique l'avait forcé à faire la guerre.

En face de ces faits nous ne pouvons chercher nos garanties dans les dispositions changeantes de la France. Nous ne saurions nous faire des illusions sur le fait que nous devons nous préparer à une nouvelle attaque de la part de la France, et non à une paix durable, et cela tout-à-fait indépendamment des conditions que nous pourrions demander.

C'est la défaite en elle-même, c'est le fait que nous avons victorieusement repoussé son attaque criminelle, que la France ne nous pardonnera jamais. Si nous voulions maintenant évacuer la France sans aucune contribution, sans autres avantages que la gloire de nos armes—la même haine, le même désir de vengeance subsisteraient pourtant chez les Français à cause de leur vanité blessée et de leur désir de dominer, et ils ne feraient qu'attendre le jour où ils pourraient espérer de traduire ces sentiments en actes avec l'espoir de succès. Ce n'était pas le doute sur la justice de notre cause ou la crainte de ne pas être assez forts qui nous empêcha en 1867 de faire la guerre, pour laquelle on nous avait alors déjà fourni assez de motifs, mais l'appréhension d'exciter précisément par nos victoires les passions dont je parle et d'amener par-là une ère d'animosité réciproque et de guerres toujours renouvelées, tandis que nous espérions gagner par la durée prolongée et l'entretien soigneux de relations pacifiques entre les deux nations une base solide pour une ère de paix et de bien-être réciproques.

Maintenant qu'on nous a forcés à cette guerre qui nous répugnait, nous devons chercher, contre la prochaine attaque des Français, de meilleures garanties pour notre défense que celle de leur bienveillance.

Les garanties pour la paix de l'Europe qu'on a cru trouver, après l'année 1815, contre ces mêmes convoitises Françaises dans la Sainte Alliance et d'autres institutions créées dans l'intérêt Européen, ont perdu leur valeur par le cours du temps ; de sorte qu'en définitive l'Allemagne a dû se défendre seule contre la France, étant réduite à sa propre force et à ses propres ressources. On ne saurait cependant demander toujours de nouveau au peuple Allemand les mêmes efforts qu'il fait aujourd'hui, et nous sommes donc obligés de chercher des garanties matérielles pour la sécurité de l'Allemagne contre les attaques futures de la France, garanties en même temps pour la paix Européenne qui n'est pas menacée par l'Allemagne.

Ces garanties, nous n'avons pas à les demander d'un Gouvernement passager de la France, mais de la nation Française qui a prouvé qu'elle est prête à suivre chaque Gouvernement à la guerre contre nous, comme la série de guerres offensives que la France a faites pendant des siècles contre l'Allemagne le prouve jusqu'à l'évidence.

Nous ne pouvons, par ces raisons, que faire nos conditions de paix uniquement dans le but de rendre plus difficile à la France sa prochaine attaque contre l'Allemagne et surtout contre notre frontière du sud-ouest, jusqu'ici sans défense, en reculant cette frontière et par-là le point de départ des attaques Françaises, et en cherchant à acquérir pour l'Allemagne les forteresses par lesquelles la France nous menace, afin d'en faire des boulevards de défense.

(Signé) BISMARCK.

(Translation.)

Rheims, September 13, 1870.

THE erroneous opinions which we find even among our friends with regard to our relations with France, make me wish to communicate the following observations to you on the views of His Majesty the King, which are completely shared by the Governments of our German allies.

We thought we saw in the plébiscite and the apparently satisfactory state of France which followed it, a guarantee for peace and the expression of a pacific feeling on the part of the French nation.

Events have proved to us that it was otherwise ; at least they have shown with what facility that disposition gives way to the contrary feeling with the French. The almost unanimous majority of the Representatives of the people, of the Senate, and of the organs of public opinion in the press, demanded a war of conquest against us so loudly and so decidedly that the necessary courage failed the isolated friends of peace, and the Emperor Napoleon did not depart from the truth when he declared to the King that the state of public opinion had forced him to make war.

In the face of these facts we cannot seek our guarantees in the changeable humour of France. We must not blind ourselves to the fact that we must now prepare for a new attack on the part of France, and not for a lasting peace, and that quite independently of the conditions which we might ask.

It is the defeat in itself, it is the fact that we have victoriously repulsed its criminal attack, that France will never forgive us. If we were now willing to evacuate France without any contribution, without other advantages than the glory of our arms, the same hatred, the same thirst for vengeance would nevertheless remain with the French on account of their wounded vanity and of their desire to dominate, and they would only await the day when they could hope to transfer the feelings into acts with the hope of success. It was not the doubt of the justice of our cause or the fear of not being strong enough, which hindered us in 1867 from making war, for which motives enough had already then been furnished to us, but the apprehension of exciting by our very victories the passions of which I speak, and of thereby bringing in an era of reciprocal animosity and of constantly renewed wars, while we hoped by the lengthened duration and careful maintenance of pacific relations between the two nations to gain a solid basis for an era of mutual peace and well-being.

Now that we have been forced to this war which was repugnant to us, we must seek better guarantees for our defence against the next attack of the French than that of their good-will.

The guarantees for the peace of the Empire against this same French greed which were thought to be found, after the year 1815, in the Holy Alliance and other institutions made in the interest of Europe, have lost their value by the course of time, so that finally Germany has been compelled to defend herself single-handed against France, being reduced to her own strength and to her own resources. We could not, however, ask over and over again from the German nation for the same efforts which it has now made, and we are

obliged to seek material guarantees for the security of Germany against future attacks from France ; guarantees at the same time for the peace of Europe which is not threatened by Germany.

We must not demand these guarantees from a fugitive Government of France, but from the French nation, which has shown that it is ready to follow each Government to a war against us, as the series of offensive wars which France has for centuries made against Germany clearly proves.

For these reasons we cannot but make our terms of peace with the sole object of making more difficult for France her next attack on Germany, and above all on our south-west frontier hitherto undefended, by pushing back that frontier and thereby the starting-point of the French attacks, and by seeking to acquire for Germany the fortresses with which France threatens us, so as to make of them bulwarks of defence.

(Signed) BISMARCK.

No. 149.

*Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.**

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 22, 1870.

COUNT BERNSTORFF placed in my hands this afternoon a Circular despatch from Count Bismarck, of which I inclose a copy for your Excellency's information,† setting forth the views of the Prussian Government as to the guarantees to be obtained from France in any peace to be concluded with her.

I asked Count Bernstorff whether I was to understand that any expression of opinion on the contents of the Circular was invited by the Prussian Government ; and on his replying in the negative, and that it was only a statement of the views of his Government and their allies, I said that it was an important document, and that I would not fail at once to lay it before the Queen, and communicate it to my colleagues.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 150.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 22, 1870.

I RECEIVED in the course of last night your despatch of the 19th instant, reporting what had passed previously to and on the subject of the withdrawal of yourself and certain other members of the Diplomatic Body from Paris ; and I have to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve of your language in that despatch, and of your being determined to remove to Tours.

They also approve the arrangements which you made for leaving Mr. Wodehouse and Colonel Claremont alone at Paris.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 151.

Earl Granville to Lord Bloomfield.‡

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 22, 1870.

IN the course of an interview which I had recently with Count Apponyi, his Excellency called my attention to various communications which had been made to Count Beust by the French Government, the object of which was to refute the accusations made by the Prussians against the conduct of the French Government and soldiers during the war, and to bring certain counter-accusations against the Prussian Government. His Excellency inquired whether Her Majesty's Government had received similar communications, and if so, what answers had been returned to them.

* A similar despatch was addressed to Sir A. Buchanan.

‡ A similar despatch was addressed to Lord Lyons.

† No. 148.

The communications referred to consisted—1st, of a note dated the 30th of August, in which the French Government repelled the accusation that French soldiers had voluntarily fired upon ambulances and flags of truce, and retorted upon the Prussians that they had not invariably respected ambulances, had permitted the use of explosive bullets, and had compelled French peasants to work in the trenches before Strasburg, thus exposing them to the fire of their own countrymen; 2ndly, of a note dated the 31st of August, complaining of the abuse in the Prussian army of the immunity given to supposed non-combatants by the Geneva Convention; 3rdly, of a note dated the 2nd of September, explaining and defending the expulsion of Germans from Paris; lastly, of two notes dated the 3rd of September—one containing fresh complaints of the abuse of the Geneva Convention, the other stating that if the Prussians carried out their avowed intentions with regard to the Franc-tireurs and Gardes Mobiles, the French would retaliate upon what they considered to be the corresponding classes in the Prussian army.

I replied that only one of these notes had been communicated to Her Majesty's Government,—that last mentioned, respecting the treatment of the Franc-tireurs and the Garde Mobile. The Marquis de Lavalette had requested Her Majesty's Government to communicate this note to the Prussian Government, and Her Majesty's Government had acceded to this request, but without making any comment upon its contents.

Count Apponyi observed that Count Beust had adverted to a further communication, with a copy of which he had not been able to supply him, but upon which he was particularly anxious to have the opinion of Her Majesty's Government. This was a note in which the French Government remonstrated against the employment of private-cruizers, not being regular men-of-war, as being an infraction of the Treaty of Paris of 1856.

I informed his Excellency that the question of the employment of this class of cruizers had been carefully considered by Her Majesty's Government, and that it had been decided that it was not a violation of the Treaty of 1856. It appeared to Her Majesty's Government that there were substantial distinctions between the employment of such vessels and the system of privateers which that Treaty intended to suppress. The former vessels appeared to be, to all intents and purposes, in the service of the Prussian Government, and the crews were to be under the same discipline as the crews of men-of-war. Her Majesty's Government did not, therefore, consider that they were entitled to make any remonstrance against their being employed, but had confined themselves to calling the attention of the Prussian Government to the Declaration of Paris, and expressing the hope that the latter would take care, by stringent instructions, to prevent any breach of that Declaration.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 152.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, September 23, 1870.

ON the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 6th instant, in which it was stated that, on the occasion of the visit of Rear-Admiral Prince William of Hesse under a flag of truce to the French fleet off Heligoland, on the 18th ultimo, three English steam-colliers were observed to be unloading coals into the French ships of war, I requested you to be good enough to inform me whether you could give me any particulars as to how these colliers were known to be English; and at the same time I requested Her Majesty's Secretary of State for the Colonies to cause inquiries to be made at Heligoland, with the view of ascertaining whether the report was well-founded.

I have now the honour to inform your Excellency that the Governor of Heligoland has reported that there was not a single English steam-collier among the French fleet on the occasion in question; he is perfectly confident of this fact, as he says that not only could everything be seen from the island, but that his own yacht passed through the fleet on the day referred to. The Governor adds that, on no occasion whatever up to the 14th instant had a British ship, either steamer or sailing-vessel, delivered coals or provisions to the French blockading squadron.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 24, 1.20 P.M.)

My Lord,

Tours, September 21, 1870.

AS I had the honour to report to your Lordship in my despatch of the day before yesterday, the Representatives of Austria, Italy, Russia, and Turkey left Paris on the night of the 17th instant, and arrived here on the morning of the 18th. At half-past 5 o'clock on that evening all communication between Paris and the rest of France by railroad was completely interrupted by the German forces; and at 4 o'clock in the afternoon of the following day (the 19th) the last remaining telegraph wire from Paris was cut, and no intelligence from that place has since been received here.

It is known that M. Jules Favre set out for the Prussian head-quarters on Sunday morning, the 18th; and as no news of him has since reached Tours, it is presumed that he had not returned to Paris when the telegraphic communication ceased, on the evening of the day before yesterday.

Under these circumstances the arrangements for carrying on the administration, when Paris should be hemmed in by the German armies, have come into effect.

The powers of the Government are exercised in entire plenitude by the three Members of it present here: M. Crémieux, Minister of Justice; Vice-Admiral Fourichon, Minister of Marine; and M. Glais Bizoin.

The administrative functions of those Members who are shut up in Paris are performed by delegates deputed by them, who have been for some time established here.

On setting out for the Prussian head-quarters, M. Jules Favre directed his Chef de Cabinet, the Comte de Chaudordy, to come to Tours to act as his representative in the conduct of Foreign Affairs. M. de Chaudordy has shown me an autograph letter which M. Jules Favre put into his hand, expressing complete confidence in him, and charging him to transact business for him with the chiefs of foreign Missions here. The letter contains, moreover, an allusion to the probability of M. Jules Favre's coming here himself eventually.

M. de Chaudordy informs me that letters on business addressed to M. Jules Favre by the Representatives of foreign Powers at Tours will be opened and attended to here under present circumstances.

The Spanish Chargé d'Affaires arrived here from Paris the day before yesterday. Consequently the Foreign Representatives present in this town are Prince Metternich, Austrian Ambassador; Djemil Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador; Chevalier Nigra, Italian Minister; M. Okouneff, Russian Chargé d'Affaires; M. Hernandez, Spanish Chargé d'Affaires; and myself.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 24, 1.20 P.M.)

My Lord,

Tours, September 21, 1870.

M. THIERS arrived here yesterday morning at 7 o'clock, and proceeded three hours afterwards on his journey to St. Petersburg, by way of Turin, Vienna, and Warsaw. Being very desirous of reaching St. Petersburg as soon as possible, he intends, I understand, to remain only a few hours at Vienna on the way, and to postpone his negotiations with the Austrian Government until his return.

M. Thiers' stay at Tours was so short that I was unable to see him; but I am informed that he spoke with great satisfaction of the cordial reception he had personally met with from your Lordship and Mr. Gladstone; and that he expressed himself as generally well pleased with the result of his mission to England.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 155.

Sir E. Thornton to Earl Granville.—(Received September 25.)

My Lord,

Washington, September 12, 1870.

MR. FISH stated to me yesterday in conversation at his own house that Mr. Washburn, Minister of the United States at Paris, had been requested by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the French Republic to ask his Government whether they would be disposed to mediate conjointly with the European Powers, for the restoration of peace between North Germany and France. The request was transmitted by telegraph, and Mr. Fish informed me that, in compliance with the orders of the President, he had instructed Mr. Washburn by telegraph to say that it was contrary to the traditional policy of the United States to intervene in the affairs of Europe, and that the United States' Government were, therefore, precluded from offering their mediation conjointly with the European Powers. Mr. Fish added, as for my information, that in this particular case it was the more impossible for the United States to interfere, because it was a question of dynasty which had been the origin of the war, and in which this Republic could take no part. Mr. Washburn had been further instructed to state that if France and North Germany should both ask the good offices and even the sole mediation of the United States for the restoration of peace, his Government would feel it their duty, for humanity's sake, to accept the task.

Upon my observing that any durable arrangement would hardly be feasible without consulting the interests of other European Powers, Mr. Fish assured me that his Government would not have the slightest objection to confer with other European Governments upon the subject; indeed, it would be absurd to attempt the establishment of a durable peace without listening to the expression of their views, but that what the United States would be obliged to decline would be a joint official mediation with European Powers.

Mr. Fish expressed his great regret that M. Jules Favre should have committed his Government so far in his first declaration of their intentions as to render peace almost impossible. He thought that North Germany had a right to demand some guarantees for the future maintenance of peace, which had been in this instance disturbed on so groundless a pretext; and that though the Government of the United States would be most ready to endeavour to moderate the demands of Germany, it could hardly be expected that the latter would be satisfied without a large pecuniary indemnity and the destruction of certain fortresses, even if she could be induced by the friendly representations of other Powers to abstain from demanding an acquisition of territory; if, however, the influence of the United States were of any weight, it would be exercised to induce moderation in the demands of North Germany.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. THORNTON

No. 156.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 27, 6.30 P.M.)

(Extract.)

Tours, September 25, 1870.

I HAD yesterday the honour to inform your Lordship by telegraph that it appeared from a despatch which M. Jules Favre had found the means of conveying from Paris to the members of the Government here that Count Bismarck had insisted upon the cession to Germany of the whole of Alsace, and of Lorraine as far as Metz; that he had refused to grant an armistice unless the German forces were put into possession of Metz, of Strasburg, and of Mont Valerien, a detached fort, the most important of those which defend and command Paris, and, lastly, that the Government here, in concert with that at Paris, considered that Count Bismarck's terms were wholly inadmissible, and that nothing remained for France but to resist to the last extremity.

I communicated to your Lordship by telegraph this morning the text of a Proclamation to the above effect issued by the Government here, and of a Decree postponing *sine die* the municipal elections which were to have taken place to-day, and the elections for the Constituent Assembly which were to have been held on this day week. I inclose herewith copies of both these documents.

I had some conversation this morning with M. Drémieux on the state of things,

which has been the result of the total failure of M. Jules Favre's endeavour to come to terms with Count Bismarck.

M. Crémieux told me that Count Bismarck's language to M. Favre appeared to have been even stronger than the recital of it which the Government here had inserted in their Proclamation, and that he had said distinctly to M. Favre that Prussia was determined that France, which had never ceased to attack Germany since the time of Louis XIV, should now be reduced to the condition of a second-rate Power. No mention had, M. Crémieux said, so far as he knew, been made of a pecuniary indemnity or of any other conditions of peace except the cession of Alsace and Lorraine. It was not, in fact, to be supposed that, on these terms being announced and insisted upon, M. Jules Favre would have continued the conversation. Count Bismarck had equally put all discussion on the subject of an armistice out of the question by requiring not only that Metz, Toul, and Strasburg, but that Mont Valérien, which was virtually the same thing as Paris itself, should be given up to him.

M. Crémieux went on to say that the Prussian demands had caused a violent outburst of indignation at Paris; that all classes there had rallied round the Government; that the determination to resist to the utmost was universal; and that the spirit amongst the troops, the National Guard, and the whole population at Paris was excellent. The accounts which had already reached the Government here from various parts of France were equally satisfactory. In fact, every Frenchman must feel that he was now called upon to fight for the very existence of France. Other nations had fallen before an irresistible invasion, and so perhaps might France now, but she would not be subdued without struggling to the last for her honour and her place among nations. War to the last extremity was now all that remained to her.

Passing to details, I asked M. Crémieux whether, looking at the question in a diplomatic point of view, he was sure that it was wise to postpone the election of a Constituent Assembly. Might not the difficulty of entering hereafter into negotiations with Prussia be increased by the absence of a regularly established Government?

M. Crémieux answered that, in adjourning the elections, the Government here had followed instructions which they had received from their colleagues in Paris. It appeared that the Paris National Guard had demanded that not only the elections for the Constituent Assembly, but even the Municipal elections, should be adjourned; and this was the more remarkable because (as I of course knew) the Municipal Authorities at Paris had, under the Imperial system, been named by the Government—not chosen by the inhabitants. It had, however, been felt that every energy should be devoted at this moment to the defence of the country, and that every other consideration, however important, should be set aside.

M. Crémieux proceeded to tell me that the latest news he had received from Paris was of the day before yesterday. It had been brought by a man who had left the place in a balloon, and had landed near Evreux. The spirit of the people was described as being excellent, but not many details were given. Among other documents, the following address had been conveyed by this balloon:—

“ Hôtel de Ville de Paris.

“ La Mairie de Paris veille. Deux cents quinze bataillons de Gardes Nationaux sont armés et occupent les remparts.

“ L'esprit public est excellent.

“ Toute la population est déterminée à se défendre jusqu'à la dernière extrémité.

“ Que la France réponde !

“ Ordre à toutes les administrations entre les mains desquelles cette déclaration arrivera de la faire publier et afficher.” *

Finally, M. Crémieux told me that Toul had at last been obliged to capitulate, and that it had surrendered on the 23rd instant, on the same conditions as had been made at Sedan.

* (Translation:)

“ Hôtel de Ville, Paris.

“ The Mairie of Paris is on the watch. Two hundred and fifteen battalions of National Guards are armed, and occupy the ramparts.

“ Public spirit is excellent.

“ The whole population is determined to defend itself to the last extremity.

“ May France respond !

“ All the administrations which receive this declaration are ordered to have it published and posted up.”

Inclosure in N^o. 156.

Extract from the "Moniteur" of September 24, 1870.

Bulletin Officiel de la Délégation du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale.

Tours, 24 Septembre, 1870.

ACTES OFFICIELS.

A la France !

AVANT l'investissement de Paris, M. Jules Favre, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères, a voulu voir M. de Bismarck pour connaître les dispositions de l'ennemi.

Voici la déclaration de l'ennemi :

La Prusse veut continuer la guerre et réduire la France à l'état de Puissance de second ordre ;

La Prusse veut l'Alsace et la Lorraine jusqu'à Metz, par droit de conquête ;

La Prusse, pour consentir à un armistice, a osé demander la reddition de Strasbourg, de Toul, et du Mont Valérien.

Paris exaspéré s'ensevelirait plutôt sous ses ruines.

A d'aussi insolentes prétentions, en effet, on ne répond que par la lutte à outrance.

La France accepte cette lutte et compte sur tous ses enfants.

Les Membres Délégués du Gouvernement :

CREMIEUX.
GLAIS-BIZOIN.
FOURICHON.

Tours, le 24 Septembre, 1870.

Vu la Proclamation ci-dessus qui constate la gravité des circonstances ;

Le Gouvernement décrète :

Toutes élections municipales et pour l'Assemblée Constituante sont suspendues et ajournées.

Toute élection municipale qui serait faite est annulée.

Les Préfets pourvoieront par le maintien des municipalités actuelles ou la nomination de municipalités provisoires.

Les Membres Délégués du Gouvernement :

CREMIEUX.
GLAIS-BIZOIN.
FOURICHON.

(Translation.)

Official Notice of the Delegation of National Defence.

Tours, September 24, 1870.

ACTES OFFICIELS.

To France !

BEFORE the investment of Paris, M. Jules Favre, Minister for Foreign Affairs, wished to see M. de Bismarck to learn the intentions of the enemy.

Here is the declaration of the enemy :—

Prussia wishes to continue the war, and to reduce France to the rank of a second-rate Power ;

Prussia claims Alsace and Lorraine, as far as Metz, by right of conquest ;

Prussia, to consent to an armistice, has dared ask for the surrender of Strasbourg, of Toul, and of Mont Valerien.

Paris, enraged, would sooner bury itself beneath its ruins.

To such insolent pretensions, in fact, we answer only by a struggle "à outrance."

France accepts this struggle, and relies on her children.

The Delegates of the Government :

CREMIEUX.
GLAIS-BIZOIN.
FOURICHON.

Tours, September 24, 1870.

Seeing the above Proclamation, which states the gravity of the situation,
The Government decrees :—

All municipal elections, and those for the Constituent Assembly, are suspended and adjourned.

Every municipal election which has been held, is annulled.

The Prefects will provide for the maintenance of the present municipalities, or the nomination of provisional ones.

The Delegates of the Government :

CREMIEUX.
GLAIS-BIZOIN.
FOURICHON.

No. 157.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 27.)

My Lord,

Tours, September 25, 1870.

I WAS on the point of dispatching the messenger when the Comte de Chaudordy came to me to urge that the time was come for the formal recognition of the present Government of France by Great Britain.

He represented that the Government was now universally acknowledged and obeyed throughout France; that it had shown that it had the will and the power to preserve order and conduct the administration in a moderate, reasonable manner at home, as well as to maintain friendly and correct relations with foreign Powers. Nor, he observed, could it be doubted that it was the only Government possible in France at the present moment, and that while it was not responsible for the war, it was honestly endeavouring to defend the integrity of the territory of France, after having in vain used its utmost endeavours to obtain tolerable terms of peace. To recognize it at this moment would, he thought, enable Her Majesty's Government, without in the slightest degree departing from neutrality, to establish a claim to the sympathy and gratitude of the whole French nation.

I said to M. de Chaudordy that the question had been so lately discussed by your Lordship with M. Thiers that it would be presumptuous of me to do more than remind him of what had been said by your Lordship on that occasion. I would, however, I added, employ the few minutes at my disposal before I was obliged to send off my messenger, in making to your Lordship a hasty report of the representation which he had made on behalf of the Government here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 158.

Earl Granville to Sir A. Paget.

Sir,

Foreign Office, September 27, 1870.

M. CADORNA called upon me to-day, and asked me what were the views of Her Majesty's Government as to the failure of the recent negotiations between M. Jules Favre and Count Bismarck.

I informed him that we regretted their failure; and I expressed my opinion that there is no means at present by which the neutral Powers can accelerate the conclusion of peace.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 159.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 28, 1870.

I HAVE received, and laid before the Queen, your Excellency's despatch of the 25th instant, reporting a conversation with the Comte de Chaudordy, in which he pressed for the recognition by Her Majesty's Government of the present Government of

France; and I have to state to your Excellency that I approve the language which you employed on the occasion in question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE

No. 160.

Count Apponyi to Earl Granville.—(Received September 28.)

M. le Comte, *Belgrave Square, le 27 Septembre, 1870.*
 LORD BLOOMFIELD a été chargé de donner officiellement communication au Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale et Royale Apostolique du texte des Traités conclus par l'Angleterre avec la Prusse et la France pour le maintien de l'indépendance et de la neutralité de la Belgique pendant la guerre actuelle.
 Le Gouvernement Impérial et Royal a pris connaissance avec autant d'intérêt que de satisfaction de ces importants documents. En sa qualité de signataire du Traité de 1839, il ne peut qu'applaudir à la sollicitude témoignée dans la présente occasion par le Gouvernement Britannique en faveur des principes consacrés par ces actes internationaux, que les récents Traités entourent de nouvelles garanties.
 J'ai été, en conséquence, chargé de déclarer à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement de l'Empereur et Roi approuve complètement les Traités que l'Angleterre a signés avec la France et la Prusse pour garantir la neutralité de la Belgique, et donne son adhésion explicite et formelle au but que ces Traités ont en vue.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) APPONYI.

(Translation.)

My Lord, *Belgrave Square, September 27, 1870.*
 LORD BLOOMFIELD has been directed to communicate officially to the Government of His Imperial and Royal Apostolic Majesty the text of the Treaties concluded by England with Prussia and France for the maintenance of the independence and of the neutrality of Belgium during the present war.
 The Imperial and Royal Government has learned with as much interest as satisfaction of these important documents.
 In its quality of signatory of the Treaty of 1839, it cannot but rejoice at the solicitude shown on the present occasion by the British Government in favour of the principles sanctioned by these international Acts, which the recent Treaties invest with fresh guarantees.
 I have been, in consequence, directed to declare to your Excellency that the Government of the Emperor and King entirely approves of the Treaties which England has signed, with France and Prussia, to guarantee the neutrality of Belgium, and gives its explicit and formal adhesion to the object which these Treaties have in view.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) APPONYI.

No. 161.

Earl Granville to Mr. Layard.

(Extract.) *Foreign Office, September 28, 1870.*
 THE Spanish Minister, Señor Rances, called on me to-day to inquire what were the views held by Her Majesty's Government on the failure of the peace negotiations between Count Bismarck and M. Jules Favre, what we thought of the conditions offered by Prussia and rejected by the French Minister, and whether the publication of the two Prussian Circulars of the 13th and 16th instant, from Rheims and Meaux, could be considered as offering an opportunity for mediation, and had in any way modified the attitude of Her Majesty's Government.
 In reply, I informed Señor Rances that Her Majesty's Government deeply deplored the failure of those negotiations, and regretted that no practical good could be at present derived from giving an opinion uninvited on the conditions offered by Count Bismarck and rejected by M. Jules Favre, because the present moment gave no opening for action in the sense of peace. Her Majesty's Government, therefore, adhered to the line of policy already adopted for the present, and reserved perfect liberty of action for the future.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 29.)

My Lord,

Tours, September 27, 1870.

THE Chevalier Nigra, the Italian Minister, told me this morning that he had received a telegram from his Government, stating that Count Bismarck denied that he had required to be put in possession of Metz and Mont Valérien before agreeing to an armistice, and maintained that he had only asked for Strasburg, Toul, and Verdun.

I learnt also, this morning, that intelligence had been received by telegraph at the Foreign Department here, from the French Chargé d'Affaires in London, that an article, inserted apparently on authority in the "Times," denied that Count Bismarck had demanded the surrender of Metz and Mont Valérien as conditions of an armistice, or that he had expressed the intention of reducing France to the rank of a second-rate Power.

M. de Chaudordy, with whom I had, in the course of the morning, some conversation on the subject, remarked that I might have observed that the surrender of Metz was not mentioned in the Proclamation issued by the Government on the 24th instant, as one of the conditions which Count Bismarck had required for an armistice. No mention had, he said, been made of Verdun in the Proclamation, as that place was not alluded to in the information received by the Government here from Paris; but it seemed impossible that there could have been any mistake on a matter so important as the surrender of Mont Valérien, which had been most distinctly stated by M. Jules Favre to have been demanded. In what form or in what part of the discussion the expression "reducing France to the state of a second-rate Power" had been used, M. de Chaudordy was unable to tell me.

M. Jules Favre had, M. de Chaudordy went on to say, inquired with much apparent anxiety whether the Government here had received his detailed report of his interview with Count Bismarck. M. de Chaudordy supposed that this report had been published in the "Journal Officiel," in Paris, but it had not yet reached the world beyond. It would, no doubt, had it done so, have cleared up all doubts.

As matters now stood, M. de Chaudordy thought that the best course would be for the neutral Powers to ask Count Bismarck what his conditions really were. France could not again apply to Count Bismarck, and M. Jules Favre was shut up in Paris, and communication with him was difficult and uncertain. But the neutral Powers were in a position to ascertain the exact state of the case, and to make use of the information they might obtain, if it gave any hope that hostilities might in fact be arrested.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 9.)

My Lord,

Tours, September 27, 1870

THE Comte de Chaudordy told me this morning that he had just received an important instruction from M. Jules Favre which had come out of Paris in a balloon.

M. Jules Favre had, he said, desired him to point out to the Representatives of the foreign Powers here that the pretensions of Prussia, as now avowed by Count Bismarck, were such as it was manifestly impossible for France ever to submit to. M. Jules Favre had been encouraged by foreign Powers to put himself into direct communication with Count Bismarck. He had accordingly, not without a most painful sacrifice of his feelings, presented himself at the Prussian head-quarters. He had been met there by demands as humiliating in form as they were in substance. The ambition of Prussia and her desire to destroy France were now patent to the world. M. Jules Favre felt that he was entitled to appeal to the rest of Europe for support. The time for mere good offices had passed. The Powers should now speak to Prussia in a tone which could not be mistaken, and take measures to insure their being listened to. M. Jules Favre had done all that it was possible to do to obtain endurable conditions of peace; he was prepared to make every reasonable sacrifice in order to obtain such conditions. It was not his fault, nor the fault of France, if the war went on; and he felt himself entitled to call with confidence for the active intervention of Europe.

Such, M. de Chaudordy said, was the communication he was directed by M. Jules Favre to make to the foreign Representatives here, and to request them to forward without delay to their respective Governments.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received September 29.)

My Lord,

Tours, September 27, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy which I have just received from the Comte de Chaudordy, of M. Jules Favre's detailed Report of his interview with Count Bismarck. I have not time to read it before the departure of the messenger.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 164.

Report by M. Jules Favre of his Interview with Count Bismarck.

A MM. les Membres du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale.

Mes chers Collègues,

L'UNION étroite de tous les citoyens, et particulièrement celle des membres du Gouvernement, est plus que jamais une nécessité de salut public. Chacun de nos actes doit la cimenter. Celui que je viens d'accomplir de mon chef m'était inspiré par ce sentiment ; il aura ce résultat. J'ai eu l'honneur de vous l'expliquer en détail. Cela ne suffit point. Nous sommes un Gouvernement de publicité. Si, à l'heure de l'exécution, le secret est indispensable, le fait, une fois consommé, doit être entouré de la plus grande lumière. Nous ne sommes quelque chose que par l'opinion de nos concitoyens ; il faut qu'elle nous juge à chaque heure, et pour nous juger elle a le droit de tout connaître.

J'ai cru qu'il était de mon devoir d'aller au Quartier-Général des armées ennemies ; j'y suis allé. Je vous ai rendu compte de la mission que je m'étais imposée à moi-même ; je viens dire à mon pays les raisons qui m'ont déterminé, le but que je me proposais, celui que je crois avoir atteint.

Je n'ai pas besoin de rappeler la politique inaugurée par nous, et que le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères était plus particulièrement chargé de formuler. Nous sommes avant tout des hommes de paix et de liberté. Jusqu'au dernier moment nous nous sommes opposés à la guerre que le Gouvernement Impérial entreprenait dans un intérêt exclusivement dynastique ; et quand ce Gouvernement est tombé, nous avons déclaré persévérer plus énergiquement que jamais dans la politique de la paix.

Cette déclaration, nous la faisons quand, par la criminelle folie d'un homme et de ses conseillers, nos armées étaient détruites ; notre glorieux Bazaine et ses vaillants soldats bloqués devant Metz ; Strasbourg, Toul, Phalsbourg écrasés par les bombes ; l'ennemi victorieux en marche sur notre capitale. Jamais situation ne fut plus cruelle ; elle inspira cependant, au pays, aucune pensée de défaillance, et nous crûmes être son interprète fidèle en posant nettement cette condition : pas un pouce de notre territoire, pas une pierre de nos forteresses.

Si donc à ce moment, où venait de s'accomplir un fait aussi considérable que celui du renversement du promoteur de la guerre, la Prusse avait voulu traiter sur les bases d'une indemnité à déterminer, la paix était faite ; elle eût été accueillie comme un immense bienfait ; elle fût devenue un gage certain de réconciliation entre deux nations qu'une politique odieuse seule a fatalement divisées.

Nous espérions que l'humanité et l'intérêt bien entendus remporteraient cette victoire, belle entre toutes, car elle aurait ouvert une ère nouvelle, et les hommes d'Etat qui y auraient attaché leur nom auraient eu comme guides, la philosophie, la raison, la justice ; comme récompense, les bénédictions et la prospérité des peuples.

C'est avec ces idées que j'ai entrepris la tâche périlleuse que vous m'avez confiée. Je devais tout d'abord me rendre compte des dispositions des Cabinets Européens et chercher à me concilier leur appui. Le Gouvernement Impérial l'avait complètement négligé, ou y avait échoué. Il s'est engagé dans la guerre sans une alliance, sans une négociation sérieuse ; tout, autour de lui, était hostilité ou indifférence ; il recueillait ainsi le fruit amer d'une politique blessante pour chaque Etat voisin, par ses menaces ou ses prétentions.

A peine étions-nous à l'Hôtel de Ville qu'un diplomate, dont il n'est point encore opportun de révéler le nom, nous demandait à entrer en relation avec nous. Dès le lendemain, votre Ministre recevait les Représentants de toutes les Puissances. La République des Etats-Unis, la République Helvétique, l'Italie, l'Espagne, le Portugal reconnaissent

officiellement la République Française. Les autres Gouvernements autorisaient leurs agents à entretenir avec nous des rapports officiels qui nous permettaient d'entrer de suite en pourparlers utiles.

Je donnerais à cet exposé, déjà trop étendu, un développement qu'il ne comporte pas, si je racontais avec détail la courte mais instructive histoire des négociations qui ont suivi. Je crois pouvoir affirmer qu'elle ne sera pas tout à fait sans valeur pour notre crédit moral.

Je me borne à dire que nous avons trouvé partout d'honorables sympathies. Mon but était de les grouper, et de déterminer les Puissances signataires de la ligue des neutres à intervenir directement près de la Prusse en prenant pour base les conditions que j'avais posées. Quatre de ces Puissances me l'ont offert ; je leur en ai, au nom de mon pays, témoigné ma gratitude, mais je voulais le concours des deux autres. L'une m'a promis une action individuelle dont elle s'est réservée la liberté, l'autre m'a proposé d'être mon intermédiaire vis-à-vis de la Prusse. Elle a même fait un pas de plus : sur les instances de l'Envoyé Extraordinaire de la France, elle a bien voulu recommander directement mes démarches. J'ai demandé beaucoup plus, mais je n'ai refusé aucun concours, estimant que l'intérêt qu'on nous montrait était une force à ne pas négliger.

Cependant, le temps marchait ; chaque heure rapprochait l'ennemi. En proie à de poignantes émotions, je m'étais promis à moi-même de ne pas laisser commencer le siège de Paris sans essayer une démarche suprême, fussé-je seul à la faire. L'intérêt n'a pas besoin d'en être démontré. La Prusse gardait le silence et nul ne consentait à l'interroger. Cette situation était intenable ; elle permettait à notre ennemi de faire peser sur nous la responsabilité de la continuation de la lutte ; elle nous condamnait à nous taire sur ses intentions. Il fallait en sortir. Malgré ma répugnance, je me déterminai à user des bons offices qui m'étaient offerts, et, le 10 Septembre, un télégramme parvenait à M. de Bismarck, lui demandant s'il voulait entrer en conversation sur des conditions de transaction.

Une première réponse était une fin de non-recevoir tirée de l'irrégularité de notre Gouvernement. Toutefois le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord n'insista pas, et me fit demander quelles garanties nous présentions pour l'exécution d'un Traité. Cette seconde difficulté levée par moi, il fallait aller plus loin. On me proposa d'envoyer un courrier, ce que j'acceptai. En même temps on télégraphiait directement à M. de Bismarck, et le Premier Ministre de la Puissance qui nous servait d'intermédiaire disait à notre Envoyé Extraordinaire que la France seule pouvait agir ; il ajoutait qu'il serait à désirer que je ne reculasse pas devant une démarche au quartier-général. Notre Envoyé, qui connaissait le fond de mon cœur, répondit que j'étais prêt à tous les sacrifices pour faire mon devoir, qu'il y en avait peu d'aussi pénibles que d'aller au travers des lignes ennemies chercher notre vainqueur, mais qu'il supposait que je m'y résignerais. Deux jours après, le courrier revenait. Après mille obstacles, il avait vu le Chancelier, qui lui avait dit être disposé volontiers à causer avec moi.

J'aurais voulu une réponse directe au télégramme de notre intermédiaire ; elle se faisait attendre. L'investissement de Paris s'achevait. Il n'y avait plus à hésiter, j'e me résolus à partir.

Seulement il m'importait que pendant qu'elle s'accomplissait, cette démarche fût ignorée ; je recommandai le secret et j'ai été douloureusement surpris en rentrant hier soir d'apprendre qu'il n'a pas été gardé. Une indiscretion coupable a été commise. Un journal, "L'Electeur Libre," déjà désavoué par le Gouvernement, en a profité ; une enquête est ouverte, et j'espère pouvoir réprimer ce double abus.

J'avais poussé si loin le scrupule de la discrétion que je l'ai observée même vis-à-vis de vous, mes chers collègues. Je ne m'y suis pas résolu sans un vif déplaisir. Mais je connaissais votre patriotisme et votre affection ; j'étais sûr d'être absous. Je croyais obéir à une nécessité impérieuse. Une première fois je vous avais entretenus des agitations de ma conscience, et je vous avais dit qu'elle ne serait en repos que lorsque j'aurais fait tout ce qui était humainement possible pour arrêter honorablement cette abominable guerre. Me rappelant la conversation provoquée par cette ouverture, je redoutais des objections, et j'étais décidé ; d'ailleurs je voulais, en abordant M. de Bismarck, être libre de tout engagement, afin d'avoir le droit de n'en prendre aucun. Je vous fais ces aveux sincères, je les fais au pays pour écarter de vous une responsabilité que j'assume seul. Si ma démarche est une faute, seule j'en dois porter la peine.

J'avais cependant averti M. le Ministre de la Guerre, qui avait bien voulu me donner un officier pour me conduire aux avant-postes. Nous ignorions la situation du quartier-général. On le supposait à Grosbois. Nous nous acheminâmes vers l'ennemi par la porte de Charenton.

Je supprime tous les détails de ce douloureux voyage, pleins d'intérêts cependant, mais qui ne seraient point ici à leur place. Conduit à Villeneuve-Saint-Georges, où se

trouvait le Général-en-chef commandant le 6^{me} Corps, j'appris assez tard dans l'après-midi que le quartier-général était à Meaux. Le Général, des procédés duquel je n'ai qu'à me louer, me proposa d'envoyer un officier porteur de la lettre suivante, que j'avais préparée pour M. de Bismarck :—

“M. le Comte,

“J'ai toujours cru qu'avant d'engager sérieusement les hostilités sous les murs de Paris, il était impossible qu'une transaction honorable ne fût essayée. La personne qui a eu l'honneur de voir votre Excellence, il y a deux jours, m'a dit avoir recueilli de sa bouche l'expression d'un désir analogue. Je suis venu aux avant-postes me mettre à la disposition de votre Excellence. J'attends qu'elle veuille bien me faire savoir comment et où je pourrai avoir l'honneur de conférer quelques instants avec elle.

“J'ai, &c.

(Signé) “JULES FAVRE.”

Nous étions séparés par une distance de quarante-huit kilomètres. Le lendemain matin, à 6 heures, je recevais la réponse que je transcris :—

“Je viens de recevoir la lettre que votre Excellence a eu l'obligeance de m'écrire, et ce me sera extrêmement agréable si vous voulez bien me faire l'honneur de venir me voir demain, ici à Meaux.

“Le porteur de la présente, le Prince Biron, veillera à ce que votre Excellence soit guidée à travers nos lignes.

“J'ai, &c.

(Signé) “DE BISMARCK.”

A 9 heures l'escorte était prête, et je partais avec elle. Arrivé près de Meaux vers 3 heures de l'après-midi, j'étais arrêté par un aide-de-camp venant m'annoncer que le Comte avait quitté Meaux avec le Roi pour aller coucher à Ferrières. Nous nous étions croisés ; en revenant l'un et l'autre sur nos pas nous devions nous rencontrer.

Je rebroussai chemin, et descendis dans la cour d'une ferme entièrement saccagée, comme presque toutes les maisons que j'ai vues sur ma route. Au bout d'une heure, M. de Bismarck m'y rejoignait. Il nous était difficile de causer dans un tel lieu. Une habitation, le château de la Haute-Maison, appartenant à M. le Comte de Rillac, était à notre proximité ; nous nous y rendîmes. Et la conversation s'engagea dans un salon où gisaient en désordre des débris de toute nature.

Cette conversation, je voudrais vous la rapporter tout entière, telle que le lendemain je l'ai dictée à un secrétaire. Chaque détail y a son importance. Je ne puis ici que l'analyser.

J'ai tout d'abord précisé le but de ma démarche. Ayant fait connaître par ma circulaire les intentions du Gouvernement Français, je voulais savoir celles du Premier Ministre Prussien. Il me semblait inadmissible que deux nations continuassent, sans s'expliquer préalablement, une guerre terrible qui, malgré ses avantages, infligeait au vainqueur des souffrances profondes. Née du pouvoir d'un seul, cette guerre n'avait plus de raison d'être, quand la France redevenait maîtresse d'elle-même ; je me portais garant de son amour pour la paix, en même temps de sa résolution inébranlable de n'accepter aucune condition qui ferait de cette paix une courte et menaçante trêve.

M. de Bismarck m'a répondu que, s'il avait la conviction qu'une pareille paix fût possible, il la signerait de suite. Il a reconnu que l'opposition avait toujours condamné la guerre. Mais le pouvoir que représente aujourd'hui cette opposition est plus que précaire. Si, dans quelques jours, Paris n'est pas pris, il sera renversé par la populace.

Je l'ai interrompu vivement pour lui dire que nous n'avions pas de populace à Paris, mais une population intelligente, dévouée, qui connaissait nos intentions et qui ne se ferait pas complice de l'ennemi en entravant notre mission de défense. Quant à notre pouvoir, nous étions prêts à le déposer entre les mains de l'Assemblée déjà convoquée par nous.

“Cette Assemblée,” a repris le Comte, “aura des desseins que rien ne peut nous faire pressentir. Mais si elle obéit au sentiment Français elle voudra la guerre. Vous n'oublierez pas plus la capitulation de Sedan que Waterloo, que Sadowa, qui ne vous regardait pas.” Puis il a insisté longuement sur la volonté bien arrêtée de la nation Française d'attaquer l'Allemagne et de lui enlever une partie de son territoire. Depuis Louis XIV jusqu'à Napoléon III ses tendances n'ont pas changé, et quand la guerre a été annoncée, le Corps Législatif a couvert les paroles du Ministre d'acclamations.

Je lui ai fait observer que la majorité du Corps Législatif avait quelques semaines avant acclamé la paix ; que cette majorité, choisie par le Prince, s'était malheureusement crue obligée de lui céder aveuglément, mais que, consultée deux fois, aux élections de 1869,

et au vote du plébiscite, la nation avait énergiquement adhéré à une politique de paix et de liberté.

La conversation s'est prolongée sur ce sujet, le Comte maintenant son opinion, alors que je défendais la mienne ; et comme je le pressais vivement sur ses conditions, il m'a répondu nettement que la sécurité de son pays lui commandait de garder le territoire qui la garantissait. Il m'a répété plusieurs fois :—“Strasbourg est la clé de la maison, je dois l'avoir.” Je l'ai invité à être plus explicite encore :—“C'est inutile,” objectait-il, “puisque nous ne pouvons nous entendre ; c'est une affaire à régler plus tard.” Je l'ai prié de le faire de suite ; il m'a dit alors que les deux Départements du Bas et du Haut-Rhin, une partie de celui de la Moselle, avec Metz, Château-Salins et Soissons, lui étaient indispensables, et qu'il ne pouvait y renoncer.

Je lui ai fait observer que l'assentiment des peuples dont il disposait ainsi était plus que douteux, et que le droit public Européen ne lui permettait pas de s'en passer. “Si fait,” m'a-t-il répondu. “Je sais fort bien qu'ils ne veulent pas de nous. Ils nous imposent une rude corvée ; mais nous ne pouvons pas ne pas les prendre. Je suis sûr que dans un temps prochain nous aurons une nouvelle guerre avec vous. Nous voulons la faire avec tous nos avantages.”

Je me suis récrié, comme je le devais, contre de telles solutions. J'ai dit qu'on me paraissait oublier deux éléments importants de discussion : l'Europe d'abord, qui pourrait bien trouver ces prétentions exorbitantes et y mettre obstacle ; le droit nouveau ensuite, le progrès des mœurs, entièrement antipathique à de telles exigences. J'ai ajouté que, quant à nous, nous ne les accepterions jamais. Nous pouvions périr comme nation, mais non nous déshonorer ; d'ailleurs, le pays seul était compétent pour se prononcer sur une cession territoriale. Nous ne doutons pas de son sentiment, mais nous voulons le consulter. C'est donc vis-à-vis de lui que se trouve la Prusse. Et, pour être net, il est clair qu'entraînée par l'enivrement de la victoire, elle veut la destruction de la France.

Le Comte a protesté, se retranchant toujours derrière des nécessités absolues de garantie nationale. J'ai poursuivi : “Si ce n'est pas de votre part un abus de la force, cachant de secrets desseins, laissez-nous réunir l'Assemblée, nous lui remettrons nos pouvoirs ; elle nommera un Gouvernement définitif, qui appréciera vos conditions.”

“Pour l'exécution de ce plan,” m'a répondu le Comte, “il faudrait un armistice, et je n'en veux à aucun prix.”

La conversation prenait une tournure de plus en plus pénible. Le soir venait. Je demandai à M. Bismarck un second entretien à Ferrières, où il allait coucher, et nous partîmes chacun de notre côté.

Voulant remplir ma mission jusqu'au bout, je devais revenir sur plusieurs des questions que nous avions traitées, et conclure. Aussi, en abordant le Comte vers neuf heures et demie du soir, je lui fis observer que les renseignements que j'étais venu chercher près de lui étant destinés à être communiqués à mon Gouvernement et au public, je résumerais, en terminant, notre conversation pour n'en publier que ce qui serait bien arrêté entre nous. “Ne prenez pas cette peine,” me répondit-il, “je vous la livre tout entière ; je ne vois aucun inconvénient à sa divulgation.” Nous reprîmes alors la discussion, qui se prolongea jusqu'à minuit. J'insistai particulièrement sur la nécessité de convoquer une Assemblée. Le Comte parut peu à peu se laisser convaincre, et revint à l'armistice. Je demandai quinze jours. Nous discutâmes les conditions. Il ne s'expliqua que d'une manière très-incomplète, se réservant de consulter le Roi. En conséquence, il m'ajourna au lendemain onze heures.

Je n'ai plus qu'un mot à dire ; car, en reproduisant ce douloureux récit, mon cœur est agité de toutes les émotions qui l'ont torturé pendant ces trois mortelles journées, et j'ai hâte de finir. J'étais au château de Ferrières à onze heures. Le Comte sortit de chez le Roi à midi moins le quart, et j'entendis de lui les conditions qu'il mettait à l'armistice ; elles étaient consignées dans un texte écrit en langue Allemande et dont il m'a été donné communication verbale.

Il demandait pour gage l'occupation de Strasbourg, de Toul, et de Phalsbourg ; et comme, sur sa demande, j'avais dit la veille que l'Assemblée devait être réunie à Paris, il voulait, dans ce cas, avoir un fort dominant la ville, celui du Mont Valérien, par exemple.

Je l'ai interrompu pour lui dire : “Il est bien plus simple de nous demander Paris. Comment voulez-vous admettre qu'une Assemblée Française délibère sous votre canon ? J'ai eu l'honneur de vous dire que je transmettrai fidèlement notre entretien au Gouvernement ; je ne sais vraiment si j'oserai lui dire que vous m'avez fait une telle proposition.”

“Cherchons une autre combinaison,” m'a-t-il répondu. Je lui ai parlé de la réunion de l'Assemblée à Tours, en ne prenant aucun gage du côté de Paris.

Il m'a proposé d'en parler au Roi, et, revenant sur l'occupation de Strasbourg, il a ajouté : " La ville va tomber entre nos mains, ce n'est plus qu'une affaire de calcul d'ingénieur. Aussi je vous demande que la garnison se rende prisonnière de guerre."

A ces mots, j'ai bondi de douleur, et me levant je me suis écrié : " Vous oubliez que vous parlez à un Français, M. le Comte : sacrifier une garnison héroïque qui fait notre admiration et celle du monde, serait une lâcheté ; et je ne vous promets pas de dire que vous m'avez posé une telle condition."

Le Comte m'a répondu qu'il n'avait pas l'intention de me blesser ; qu'il se conformait aux lois de la guerre ; qu'au surplus, si le Roi y consentait, cet article pourrait être modifié.

Il est rentré au bout d'un quart d'heure. Le Roi acceptait la combinaison de Tours, mais insistait pour que la garnison de Strasbourg fût prisonnière.

J'étais à bout de forces et craignis un instant de défaillir. Je me retournais pour dévorer les larmes qui m'étouffaient, et, excusant cette faiblesse involontaire, je prenais congé par ces simples paroles :—

" Je me suis trompé, M. le Comte, en venant ici ; je ne m'en repens pas, j'ai assez souffert pour m'excuser à mes propres yeux ; d'ailleurs je n'ai cédé qu'au sentiment de mon devoir. Je reporterai à mon Gouvernement tout ce que vous m'avez dit, et s'il juge à propos de me renvoyer près de vous, quelque cruelle que soit cette démarche, j'aurai l'honneur de revenir. Je vous suis reconnaissant de la bienveillance que vous m'avez témoignée, mais je crains qu'il n'y ait plus qu'à laisser les événements s'accomplir. La population de Paris est courageuse et résolue aux derniers sacrifices ; son héroïsme peut changer le cours des événements. Si vous avez l'honneur de la vaincre, vous ne la soumettez pas. La nation tout entière est dans les mêmes sentiments. Tant que nous trouverons en elle un élément de résistance, nous vous combattons. C'est une lutte indéfinie entre deux peuples qui devraient se tendre la main. J'avais espéré une autre solution. Je pars bien malheureux et néanmoins plein d'espoir."

Je n'ajoute rien à ce récit, trop éloquent par lui-même. Il me permet de conclure et de vous dire quelle est à mon sens la portée de ces entrevues. Je cherchais la paix, j'ai rencontré une volonté inflexible de conquête et de guerre. Je demandais la possibilité d'interroger la France représentée par une Assemblée librement élue, on m'a répondu en me montrant les fourches caudines sous lesquelles elle doit préalablement passer. Je ne récrimine point. Je me borne à constater les faits, à les signaler à mon pays et à l'Europe. J'ai voulu ardemment la paix, je ne m'en cache pas ; et en voyant pendant trois jours la misère de nos campagnes infortunées, je sentais grandir en moi cet amour avec une telle violence que j'étais forcé d'appeler tout mon courage à mon aide pour ne pas faillir à ma tâche. J'ai désiré non moins vivement un armistice, je l'avoue encore, je l'ai désiré, pour que la nation pût être consultée sur la redoutable question que la fatalité pose devant nous.

Vous connaissez maintenant les conditions préalables qu'on prétend nous faire subir. Comme moi, et sans discussion, vous avez été unanimement d'avis qu'il fallait en repousser l'humiliation. J'ai la conviction profonde que, malgré les souffrances qu'elle endure et celles qu'elle prévoit, la France indignée partage notre résolution, et c'est de son cœur que j'ai cru m'inspirer en écrivant à M. de Bismarck la dépêche suivante qui clôt cette négociation :—

" M. le Comte,

" J'ai exposé fidèlement à mes collègues du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale la déclaration que votre Excellence a bien voulu me faire. J'ai le regret de faire connaître à votre Excellence que le Gouvernement n'a pu admettre vos propositions. Il accepterait un armistice ayant pour objet l'élection et la réunion d'une Assemblée Nationale. Mais il ne peut souscrire aux conditions auxquelles votre Excellence le subordonne. Quant à moi, j'ai la conscience d'avoir tout fait pour que l'effusion du sang cessât, et que la paix fût rendue à nos deux nations pour lesquelles elle serait un grand bienfait. Je ne m'arrête qu'en face d'un devoir impérieux, m'ordonnant de ne pas sacrifier l'honneur de mon pays déterminé à résister énergiquement. Je m'associe sans réserve à son vœu ainsi qu'à celui de mes collègues. Dieu, qui nous juge, décidera de nos destinées. J'ai foi dans sa justice.

" J'ai, &c.

(Signé) " JULES FAVRE.

" 21 Septembre, 1870."

J'ai fini, mes chers collègues, et vous penserez comme moi, que si j'ai échoué, ma mission n'aura pas été cependant tout à fait inutile. Elle a prouvé que nous n'avons pas

dévié. Comme les premiers jours nous maudissons une guerre par nous condamnée à l'avance ; comme les premiers jours aussi, nous l'acceptons plutôt que de nous déshonorer. Nous avons fait plus : nous avons tué l'équivoque dans laquelle la Prusse s'enfermait, et que l'Europe ne nous aidait pas à dissiper.

En entrant sur notre sol, elle a donné le monde sa parole qu'elle attaquait Napoléon et ses soldats, mais qu'elle respectait la nation. Nous savons aujourd'hui ce qu'il faut en penser. La Prusse exige trois de nos départements, deux villes fortes, l'une de 100,000 l'autre de 75,000 âmes, huit à dix autres également fortifiées. Elle sait que les populations qu'elle veut nous ravir la repoussent, elle s'en saisit néanmoins, opposant le tranchant de son sabre aux protestations de leur liberté civile et de leur dignité morale.

A la nation qui demande la faculté de se consulter elle-même, elle propose la garantie de ses obusiers établis au Mont Valérien et protégeant la salle des séances où nos Députés voteront. Voilà ce que nous savons, et ce qu'on m'a autorisé à vous dire. Que le pays nous entende et qu'il se lève, ou pour nous désavouer quand nous lui conseillons de résister à outrance, ou pour subir avec nous cette dernière et décisive épreuve. Paris y est résolu.

Les Départements s'organisent et vont venir à son secours. Le dernier mot n'est pas dit dans cette lutte, où maintenant la force se rue contre le droit. Il dépend de notre constance qu'il appartienne à la justice et à la liberté.

Agréez, mes chers collègues, le fraternel hommage de mon inaltérable dévouement.

Le Vice-Président du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale,
Ministre des Affaires Etrangères,
(Signé) JULES FAVRE.

Paris, le 21 Septembre, 1870.

(Translation.)

To the Members of the Government of National Defence.

My dear Colleagues,

THE close union of all citizens, and particularly of the members of the Government, is more than ever a necessity of public safety. Every one of our acts should cement it. That which I have just performed on my own authority was inspired by this sentiment ; it will have this result. I have had the honour to explain it to you in detail. That is not enough. We are a government of publicity. If at the hour of execution secrecy is indispensable, the act, once completed, should be surrounded by the clearest light. We are nothing save by the opinion of our fellow-citizens, and they must judge us hourly, and in order to form a judgment upon us, they have a right to know everything.

I considered it my duty to go to the head-quarters of the hostile armies, and I went. I have given you an account of the mission which I had imposed upon myself ; I am about to tell my country the reasons which determined my action, the object which I had placed before me, and that which I believe I have attained.

I need not recapitulate the policy which we inaugurated, and which the Minister of Foreign Affairs was particularly charged to carry out. We are, above all, men of peace and liberty. Up to the last moment we opposed the war which the Imperial Government undertook in a spirit exclusively dynastic ; and when this Government fell, we declared that we would persevere more energetically than ever in the policy of peace.

We made this declaration when, through the criminal madness of one man and of his counsellors, our armies were destroyed ; our glorious Bazaine and his valiant soldiers blocked up before Metz ; Strasburg, Toul, Phalsburg, shattered by bombs ; and the victorious enemy marching upon our capital. Never was situation more cruel ; yet it did not occasion in the country any thought of weakness, and we believed ourselves its faithful interpreters in laying down clearly this condition—"Not an inch of our territory, not a stone of our fortresses."

If, then, at this instant, when an event was accomplished so important as the overthrow of the promoter of the war, Prussia had been willing to treat upon the bases of an indemnity to be determined, peace was made ; it would have been greeted as an incalculable blessing ; it would have become a certain pledge of reconciliation between two nations which have been fatally divided solely by an odious policy.

We hoped that humanity and interest, properly understood, might gain this victory, the best of all ; for it would have inaugurated a new era, and the statesmen who would have signed it would have had as guides philosophy, reason, and justice, as a reward the blessings and the prosperity of nations.

It was with these ideas that I undertook the perilous task with which you entrusted me. I had at once to ascertain the feelings of the European Cabinets and to seek to obtain their support. The Imperial Government had either completely neglected to do this or it had failed in the attempt. It engaged in the war without one alliance, without one serious negotiation; all around it was hostility or indifference. It thus reaped the bitter harvest of a policy obnoxious to each neighbouring state on account of its menaces or its pretensions.

Scarcely were we at the Hôtel de Ville, when a diplomat, whose name it is not fitting to reveal, asked to enter into relations with us. From the next day your Minister received the Representatives of all the Powers. The Republic of the United States, the Helvetic Republic, Italy, Spain, and Portugal officially recognized the French Republic. The other Governments authorized their agents to maintain with us official relations, which permitted us to enter at once into useful communications.

I should give to this explanation, which is already too diffuse, a fulness which it does not merit if I were to relate in detail the short but instructive history of the negotiations which followed. I believe I am right in asserting that it will not be altogether valueless as relates to our moral position.

I confine myself to saying that everywhere we found honourable sympathies. My object was to unite them, and to induce the Powers who had signed the league of neutrality to intervene directly with Prussia on the basis of the conditions which I had laid down. Four of these Powers offered to do so. I testified to them my gratitude in the name of my country, but I wished to have the co-operation of the two others. One of them promised me an independent action, reserving its liberty respecting it; the other proposed to be my intermediary with Prussia. It even went a step further. Upon the request of the Envoy Extraordinary of France, it was good enough directly to countenance my proceedings. I asked for much more, but I have refused no co-operation, esteeming that the interest which was evinced for us was a power not to be neglected.

However, time was passing. Each hour brought the enemy nearer. Under the most poignant feelings, I had promised myself not to permit the siege of Paris to begin without making a supreme effort, were I left alone to make it. It is unnecessary to enlarge upon its importance. Prussia maintained silence, and no one consented to question her. This position was untenable; it allowed our enemy to lay upon us the responsibility of the continuation of the struggle; it condemned us to be silent with regard to their intentions; it must be got out of. An escape had to be found. Despite my repugnance, I determined to make use of the good offices which were offered me, and on September 10 a telegram reached M. de Bismarck, asking him if he would enter into a conversation with me upon the conditions of negotiation.

A first reply was a plea in bar, founded upon the irregularity of our Government. However, the Chancellor of the Confederation of the North did not insist upon that, and asked what guarantees we could offer for the execution of a Treaty. This second difficulty having been removed by me, it was necessary to go further. It was proposed that I should send a messenger, to which I agreed. At the same time, M. de Bismarck was telegraphed to directly, and the Prime Minister of the Power which acted as our intermediary said to our Envoy Extraordinary that France alone could act; he added that it was to be desired that I should not shrink from taking steps at Head-quarters. Our Envoy, who was acquainted with my inmost feelings, replied that I was ready at all sacrifices to do my duty, and that there were few things so painful to do as that of going through the enemy's lines to seek our conqueror, but that he supposed I would resign myself to it. Two days later the courier returned. After a thousand obstacles he had seen the Chancellor, who had told him that he was willing to converse with me.

I should have wished for a direct reply to the telegram of our intermediary; we had to wait for it. The investment of Paris was accomplished. No further hesitation was possible. I resolved to set out.

However, it was important to me that while it was in progress this proceeding should be secret. I advised secrecy, and was deeply surprised, on returning last evening, to learn that it had not been maintained. A culpable indiscretion had been committed. A journal "L'Electeur Libre," already disavowed by the Government, made use of it. An inquiry has been commenced, and I hope to repress this double abuse.

I had carried discretion so far, that I observed it even towards you, my dear colleagues. I had not come to this resolution without great repugnance; but I knew your patriotism and your affection—I was certain of your forgiveness. I believed I was acting in obedience to an imperious necessity. On the first occasion I had spoken with you of the troubles of my mind, and had told you it would not be at rest until I had done everything that was humanly possible with honour to arrest this abominable war. Recollecting the conversation

which followed from this commencement, I feared objections, and I was decided. Further, I wished, in meeting M. de Bismarck, to be free from any engagement, in order to have the right not to accept any. I make to you these sincere avowals; I make them to the country to remove from you a responsibility which I take upon myself alone. If my proceeding has been an error, I alone should bear the blame.

I had, nevertheless, informed the Minister of War, who was kind enough to give me an officer to conduct me to the outposts. We did not know where Head-quarters were situated. We imagined them to be at Grosbois. We started on our way towards the enemy by the gate of Charenton.

I suppress all the details of this sorrowful journey, full of interest nevertheless, but which would not be in place here. Conducted to Villeneuve St. Georges, where was the General-in-chief, commanding the 6th Corps, I learnt full late in the afternoon that Head-quarters were at Meaux. The General, whose treatment of me was all that could be desired, proposed to send an officer to carry the following letter which I had written for M. de Bismarck:—

“ M. le Comte,

“ I have always believed that before seriously commencing hostilities under the walls of Paris, it was impossible that some attempt at an honourable agreement should not be made. The person who had the honour of seeing your Excellency two days ago informed me that you yourself had expressed such a desire. I have come to the outposts, to place myself at the disposal of your Excellency. I wait for you to inform me how and where I can have the honour of conferring for some minutes with you.

“ I have, &c.
(Signed) “ JULES FAVRE.”

We were separated by a distance of 48 kilometres. The next morning, at 6 o'clock, I received the reply, which I transcribe:—

“ I have just received the letter that your Excellency was good enough to write me; and it will be extremely agreeable to me if you will do me the honour to come and see me to-morrow here at Meaux. The bearer of the present, Prince Biron, will see that your Excellency is guided through our lines.

“ I have, &c.
(Signed) “ DE BISMARCK.”

At 9 o'clock the escort was ready, and I left with it. When I got near Meaux, about 3 in the afternoon, I was stopped by an aide-de-camp, who came to inform me that the Count had left Meaux with the King, to sleep at Ferrières. We had passed each other, and by retracing our steps we should both of us meet.

I retraced my way, and halted in the courtyard of a farm entirely plundered, as were nearly all the houses that I passed on my way. At the end of an hour, M. de Bismarck joined me there. It was difficult for us to talk in such a place. A house, the Château de la Haute Maison, belonging to the Count de Rillac, was close to us, and we went there.

The conversation took place in a saloon, where in disorder lay fragments of all kinds. I should like to report the whole of this conversation, such as I dictated to a Secretary on the following day. Every one of its details has its importance. But I can only give an analysis of it here.

At the commencement I stated briefly the object of the proceeding. Having published in my Circular the intentions of the French Government, I wished to know those of the Prussian Prime Minister. It appeared to me inadmissible that two nations should continue without preliminary and mutual explanations a terrible war which, in spite of its advantages, would inflict most serious injuries upon the conqueror. Created by the power of an individual, this war had no further *raison d'être*, now that France had again become her own mistress. I offered to guarantee her desire for peace, and at the same time her irrevocable resolve not to accept any condition which would render this peace a short and threatening truce.

M. de Bismarck replied to me that were he convinced that such a peace were possible he would sign it directly. He acknowledged that the Opposition had always condemned the war. But the power which this Opposition represents at present is more than precarious. If in a few days Paris is not taken, it will be overthrown by the populace.

I immediately interrupted him by saying we had no populace in Paris, but a population intelligent and devoted, fully aware of our intentions, and who would not become accom-

plices of the enemy by fettering our mission of defence. With regard to our power, we were ready to place it in the hands of the Assembly which we had already convoked.

"This Assembly," replied the Count, "might have designs which nothing can make us foresee. If it listens to the sentiments of France it will desire war. You will no more forget the capitulation of Sedan than Waterloo, than Sadowa, which did not concern you." Then he insisted at length on the fixed determination of the French nation to attack Germany, and to deprive her of a portion of her territory. "From Louis XIV, down to Napoleon III, these tendencies have not changed, and when war was announced, the Corps Législatif received the words of the Minister with acclamations."

I remarked to him that the majority of the Corps Législatif had a few weeks before welcomed peace, that this majority, chosen by the Prince, unfortunately thought itself obliged to yield blindly to him, but that consulted twice at the elections of 1869, and at the vote of the plebiscite, the nation had energetically adhered to a policy of peace and liberty.

The conversation was prolonged on this subject, the Count maintaining his opinion and I defending mine; and as I pressed him hard as to the conditions, he replied distinctly that the security of his country demanded that he should retain the territory which guaranteed it. He repeated several times, "Strasburg is the key of the house; I ought to have it." I requested him to be more explicit. "It is useless," he objected; "we cannot come to terms; it is a matter which must be decided later." I requested him to do so immediately; he then told me that the two Départments of the Bas and Haut Rhin, a part of that of the Moselle, including Metz, Château Salins, and Soissons, were indispensable to him, and he could not renounce them.

I remarked to him that the consent of the populations whom he thus disposed of was more than doubtful; that the public rights of Europe would not permit him to disregard it. "Oh, yes, indeed," he replied to me. "I am perfectly aware that they do not want us. We shall have some hard work cut out for us by them, but we cannot do otherwise than take them. I am certain that at a future time we shall have a fresh war with you, and we wish to undertake it under every advantage."

I expostulated, as was my duty, against such propositions. I said that it seemed to me as if two important elements had been lost sight of in this discussion: in the first place, Europe, which might find such pretensions exorbitant, and offer opposition; and again, that modern rights and the progress of all customs were entirely antipathetic to such exigencies. I added that, as far as we were concerned, we would never agree to them. "We might perish as a nation, but we could not dishonour ourselves. However, the country itself was alone competent to give an opinion respecting any cession of territory. We have not any doubts as to its feeling, but we wish first to consult it. It is before the whole nation that Prussia must take up her position. And to speak plainly, it is clear that, led away by the frenzy of victory, she desires the destruction of France."

The Count protested, alleging the absolute necessity of a national guarantee. I continued:—"If on your side it is not an abuse of power, covering secret designs, let us call an Assembly together; we will hand in our powers, and it will appoint a definite Government who will be able to appreciate your conditions."

"In order to carry out this plan," replied the Count, "an armistice would be required, and I will not grant one at any price."

The conversation took a more and more painful turn. Night came. I requested M. de Bismarck to give me a second interview at Ferrières, where he was going to sleep, and we each went our way.

Desiring to fulfil my mission to the end, I had to return to several questions that we had argued, and to conclude them. Therefore, on meeting the Count about half-past 9 at night, I remarked to him that the information which I had come to obtain from him was intended to be transmitted to my Government and to the public; therefore I should resume in conclusion our conversation, so as only to publish what had entirely been agreed upon between us. "Do not trouble yourself," he replied, "I give it you entire. I do not see any inconvenience in its publication." We then resumed our discussion, which continued till midnight. I dwelt particularly upon the necessity of convoking an Assembly. The Count appeared to allow himself to be convinced by degrees, and returned to the armistice. I asked for a fortnight. We discussed the conditions. He only expressed himself very vaguely, reserving them for the King's consideration. Consequently he adjourned the interview to 11 o'clock on the following day.

I have only one more word to say, for in repeating this sad recital my heart is agitated by all those emotions which have tortured it during three mortal days, and I am in haste to finish. I arrived at the Château of Ferrières at 11 o'clock. The Count left the King at a quarter to 12, and I heard from him the conditions upon which an armistice

would be granted ; they were written in the German language, and a verbal communication was made to me of their purport.

He asked as a guarantee the occupation of Strasburg, Toul, and Phalsburg ; and as, in answer to a question from him, I had told him on the previous day that the Assembly would take place in Paris, he wished in this case to have a fort dominating the city, as, for instance, that of Mont Valérien.

I interrupted him by remarking, " It would be much simpler to ask for Paris at once. How can you suppose that a French Assembly could deliberate under your guns ? I had the honour of informing you that I should faithfully communicate our interview to the Government, and I hardly know if I dare mention to them that you have made such a proposal to me."

" Let us seek some other combination," he replied. I spoke to him of a reunion of the Assembly at Tours, taking no pledge as regards Paris.

He proposed to speak of this to the King, and again speaking of the occupation of Strasburg, he added : " The town is on the point of falling into our hands ; it is merely an engineer's question. Therefore I demand of you that the garrison shall surrender themselves as prisoners of war."

At these words I started with pain, and rising, I cried, " You forget you are speaking to a Frenchman, M. le Comte. To sacrifice a heroic garrison which is our admiration and the world's, would be an act of cowardice, and I do not promise to say that you have offered me such a condition."

The Count replied that he had had no intention of hurting my feelings ; that he conformed to the laws of war ; and that, moreover, if the King gave his consent, this Article might be modified.

He returned in a quarter of an hour. The King accepted the proposal as to Tours, but insisted that the garrison of Strasburg should be prisoners.

I was exhausted, and feared for the moment that I should faint. I turned away to hide the tears which choked me, and, asking to be excused for my involuntary weakness, I took my leave with these simple words—

" I made a mistake, M. le Comte, in coming here ; but I do not regret it. I have suffered sufficiently to excuse myself in my own eyes, but in any case I only yielded to a feeling of duty. I will report to my Government all that you have said, and should they consider it fit again to send me to you, however cruel the task may be, I shall have the honour of returning. I am grateful for the kindness you have shown me, but I fear that there is nothing to be done but to let events take their course. The inhabitants of Paris are courageous, and resolved to make every sacrifice, and their heroism may change the course of events. If you have the honour of conquering them, you will never subjugate them. The whole nation is possessed with the same sentiments. As long as there can be found one element of resistance amongst us we shall fight you. This is an interminable struggle between two nations who should extend their hands to each other. I had hoped for a different solution. I leave most unhappy, but nevertheless full of hope."

I add nothing to this recital, too eloquent in itself. It enables me to conclude, and to inform you what is, in my idea, the aim of these interviews. I sought peace, and found an inflexible desire for conquest and war. I demanded an opportunity of interrogating France, represented by an Assembly freely elected, and I was replied to by being shown the Caudine Forks, through which France must first pass. I do not recriminate. I content myself with relating facts and publishing them to my country and to Europe. I ardently desired peace. I do not disguise the fact, and, witnessing during three days the misery existing in our unfortunate country districts, I felt the desire increase within me to such an extent that I was forced to summon all my courage to my aid, so as not to fail in my task. I wished for an armistice almost as eagerly. I again confess it. I wished it so that the nation might be consulted respecting the redoubtable question that fatality had placed before us.

You are now acquainted with the preliminary conditions which they desire to impose upon us. Equally with myself, and without discussion, you have been unanimously of opinion that such humiliation should be rejected. I possess the profound conviction that in spite of the sufferings she is now enduring, and which she sees before her, France, indignant, shares our determination, and drawing my inspiration from her heart I addressed to M. de Bismarck the following despatch, which closes this negotiation :—

" M. le Comte,

" I have faithfully reported to my colleagues of the Government for the National Defence the declaration that your Excellency was good enough to make to me. I regret to inform your Excellency that the Government could not entertain your propositions.

They would accept an armistice in order to proceed to the election and meeting of a National Assembly, but they cannot subscribe to the conditions on which your Excellency makes it depend. For my own part, I have the satisfaction of having done everything to stay the shedding of blood and to obtain the restoration of peace to the two nations, to whom it would prove the greatest blessing. I am only arrested by an imperious obligation which commands me not to sacrifice the honour of my country, which is determined upon an energetic resistance. I join unreservedly in its desire, and in that of my colleagues. God, who judges us, will decide our destinies. I have faith in His justice.

"I have, &c.

(Signed) "JULES FAVRE.

"September 24, 1870."

I have finished, my dear colleagues, and you will think, as I do, that even if I have failed, my mission has not been totally useless. It has proved that we have not deviated. As in the first days, we condemn a war which was deprecated by us beforehand; as in the first days, we rather accept it than dishonour. We have done more; we have abolished the equivocal position in which Prussia inclosed itself, and which Europe did not aid us to dissipate.

On entering into our territory she gave the world her word that she attacked Napoleon and his soldiers, but she would respect the nation. We know to-day what to think of such statements. Prussia exacts three of our departments, two fortified towns, one containing 100,000 and the other 75,000 inhabitants, and eight or ten other places equally fortified. She is aware that she is repugnant to the populations she wishes to tear from us, but she seizes them nevertheless, opposing the edge of her sword to the protestations of their civic liberty and moral dignity.

To a nation requesting the faculty of consulting itself, she proposes the guarantee of her howitzers planted on Mont Valérien and protecting the place of our deliberations where our deputies will vote. This is what we know and what I am authorized to inform you. Let the whole nation hear us and rise up, either to repudiate us when we advise it to resist *à outrance*; or to support with us this last and decisive trial. Paris is resolved upon it.

The Departments are organizing the mselves and will come to our assistance. The last word has not been pronounced in this struggle, where might is combating against right. It depends upon our constancy whether it be spoken for justice and liberty.

Accept, my dear colleagues, the fraternal homage of my unchanging devotion.

Minister for Foreign Affairs,

The Vice-President of the Government of National Defence,
(Signed) JULES FAVRE.

Paris, September 21, 1870.

No. 165.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

My dear Count,

Foreign Office, September 30, 1870.

I HAVE reported to the Cabinet the communication you were good enough to make to me of the Circular of Count Bismarck of the 13th of this month.

You informed me, in reply to a question, that it was not the desire of the Prussian Government to elicit the opinion of Her Majesty's Government upon its contents.

It does not appear that any observations which occur to us would at the present moment be of any practical effect.

You will not, however, conclude from our silence that Her Majesty's Government concur in all the views which are stated by Count Bismarck.

Yours, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 166.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 1, 1870.

I THOUGHT it right to bring before my colleagues at the Cabinet held yesterday the question which had been raised of the immediate recognition of the French Republic as now constituted. I stated to them that I had said to M. Thiers that the course which Her Majesty's Government were pursuing in this respect, was in strict conformity with that heretofore observed in analogous cases; and that I had pointed out to him that the Government, though administering *de facto* the affairs of France, itself recognized that the voice of France speaking in a Constituent Assembly could alone determine the form and character of the Government to whom the destinies of France should be finally committed, I had added that I believed Her Majesty's Government would at once advise the Queen to recognize any such Government, and to enter into formal and official relations with it.

The question was considered by my colleagues in a spirit very friendly to the present Government, and the language which I had held to M. Thiers in the matter was concurred in by them; and though the French Government will have been long since apprized by M. Thiers of my own view of the matter, it is nevertheless desirable that your Excellency should inform M. de Chaudordy that my view is shared by the Cabinet in general.

In doing so you will, however, further say to M. de Chaudordy that Her Majesty's Government look forward with hope to the early arrival of the day when France having recognized a Government for herself may justly expect its recognition by other Powers. I have informed M. Tissot of the substance of this communication, and added that it must be a matter of regret to the Government to have found themselves obliged to postpone the meeting of the Constituent Assembly; that it would have strengthened their hands at home and abroad, although I could easily understand that the practical difficulty was very great.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 167.

Mr. Wodehouse to Earl Granville.—(Received October 3.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 21, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the "Journal Officiel" of this day, a declaration by the Government of the Defence that the terms of their policy are "not an inch of our territory nor a stone of our fortresses," and that this policy will be maintained to the end.

I have, &c.
(Signed) HENRY WODEHOUSE.

Inclosure in No. 167.

*Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of September 21, 1870.**Paris, le 20 Septembre, 1870.**République Française : Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale.*

ON a répandu le bruit que le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale songeait à abandonner la politique pour laquelle il a été placé au poste de l'honneur et du péril.

Cette politique est celle qui se formule, en ces termes :

Ni un pouce de notre territoire, ni une pierre de nos forteresses.

Le Gouvernement la maintiendra jusqu'à la fin.
Fait à l'Hôtel de Ville, le 20 Septembre, 1870.

GENERAL TROCHU.
EMMANUEL ARAGO.
JULES FAVRE.
JULES FERRY.
GAMBETTA.
GARNIER PAGES.
PELLETAN.
ERNEST PICARD.
ROCHEFORT.
JULES SIMON.

Le Ministre de la Guerre,

GENERAL LE FLO.

Le Ministre de l'Agriculture et du Commerce,

M. MAGNIN.

Le Ministre des Travaux Publics,

M. DORIAN.

(Translation.)

Paris, September 20, 1870.

French Republic : Government of National Defence.

A RUMOUR is in circulation that the Government of National Defence was intending to abandon the policy, to support which it has been placed at the post of honour and of peril.

This policy may be summed up in these terms :—

“Not an inch of our territory, not a stone of our fortresses.”

The Government will maintain it to the end.

Done at the Hôtel de Ville, this 20th day of September, 1870.

GENERAL TROCHU.
EMMANUEL ARAGO.
JULES FAVRE.
JULES FERRY.
GAMBETTA.
GARNIER PAGES.
PELLETAN.
ERNEST PICARD.
ROCHEFORT.
JULES SIMON.

The Minister for War,

GENERAL LE FLO.

The Minister for Agriculture and Commerce,

M. MAGNIN.

Le Ministre des Travaux Publics,

M. DORIAN.

No. 168.

Mr. Wodehouse to Earl Granville.—(Received October 3.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 22, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the “Journal Officiel” of this day, an article on the subject of M. Favre’s interview with Count Bismarck, in anticipation of the full account which is being prepared by his Excellency.

I have, &c.

(Signed) HENRY WODEHOUSE.

Inclosure in No. 168.

*Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of September 22, 1870.**Paris, le 21 Septembre, 1870.*

AVANT que le siège de Paris commencât, le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères a voulu connaître les intentions de la Prusse, jusque-là silencieuse.

Nous avons proclamé hautement les nôtres le lendemain de la révolution du 4 Septembre.

Sans haine contre l'Allemagne, ayant toujours condamné la guerre que l'Empereur lui a faite dans un intérêt exclusivement dynastique, nous avons dit : Arrêtons cette lutte barbare qui décime les peuples au profit de quelques ambitieux. Nous acceptons des conditions équitables. Nous ne cédon's ni un pouce de notre territoire, ni une pierre de nos forteresses.

La Prusse répond à ces ouvertures en demandant à garder l'Alsace et la Lorraine par droit de conquête.

Elle ne consentirait même pas à consulter les populations ; elle veut en disposer comme d'un troupeau.

Et quand elle est en présence de la convocation d'une Assemblée qui constituera un pouvoir définitif et votera la paix ou la guerre, la Prusse demande comme condition préalable d'un armistice l'occupation des places assiégées, le fort du Mont Valérien et la garnison de Strasbourg prisonnière de guerre.

Que l'Europe soit juge !

Pour nous l'ennemi s'est dévoilé. Il nous place entre le devoir et le deshonneur ; notre choix est fait,

Paris résistera jusqu'à la dernière extrémité. Les Départements viendront à son secours, et, Dieu aidant, la France sera sauvée.

Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères s'occupe de rédiger une relation détaillée de son voyage au quartier-général Prussien.

(Translation.)

Paris, September 21, 1870.

BEFORE the siege of Paris began, the Minister for Foreign Affairs wished to learn the plans of Prussia, till then silent.

We had proclaimed ours aloud the day after the Revolution of the 4th of September.

Without hatred towards Germany, having always condemned the war which the Emperor made against it in an exclusively dynastic interest, we said :—" Let us stop this barbarous struggle, which is decimating the nations for the gain of a few ambitious persons. We accept equitable conditions. We give up neither an inch of our territory, nor a stone of our fortresses.

Prussia responds to these overtures, by demanding to keep Alsace and Lorraine by right of conquest.

She would not even consent to consult the populations ; she wishes to dispose of them as of a herd.

And when she is in presence of the convocation of an Assembly, which will constitute a definitive power, and will vote for peace or war, Prussia asks as a previous condition of an armistice the occupation of the besieged places, the fort of Mont Valérien, and the garrison of Strasburg as prisoners of war.

Let Europe be the judge.

For us the enemy is unmasked. He places us between duty and dishonour ; our choice is made.

Paris will resist to the last extremity. The Departments will come to its aid ; and, with the help of God, France will be saved.

The Minister for Foreign Affairs is engaged in drawing up a detailed account of his journey to the Prussian Head-quarters.

No. 169.

Mr. Wodehouse to Earl Granville.—(Received October 3.)

(Extract.)

Paris, September 23, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith a copy of the Report, taken from the "Journal Officiel," which has been addressed by M. Jules Favre to his colleagues in the Government of National Defence on the subject of his interview with Count Bismarck.

His Excellency's Report has produced a very good impression in Paris. The conduct and language of M. Favre is generally approved, and the position of the Government thereby strengthened.

Inclosure 1 in No. 169.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of September 23, 1870.

[See Inclosure in No. 164.]

No. 170.

Mr. Wodehouse to Earl Granville.—(Received October 3.)

My Lord,

Paris, September 24, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the "Journal Officiel" of this day, an announcement that the Government has decided to adjourn the Paris Municipal Elections and also the Elections for the "Assemblée Constituante."

I have, &c.

(Signed)

HENRY WODEHOUSE.

Inclosure in No. 170.

*Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of September 24, 1870.**Paris, le, 23 Septembre, 1870.*

PAR décision du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale, et à raison des obstacles matériels apportés à l'exercice des droits électoraux par les événements militaires, les Elections Municipales de Paris, fixées au 28 Septembre, n'auront pas lieu à cette date.

Pour les mêmes motifs, les élections à l'Assemblée Nationale Constituante, fixées au 2 Octobre, sont également ajournées.

(Translation.)

Paris, September 23, 1870.

BY the decision of the Government of National Defence, and by reason of the material obstacles raised to the exercise of electoral rights by military operations, the municipal elections of Paris, fixed for the 28th of September, will not take place on that date.

For the same reasons, the elections for the National Constituent Assembly of Paris, fixed for the 2nd of October, are likewise postponed.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received October 3.)

My Lord,

Vienna, September 24, 1870.

M. THIERS arrived here last night, having travelled from Tours by the way of Italy, and proceeds on his journey to St. Petersburg this evening.

He brought a letter to Count Beust from M. Jules Favre, and has had a long interview with his Excellency to-day, which lasted two hours, during which he naturally sought to gain the sympathies of this Government in favour of France.

Count Beust has told me that he gave M. Thiers no assurance beyond the good-will of Austria, and the expression of his hopes that Prussia would not insist upon unacceptable terms of peace, but he gave no promise of support at Berlin; and, indeed, M. Thiers does not appear to have made any special proposition on the subject, but rather to have deferred pushing the question until his return here from St. Petersburg, where he hopes to find more sympathy than he has yet met with.

Count Beust expects M. Thiers back in a week or ten days. He does not think the Russian Government will be disposed to assist France at the present moment, and apprehends that his mission will have as little influence at St. Petersburg as it has had at other places. He added, that M. Thiers appeared to be travelling quite in the interest of the Republic; for he wished it to be understood that the present Government of France was a serious one, and ought to be acknowledged by the foreign Powers who desired the restoration of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received October 3.)

My Lord,

Vienna, September 27, 1870.

AT my last interview with Count Beust his Excellency hardly made any allusion to the Treaties concluded by Great Britain with France and Prussia for insuring respect for the independence and neutrality of Belgium. I consequently avoided renewing a discussion of the subject, and have not spoken to him respecting your Lordship's despatch of the 21st instant.

He told me, however, that the communication he had made by the last messenger of his readiness to sign a Protocol, or exchange letters, with Her Majesty's Government regarding Belgian neutrality, had been well received by your Lordship.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

Earl Granville to Lord Bloomfield.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 3, 1870.

IN the course of a conversation which I had recently with Count Apponyi on the subject of the two Circulars addressed by Count Bismarck to the Diplomatic Representatives of the North German Confederation on the 13th and 16th ultimo, I inquired of his Excellency whether either or both of these despatches had been communicated to Count Beust, and if so in what manner the communication had been made. His Excellency has informed me that both despatches had been communicated to Count Beust by the Prussian Minister at Vienna, but that the communication had been merely verbal.

I informed Count Apponyi that Count Bernstorff had communicated to me a copy of the Circular of the 13th, informing me, in reply to a question, that he did not wish to elicit any expression of opinion upon it from Her Majesty's Government; and that I had replied by thanking him for the communication, but requesting him at the same time to understand that he must not infer from the silence of Her Majesty's Government that they concurred in all the views expressed by Count Bismarck.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 4, 1870.

THE formal application made by M. Jules Favre to your Excellency after his return from the Prussian head-quarters, as reported in your despatch of the 27th ultimo, for the intervention of Great Britain as a neutral Power to relieve France from the dangers and embarrassments of her present position, brings us to a new state in the transactions which during the last three months have agitated the whole of Europe. It may be convenient, therefore, before discussing the question with which they are now called upon to deal, briefly to recapitulate the course that Her Majesty's Government have hitherto pursued.

When the selection of the Prince of Hohenzollern as a willing candidate for the Throne of Spain gave rise to an excitement in France which threatened to disturb the peace of Europe, Her Majesty's Government earnestly and zealously applied themselves to avert the danger by recommending the removal of the cause which gave rise to it. Acting in this respect in common accord with the general sentiment of Europe, they rejoiced to think, after a short period of intense anxiety, that the renunciation of the Crown of Spain by the Prince of Hohenzollern had dispelled the dangers which appeared so vitally to threaten the general peace of the world. It was with regret and disappointment, which they expressed at the time, that Her Majesty's Government found new conditions insisted upon which the occasion did not seem to justify, and which were also insufficient to warrant a recourse to arms. Her Majesty's Government saw with regret that a state of tension prevailed between two nations with whom they were connected by terms of the strictest amity and alliance, which it seemed impossible should be relaxed by any ordinary or direct discussion between the parties themselves. In this state of things Her Majesty's Government resolved to have recourse to the last expedient which remained to them as a neutral Power, and appealed to both parties, in virtue of the common agreement entered into by all the Powers parties to the Treaty of Paris of 1856, to seek the good offices of one or more friendly Powers for the settlement of their differences. This appeal, to Her Majesty's Government's great regret, was rejected.

It only remained then for Her Majesty's Government to take up clearly and unreservedly the position of a neutral Power, resolved to maintain to the utmost of their ability friendly relations with both belligerents, and to judge and act with impartiality in regard to the several phases of the war as they might successively occur. To that neutrality, from the commencement of the war up to the present time, Her Majesty's Government have rigidly and conscientiously adhered; and the complaints made by each belligerent in turn that undue partiality was shown by Great Britain to the other, afford a presumptive argument in support of the sincerity and steadfastness with which her neutrality has been observed.

But Her Majesty's Government retained for themselves complete liberty of action and of words in regard to any matters on which they might be called upon to exercise a judgment, and it was consistent with such liberty of action that they should determine to abstain from offering to either belligerent advice unasked for, or which might not be likely to be of effect, and also from offering their mediation unless they had good reason to suppose that it would be acceptable to both belligerents, and that there was a basis on which both might be prepared to negotiate.

But in the face of a very general though unofficial intimation of what one party would insist upon as the indispensable condition of peace, and of an official declaration on the part of the other that any such condition would not be subscribed to, the only course that remained was to endeavour to bring both parties into direct communication with each other, in the hope that they might agree upon some practical basis of negotiation. This, through the instrumentality of Her Majesty's Government, whose good offices were solicited by M. Thiers on behalf of France, was brought about, but unhappily the interview between Count Bismarck and M. Favre failed in producing peace. The French Government have now formally asked for the active support of that of Her Majesty, in concert with other neutrals.

Her Majesty's Government cannot doubt that, if the Government of Prussia came to the opinion that the mediation of one or more neutral Powers would obviate the continued loss of life and the misery which has resulted from this destructive war, and would lead to an honourable and permanent peace, they would willingly have recourse to such mediation as to any other legitimate means which might effect this object; but Her Majesty's Government have reluctantly come to the conclusion, shared by at least one of the other neutral Powers most competent to judge, that at the present moment no such disposition

to accept the interposition of a neutral Power exists at the head-quarters of the German army.

There would be an entire absence of a starting-point for negotiation, for the success of which the interposition of neutral Powers might usefully be employed. It would be idle, in present circumstances, for them to propose to Prussia mediation, which she does not desire in any shape, on the basis of the surrender by her of territory and fortresses which she now occupies in France. On the other hand, the appeal made to your Excellency by M. Favre does not indicate any disposition on the part of the French Government to recede from the determination which it has announced, to submit to no Treaty which would give up an inch of territory, or a stone of a fortress.

Her Majesty's Government deeply regret to see France oppressed with great misfortunes. They behold with profound concern that a great nation—their nearest neighbour—with whom they have been long in friendly alliance that has been daily strengthened by continually increasing intercourse, and with whom they have co-operated in peace and war for interests common to both, should be weakened by such disasters as those by which she is now oppressed. They would gladly do anything consistent with their duty to their own country to obtain for France a permanent peace, which, in the circumstances of the war, the French Government could with honour accept; but they would not be acting a friendly part if they did not fully state their views to the Provisional Government.

The object of the Provisional Government appears, from the present application, to be that the neutral Powers should, if needful, support by force any representations that they might make to Prussia. Her Majesty's Government are bound to state explicitly that they are not themselves prepared to adopt any such course, or to propose it to other neutral Powers. They can only anxiously await the moment when some prospect may appear of bringing to a conclusion the sad conflict by the wisdom, the moral courage, and the moderation of the belligerents, or by an opportunity presenting itself for the exercise by neutral Powers of their influence for the restoration of peace.

Your Excellency will be good enough to read this despatch, and give a copy of it to Count Chaudordy.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 175.

Count Beust to Count Apponyi.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by Count Apponyi, October 5.)

M. le Comte,

Vienne, le 28 Septembre, 1870.

EN se rendant à St. Pétersbourg M. Thiers ne s'est arrêté qu'un jour à Vienne, où il se réserve de rester plus longtemps à son retour. Je n'ai donc pu avoir qu'un seul entretien avec cet homme d'Etat au sujet de la mission qui lui a été confiée par le Gouvernement actuel de la France.

M. Thiers, après m'avoir donné tant sur l'origine et sur la marche de la guerre que sur l'état actuel de la France des aperçus aussi intéressants pour le fonds qu'attrayants pour la forme, n'est pas arrivé dans cet entretien à des conclusions bien précises. Il n'est guère sorti des généralités, et en dehors du désir bien naturel de provoquer une action des neutres bienveillante pour la France il ne m'a point paru poursuivre un but bien déterminé. Je dois cependant reconnaître qu'il ne semble point se faire illusion sur la situation. Son langage ne porte pas l'empreinte du découragement, mais il indique une juste appréciation des événements et admet la nécessité de se soumettre à des sacrifices considérables afin d'obtenir la paix.

Quant aux demandes spéciales qu'il avait à adresser au Gouvernement Impérial et Royal, elles se bornaient à peu près aux deux points suivants :—D'abord, qu'on prît le Gouvernement de la France au sérieux et qu'on l'acceptât avec confiance; ensuite qu'on se joignît aux tentatives de médiation qui seraient faites par d'autres Puissances et particulièrement par la Russie.

La forme Républicaine était la seule, me dit M. Thiers, qui peut être adoptée aujourd'hui en France. C'était l'unique manière de rallier tous les partis autour du drapeau de la défense nationale, et aucun autre Gouvernement ne pourrait s'établir. Il me parla avec éloge des hommes placés à la tête du pouvoir. Ils étaient honnêtes, modérés dans leurs opinions, et ne pensaient qu'à sauver le pays. Les Cabinets ne devaient donc éprouver aucune méfiance et ne pas se laisser effrayer par le mot de "République." Il fallait prendre le Gouvernement actuel au sérieux et le considérer comme la meilleure et la plus exacte représentation des intérêts de la France.

En ce qui concernait les tentatives de médiation M. Thiers espérait de bons résultats de son voyage en Russie. Selon lui, le Cabinet de St. Petersburg était sans contredit le plus en mesure de se faire écouter à Berlin et de plaider en faveur du rétablissement d'une paix basée sur des conditions acceptables. Il croyait que les intérêts de l'humanité aussi bien que ceux de la politique engagerait la Cour de Russie à interposer ses bons offices, et il désirait seulement que l'Autriche appuyât les démarches éventuelles de la Russie.

Je me suis empressé d'assurer M. Thiers qu'en ce qui nous regardait ses désirs étaient accomplis d'avance. Nous n'avions aucun préjugé hostile contre une forme de Gouvernement quelconque en France. Dès le premier moment nous étions entrés en relation avec le nouveau Gouvernement, et nous ne demandions pas mieux que de continuer à entretenir avec lui de bons rapports. Nos sympathies pour la France, aussi bien que les intérêts qui nous unissaient à ce pays, étaient indépendants de la forme de son Gouvernement, et nous étions prêts à accorder notre confiance aux hommes qui avaient accepté dans de si pénibles circonstances le fardeau du pouvoir.

Les idées de M. Thiers au sujet d'une médiation éventuelle répondaient tout à fait aux nôtres. Nous avons déjà suggéré aussi bien à Londres qu'à St. Pétersbourg l'opportunité d'une médiation collective, et nous avons toujours été d'avis que l'initiative devait partir de St. Pétersbourg. Nous ne pourrions donc voir qu'avec une entière satisfaction le succès de la mission de M. Thiers, et on nous trouverait toujours disposés à nous joindre aux efforts qui seraient tentés par la Russie afin de mettre un terme aux calamités de la guerre.

Tel est à peu près le résumé de l'entretien que j'ai eu avec l'illustre homme d'Etat Français.

J'autorise votre Excellence à faire de ces informations l'usage confidentiel qu'elle jugera opportun.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) BEUST.

(Translation.)

M. le Comte,

Vienna, September 28, 1870.

M. THIERS on his way to St. Petersburg stopped only a day at Vienna, where he proposes to remain longer on his return. I was thus enabled to have but one single conversation with this Statesman on the subject of the mission which has been entrusted to him by the present Government of France.

M. Thiers, after having given me some sketches both of the origin and progress of the war, and of the actual state of France, the substance of which was as interesting as their form was attractive, did not come during this conversation to any very precise conclusions. He hardly went beyond generalities, and apart from the quite natural desire to call forth a friendly action of the neutrals on the part of France, he did not appear to me to pursue a clearly defined object. I must, however, acknowledge, that he does not seem to be blind to the situation. His language does not bear the stamp of discouragement, but it shows a just appreciation of the events, and admits the necessity of submitting to considerable sacrifices in order to obtain peace.

With regard to the special demands which he had to address to the Imperial and Royal Government, they were nearly limited to the two following points. First, that the Government of France should be considered as real, and that it should be accepted with confidence: Secondly, that part should be taken in the attempts at mediation which would be made by other Powers, and particularly by Russia.

The Republican system was the only one, M. Thiers told me, which can be adopted now in France. It was the sole means of rallying all factions around the flag of National Defence, and no other Government could be established. He spoke to me with praise of the men placed at the head of the Government. They were honest, moderate in their opinions, and only thought of saving the country. Foreign Cabinets then should feel no mistrust, and should not allow themselves to be frightened by the word "Republic." The existing Government should be looked on as real, and be considered as the best and most exact representation of the interests of France. In what concerned the attempts at mediation, M. Thiers looked for good results from his journey to Russia. In his opinion the Cabinet of St. Petersburg was beyond all dispute the most in a position to be listened to at Berlin, and to plead in favour of the re-establishment of a peace based upon acceptable conditions. He believed that the interests of humanity as well as those of policy would induce the Court of Russia to interpose its good offices, and he desired only that Austria should support the eventual steps of Russia.

I hastened to assure M. Thiers that, as far as regarded us, his wishes were fulfilled beforehand. We had no hostile prejudice against any form of Government whatever in

France. From the first moment, we had entered into relations with the new Government, and we asked nothing better than to continue to hold good relations with it. Our sympathies for France, as well as the interests which united us to that country, were independent of the form of its Government, and we were ready to lend our confidence to men who had accepted the burden of power under such difficult circumstances.

The ideas of M. Favre on the subject of an eventual mediation corresponded entirely with our own. We had already suggested both at London and St. Petersburg the opportuneness of a collective mediation, and we had always been of opinion that the initiative should proceed from St. Petersburg. We could not see but with entire satisfaction the success of M. Thiers' mission, and we should always be found disposed to join in the efforts which Russia might make to put an end to the calamities of war.

Such is as near as may be a summary of the conversation which I had with the illustrious French Statesman.

I authorise your Excellency to make such confidential use of this information as you may judge fit.

Receive, &c.
(Signed) BEUST.

No. 176.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 5.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 1, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the "Moniteur Universel" of this day, a Proclamation, signed by the Delegates of Government at Tours, decreeing that the elections for a Constituent Assembly are to take place on the 16th instant.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 176.

Extract from the "Moniteur Universel" of October 2, 1870.

Bulletin Officiel de la Délégation du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale.

Tours, le 1 Octobre, 1870.

ELECTIONS A LA CONSTITUANTE.

LE Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale au peuple Français.

Français,

Le 8 Septembre, tout le Gouvernement siégeant à Paris adressait à la France ces paroles que nous nous faisons un devoir de rappeler:—

"L'Europe a besoin qu'on l'éclaire; il faut qu'elle connaisse par d'irrécusables témoignages que le pays tout entier est avec nous. Il faut que l'envahisseur rencontre sur sa route non-seulement l'obstacle d'une ville immense résolue à périr plutôt que de se rendre, mais un peuple entier debout, organisé, représenté, une Assemblée enfin qui puisse porter en tous lieux, et en dépit de tous les désastres, l'âme vivante de la patrie."

A cette inspiration de notre cœur, reflet de la pensée publique, était joint un Décret convoquant pour le Dimanche 16 Octobre les collèges électoraux à l'effet d'élire une Assemblée Nationale Constituante.

Vous savez comment la convocation fut avancée et fixée au 2 Octobre. Le Gouvernement avait pensé que notre cher Jules Favre, dans une démarche patriotique auprès du Roi de Prusse, en s'appuyant de la loi qui rapprochait le jour où allait s'exprimer la volonté du peuple tout entier, inspirerait à l'ennemi la confiance que commande la loyauté de notre nation, assurerait au membre du Gouvernement né de l'acclamation populaire de Paris et si merveilleusement adopté par tous nos concitoyens, l'accueil honorable qui lui était dû.

Il n'y avait plus aucun motif de lutte entre nos deux grandes nations ; l'Europe entière savait par nos débats au Corps Législatif que tous les membres du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale s'étaient opposés à cette guerre fatale, conçu dans un intérêt purement dynastique, par la coupable ambition d'un despote. Le Roi de Prusse n'avait point d'ennemis à combattre après tant d'héroïsme montré des deux parts dans cette lutte gigantesque.

Mais si le membre du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale fut reçu par le Ministre de la Prusse avec les égards dus à son caractère et à sa renommée, vous avez appris avec une douloureuse indignation les propositions de M. de Bismarck. Paris, exaspéré et menacé d'un siège, ne dut songer qu'à sa défense, c'est-à-dire, à la défense de la capitale du monde civilisé ; ses intrépides citoyens ont voulu des armes pour combattre et non des urnes pour voter. Les élections ont été ajournées, et Paris investi nous montre chaque jour un énergique soldat dans chacun de ces citoyens, qui tous entourent avec un égal dévouement le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale.

L'honneur nous a été conféré de représenter le Gouvernement qui ne peut en ce moment s'adresser à la France, objet de notre culte.

C'est en son nom et au nôtre que nous venons aujourd'hui demander à nos concitoyens l'acte le plus important de la vie républicaine. Que le suffrage universel se prononce ; que le vœu du peuple soit connu et proclamé ; qu'une Assemblée Nationale Constituante se réunisse. Puissent, avant le jour prochain où le Gouvernement Republicain l'appellera, les événements et le courage des Parisiens amener la délivrance ! Si nous devons combattre encore, que l'Assemblée elle-même donne à l'armée qui devra délivrer Paris le souffle de patriotisme et de l'honneur qui l'animerait tout entière ; que l'ennemi voie, en effet, tout le peuple Français marchant comme un seul homme contre l'envahisseur de notre chère patrie.

Citoyens, vous comprenez l'importance des choix que vous allez faire. La liberté la plus entière vous est laissée ; aucune autorité ne veut peser sur votre volonté ; le mépris public a couvert les candidatures officielles. Consultez-vous durant les quinze jours qui vous séparent du moment où vous élirez vos représentants. Point de tumulte, point d'orageuses réunions. Jamais, à aucune époque de l'histoire des nations, une situation plus grave et plus solennelle n'est apparue. La France sera à la hauteur des destinées que son vote va fixer.

En donnant un douloureux regret à nos concitoyens que l'ennemi enveloppe, les représentants se souviendront mieux encore du glorieux devoir qu'ils ont à remplir non pas seulement en leur nom, mais pour nos absents, que ne pouvant exercer un pouvoir qui serait si bon dans leurs mains, le remettent à ceux que leurs concitoyens ont proclamé les plus dignes.

Le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale, vu le Décret du 8 Septembre, 1870,

Décète :

Article 1. Les collèges électoraux sont et demeurent convoqués pour le Dimanche 16 Octobre courant, à l'effet d'élire une Assemblée Nationale Constituante.

Art. 2. Le nombre total des Représentants du peuple sera de 750, non compris l'Algérie et les colonies Françaises.

Les représentants à nommer sur la base de la population seront répartis entre les Départements, selon le tableau joint au présent Décret, et qui en fait partie intégrante.

Art. 3. Si dans le tableau quelque erreur s'était glissée qui privât un ou plusieurs Départements d'un nombre quelconque de Représentants, l'Assemblée Nationale fixerait le nombre, et le Gouvernement le ferait compléter immédiatement par l'élection. L'erreur en plus ne serait réparable qu'à l'élection d'une Assemblée Législative.

Art. 4. Participent à l'élection, sauf les exceptions portées en Article 3 de la Loi des 15-18 Mars, 1849 :—

1. Tous les Français âgés de vingt-et-un ans, résidant depuis six mois dans une des communes du Département et inscrits sur les dernières listes électorales ;

2. Tous ceux qui, ayant droit d'après le paragraphe ci-dessus, auraient été omis sur ces dernières listes. Ils auront le droit de présenter leurs réclamations jusqu'au 13 Octobre à 8 heures du soir.

Ces réclamations seront portées dans chaque commune devant le Maire, qui réunira, sous sa présidence, une Commission de quatre membres pris parmi les électeurs, lesquels prononceront sur toutes les demandes sans aucun appel ni recours.

Le dernier paragraphe de l'Article 62, qui suspend l'exercice du droit électoral pour les armées en campagne, est supprimé.

Art. 5. Sont éligibles tous les Français âgés de vingt-cinq ans, et qui ne sont compris

dans aucune des exceptions ou des incompatibilités portés dans les Articles 79 et suivants de la Loi des 15-18 Mars, 1849.

Les Préfets et Secrétaires Généraux actuellement en fonctions pourront être élus s'ils se démettent de leurs fonctions dix jours avant l'élection.

Art. 6. Le scrutin sera secret.

Art. 7. Tous les électeurs voteront au chef-lieu de leur canton par scrutin de liste. Néanmoins le Préfet peut à cause des circonstances locales diviser le canton en deux ou trois circonscriptions. Dans ce cas le vote pour chacune de ces circonscriptions aura lieu dans la commune qu'il aura spécialement désignée.

Art. 8. Le scrutin sera ouvert le Dimanche 16 Octobre, depuis 7 heures du matin jusqu'à 7 heures du soir. Il sera procédé selon les prescriptions de la Loi des 15-18 Mars, 1849, avec cette seule dérogation que le Préfet pourra désigner, pour chaque section où l'élection aura lieu, le Président du bureau électoral.

Art. 9. Le dépouillement du scrutin aura lieu le soir même. Il sera commencé à sept heures et demie. Les tables de dépouillement seront composées de six membres au moins.

Art. 10. Les éligibles qui auront obtenu le plus grand nombre de suffrages légaux, quel que soit le nombre des électeurs inscrits ou des votants, seront proclamés représentants élus à l'Assemblée Nationale Constituante.

Art. 11. La Loi Electorale des 15-18 Mars, 1849, est d'ailleurs applicable dans toutes celles de ses autres dispositions qui ne sont pas contraires au présent Décret.

Art. 12. Les citoyens qui, depuis le 4 Septembre dernier, ont accepté les fonctions de Préfets ou de Secrétaires Généraux de Préfecture pourront être élus Représentants, pourvu qu'ils aient donné la démission de leurs fonctions dans la journée du 6 Octobre au plus tard. Ceux qui, malgré l'invasion ou l'investissement de l'ennemi, restent à leur poste pourront être élus.

Art. 13. La répartition du nombre des Représentants entre les Départements sera faite conformément au tableau ci-après :—

(Nous donnerons ce tableau demain.)

Délibéré en Conseil de Gouvernement, le 30 Septembre, 1870.

(Signé)

AD. CREMIEUX.
GLAIS-BIZOIN.
FOURICHON.

(Translation.)

Official Bulletin of the Delegation of the Government of National Defence.
Tours, October 1, 1870.

ELECTIONS TO THE CONSTITUENT ASSEMBLY.

THE Government of the National Defence to the French nation.

Frenchmen,

On the 8th September all the Government sitting at Paris addressed to France these words, which we make it our duty to recall :—

"Europe has need of being enlightened ; it must know from irrefutable testimony that the whole country is with us. The invader must meet on his way not only the obstacle of an immense town resolved to perish rather than to surrender, but a whole nation astir, organized, represented ; an Assembly, in short, which can bear into all places, and in spite of all disasters, the living soul of the country."

To this inspiration of our heart, the reflection of public opinion, was added a Decree convoking for Sunday, the 16th October, the electoral colleges for the election of a National Constituent Assembly.

You know how the Convocation was hastened and fixed for the 2nd October. The Government had thought that our dear Jules Favre, by a patriotic advance which he made to the King of Prussia, relying upon the law which brought the day nearer on which the will of the whole people was to be expressed, would inspire the enemy with the confidence which the loyalty of our nation commands, and would secure to the member of the Government, sprung from the popular acclamation of Paris, and so wonderfully adopted by all our fellow-citizens, the honourable reception which was due to him.

There was no longer any motive for the struggle between our two great nations ; all Europe knew from our debates in the Corps Législatif that all the members of the

Government of National Defence were opposed to this fatal war, conceived in a purely dynastic interest, by the culpable ambition of a despot. The King of Prussia had no enemies to contend with after so much heroism shown on both sides in this gigantic struggle.

But if the member of the Government of National Defence was received by the Prussian Minister with the respect due to his character and reputation, you have learnt with sorrowful indignation of the propositions of M. de Bismarck. Paris, exasperated and threatened with a siege, could only think of her defence, that is to say, the defence of the capital of the civilized world; its intrepid citizens wished for arms to fight and not urns to vote. The elections have been adjourned, and Paris, invested, points out to us daily an energetic soldier in each of its citizens, who all surround with equal devotion the Government of National Defence.

The honour has been conferred upon us of representing the Government which cannot at this moment address itself to France, the object of our worship.

It is in its name and in our own that we come to-day to ask of our fellow-citizens the most important act of Republican life. Let universal suffrage be pronounced, let the will of the people be known and proclaimed; let a National Constituent Assembly be summoned. Before the next day on which the Republican Government invokes it, may events and the courage of the Parisians effect deliverance! If we are still to fight, let the Assembly itself give to the army which is to rescue Paris the inspiration of patriotism and of honour which will animate it all; let the enemy see, in fact, the whole French people marching as one man against the invader of our dear country.

Citizens, you understand the importance of the choice which you are about to make.

You are allowed the most entire liberty; no influence will bear on your wishes; official candidatures are covered with public contempt. Deliberate during the fifteen days which separate you from the moment when you will elect your Representatives. No tumult, no stormy meetings. At no epoch of the history of nations has a more grave and solemn moment arisen. France will be equal to the destinies which her vote is about to settle.

Deeply regretting our fellow-citizens whom the enemy surrounds, the Representatives will remember better still the glorious duty which they have to fulfil, not only in their own name, but for those who are absent, who, being unable to exercise a power which was to be so useful in their hands, transfer it to those whom their fellow-citizens have proclaimed most worthy.

The Government of National Defence, seeing the Decree of 8th September, 1870,
Decrees:—

Article 1. The electoral colleges are and stand convoked for Sunday, October 16th, to elect a Constituent National Assembly.

Art. 2. The total number of the Representatives of the people shall be 750, not including Algeria and the French colonies.

The Representatives to be named on the basis of the population will be distributed among the Departments, according to the Table which is added to the present Decree, and which forms an integral part of it.

Art. III. If any error has slipped into the Table which would deprive one or several Departments of any number whatever of Representatives, the National Assembly will fix the number, and the Government will cause it to be completed immediately by election. The error can only be rectified at the election of a Legislative Assembly.

Art. 4. The following take part in the election, with the exception named in Article III of the law of the 15th and 18th March, 1849:—

1. All Frenchmen of 21 years of age having resided for six months in one of the communes of the Department and inscribed on the last electoral lists.

2. All those who, although having the right in accordance with the preceding paragraph, have been omitted in those last lists. They will have the right of presenting their claims up to the 13th of October at 8 P.M.

These claims will be brought in each commune before the Maire, who will assemble under his presidency a Commission of four members taken from among the electors, who will decide on all the demands without any appeal or redress.

The last paragraph of Article 62, which suspends the exercise of the electoral right by the armies in the field, is suppressed.

Art. 5. All Frenchmen of 25 years of age, who are not included in any of the exceptions or disqualifications named in Article 79 and following ones of the law of the 15th and 18th March, 1849, are eligible.

The Prefects and General Secretaries actually in office may be elected if they resign their duties ten days before the election.

Art. 6. The ballot will be secret.

Art. 7. All the electors will vote at the chief town of their canton by voting-papers ("scrutin de liste") The Prefect can, however, by reason of local circumstances, divide the canton into two or three circumscriptions. In this case the vote for each of these circumscriptions will take place in the commune specially designated.

Art. 8. The ballot will be open from 7 A.M. to 7 P.M. on Sunday, the 16th of October. It will be conducted according to the terms of the law of the 15th and 18th March, 1849, with this single alteration, that the Prefect can name for each section, where the election takes place, the President of the electoral bureau.

Art. 9. The counting of the votes will take place the same evening. It will commence at half-past 7. The boards of scrutineers will consist of six members at the least.

Art. 10. The candidates who have obtained the largest number of legal votes, whatever the number of the electors inscribed or of voters, will be declared elected Representatives to the National Constituent Assembly.

Art. 11. The Electoral Law of the 15th and 18th March, 1849, is besides applicable in all those of its other Ordinances which are not contrary to the present Decree.

Art. 12. The citizens who, since the 4th of September last, have accepted the duties of Prefects or of General Secretaries of Prefectures can be elected as Representatives, provided they have given in the resignation of their offices on the 6th of October at latest. Those who, in spite of the invasion or investment of the enemy, remain at their post, can be elected.

Art. 13. The distribution of the number of the Representatives among the Departments will be carried out conformably to the Table below.

(We will give this Table to-morrow.)

Deliberated upon in the Council of Government, September 30, 1870.

(Signed) AD. CREMIEUX.
GLAIS-BIZOIN.
FOURICHON.

No. 177.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 5.)

(Extract.)

Tours, October 3, 1870.

IF the steps taken by England have not hitherto led to an approach to an understanding between the belligerents, they seem nevertheless to have been of a more practical character than those of the other neutrals. I was the first of the European Diplomats with whom M. Jules Favre communicated on coming into power. It was through Her Majesty's Government that the proposal to enter into negotiation was communicated to Count Bismarck. It was likewise through Her Majesty's Government that the interview between M. Jules Favre and Count Bismarck was proposed, and it was the information obtained by Mr. Malet from Count Bismarck which made M. Jules Favre determine to go to the Prussian head-quarters. By England no more than by other Powers has France been given reason to expect any active intervention in her favour.

At this moment the French Government and the French people seem determined upon making a desperate resistance to the demands of Prussia. They trust that Paris and Metz will hold out long enough to enable them to organize the abundant materials for an army which they have collected.

No. 178.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Granville.—(Received October 6.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, September 30, 1870.

M. THIERS arrived here on the 27th instant, and proceeded on the same day to Czarskoe Seloe to wait upon Prince Gortchakoff; and he had yesterday the honour of being received by the Emperor at a private audience at the winter palace.

No. 179.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received October 6.)

My Lord,

Berlin, October 4, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith a translation by Mr. Harris of a Circular despatch addressed by Count Bismarck to the North German Representatives at foreign Courts, relating the substance of the conversation which took place in the interview he lately had with M. Jules Favre on the subject of an armistice.

I further annex a translation of a correspondence between Count Bismarck and M. Jules Favre on the subject of permission being granted to the members of the Diplomatic Body to retire from Paris in the event of a bombardment, and also of granting the Corps Diplomatique permission to send once a week a diplomatic courier for the transmission of their correspondence.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 179.

*Circular Despatch addressed by Count Bismarck to North German Confederation
Representatives abroad.*

(Translation.)

Ferrières, September 27, 1870.

THE report which M. Jules Favre addressed on the 21st instant to his colleagues with respect to his conversations with me, obliges me to make a communication to your Excellency respecting the negotiation which took place. This communication will enable you to form an accurate idea of the course which they followed.

As a whole, the recital of M. Jules Favre must be recognized as testifying to the trouble which he has given himself to relate accurately the proceedings in general wherever this result has not been so successfully attuned. The fact can be explained by the length of our conversations, and by the circumstances under which they took place. But, as regards the general tendency of his statements, I cannot omit to recall to mind that the foreground of our interview was occupied not by the question of the conclusion of peace, but by that of the armistice which should precede it with respect to our demands in a subsequent conclusion of peace. I expressly stated to M. Jules Favre that I should not explain our views of the frontier we claimed until the principle of a cession of territory had been publicly recognized by France.

In convention with this subject I mentioned the construction of a new Moselle Department, consisting of the districts of Saarbarg, Chateau Salins, Saargemund, Metz, and Thionville, as an organization which would comport with our views. In no manner whatsoever did I forego the right of putting forward further conditions for the conclusion of peace, in proportion to the sacrifices which the continuance of the war shall lay upon us.

Strasburg, which M. Jules Favre states me to have called "the key of the house," leaving it, however, uncertain whether or not France is the house signified, was so-called by me expressly as the key of our house, of which we accordingly did not wish to leave the possession in foreign hands. Our first conversation in the Chateau Haute Maison at Martry was chiefly restricted to the limits of an "academical examination" of present and past, of which the real kernel was the declaration of M. Favre that he would take into consideration any possible sum of money ("tout l'argent que nous avons"), but would refuse all cession of territory. After I had pointed out the indispensable nature of the latter, he declared that negotiations of peace were purposeless, urging that cession of territory would be humiliating, and even dishonourable, to France.

I did not succeed in convincing him that conditions like those France had obtained from Italy, and had demanded from Germany, without even being at war with either of these countries,—conditions which France would have, without doubt, imposed upon us if we had been defeated, and which had been the result of nearly every war, even in modern times—could not contain in them anything dishonourable for a country defeated after a brave resistance. Neither did I succeed in convincing him that the honour of France is not of a different quality to that of all other countries. Just as little could I find in M. Favre the possibility of understanding that the re-delivery of Strasburg would, as regards the point of honour, have no greater importance than that of Landau and Saarlouis, and that the forcible conquests of Louis XIV had not grown up in a more intimate connection with the honour of France than those of the first Republic, or of the first Empire.

Our conversations took a more practical turn first in Ferrières, where they entered upon the question of an armistice, and being confined to this subject exclusively they contradict the assertion that I had declared myself unwilling, under any circumstances, to accept an armistice.

The manner in which M. Favre gives me the honour of discussing for myself these and other questions ("il faudrait un armistice et je n'en veux à aucun prix" and the like) obliges me to put the matter in its right light. In such conversation I have never used, and never use, the expressions that I personally desire or refuse, or grant something, but speak only of the views and demands of the Government of which I have to conduct the affairs.

In this conversation both sides recognized, as the motive for an armistice, the necessity of giving the French nation the opportunity of the election of Representatives who would alone be in a position to complete, so far as the legal position of the present Government, as to render possible the conclusion of a peace with it in accordance with international law. I pointed out that an armistice places at all times a military disadvantage an army in its victorious advance, and that in this case it also offered a very important gain of time for the defence of France, and for the recognition of her army, and that, consequently, we could not grant an armistice without a military equivalent. I designated the surrender of fortresses which rendered more difficult our communications with Germany, because, inasmuch as the armistice would prolong the period of our requiring supplies, we must obtain as a preliminary condition some faculties for those supplies. The fortresses in question were Strasburg, Toul, and some smaller places. With regard to Strasburg I laid a stress upon the fact that the taking of it, now that possession had been obtained of the glacis, could only be a question of a short time, and that accordingly we considered it in conformity with the military situation that the garrison should surrender as prisoners of war, whilst those of the other fortresses would be allowed to retire free. A further difficult question was Paris. After our having completely surrounded this town, we could not grant the opening of access to it unless the provisioning afresh of the fortresses, which was thereby rendered possible, did not weaken our military position, and prolong the period of starving out the town. After consultation with the military authorities, I stated, on the authority of His Majesty the King, the following alternative with regard to the town of Paris:—

Either the position of Paris is given up to by the surrender of a dominating portion of the fortress, and at this price we are ready to allow complete communication with Paris, and the access of all supplies of food. Or, the position of Paris is not given up to us: then we cannot agree to the raising of the blockade, but must retain military *status quo* at Paris as a part of the armistice; for otherwise the latter would have for us the consequence of finding Paris, after the lapse of the armistice, provisioned and armed afresh.

M. Favre declined the first alternative, the delivering of a part of the fortifications, as distinctly as the condition that the garrison of Strasburg should be prisoners of war.

On the other hand, he promised to seek the opinion of his colleagues in Paris on the second alternative, which maintained the military *status quo* of Paris.

The programme which M. Favre took as the result of our conversations to Paris, and which was there rejected, contains nothing as to future conditions of peace, but the conversion of an armistice for two to three weeks for the purpose, of an election of a National Assembly, of which the following are the conditions:—

1. In and before Paris the maintenance of the military *status quo*.
2. In and before Metz, continuance of hostilities within a circle to be laid down in detail.
3. Surrender of Strasburg with garrison as prisoners of war, and of Toul and Bitsche, with freedom of withdrawal for the garrison.

I believe that our conviction that we, in these conditions, made an acceptable offer will be shared by all neutral Cabinets when the French Government does not show any readiness to avail itself of the opportunity offered to it for the election of a National Assembly even within the part of France occupied by us, it thereby announces its determination to ascertain the difficulties which surround the conclusion of a peace valid at international law, and its desire not to listen to the public opinion of the French people. That general and free elections would give an answer in the sense of peace is an expression which is borne in upon us here, and which cannot escape the authority in power at Paris, I request your Excellency to bring this despatch to the knowledge of the Government of, &c.

(Signed) . Von BISMARCK.

Inclosure 2 in No. 179.

Newspaper Extract.

(Translation.)

WE are enabled to publish the following despatch of M. Jules Favre (without a date) addressed to the Chancellor of the North German Confederation, and the answer to it of Count Bismarck, in the German language, of the 26th September; as also the Circular despatch of the latter, addressed to the Ministers of the Federal Missions on the 27th September, respecting the negotiations between the Chancellor of the North German Confederation and M. Jules Favre :—

“ M. le Comte,

“ LE Corps Diplomatique présent à Paris me charge de demander à votre Excellence d’être prévenu en cas de bombardement, et mis à même de s’éloigner de la ville.

“ Il voudrait aussi pouvoir, une fois par semaine, faire partir un courrier, exclusivement diplomatique, en acceptant toutes les précautions que votre Excellence croirait devoir prendre.

“ En transmettant ce double vœu à votre Excellence, je la prie d’agréer, &c.

(Signé) “ JULES FAVRE.” *

“ M. le Ministre,

“ Ferrières, September 26, 1870.

“ In reply to the note which I had the honour to receive from your Excellency to-day, I regret that a due regard of military exigencies forbids me to make communications respecting the impending attack on the fortress of Paris.

“ Permission for transmission of letters to and from a beleaguered fortress is not customary in usage of war; and even if we should undertake to forward open letters of Diplomatic Agents, when their contents are of no importance from a military point of view, yet I am of opinion that I cannot recognize and treat as well-founded the view of those who consider the interior of the fortifications of Paris during the siege as a fitting centre of diplomatic communications. This view appears to be shared by the neutral Governments, as their Representatives have moved to Tours.

“ I have, &c.

(Signed) “ BISMARCK.”

No. 180.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 7, 1870.

COUNT BERNSTORFF communicated to me a few days since the Circular despatch addressed by Count Bismarck on the 13th ultimo to the Diplomatic Representatives of the North German Confederation, recording the views of the Prussian Government as to the material guarantees which it would be necessary to exact from France at the close of the war. His Excellency informed me at the same time, in answer to a question from me, that the communication was not made with the view to elicit the opinion of Her Majesty’s Government upon the contents of this Circular.

I thanked Count Bernstorff for the communication of this important document, and informed him that I would lay it before my colleagues; and I have subsequently taken occasion to observe to him that it did not appear that any observations upon it which occurred to Her Majesty’s Government would at the present moment be of any practical effect. I begged him, however, to understand that he must not conclude from our silence that Her Majesty’s Government concurred in all the views which were stated by Count Bismarck.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

* (Translation.)

“ M. le Comte,

“ The Corps Diplomatique present in Paris requests me to ask your Excellency that they may be warned in case of bombardment, and be enabled to leave the city.

“ They would wish also to be able once a week to dispatch a courier, exclusively diplomatic, adopting all the precautions which your Excellency might believe it necessary to take.

“ In transmitting to your Excellency this two-fold wish, I beg you to accept, &c.

(Signed)

“ JULES FAVRE.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 8.)

(Extract.)

Tours, October 6, 1870.

ON the day before yesterday the Comte de Chaudordy made me acquainted with the substance of a telegram which he had received from M. Thiers from St. Peterburgh.

M. Thiers, it appeared, expressed very great satisfaction with the reception which he had met with from the Emperor and the Imperial Family, from Prince Gortchakoff, and other men in high office, as well as from the society in general. He had found public opinion alarmed by the progress of Prussia, and extremely well-disposed towards France. The Emperor and Prince Gortchakoff had expressed themselves warmly against the enforcement by Prussia of any exorbitant terms of peace, and had declared that Russia would never give her sanction to any conditions which were not equitable; and that, consequently, the sanction of the other Powers would also be withheld, and the exactions of Prussia would be simply the effect of force, and would rest on no European foundation.

Such was the substance of M. Thiers' telegram, as related to me by M. de Chaudordy. It did not appear that M. Thiers had elicited either from the Emperor or Prince Gortchakoff any definite statement of what terms of peace they would consider equitable or inequitable, nor any distinct declaration in favour of the maintenance of the integrity of the French territory.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 8.)

(Extract.)

Tours, October 6, 1870.

IN my immediately preceding despatch of to-day, I have given your Lordship an account of a report of M. Thiers of his proceedings at St. Petersburg.

On the same occasion M. de Chaudordy read to me a despatch from M. Jules Favre, commenting with some bitterness on what the writer termed the abandonment of France by the Cabinets of Europe, and containing a positive order to make a distinct demand for armed aid ("concours armé") upon Italy.

M. de Chaudordy proceeded to read to me a Report from M. Tissot, giving an account of an interview which he had had with your Lordship before the sitting of the Cabinet on the 30th ultimo. M. Tissot said that at this interview he had brought before you the requests of the French Government for recognition and for the active intervention of Great Britain with which you had already been made acquainted by despatches from me. M. Tissot added that you had been so good as to call upon him on the following morning, and tell him in general terms the decision of the Cabinet upon these requests.

It appeared, M. de Chaudordy went on to say, that Her Majesty's Government held firm to the conclusions which your Lordship had stated to M. Thiers, and, in distinct though kind and courteous terms, declined at the present moment to recognize the present Government, to intervene actively with Prussia, or even to give an authoritative opinion upon the Prussian demands.

Finally, M. de Chaudordy told me that he had not received an answer to the application made to the Government of Italy for its armed assistance.

While with M. de Chaudordy I received a request from M. Crémieux, whose apartments are in the same building, to call upon him. On my entering his room he said that he had been simply anxious to see me in order to relieve his mind by conversing with me. He was, he told me, distressed beyond measure by the intelligence he received from the several European Cabinets to which he had addressed himself. The Emperor of Russia and his Minister spoke in the kindest way to M. Thiers; but, after all, they gave nothing but fine words; they did not withdraw their prohibition against Austria's moving—they did not move themselves; they did not give any effectual advice to Prussia; England maintained her reserve. When Russia sends us nothing but words, and England does not even send us words, to whom, said he, are we to turn? We have asked for the armed intervention of Italy, but shall we obtain it? and if we do, will it suffice to turn the scale in our favour?

I said to M. Crémieux that Her Majesty's Government were certainly not prepared to intervene by force of arms in the present war, or to urge other neutrals to do so; but that he must not suppose for a moment that the reserve of which he complained proceeded from coldness or indifference. On the contrary, Her Majesty's Government were ardently desirous that the war should cease, and would rejoice at nothing more than

at being instrumental in bringing about a satisfactory and honourable peace. They were on the watch for a moment at which they could act with effect for this purpose, and it was in order not to lessen their means of being useful hereafter that they abstained from an interference now, which would (they were persuaded) be prejudicial to the cause they desired to serve.

No. 183.

Sir E. Thornton to Earl Granville.—(Received October 9.)

My Lord,

Washington, September 26, 1870.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 22nd instant, in which I reported to your Lordship the shipment of arms and ammunition for France on board the French steamer "Lafayette," which left New York on the 20th instant, I have the honour to inform you that it has been generally said by the newspapers, and even Mr. Fish told me, that there were a much larger number of arms than I have mentioned in that telegram, besides some cannon. From the source, however, whence I obtained the information, I am inclined to think that my report is correct (*i.e.*, 6,000 rifles, 3,000,000 cartridges).

The "Lafayette" also took between 500 and 600 Frenchmen, who, it was generally supposed, were about to join the French army; but there seems to be no proof that they had been enlisted in the United States, or that they were anything more than volunteers who were going as passengers of their own free will and without any engagement. It seems, however, that Mr. Roesing, the North German Consul-General, made a representation to the authorities with a view to the "Lafayette's" being prevented from leaving the port, and, although this step was unsuccessful, they were induced to go on board and select eighty-six Frenchmen from among the passengers and arrest them. These were not provided with tickets, but as nothing else could be proved against them they were immediately discharged, though not in time to regain the steamer, which had started with their luggage on board.

The District Attorney had previously telegraphed to Mr. Fish for instructions, and Mr. Roesing to my Prussian colleague, urging that orders should be sent for the detention of the "Lafayette." Mr. Fish replied to the District Attorney that he was to be guided by the neutrality laws of the United States, and that with regard to the ship it could not be alleged that she was intended for hostile purposes against North Germany. As for the arms and ammunition, they were articles of a legitimate commerce, with which the United States would not interfere, although the vessel might run the risk of being detained by the cruisers of North Germany on her voyage to France. Baron Gerolt also called upon Mr. Fish, and earnestly urged him to order the detention of the "Lafayette"; but I understand that he received a similar answer to that which had previously been given to the District Attorney.

Mr. Roesing asserts that he will make it clear to the authorities that the men who were arrested on board the "Lafayette" had actually been enlisted at New York; but he has not as yet been able to do so, and he is threatened with an action for damages by the men who were detained.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. THORNTON.

No. 184.

Count Bernstorff to Earl Granville.—(Received October 9.)

(Translation.)

My Lord,

Prussia House, October 4, 1870.

I HAVE had the honour of receiving your Excellency's courteous note of the 19th ultimo relative to my communications of the 7th and 9th September on the continued exportation of arms to France, and have learned therefrom the result of the inquiries made into the matter by the Royal British authorities. I regret that they did not succeed in finding out anything farther about the 170 cases of guns sent to Southampton on the 6th ultimo, the more so as official information has just reached me that those cases were shipped, on the 20th ultimo, at Southampton in the Jersey cutter "Otter," and landed at St. Malo on the 26th.

My other statements have been confirmed in the essential points by your Excellency's

courteous note; I will therefore only observe, in regard to the opinion expressed at the end of it, that the "Middlesex," in which the fifty cases sent by Messrs. Wilson and Deeley were loaded, was intended for Rotterdam, that that opinion unfortunately rests upon an error. For the "Middlesex," which usually lies at Blackwall Stairs, is only a tender or tug-boat, and, therefore, not adapted for undertaking a sea-voyage to foreign ports. It only went as far as Gravesend with those cases, where it was to receive a second cargo of gunpowder. In consequence of bad weather, however, or of contrary orders, the Captain of the "Middlesex" went from thence up the river again and had the whole cargo shipped by other boats into the "Blanche," a ship bound for France.

If, since my note of the 9th ultimo, I have forbore from making further communications to your Excellency relative to the exportation of arms lately carried on on the most extensive scale, I beg you not by any means to suppose that it has been for want of the necessary materials; on the contrary, I have been daily in a position to furnish your Excellency with indisputable proof that thousands of guns lay ready to be shipped for France. But as your Excellency, by your note of the 15th ultimo, declined, on principle, to prohibit the exportation of arms, I considered it unnecessary to take further steps in the above direction until my answer to that note, which I reserve for an early day.

With, &c.

(Signed) BERNSTORFF.

No. 185.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Granville.—(Received October 10.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, October 2, 1870.

PRINCE GORTCHAKOFF has read a despatch to me from Baron Brunnow, stating that your Lordship was not disposed to make any observations on Count Bismarck's circular of the 13th ultimo, of which a copy had been communicated to you, but that you would be guided in some measure by the course which might be adopted here. His Excellency said he had immediately replied to Baron Brunnow that, as he had not been invited to express an opinion on the contents of the circular, he did not intend to do so.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 186.

Sir A. Paget to Earl Granville.—(Received October 10.)

My Lord,

Florence, October 6, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that M. Thiers is expected at Florence at the beginning of next week.

I have, &c.

(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 187.

Count Bernstorff to Earl Granville.

My Lord,

Prussia House, October 8, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 15th ultimo, in reply to my Memorandum of the 30th August concerning British neutrality. I have left it unanswered for a time because, for the moment, hopes of peace appeared to offer, and as I should have much preferred to discontinue the controversy altogether. These hopes having however, I sincerely regret, disappeared for the present, I cannot but reply to your Excellency's note.

Before entering upon its contents, I ask your Excellency's permission to say a few words regarding the form and origin of this correspondence.

The Memorandum of the 30th August, which I had the honour to transmit to your Excellency with a private letter of the 31st of the same month, was originally not intended for publicity, as may easily be perceived by some of its passages. I afterwards, indeed, acceded to your Excellency's wish to deal with it officially, and will therefore not complaint

of your Excellency's having immediately caused your reply to be published by the press simultaneously with my Memorandum before I had been allowed time to remove certain evident misconceptions, and hence before the correspondence could be regarded as closed.

The circumstances under which the Memorandum was written were as follows :— My verbal and written remonstrances on account of the direct supply of the French fleet with coals, and on account of the export of arms and ammunition to France, had remained without any practical result.

Your Excellency had, it is true, promised that as soon as I could adduce proofs of a certain vessel being hired by the French Government, in order to be used as a store-ship in its service, the case should receive consideration. Notwithstanding this promise, your Excellency declined acceding to my request of the 19th of August, to proceed against the vessels "Hypathia" and "Norseman," merely on the ground that these vessels had sailed before the Foreign Enlistment Act had come into operation. The two other points, however, proved by undeniable evidence, namely, that both vessels had sailed under the British flag after the conclusion of the sale, and that, even up to the 8th ultimo, the transfer of the property to the French owners had not been entered on the ship's books, while the sale had taken place about the middle of the month of July, have been passed over in silence by your Excellency, although the twofold violation of the international law and of the English law had been clearly established.

The notes, in which I had submitted to your Excellency several cases which had become known of contemplated or already accomplished open and clandestine consignments of arms and ammunition to France, in order to afford an opportunity to Her Britannic Majesty's Government of preventing them or obviating the further extension or the mischief, met with the same fate. Your Excellency had assured me, in the replies to my communications on the subject, that they should receive attention, or that they should be taken into immediate consideration, or that inquiries should be made at once. But none of your Excellency's notes contained a positive statement to the effect that Her Britannic Majesty's Government regarded the traffic in contraband of war compatible with their neutrality, and that they could not interfere. On the contrary, it has been repeatedly left to me to search after particular cases with the means at my disposal, in order to bring them under the notice of Her Majesty's Government.

I should have been glad, indeed, if your Excellency had, by a categorical official declaration, placed me in a position to release the Consular Agents of the North German Confederation in the United Kingdom from the laborious and unpleasant task of controlling this illegitimate traffic.

Your Excellency will especially please to recollect that, subsequent to the indiscretion of Count Palikao, which created a great sensation not only in Germany, but also in this country, your Excellency, far from declaring the despatch of 40,000 breech-loaders for the French army to be compatible with strict neutrality, stated that it would be impossible to interfere unless I adduced positive proofs that those consignments had really taken place. At least your Excellency's notes of the 25th and 26th of August, in reply to my note of the 25th, justified such conclusion on my part. For in the first note your Excellency expressed the apprehension that my communications not containing more precise statements of the name of the ship having on board part of the arms in question, and of the particular place in the river where the vessel was lying, the inquiry would be difficult; and in the second note your Excellency informed me that the investigations had remained without result.

After waiting in vain for the promulgation of an "Order in Council," or for any official announcement on the part of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, or for instructions to the Police, Customs, and Harbour authorities of the United Kingdom, but having meanwhile ascertained, by means of reliable communications, that the consignments announced by Count Palikao were being actively carried on, I embodied my views of the political bearing of the question in the Memorandum, in order to show distinctly to the British Cabinet, in a most unofficial form, the impression necessarily created in Germany by the toleration of the export of arms to France. I have since then been almost daily in a position to draw your Excellency's attention to various instances of consignments of arms. In reply to my note on the subject I for a long time either received no answers at all, or only such as were dilatory, although the cases acknowledged in your Excellency's subsequent notes of the 13th and 19th ultimo prove that Her Britannic Government would have had time to prevent the despatch of many thousands of rifles to France.

It is true your Excellency, on the 5th ultimo, in reply to my note of the 2nd ultimo, informed me that some of the packages in a certain truck on a railway pointed out by me contained bacon. But, besides the possibility of other packages which had not been opened having contained arms, and of my having been misinformed only in regard to the

particular number of the railway truck, I could, *e contrario*, draw the conclusion from your Excellency's communication that Her Britannic Majesty's Government would have complied with my request if those packages had contained arms instead of bacon. However, after I had succeeded, by my notes of the 1st, 2nd, 3rd, 6th, 7th, 8th, and 9th ultimo, in bringing a series of irrefutable facts before Her Britannic Majesty's Government, a sudden change took place. In your note of the 13th ultimo, while acknowledging the correctness of a large number of cases pointed out by me, your Excellency declared that the traffic, which had been quite openly carried on, was legitimate, and that the Customs authorities had no power to stop it. Had Her Majesty's Government, from the commencement of the discussion, taken this standing point, they would certainly not have induced me to institute the above inquiries; and far less would they have had reason to subject the correctness of my information to a practical test.

I therefore consider myself justified in concluding that Her Britannic Majesty's Government since the receipt of my Memorandum has materially changed the position previously occupied in regard of our complaints. It was unavoidable that this change should be reflected in the answer to my Memorandum penned under different conditions; for I had started with the supposition that the legal means at the disposal of the Executive had hitherto not been applied simply from motives of convenience. I had been under the impression that it would only be necessary to prove the serious extent of the supply of France with arms and ammunition on the part of England in order to convince the British Government that the time had arrived to make use of their powers. I had, therefore, not entered upon a judicial examination of the question of English neutrality, not because I had reason to shun its discussion, but merely because I had hoped that by abstaining from it I should be bringing about a more rapid practical decision, and, therefore, considered it sufficient to restrict myself to the practical and political aspect of the question.

I now have the honour to refer to your Excellency's note of the 15th ultimo, and must begin by contradicting the supposition that I had expressed a desire on the part of my Government that the attitude of Great Britain towards Germany in this war should be that of a "benevolent neutrality." On the contrary, as a repeated and careful examination of my arguments in their mutual connection will convince your Excellency, I have, on the one hand, merely given expression to my satisfaction that public opinion had ranged itself on our side in this war wantonly thrust upon us, and had, on the other hand, combined with it the reflection how difficult it is to reconcile the faith in the practical value of public opinion with the neutrality policy actually pursued by Her Britannic Majesty's Government.

I have by no means asked, and far less claimed, on our part that England should transgress the bounds of a strict neutrality in our favour and to the detriment of France. But I have asserted, and, in the face of the experiences of the last few weeks, as well as in consequence of your Excellency's note of the 15th ultimo, must maintain my assertion that the neutrality of England, while, as I am most willing to admit, intended to be impartial, in its practical effect assumes the form of a neutrality which is benevolent and partial towards France. For my part I have only wished a return from a lax neutrality, whereby one party is benefited, to a strict and really impartial neutrality. For I am unable to admit that it is compatible with strict neutrality that French Agents should be permitted to buy, up in this country, under the eyes and with the cognisance of Her Britannic Majesty's Government, many thousands of breech-loaders, revolvers, and pistols, with the requisite ammunition, in order to arm therewith the French people, and make the formation of fresh army corps possible, after the regular armies of France have been defeated and surrounded.

Your Excellency admits that the export of arms and ammunition to France has latterly assumed larger proportions than had hitherto appeared credible. I have the honour to remark that, according to my information, which may be partly tested upon oath if this should appear desirable, the number of fire-arms shipped from England to France since my Memorandum of the 30th ultimo is treble and fourfold the number of 40,000 announced by Count Palikao, and that a number of manufactories, especially in Birmingham and London, are working day and night for French agents and their men of straw. I am in possession of authenticated copies of contracts concluded between the French Government and English contractors. The events of the war have quite recently delivered into our hands an official letter of the present French Minister of War, dated the 18th ultimo, to a French officer at the French Embassy in London, and in which the then expected dispatch of 25,000 Snider rifles is mentioned, and reference is made, for the payment, to the funds at the disposal of the French Chargé d'Affaires for the purchase of arms in general. In like manner authentic proofs lie before me that the export of fire-arms and ammunition to France has been thoroughly organised in some British ports.

Since, however, as already alluded to, Her Britannic Majesty's Government, relinquishing its former standing-ground, does not doubt the actual legitimacy of these consignments of arms, but disputes the validity of our claims concerning the toleration of these facts from a judicial and political point of view, I shall now proceed to an enumeration of the arguments contained in your Excellency's note of the 15th ultimo.

According to your Excellency's own admission, the Executive has the power to prohibit the export of contraband of war. But you state the practice is to make use of this right only in the interest of England, as in the case of self-defence. A letter of the Duke of Wellington to Mr. Canning, dated 30th August, 1825, and reprinted in a London newspaper immediately after the indiscretion of Count Palikao, refutes this assumption, proving that England as a neutral has repeatedly prohibited the export of arms by an "Order in Council," according to the usual practice, as the renowned Duke says. In one part of this letter the words occur, "I am afraid, then, that the world will not entirely acquit us of at least not doing our utmost to prevent this breach of neutrality of which the Porte will accuse us."

Practice consequently is in itself not opposed to the adoption of a measure desired by us for the prohibition of the sale of arms to our enemy; but the law allows Government a certain latitude of consideration to make use of their power according to circumstances. Your Excellency is, however, of opinion that the present customs system would require a radical reform in order to prevent the export of contraband of war. I gladly concede that the lax method of despatch and control on the part of the Custom-house authorities, which has become usual in the interest of an unfettered commercial intercourse, bars the energetic carrying out of a measure in prohibiting the exportation of contraband of war. But, on the other hand, I think the very fact of such laxity tends to show that, for the purpose of rendering an "Order in Council" effectual, no new organization would be required, but simply more stringent instructions for the customs and harbour authorities, reminding them of the existing regulations. The correctness of this opinion is founded upon the numerous official reports and other partly sworn evidence lying before me. They clearly prove that many thousands of boxes containing rifles, well known to be such by the Custom-house authorities, have been shipped for France without challenge. I know several instances where the cases have not even been registered in the books, but have openly been shipped as passengers' luggage by the French agents. When our Consular Agents protested against such proceedings the Custom-house officers invariably replied that they had no instructions to detain the packages.

I hope, however, to be able to prove, by the following passages in English statutes, that Her Britannic Majesty's Government have at their disposal, in case they should wish to avail themselves of them, the means to put a stop to this traffic without the necessity of introducing a new machinery of officials for the purpose.

By the 150th section of chapter 107, "The Customs Consolidation Act, 1853" (16 and 17 Vict.), it is enacted that—

"The following goods may by Proclamation or Order in Council be prohibited either to be exported or carried coastwise: arms, ammunition, and gunpowder, &c.; and if any goods so prohibited shall be exported from the United Kingdom, or carried coastwise, or by water borne to be so exported, they shall be forfeited."

Section 125 of the same Act enacts—

"That the exporter of British manufactures or his agents has to declare in a shipping bill the marks, numbers, description of packages, and the quantity, quality, and description of goods about to be shipped for exportation."

Section 5 of the 122nd chapter of the 17th and 18th Vict. (1854) enacts—

"That, on the entry of the Customs of arms and ammunition of war, whether for home use, exportation, or in transit, the number of articles of each description as denominated in Table A (swords, bayonets, muskets, rifles, carbines, cannons, mortars, &c.) shall be stated in the import, export, or transit entry."

"The passage, therefore, in your Excellency's note, that "such exportation is not forbidden by our municipal law," can but have the meaning that a positive declaration is still required on the part of Her Britannic Majesty's Government before the power with which it is invested comes into operation.

The second passage of the quoted enactment proves that the means for an efficient control have likewise been provided by the law itself. It is true the intention must exist

to apply the remedy. That, however, the action of Her Majesty's Government does not remain the same under all circumstances, I may be permitted to prove by two instructions issued to the Customs authorities of the United Kingdom on the 2nd June, 1848, and the 8th September, 1870, respectively.

The first originated at the time of the Danish-German complications, when Sir Charles Trevelyan, one of the Secretaries to the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, informed the Commissioners of Customs in a Treasury Minute that—

“In transmitting to them copies of a letter received by their Lordships from the Foreign Office, and of its inclosures, from the Danish Minister to this Court, he has been commanded by their Lordships to desire that if the Commissioners shall be satisfied that any arms or warlike stores are embarked to be sent from this country for the purpose of being employed in hostilities against the Danish Government, they will give instructions to their officers to prevent their exportation taking place.”

In pursuance of this Order of the Lords of the Treasury, the Commissioners of the Customs issued directions to their officers at the several departments in the port of London, and to all the collectors and comptrollers of all the ports throughout the kingdom, to take care that the same be duly obeyed, with instructions to make a special “Report to the Board of any circumstances that may arise fit for their cognizance.”

On the other hand, the present instructions, notwithstanding my continued complaints since the middle of July in this year, are as follows:—

“*The Examining Officer, Custom-house, London.*

“September 8, 1870.

“In pursuance of instructions from the Lords Commissioners of Her Majesty's Treasury, the Board directs you, when it is supposed that arms and ammunition are being exported, to ascertain the fact, and, if so, what is the nature of the arms and ammunitions, and in what quantities, by whom, and to what destination they are to be shipped; but you are not in any case to delay the shipment longer than is sufficient to obtain the above particulars. A Report to be made to the Board in each case.

“I am, &c.

“J. B. HALE.

“The Collector at ———.”

This contrast in the treatment of analogous cases is self-evident, and calls for no comment on my part. At the time I wrote my memorandum and the above-mentioned numerous notes to your Excellency I was naturally not yet acquainted with the instructions of the 8th ultimo. I think, however, that I am entitled to contend that they prove conclusively how easy it would have been for Her Britannic Majesty's Government to render the control which has been ordered for their own information effective also with regard to my complaints, without damaging the usual and legitimate trade of the country.

I had on a former occasion taken the liberty to propose to your Excellency still another remedy, which appeared to me appropriate for guarding the *bond fide* commerce with other neutral countries against unnecessary annoyance, without in its interest setting aside all and every control.

This measure would consist in demanding securities that articles cleared for a neutral port should really be delivered there. Your Excellency considers this proposal impracticable. I beg permission, however, to quote a passage from a French law of the 14th July, 1860—“Law concerning the Manufacture and Sale of Arms for War Purposes”—which has been reprinted in the Appendix to the “Report of the Neutrality Laws Commissioners of 1867.”

It says at page 8 of the Report, under the head of Title II, No. 9:—

“The export of arms or pieces of arms for warfare is free, under the conditions laid down by the law, or by the regulations of the administrative authorities. An Imperial Decree may, however, forbid this exportation beyond the frontiers for a fixed destination and limited period. The Custom-house officers through which the export may take place are named by Decrees for the purpose. When the export is prohibited for certain points of destination, the exporters must, under the penalties imposed by Article 4 of section 3 of the Law of 22nd August, 1791, certify the arrival of the arms at a legitimate point of destination by means of bonds which, on departure, are delivered to them by the Customs authorities, and cancelled on arrival at the port of destination by the Consular Agents of France.”

My proposal therefore, if it has not the merit of originality, enjoys at least the advantage of being recognized as practicable by the French Legislature. France could

consequently least of all have been in the position to see any kind of unfriendliness in the application of the remedy.

Notwithstanding a careful study of the quoted "Report of the Neutrality Laws Commissioners," I have not been able to find the proof in it that this Commission had come to the decision that a prohibition of the export of arms and ammunition was indeed impracticable or impolitic. Besides, the authority of the Commission would scarcely have extended far enough to prejudice (by such a decision) all future contingencies and the rights of other nations. I believe, however, I have proved that a prohibition of export is legally admissible and practicable, as well as possible, in the usual course of administration. Whether it is politic or not, that is the very question on which a difference of opinion exists between us up to the present time.

The second objection of your Excellency to the legitimacy of our complaints is the alleged wrong on the part of Prussia during the Crimean war. I do not wish to recur to the greater or less degree of analogy between both the cases in question, as a continuation of this controversy, especially before the public, might create feelings in one or other of the two nations which I am most anxious to avoid.

However that may be, and even if the most complete analogy existed and had been acknowledged by me, I still could not refrain from upholding the alternative that if the complaints of England against Prussia at the time of the Crimean war were warranted, those of Germany against England at the present time are at least equally well founded.

As regards your Excellency's arguments, by which the dilemma is to be obviated, I wish to make a single reply. Your Excellency remarks—

"The course of Great Britain, then and now, is perfectly consistent. As she then remonstrated against infractions of Prussian law, so she now admits the justice of remonstrances against infractions of British law. such as store-ships, enlistments, and others."

In another place your Excellency says:—

"I have alluded to the difficulties which the Prussian Government encountered when placed in a position analogous to that now occupied by Great Britain, and I have shown that those difficulties were chiefly owing to their having so far departed from existing practice as to prohibit the transit trade—a concession which gave Great Britain a standing ground for complaints which she would not otherwise have possessed, and which, notwithstanding, was powerless in its results."

It is evident that the justice of former complaints against us is deduced from a concession made by Prussia to England and her allies, in excess of its strict obligations as a neutral; while our present grievances are stated to be unfounded, because England has not made concessions of any kind in excess of its bare duties of neutrality, and merely concedes to us a right of complaint in so far as the violation of English law is concerned.

If I should at all draw a conclusion from this line of argument, it could only be that Prussia did at that time more in principle for the observation of neutrality than England does at present; and therefore evinced at that time a more friendly neutrality towards England than the latter now observes towards us, and that therefore the complaints of England were then less warranted than ours now are.

As regards the practical observations of the existing laws and regulations I shall not revert to the numerous complaints of England, on account of alleged transport of arms through Prussia, of which I have still a perfect recollection, and which at the time were proved to be unfounded.

On the other hand, I must draw attention to the infractions of British law, as shown above, even in its present state, in order to prove that our complaints certainly have, in this respect also, a foundation based on facts.

In addition, I cannot refrain from opposing the principle involved in your Excellency's argument. For I am of opinion that the right of the belligerent Powers to complain about the attitude of a neutral State does not so much originate in its accidental municipal law as in the international law, with which it is the duty of every Government to bring its own laws into harmony.

This is the very standing ground of Germany. According to the existing principles of international law, arms and ammunition rank first amongst the articles which are regarded as contraband of war, and the sale of which to the belligerent Powers contributes most towards feeding and protracting the war.

The reference to the Crimean war could therefore only be considered an argument for the position of Her Britannic Majesty's Government if they should insist upon the

analogy denied by me, and deduce therefrom the right to return our alleged former wrong by a positive wrong at the present moment.

I have in my memorandum already too strongly declared the possibility of such a supposition to be at variance with the liberal and conciliatory ideas of the English people and statesmen, to make any particular allusion necessary to the injurious effects which the reintroduction of the principle of retaliation would necessarily have upon the progress and the peace of Europe. I may the more readily refrain from doing so, as your Excellency has, on your own part, emphatically repudiated such an idea.

In the same manner I may abstain from entering at present upon the question whether it would be more in the interest of all to extend or restrict the duties of neutrals in the future.

That Germany inclines to every progress in the field of increasing active freedom it has already proved in the course of three wars, by applying reciprocally in the Danish and the Austrian wars, and, without regard to reciprocity, in the present war, the principle aimed at by the majority of the whole commercial world, namely, the security of private property at sea; a principle the adoption of which proved to be unattainable at the Congress of Paris in 1856. Germany has, therefore, the more reason to expect from the other Powers that they should not selfishly alter the existing international rights to its detriment and their own advantage.

The present controversy simply centres in the question whether the refusal of Her Majesty's Government to prohibit the export of arms is not at variance with the still unaltered general rules of international law regarding the duties of neutrals towards belligerents, and with the laws of this country not yet repealed by the Legislature for the better fulfilment of those duties. That such is the case I believe I have proved by the existing facts and the laws themselves.

I will now try and remove the final obstacle which, according to the concluding paragraph of your Excellency's note, dated the 15th ultimo, has prevented Her Britannic Majesty's Government from issuing an order prohibiting the export of arms.

Your Excellency remarks that France has suffered only defeats, while Germany, on the other hand, exhibits uninterrupted successes; and you connect therewith the reflection that it would be contrary to the feelings of Her Britannic Majesty's Government now to change a line of policy entered upon at a time when they could not know which side would be favoured by the fortune of war.

In the first instance, I should wish to raise the objection hereto that the Government of Her Britannic Majesty brought the new Foreign Enlistment Act before Parliament after the outbreak of the war, and that when advocating the Bill they emphatically declared that the laws hitherto in force would not be altered thereby, but merely supplemented.

If, however, it cannot be doubtful, on the one hand, that in existing circumstances the new law is only beneficial to France, rendering it impossible for Germany to get ships which she needed most urgently, while, on the other hand, the Executive now refuses to apply the old laws for the prevention of export of arms and ammunition to France, and hereby the United Kingdom becomes a great arsenal for our enemy, the new law assumes in consequence of this a character as regards Germany which, if not hostile, is practically malevolent. But this, as I have the satisfaction to know, and as is proved by the Parliamentary debates, was not the intention of the Legislature.

I further have the honour to remark that our complaints of the manner in which the English neutrality laws are being administered date from a time when we had not yet gained any victories, and that they were in nowise first raised by my memorandum of the 30th August. Moreover, at the time the Memorandum was penned France still possessed two powerful armies, while her fleets commanded the Baltic and the North Sea; so that it could not possibly be a matter of indifference to us whether England, by the exercise of her neutrality, materially increased the advantages which France derived from our want of control of the sea.

But even under the present circumstances the German people would not easily be persuaded that it was wanting in chivalry, because it complains that by an unrestricted export of arms the enemy, who had been overcome only by its own great sacrifices, is furnished with the means of prolonging a struggle which, even if its final result should not thereby be materially affected, still in any case must lead to more bloodshed, and more sacrifices for both belligerents. Even the most eloquent defender of the position taken by Her Britannic Majesty's Government will not succeed in the eyes of Germany in bringing such a neutrality policy into harmony with the considerations of humanity, and the wishes for peace so frequently advocated by England.

As for the hope expressed by your Excellency that the German people will in a

cooler moment judge less severely the attitude of the Government of Great Britain in this question than now in the heat of action, I regret that, in consequence of your Excellency's note of the 15th ultimo, added to the knowledge that our enemy is being daily equipped with British arms, I cannot share it.

Should this state of things continue, I could only look forward to the soothing influence which the numerous and actual proofs of sympathy given by the English people, and the manifold testimonies of public opinion in favour of Germany and its good right, may have upon the feelings of the German nation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERNSTORFF.

No. 188.

Earl Granville to Lord Bloomfield.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 10, 1870.

I HAVE been informed by Count Apponyi that he had been instructed by Count Beust to speak to me upon the subject of the expediency of mediation between France and Prussia, and to explain to me the views with regard to it entertained by the Austro-Hungarian Government.

Count Beust had hoped, when Her Majesty's Government proposed an interchange of notes relative to the maintenance of neutrality, that that measure would result in a collective effort for the re-establishment of peace; and it was with this view that the suggestion was made by Austria that a clause should be inserted in those notes which would prevent the isolated mediation of any one Power. The idea of the insertion of such a clause was not favourably received, and was consequently abandoned. Her Majesty's Government had preferred that each Power should retain its freedom of action. Since then each had taken timid and fruitless steps to facilitate a reconciliation between the belligerents. Austria, though she regretted this result, was not surprised at it, as it only confirmed her previous opinion that the only chance of success would be found in collective action. It was impossible for Austria to take the initiative; but the reasons which deterred her from doing so did not apply to England and Russia, whose relations with the belligerents were such that their motives or their impartiality could not be suspected. The Cabinets of London and St. Petersburg would only have expressed the general wish of Europe to see a termination of hostilities; and Austria would most gladly have joined them in pleading the cause of peace in the interests of humanity no less than in those of policy. It would certainly have been a meritorious act to have seized the earliest opportunity for encouraging by wise advice and prudent counsels any dispositions which might be evinced in favour of peace. It was owing to the feeling entertained by him on this point, that Count Beust suggested the insertion in the interchanged notes of the reservation, which, however, had not been insisted upon, when it was found that it might lead to an apparent severance of Austria from the other Powers at a time when she was most anxious to promote general union. It was, however, desirable again to record the motives by which she had been guided, and to state that she would always be ready to contribute to the re-establishment of peace, when any step on the part of the neutral Powers seemed likely to meet with a chance of success.

If, for the motives referred to, Austria was compelled to abandon the idea of taking the initiative, she was not the less impressed with the desire to see Europe recover from the species of torpor in which she seemed to be plunged in fear of a great convulsion. It seemed that it was thought both in London and at St. Petersburg that collective steps would have less chance than independent steps of being favourably received by the conqueror. It was impossible to test the soundness of this opinion; but it would be well to inquire whether an agreement between the neutral Powers, displayed in a spirit of friendly impartiality, and tending not only to moderate the demands of the victor, but to calm the irritation of the vanquished, might not possess advantages which might be appreciated as well by France as by Prussia and her allies. It was unquestionable that the motives which were principally at work to push the war to a war of extermination were, on the one side, illusions and false hopes; and on the other, indifference and contempt for the European Powers which have accepted the position of spectators of the combat: but it could not be too often repeated, that if Austria were to attempt to take the lead, her efforts would be misinterpreted, and while they would act as fatal encouragement to one belligerent, they would be looked upon by the other as hostile intervention.

I observed that I was not aware what were the unfruitful steps to which Count

Beust alluded : and that, excepting the transmission of messages from one belligerent to another, Her Majesty's Government had taken no step as regarded them, excepting to recommend to each that a personal meeting should take place between Count Bismarck and M. Favre, which advice had been followed, although unfortunately the negotiations had not arrived at a solution.

Her Majesty's Government had seen nothing that induced them at the present moment to change their opinion, that to offer mediation which was not acceptable to both parties, and was without any basis for negotiation, was likely to do harm, and not good. The respective declarations of Count Bismarck and M. Favre before, during, and since their interviews offered no starting point for such negotiations.

I have already informed your Excellency, in my despatch of the 3rd instant, that upon his communication of Count Bismarck's circular of the 13th ultimo, I requested Count Bernstorff not to judge from my silence that I agreed in all the views stated therein. Her Majesty's Government are not inclined to offer advice, unless they have some reason to believe that it would be effective. It would appear, from the last communication from the French Government, made through Lord Lyons, and reported by him in the despatch of which I inclose a copy,* that the French Government are of the same opinion; for they state that the time of good offices is past, and that they desire the active support of neutral Powers, who should take measures to enforce their views.

Although I have not yet been informed of the receipt of such a communication from the French Government by the Austrian Government, I presume it was sent at the same time; and I should be glad to know what answer Count Beust has made or proposes to make to it,—whether Count Beust is prepared to accede to any such request, or whether he means to recur to the offer of good offices to both parties, and what is the definite advice he proposes to offer to each belligerent.

Her Majesty's Government are most anxious to put an end to this war; they ardently desire the conclusion of a permanent peace, which would satisfy the legitimate demands of Germany, and which it would not be injurious to the honour of the French nation to accept under the circumstances of the war. They would be ready to consider any definite proposal of the Austrian Government, but they much fear that any general advice to both parties to be moderate would at present have no effect.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 189.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, October 10, 1870.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency, with reference to the complaints made against this country for allowing the export of arms to France, that Her Majesty's Government understand that a cargo of 90,000 rifles and 8,000,000 cartridges has recently left the United States for a French port.

No. 190.

Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by Count Bernstorff, October 11.)

(Translation.)

Ferrières, October 1, 1870.

ACCORDING to the newspapers, an official Proclamation has been issued on the part of the section of the French Government staying at Tours, which represents the Under-signed as having stated to M. Favre, "Prussia means to continue the war and to bring France back to the position of a Power of the second rank." Although such an assertion can only be calculated to produce effect in circles but little acquainted either with the ordinary language of international negotiations or with the geography of France, yet the circumstance that the said official Proclamation bears the signature of MM. Crémieux, Glais-Bizoin, and Fourichon, and that those gentlemen belong to the present Government of a great European Empire, induces me to request that your Excellency will undertake to elucidate it at your business interviews.

In my conferences with M. Favre the question of the condition of peace never reached so far as to be treated as a matter of business, and it was only at his repeated desire that I

communicated to the French Minister, in general outlines, those ideas which form the principal contents of my Circular dated Meaux, September 16, but have hitherto brought forward no demands overpassing them in any direction. The cession of Strasburg and Metz, which, in accordance with those ideas, we are striving for, involves, in its territorial relations, a diminution of the French dominion about equal, in its superficial extent, to its increase by the addition of Savoy and Nice, but exceeding in population the provinces acquired from Italy by about three-quarters of a million. If it be taken into consideration that France, according to the census of 1866 (Gotha Calendar of 1870, p. 514), numbers more than 38,000,000 inhabitants without Algeria, and with Algeria, which even at present furnishes an essential part of the French military force, 42,000,000 inhabitants, it is clear that a diminution of 750,000 of those inhabitants in no way alters the importance of France in regard to other countries, but leaves to that great Empire the same elements of the plenitude of power which enabled it to exercise so decided an influence on the fate of Europe, both in the Eastern and in the Italian war.

These few indications will suffice for a triumphant contrast of the logic of facts with the extravagances of the Proclamation of September 24. I have only to add that, at our interviews, I expressly called M. Favre's attention to these points of view, and, therefore, as your Excellency will be convinced, even without my assurance, was very far from making any injurious allusion to the consequences of the present war on the future position of France in the world.

(Signed) BISMARCK.

No. 191.

Prussian Circular communicated to Earl Granville by Count Bernstorff, October 11, 1870.

(Translation.)

THE conditions offered to M. Jules Favre for the conclusion of an armistice, which conditions were to be the groundwork for the re-establishment of a stable order of things in France, have been rejected by him and by his colleagues.

The continuation of a struggle which, judging from the march of events, is quite hopeless for the French people, is thereby entailed.

Since then the chances of success on the part of the French in this sanguinary war have grown considerably less: Toul and Strasburg have fallen, Paris is closely hemmed in, and German troops extend their operations as far as the Loire. The considerable forces which were engaged in besieging the above fortresses are now fully at the disposal of the German Commanders.

The country will have to endure the results of the determination thus taken by those in power at Paris to resist to the last extremity: its losses will thereby be uselessly increased, and the state of the country will entail a social disintegration of ever-increasing danger and magnitude.

The German Commanders are unfortunately not in a position effectually to combat this state of things; they are, however, fully alive to the consequences of the prolonged resistance determined on by the persons in power at Paris, and they think it right specially to call general attention to one circumstance which is more particularly connected with the state of affairs at Paris.

The result of the actions of the 19th and 30th ultimo, fought before that capital, showing as it did that the flower of the inimical troops there collected were unable even to drive in the first line of the investing forces, abundantly proves that the capital must needs sooner or later fall.

If the "Gouvernement Provisoire de la Défense Nationale" are bent on postponing the surrender of Paris until such time as it shall have been rendered necessary by impending famine, their conduct can have none but the most terrible consequences.

The senseless destruction by the French of railways, bridges, and canals in the neighbourhood of Paris failed to arrest the progress of the German armies for a single moment; the necessary means of communication by land and by water were re-established by them in a very short time.

These repairs were, however, of course only effected in such cases as the conduct of military operations imperatively called for, but the destruction of other public works which did not call for such repairs will effectually embarrass the communication between the capital and the provinces, even for a long time after its surrender.

Under these circumstances it will be wholly impossible for the German Commanders to furnish a population of nearly 2,000,000 of people with means of subsistence even for a

single day ; the neighbourhood of Paris, exhausted as it will be by the drain of supplies which our armies are compelled to draw from it, will, to the extent of many days' march, be as little able to afford subsistence, and it will therefore even be impossible to convey the inhabitants away from Paris by the country roads.

The inevitable consequence of this will be that hundreds of thousands will die of starvation.

The French Rulers must be as fully aware of these consequences as the leaders of the German armies, who have now no alternative but to accept the challenge offered to them and to continue the war.

If therefore the French Rulers allow things to come to this pass, they are responsible for the consequences.

No. 192.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 11, 1870.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 6th instant, reporting conversations with M. de Chaudordy and M. Crémieux respecting the complaints of the French Government that France is abandoned by the neutral Powers ; and I have to acquaint you that Her Majesty's Government approve the language held by you to those Ministers.

If a similar opportunity should again be afforded you, you will point out that although you have received no instructions empowering you to give any opinion on the conditions of peace, yet that it is impossible not to see from a portion of my despatch of the 4th instant, in which I replied to the demands for active support made by the French Government, that Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that the rigid adherence by M. Favre, in the present circumstances of the war, to the conditions of yielding "no inch of territory nor stone of a fortress," is a great obstacle to peace.

If, in the course of conversation, any readiness should be shown to recede from the position taken up by the French Government, you will ask whether you have authority to state as much to Her Majesty's Government ; and in such a case you would immediately telegraph to me.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 193.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 12.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 7, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the "Moniteur Universel" of this day, a rectification of the Decree concerning the election of the Constituent Assembly.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 193.

Extract from the "Moniteur" of October 7, 1870.

Tours, le 6 Octobre, 1870.

Rectification au Décret relatif aux Elections de la Constituante, d'après le texte du "Bulletin des Lois."—Dans l'Article 2 lire : "Le nombre total des représentants du peuple sera de 753, au lieu de 750."

Supprimer le paragraphe 2 de l'Article 5, et remplacer dans l'Article 12 la date du 6 Octobre par celle du 10 Octobre.

Les trois Articles suivants, relatifs à l'Algérie et aux Colonies, doivent être ajoutés à la publication faite hier dans le "Moniteur" :—

Algérie et Colonies.

"L'élection pour l'Algérie aura lieu le Dimanche, 23 Octobre ; dans les Colonies elle

aura lieu le troisième Dimanche qui suivra la réception, dans chaque Colonie, du 'Moniteur Universel' publiant le Décret de Convocation, transcrit d'après le 'Bulletin des Lois.'

"Art. 15. Le nombre des Députés pour l'Algérie et les Colonies est fixé comme il suit:—

"Colonies—							
Algérie	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
Martinique	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Guadeloupe	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Guyane	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Sénégal	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Réunion	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
							14

"Art. 16. Toute disposition législative relative aux élections, et postérieure à la Loi des 15-18 Mars, 1859, est et demeure abrogée."

(Translation.)

Tours, October 6, 1870.

Rectification in the Decree relating to the Elections for the Constituent Assembly, from the text of the "Bulletin des Lois."—In Article 2 read:—"The total number of the Representatives of the people shall be 753, instead of 750."

Suppress paragraph 2 in Article 5, and in Article 12 substitute the date of October 10 for that of October 6.

The three following Articles relating to Algeria and the Colonies are to be added to the publication made yesterday in the "Moniteur":—

Algeria and Colonies.

"The election for Algeria shall be held on Sunday October 23; in the Colonies it shall be held on the third Sunday following the reception, in each Colony, of the 'Moniteur Universel' publishing the Decree of Convocation, transcribed from the 'Bulletin des Lois.'

"Art. 15. The number of the Deputies for Algeria and the Colonies is fixed as follows:—

"Colonies—							
Algeria	..	..	..	..	..	..	6
Martinique	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Guadeloupe	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
Guiana	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Senegal	..	..	..	..	..	..	1
Réunion	..	..	..	..	..	..	2
							14

"Art. 16. Every order relating to the elections, and posterior to the law of the 15th and 18th March, 1859, is and remains abrogated."

No. 194.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 12.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 8, 1870.

I HAD on yesterday morning the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch of the 1st instant, informing me of the decision of the Cabinet upon the request made by the present Government of France that it should be at once formally recognized by Her Majesty's Government.

In the afternoon I spoke to the Comte de Chaudordy in the sense of that despatch.

I reminded him of the language which your Lordship had held to M. Thiers on the subject, and informed him that your views were shared by the Cabinet in general.

The question had, I said, been considered by Her Majesty's Ministers in a spirit very friendly to the Government of France. They deemed it, however, to be proper to persevere in the course which they had hitherto pursued, as being in strict conformity with that which had been always followed by the British Government in analogous cases. The

present "Government of National Defence," though administering the affairs of France for the moment, itself declared that the voice of the country speaking in a Constituent Assembly could alone determine the form and character of the Government to be permanently established. Her Majesty's Government looked forward with hope to the early arrival of the day when France, having recognized a Government for herself, might justly expect its recognition by other Powers. In the meantime the good relations which Her Majesty's Government maintained with the existing Government of France would, in their opinion, answer every practical purpose. I reminded M. de Chaudordy of the unbroken series of friendly acts which had marked the conduct of Her Majesty's Government towards the Provisional Government of this country. I observed that the very day after that Government had been proclaimed, I had entered into intimate and confidential relations with M. Jules Favre. Not a day passed afterwards, until I left Paris, without my having at least one interview with him. I had, in pursuance of your Lordship's orders, spoken and acted throughout in the most friendly manner; and Her Majesty's Government had, at M. Favre's request, been the channel of communication between him and Prussia on more than one occasion, and had been mainly instrumental in preparing the way for his interview with Count Bismarck. I had, moreover, at the suggestion of M. Favre, come to Tours to place myself in communication with the delegation of the Government here, and Her Majesty's Government could hardly have manifested more plainly their desire to waive questions of mere form than by authorizing this step. My presence at Tours, and the cordial relations which, under your Lordship's orders, I maintained with those in authority here, were proofs patent to all the world of the desire of Her Majesty's Government to be on the best terms with France. All practical objects were, I said in conclusion, attained under existing circumstances by the present arrangement; and so soon as the French nation had established for itself a regular Government, the Queen's Ministers would be prepared to advise Her Majesty to enter into formal and official relations with that Government.

M. de Chaudordy said that it was with a view to the moral effect which it would produce at home and abroad that the formal recognition of the present Government had had been asked for. The question had, however, he observed, now lost much of its importance, as in a few days' time a Constituent Assembly would be held, which would be entitled to speak in the name of the French nation, and claim the recognition of foreign Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 195.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 12.)

(Extract.)

Tours, October 8, 1870.

YOUR Lordship's despatch of the 4th instant, conveying your answer to the request of the French Government for the active intervention of Great Britain in the contest with Prussia, reached me yesterday morning; and in the afternoon, in obedience to your Lordship's orders, I read it to the Comte de Chaudordy, and gave him a copy of it.

M. de Chaudordy was prepared for this communication by the Report from M. Tissot, which I mentioned in my despatch of the day before yesterday, and he made but little comment on your Lordship's despatch.

This afternoon, however, he returned to the subject of the intervention of the European Powers.

It was, he said, possible that there were terms upon which France and Prussia might agree, if they were proposed and insisted upon by the united voice of Europe, but which neither Power was now in a position to propose to the other. The absolute incompatibility of the conditions formally proclaimed by each party seemed to render it necessary that some common friend should step in, and lay down equitable terms to be acquiesced in by both. The Power which should do this would, in Count Chaudordy's opinion, entitle itself to the gratitude of mankind, and obtain for itself the leading authority in Europe. England and Russia were, he thought, each in a position to undertake the office, and Austria, Italy, Spain, and moreover the lesser Powers, would undoubtedly follow the lead. But, perhaps, the most suitable plan would be to put Italy forward. By this means all jealousy between the greater Powers would be avoided, and Italy would readily take the leading part, if assured of the support of the other Governments. Italy was, moreover, in some respects especially able to speak with authority, as she was the Power which, under

the present peculiar circumstances, would have least difficulty in supporting her views, if necessary, by arms. In order, however, that she should speak with effect, it would be necessary that she should be quite sure of the real and efficacious support of the other neutral Powers. By following the course he suggested, the Statesmen of Europe would, M. de Chaudordy thought, give proof of very great diplomatic skill.

I said to M. de Chaudordy that the only answer I could make to this suggestion was to refer him to the despatch from your Lordship which I had placed in his hands the day before.

No. 196.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 12.)

(Extract.)

Tours, October 8, 1870.

PRINCE METTERNICH, the Austrian Ambassador, told me this afternoon that he had received from his Government the answer to the request of the Provisional Government here for immediate recognition.

The answer appeared to be very similar to that made to the same request by Her Majesty's Government. Prince Metternich was particularly instructed to point out that by keeping a Diplomatic Representative of the highest rank in communication with the Provisional Government, the Government of Austria at once testified its friendship and esteem for that Government, and provided for the convenient discharge of all practical business.

No. 197.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 12.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 9, 1870.

M. GAMBETTA, a member of the Provisional Government and Minister of the Interior, having succeeded in getting safely out of Paris in a balloon, arrived here this morning.

The Comte de Chaudordy told me this afternoon that M. Gambetta had brought with him a positive order from the Government at Paris that the elections for a Constituent Assembly should be postponed indefinitely, and he added that a notice to that effect would appear in the "Moniteur" to-morrow.

I told M. de Chaudordy that although I could not help forming an opinion as to the effect this measure would have in the interior of France, it was not my province to give advice on this point, and therefore I would refrain from expressing what I thought. I could not, however, I said, conceal the regret with which I regarded the postponement of the convocation of a National Assembly from a diplomatic point of view. I was constantly asked to urge Her Majesty's Government to interpose, by negotiation at least, in order to obtain peace for France on reasonable terms. But what could be a greater obstacle to negotiation than the extraordinary and irregular state in which the administration of the affairs of France was allowed to remain? Who could speak in the name of the country, and offer terms or accept them? Not only was the origin of the Government simply (so to speak) fortuitous, but it was difficult to say what the Government of France was at this moment, or even where it was to be found. A part of it was at Paris, and a part of it was at Tours; the two parts had very scanty communication with each other, and it naturally followed that, as in the case before us, they were often at cross purposes. The Representatives of the principal neutral Powers of Europe had, at the suggestion of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, come to Tours, as the place in which they could best hold communication at the same time with their own Governments and the Government of France. But was there any one at Tours who could speak authoritatively in the name of the whole Government? Was there any one at Paris who could do so? Was there any authority in either or both places which could bind the French nation to any terms of peace? M. de Chaudordy well knew the pains I had taken to prevent as far as possible these anomalies from leading to practical inconvenience. I should not relax in my endeavours; but I could not help expressing my disappointment at the prolongation of a state of things which added so much to the difficulty of conducting any negotiation for arresting the war.

M. de Chaudordy said that it appeared to be thought at Paris that the whole

attention of the country should be given undividedly to military preparations; and that it was hoped that the addition of a man of M. Gambetta's energy and popularity to the Government Delegation here would infuse new vigour into it, and accelerate the formation of the armies on which the hopes of France must rest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 198.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 12, 1870.

ALTHOUGH I have already informed your Excellency confidentially, as I have also done M. Tissot, of certain communications which I had with General Bourbaki during his late visit to this country, I think it right to place on record in a more official form what passed between us.

I received on the evening of the 29th ultimo from General Bourbaki a letter dated the same day to the following effect:—

That a Frenchman assuming the name of Régnier, and bearing a pass for two or three persons, signed by Count Bismarck, presented himself to Marshal Bazaine on the 23rd of September, alleging that he was in possession of verbal instructions of the Empress, the object of which was that Marshal Canrobert or General Bourbaki should immediately be sent to her:

That M. Régnier declared, moreover, that the Prussian Government would make no objection to the departure of one of them, showing in proof the pass of which he was the bearer:

That Marshal Bazaine, believing this declaration, ordered General Bourbaki to set out, as Marshal Canrobert was unwell:

That on arriving at the outposts they found a Prussian Colonel, who had been waiting for them since the preceding day, and every facility was afforded to General Bourbaki to proceed to Belgium, from whence he arrived on the 28th in London:

That it was evident from the first words that he had exchanged with the Empress that they were the victims of proceedings and circumstances which were still inexplicable:

That Her Imperial Majesty had not given either directly or indirectly, either by writing or verbally, any order or instructions for Marshal Bazaine to any person whatever:

In this state of things General Bourbaki said, his military duty required that he should return to his soldiers and share their fate, and he requested me to intercede on his behalf with the King of Prussia to obtain for him a pass to return to his post. The King, he was sure, would understand the sentiment of honour which induced him to make this application, and would be unwilling that the conduct of a faithful soldier should be exposed to cruel and unjust interpretation.

I lost no time in communicating General Bourbaki's letter in original to Count Bernstorff, with a request that he would let me know whether I was to inform the writer that he would forward it to head-quarters. Count Bernstorff informed me that he would do so, and I was enabled by him on the 4th of this month to inform General Bourbaki that he had received the following telegram from Count Bismarck:—

"Prince Frederick Charles has been instructed to permit and facilitate General Bourbaki's return to his post at Metz, according to the General's wishes. M. Régnier appears to be a swindler, but seems to have honestly wished to serve the Empress Eugène in bringing Bourbaki to her."

General Bourbaki expressed himself, in reply, very grateful for the permission which had been given to him, and, I believe, soon afterwards left this country.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 199.

Earl Granville to Lord Bloomfield.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 12, 1870.

COUNT APPONYI has informed me of the answer returned by Count Beust to a request made of him by Count de Mosbourg on behalf of the Provisional Government of

France for the active support of Austria, even supposing that Russia should maintain her present attitude.

Count Beust reminded Count de Mosbourg that he had already, more than once, explained to the French Government the imperative reasons which forbade Austria to depart singly from her neutral attitude, and added that these motives continued to exist. They had been fully appreciated by the Emperor Napoleon's Government; and M. Jules Favre had himself recognized that the Austro-Hungarian Government was not in a position to show its sympathy for France otherwise than it had done. M. Thiers, in his interview with Count Beust, had also seemed thoroughly to understand the situation of the Cabinet of Vienna in view of the internal complications with which they had to deal, and to perceive what France might expect from them. Count Beust had had no hesitation in replying favourably to the requests made to him by M. Thiers, inasmuch as what he desired of Austria was in perfect conformity with the policy which she had followed since the commencement of hostilities. Beyond these limits the Austrian Government could not go; and they felt it their duty not to allow any illusions to exist in France on this point.

Count Beust went on to say that the Austrian Government ardently desired the re-establishment of a solid and honourable peace. They were ready to contribute their efforts to any which might be made by England and Russia with that object. They would be glad to see these two Powers take an initiative in this respect which circumstances did not allow Austria to attempt with the same chances of success. In their opinion, the torpor of Europe in presence of the war was a mistake much to be regretted; and they thought that, if the neutral Cabinets could come to an understanding for the interposition of their good offices, their voices might exercise a salutary influence. He had written in this sense to Count Apponyi, and had not concealed his conviction that the neutral Powers had a noble task before them in attempting to put an end to the calamities of the war as it was now being prosecuted. At the same time he felt that Austria was not in a position to play such a part herself, or to put herself forward on the occasion. She could only point out the line which she hoped other Powers would take, and declare herself ready to follow them. This the Cabinet of Vienna had not failed to do, and they would be happy if their language should have any effect.

In answer to a desire which M. de Mosbourg had also expressed in the name of his Government, that the French Republic should at once be recognized by the Powers, so that the present rulers of France might have greater moral authority whether for the purpose of negotiation with or of resistance to the enemy, Count Beust replied that, as he had already said to M. Thiers, the friendly dispositions of the Austro-Hungarian Government towards France were independent of the form of her administration. They had no hostile prejudice against the Republic, and they would not hesitate to recognize it officially so soon as it had been confirmed by a national vote. As yet, before the French people had been consulted and had pronounced itself, it would be contrary to international usage to anticipate the decision of the country.

As to the actual Government of France, they had recognized it as far as its entirely provisional nature admitted. Their diplomatic relations had not been interrupted for a single instant. They had left at Paris, and were maintaining at Tours, in the person of Prince Metternich, a Representative of the highest diplomatic rank. They had entertained, and would continue to entertain most willingly, any communications from the Government of National Defence exactly as if it were in the possession of the most regular authority. In thus acting, Count Beust thought the Cabinet of Vienna had given the greatest possible proof of the goodwill and confidence they entertained for the men whom events had placed in power in France. They did full justice to their patriotism and to the rectitude of their intentions. They recognized them such as they were, that is to say, as the *de facto* rulers of a State with which Austria desired to maintain relations of cordial friendship. But it was impossible to recognize them in any other character than that which they claimed for themselves; and they had been the first to admit that they could not be considered as a definitive Government legally constituted by the nation. The Austro-Hungarian Government did not, therefore, see how they could well change the nature of their actual relations with the Government of National Defence. Their attitude was the same as that of all the other Courts friendly to France; and they knew that England, among others, had replied in the same manner to a similar demand which had been addressed to her.

I thanked Count Apponyi for the early information which he had thus given me of the course pursued by his Government, and I expressed a hope that this frank communication would continue between us; adding that, although the reasons given by Count Beust in answer to the application of the French Government for active support were not identical with those used by Her Majesty's Government, and although there were observa-

tions made by his Excellency in which I did not concur, yet that it was satisfactory to see that the policy adopted by the two Governments was the same.

I said I was glad also to observe that the two Governments were perfectly agreed as to the recognition of the present Provisional Government of France.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 200.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, October 14, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note dated the 4th, but which was not received until the 9th instant, in which you express your regret that Her Majesty's Government did not succeed in tracing the 170 cases of arms which it had been reported to you were sent on the 6th ultimo from Birmingham to London, and state that you had been officially informed that they were taken on the 20th ultimo, by the "Otter" to Southampton.

I have in reply to state to you, that the official information in the possession of Her Majesty's Government is at variance with that which has been furnished to your Excellency. The "Otter," in her voyage to St. Malo, is reported to have taken a cargo of 1,000 rifles; but the 170 cases to which your Excellency refers are believed to have been dispatched from the Thames to a French port on board the "Argos."

As regards the statement made to you that the steam-tug "Middlesex," which cleared for Rotterdam with a cargo of arms, did not leave the Thames, but transferred her cargo to the "Blanche," I have to observe that not only has it been ascertained that the "Middlesex" did leave the Thames for her avowedly neutral destination, but it has been further ascertained that when on the high seas she altered her course and eventually delivered her cargo at Havre.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 201.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 15.)

(Extract.)

Tours, October 13, 1870.

I HAD yesterday the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram of the evening before, in which you were so good as to express your approval of the assurances I had given to the French Government that Her Majesty's Government would rejoice at nothing more than at being instrumental in bringing about a satisfactory and honourable peace, and were on the watch for a moment at which they could act with effect for this purpose.

In the same telegram your Lordship also desired me to take advantage of any favourable opportunity which might occur, of pointing out to the French Government that the rigid adherence to their declaration, that not an inch of their territory nor a stone of their fortresses should be given up, was a serious obstacle to peace; and lastly you instructed me to inform you at once by telegraph, if I should be authorized by the French Government to state to Her Majesty's Government that they were prepared to recede from this declaration.

I never lose an opportunity of sounding the French Government on their intentions, and of endeavouring to elicit from them some assurance which may open the door to a serious negotiation for peace. I have not hitherto had much success.

The public official announcement of the Government to the French people and to foreign Powers continues to be—"Ni un pouce de notre territoire, ni une pierre de nos forteresses."

The ground they take up is, that France is not in a position to make any overtures whatever for peace. Their desire is, that the neutral Powers, or one of them, shall step in and lay down such conditions of peace as may be deemed equitable, and insist upon the belligerents accepting them. By equitable terms, they always understand terms maintaining the integrity of the French territory. They insinuate that, under a pressure from the neutral Powers, they might agree to other sacrifices; but they declare in private as in public that they will never consent to any cession of territory.

Thus the French do not admit that their military reverses have reduced them to such a state of weakness as to oblige them to purchase peace by territorial sacrifices ; while the Prussians appear to maintain that it is of great importance to Germany to retain a portion of the provinces she has occupied in France, and to be convinced that their military success will enable them to do so. So long ,therefore, as the relative military position of the belligerents remains what it is, the prospect of bringing them to an agreement by the simple exertion of friendly good offices on the part of the neutral Powers is not very hopeful.

It is indeed possible that some impression may be made by the personal report of his visits to the Courts of Europe which will be made by M. Thiers, who is expected to arrive here from Florence in a few days. I need not say that I shall be anxiously on the look-out, in the hopes of discovering some opening through which practical negotiation for peace may be brought into play.

No. 202.

Earl Granville to Sir A. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, October 16, 1870.

THE state of affairs between France and Prussia is so critical that Her Majesty's Government have been anxiously considering whether it might not be possible to take some step in the cause of peace.

There is some reason to suppose that the Provisional Government of France would agree to Metz and Strasburg being razed ; and the question suggests itself whether Germany will insist upon obtaining from France, as the price of peace, the concessions that she has already demanded.

I should wish your Excellency confidentially to inquire of Prince Gortchakoff, whether in his opinion it would be possible for England and Russia to come, generally, to an understanding between themselves as to the terms on which peace might be made ; and if his answer should be in the affirmative on that point, you would further ask him whether he considers there would be any possibility of putting a stop to the siege of Paris, if England and Russia, jointly with other neutral Powers, should make an appeal to the humanity of the King of Prussia on the one hand, and recommend moderation to the French Government on the other.

As this is of great importance, I have already conveyed to you by telegraph the substance of this instruction.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 203.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville:—(Received October 17.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, October 12, 1870.

M. THIERS arrived here from St. Petersburg on Friday night, and left for Florence on Tuesday. He had a long interview with Count Beust, and subsequently an audience of the Emperor, and saw many of the leading people here.

He was well received, and perfectly satisfied with the attentions shown to him. The Emperor appears to have expressed to M. Thiers the lively interest he took in the affairs of France, but to have given him to understand that, as to the policy to be followed, the interests of Austria would be his guide.

Count Beust has held the same opinions to him, and discouraged his entertaining any thought of obtaining material support from Austria.

No. 204.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville:—(Received October 17.)

My Lord,

Vienna, October 12, 1870.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch of the 3rd instant, on the subject of the two Circulars addressed by Count Bismarck to the Diplomatic Representatives

of the North German Confederation, I have stated to Count Beust that, in communicating to your Lordship the Circular of the 13th, Count Bernstorff had not sought to elicit any expression of opinion upon it from Her Majesty's Government, but that you had requested the Ambassador not to infer from the silence of Her Majesty's Government that they concurred in Count Bismarck's views.

Count Beust said he had received these two communications without remarking on their contents.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 205.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, October 17, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the despatch of Count Bismarck, dated the 1st instant, which your Excellency has been so good as to communicate to me, denying the accuracy of the language which a Proclamation of the French Government at Tours alleges to have been used by Count Bismarck, in conversation with M. Jules Favre.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 206.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, October 17, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of a Circular despatch of your Government, which your Excellency was so good as to communicate to me on the 11th instant, calling attention to the results to be expected if the surrender of Paris should be postponed until rendered necessary by impending famine.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 207.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 18.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 16, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copies, which I have just received, of two documents which appear to be Circulars, addressed by the Comte de Chaudordy, as Delegate of the Minister for Foreign Affairs, to the French Representatives abroad.

The one dated the 8th October is a reply to the statements in Count Bismarck's Circulars of the 13th and 16th September, respecting the aggressive policy of France in times past and present towards Germany.

The second is an answer to Count Bismarck's observations on the assertion in the Proclamation issued by the Government here on the 24th September, that Prussia declared that she would continue the war and reduce France to the state of a second-rate Power.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 208.

Circular addressed by M. de Chaudordy to French Representatives abroad.

Monsieur,

Tours, le 8 Octobre, 1870.

M. DE BISMARCK a adressé, le 13 et le 16 Septembre derniers, aux Agents Diplomatiques de la Confédération du Nord deux circulaires destinées à justifier aux yeux de l'Europe les exigences de la Prusse. Les arguments du Chancelier, qu'il a reproduits

ensuite à Ferrières dans ses entretiens avec M. Jules Favre, portent en substance que si la Prusse veut annexer des territoires, ce n'est pas par esprit de conquête, mais uniquement pour assurer à l'Allemagne une paix solide et la prémunir contre les attaques dont elle a été de tout temps l'objet de la part de la France. Il veut, dit-il, mettre l'Allemagne à l'abri des incursions d'un voisin belliqueux dont les ambitions n'ont cessé depuis des siècles de menacer la sécurité et l'indépendance des populations Germaniques.

Ce n'est pas la première fois que M. de Bismarck prête à ceux qu'il désire frapper les projets qu'il nourrit lui-même. Nous ne saurions admettre ni les prémisses qu'il pose ni les conséquences qu'il en déduit. La France n'est point ce qu'il la veut faire. Un coup d'œil partial jeté sur son histoire ne permet pas de la juger. Reprenons les faits et cherchons ce que la France a voulu depuis un siècle ; cette période est suffisante pour faire connaître l'esprit d'un peuple.

C'est le devoir des nations de rester solidaires de leur passé ; mais cette solidarité n'engage que leur honneur, et le progrès serait pour elles un mot vide de sens si elles étaient condamnés à marcher toujours dans les voies où les ont engagées des intérêts disparus ou des passions désormais sans objet. La France contemporaine ne ressemble pas plus au pays gouverné par Louis XIV que l'Allemagne d'aujourd'hui ne rappelle le Saint Empire. La guerre de conquête était, à cette époque, sinon dans le droit, au moins dans l'usage commun des monarchies. La Révolution de 1789 eut pour conséquence un changement de politique : la paix est une condition nécessaire à la liberté. La France se fit un idéal nouveau : assez forte désormais pour être indépendante, elle chercha moins à dominer les peuples qu'à les éclairer de son exemple. Ce qu'elle venait de faire en Amérique pour les Etats Unis, elle était prête à le recommencer en Europe.

Cette lumière qui se répandait alors autour d'elle, qui s'efforça de l'éteindre ? qui s'arma pour arrêter dans son premier essor le génie de la Révolution Française ? Nulle habileté de langage, nulle argutie historique, ne prévaudra contre ce fait ; la Révolution de 1789 ouvrait une ère nouvelle et rompait les traditions du passé ; la Prusse fut la première à la combattre.

L'invasion de 1792 marque le début de ces rivalités funestes qui devaient aboutir au malheur d'aujourd'hui. La France repoussa l'agression ; mais elle fut entraînée, nous le reconnaissons, au-delà des représailles légitimes. Elle avait subi des injures cruelles, elle se laissa étourdir par l'ivresse de la victoire. Jéna fut une revanche. Leipzig et Waterloo la suivirent et rappelèrent aux Français que s'il est permis à un peuple de renoncer pour un temps à sa propre indépendance, il ne saurait impunément porter atteinte à celle des autres nations.

La France cependant répara ses malheurs et se reconquit elle-même. A partir du moment où il devint impossible de l'engager sans son aven, quelle guerre a-t-elle provoquée ? Où voit-on éclater cet esprit d'ambition et cette ardeur conquérante que M. de Bismarck nous attribue ? Qui plus que nous pendant ces années bienfaisantes contribuait en Europe au maintien de la paix ? La France avait durement expié les fautes du premier Empire. Quelqu'entravées que fussent encore les idées modernes, leur influence si fit sentir de plus en plus dans la politique extérieure du pays. Partout où il y eut un peuple à délivrer, des libertés à défendre, une grandeur morale à conquérir, la France se trouva prête. La Restauration combattit pour la Grèce, la Monarchie de Juillet assura l'indépendance de la Belgique. Et ces idées s'étaient affermies à ce point dans la conscience de la nation que le second Empire comprit qu'il devait compter avec elle et proclamait hautement qu'il apportait la paix.

La France le crut. L'Empire cependant avait besoin du prestige militaire, et il le rechercha. Mais les guerres qu'il entreprit eurent un caractère bien différent de celles de Napoléon I ; car, s'il remonta par moments le courant pacifique que la nation tenait à suivre, il ne brisa pas avec les principes qu'elle avait adoptés. En Crimée, la France combattit avec deux peuples libres pour l'indépendance de la Turquie. Ce fut pour délivrer une nation amie que nos armées franchirent les Alpes en 1859. L'aventure Mexicaine elle-même, blâmée et combattue si énergiquement, et avec raison, par le parti Libéral, n'avait pu être expliquée qu'au moyen de théories, chimériques il est vrai, mais qui répudiaient d'avance toute pensée de conquête.

Qu'y a-t-il de commun entre ces principes, consacrés par une pratique de plus d'un demi-siècle, sous quatre régimes différents, et la politique de "fer et de sang" qui, depuis 1864, s'est déchaînée sur l'Europe ? Quel acte ou quelle parole de la France peuvent l'en rendre solidaire ? Qui a spolié le Danemark, — contraint ouvertement l'Autriche à la guerre, annexé violemment le Hanovre, la Hesse, Francfort, &c., réveillé toutes les passions endormies et troublé si profondément l'Europe ? La France n'est intervenue dans ces crises que pour hâter la paix et l'affermir.

On parle des ardeurs belliqueuses de la nation et des jalousies mesquines qu'auraient

excitées chez elle les victoires de la Prusse. Mais au lendemain de Sadowa, lors de l'incident irritant du Luxembourg, l'opinion en France se prononça nettement contre la guerre, et les publicistes Allemands eux-mêmes ont été forcés de le reconnaître : la modération se trouva de notre côté.

Lorsqu'enfin la guerre éclata, au mois de Juillet dernier, qui pouvait nier que la Prusse n'eût tout fait depuis quatre ans pour arriver à ce but ? Sans parler de sa conduite politique et de l'inexécution bien volontaire du Traité de Prague, elle était formidablement armée et prête, en huit jours, à entrer en campagne. Les événements ont montré jusqu'à quel point ses préparatifs, entrepris de longue main, avaient été poussés ; on sait trop au contraire combien ils avaient été négligés par la France. Non seulement les armements de la Prusse étaient complets, mais ses alliances étaient conclues. Il est évident qu'elle pensait à nous attirer dans un redoutable conflit.

Nous pouvons parler librement de cette guerre, car les membres du Gouvernement actuel ont tout fait pour en éviter les horreurs au pays. Nous le disons hautement : malgré la conduite de la Prusse, la raison même de la lutte n'était pas justifiée, et M. de Bismarck ne saurait sérieusement retourner contre nous les déclarations de quelques écrivains et les manifestations turbulentes de foules exaltées. C'étaient là des actes isolés, sans écho dans le pays, et qu'on ne dépassaient point la portée des agitations confuses que toute émotion publique soulève dans les grandes villes. M. de Bismarck connaît la valeur de ces choses. Quel est d'ailleurs le peuple qui ne se laisse facilement entraîner au premier cri de guerre ? Les Gouvernements sont toujours assurés de provoquer l'enthousiasme quand ils promettent la gloire et les triomphes. C'est pour cela que leur responsabilité est si grande. Mais, au premier échec, lorsqu'ils ne marchent pas avec l'opinion, leur chute est inévitable. Ce résultat s'est aussi bien reproduit sous le second que sous le premier Empire. L'un et l'autre devaient succomber, car les entreprises qu'ils poursuivaient étaient injustes.

Quant à l'affirmation de M. de Bismarck que l'Empire aurait eu la main forcée par l'opinion publique, les événements lui infligent un absolu démenti. Consultées lors des élections législatives de 1869, les populations avaient affirmé de la façon la plus énergique leur amour de la paix. Les mêmes tendances s'accusèrent et très explicitement lors du plébiscite du 8 Mai, 1870, et à tel point que deux mois après le Gouvernement dut, pour la première fois depuis bien des années, réduire le contingent de l'armée. Cette concession, exigée par l'état des esprits, prouve avec toute l'évidence d'un fait combien au mois de Juillet la France était éloignée de toute idée belliqueuse. Le renouvellement des Conseils Généraux avait encore, peu de temps auparavant, fourni aux mêmes aspirations une occasion nouvelle de se manifester. Mais nous possédons un document officiel qui prouve de la manière la plus formelle que loin d'avoir été entraîné par l'opinion, l'Empire s'inquiétait au contraire sérieusement de savoir s'il serait suivi par elle. Il était si peu convaincu de lui obéir en déclarant la guerre qu'il crut devoir l'interroger expressément sur ce sujet. Les Préfets reçurent l'ordre de rendre compte au Ministère de l'Intérieur des impressions causées par cette brusque nouvelle dans les Départements. Leurs réponses publiées depuis lors, dans le "Journal Officiel" du 2 Octobre, ne laissent prise à aucun doute :—

"Le premier mouvement a été l'étonnement et la surprise," écrivait un Préfet. D'autres disaient : "Cette nouvelle éclatant au milieu d'un calme profond a causé une vive émotion." "La guerre est considérée comme un tel fléau qu'on ne veut pas y croire." Le désir ardent de maintenir la paix se faisait jour de toutes parts. "Je crois qu'au fond on redoute la guerre," écrivait-on d'un des Départements les plus peuplés et les plus éclairés. "Personne," disait un autre Préfet, "ne désire la guerre, dût-elle être le dérivatif du grand malaise social qui traverse le pays." "Ce pays veut la paix," écrivait-on encore ; "il n'accepterait une guerre qu'avec répugnance." Et ailleurs : "La population ne veut certainement pas la guerre et désire ardemment la paix." Partout éclatait ce sentiment, que l'on n'accepterait la guerre que si elle était nécessaire à l'honneur du pays. Mais on se rattachait avec empressement aux dernières espérances de paix. Lorsqu'il sera prouvé, écrit un Préfet, que tout a été tenté inutilement pour arriver à ce résultat, on se décidera à subir les conséquences d'une collision dont on s'effraye.

On pourrait multiplier ces citations. Sur 89 rapports de Préfets, 11 seulement mentionnent une approbation complète. Tous les autres trahissent les mêmes préoccupations ou les mêmes répugnances. C'est donc un fait incontestable ; le pays subissait la guerre ; il ne l'avait pas appelée. Ainsi, il demeure établi que la France ne menaçait pas l'intégrité de l'Allemagne ; son histoire depuis plus d'un demi-siècle le prouve à toutes ses pages. Elle ne méditait point de conquêtes. Des aspirations tout opposées l'animaient. Et en effet, lors même que son génie ne l'y pousserait pas, le sentiment le plus clair de ses intérêts l'obligerait à se maintenir dans une voie pacifique. La nature de la fortune

publique a changé depuis le commencement du siècle. L'immense développement de la richesse mobilière, l'importance capitale du crédit, font de la confiance dans le maintien de la paix la condition nécessaire de la prospérité du pays. La France s'est engagée la première dans le système des libertés commerciales, et elle a ainsi rendu sa fortune solidaire de celle des peuples voisins.

Telle est la nation contre les incursions de laquelle M. de Bismarck veut protéger l'Allemagne, et dont le démembrement territorial lui semble la seule garantie efficace de la tranquillité du peuple Allemand. La ligne du Rhin, selon lui, n'est plus suffisante ; il veut la ligne des Vosges et de la Moselle. Il lui faut aujourd'hui l'Alsace et la Lorraine, et cela au moment même où l'Allemagne vient de transformer complètement sa constitution intérieure. Après 1815, l'Europe, redoutant déjà la force d'expansion du peuple Germanique, s'était efforcée de lui donner une constitution dont les bases étaient exclusivement organisées pour la défensive, et la France, bien que les Traités de Vienne fussent dirigés contre elle, fut laissée dans l'état où elle se trouve encore. Sa frontière du nord vis-à-vis de l'Allemagne est entièrement ouverte. Les résultats de la guerre actuelle en fournissent une preuve indiscutable. Et tandis que la France n'a rien modifié dans son organisation, l'Allemagne s'est constituée à l'état le plus redoutable qu'une Puissance ait jamais atteint : unité militaire absolue, action personnelle et directe du chef qui porte l'épée de commandement, service militaire obligatoire pour tous. Nous le demandons, qui de la France ou de l'Allemagne est maintenant menaçante ?

Pas plus en 1870 qu'en 1792 la Prusse n'a eu besoin de se garder contre les attaques de la France. Il est hors de doute que le Gouvernement Prussien cherche plutôt des facilités offensives que de meilleures lignes de défense. On ne voit pas bien en effet en quoi l'Allemagne serait mieux protégée parce que sa frontière serait plus loin. En cas d'invasion le pays occupé serait alors le territoire annexé à l'Allemagne, et le théâtre des hostilités serait simplement porté d'une province dans une autre. Et quel serait le résultat de ces annexions violentes de territoires qui ne veulent pas cesser d'être Français ? Sans parler du sentiment qui répugne à tout esprit honnête de voir ainsi des populations subir une nationalité contraire à leurs aspirations et à leur passé, ce serait perpétuer la guerre. N'est-il pas impossible en effet que le cœur de la France puisse jamais se détacher de contrées que tant de malheurs si noblement supportés et tant de sang si glorieusement versé unissent à elle par des liens indestructibles ? Le trouble qui en serait la conséquence agiterait l'Europe sans qu'il lui fût possible d'espérer dès lors un moment de repos. On le voit clairement, en posant de telles prétentions, en demandant des concessions pareilles, M. de Bismarck prépare lui-même les guerres nouvelles qui lui sont nécessaires pour atteindre le but où l'entraîne une ambition sans frein.

Ce que veut le peuple Allemand, c'est l'unité nationale et la liberté politique. La France libérale ne saurait s'y opposer. C'est une cause juste, et nous renierions notre passé si nous la combattions. Mais il y a un abîme entre ces aspirations légitimes et la doctrine formulée et appliquée par M. de Bismarck. Si l'on considère les événements accomplis en Europe depuis six ans, il faut reconnaître que la Prusse a pris elle-même le rôle qu'elle nous attribue avec tant d'injustice. Il n'est plus possible de conserver un doute à cet égard après l'accueil fait par M. de Bismarck à la noble démarche de M. Jules Favre. Si la France succombe, c'est la guerre menaçant de nouveau l'Europe, paralysant tout essor de la pensée, toute civilisation, tout progrès de la prospérité des peuples. La France ne lutte pas seulement pour l'intégrité de son territoire, son honneur et son indépendance, elle combat aussi pour le maintien de l'équilibre en Europe.

Recevez, &c.

• (Signé) CHAUDORDY.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Tours, October 8, 1870.

COUNT BISMARCK forwarded on the 13th and 16th ultimo to the Diplomatic Agents of the North German Confederation abroad two Circulars destined to justify, in the eyes of Europe, the pretensions of Prussia. The arguments of the Chancellor, which he subsequently presented anew at Ferrières in his interview with M. Jules Favre, tend to prove that if Prussia desires the annexation of territories, it is not in a spirit of conquest, but merely to guarantee to Germany a solid peace, and to forearm her against attacks which have always been directed against her by France. He desired, he said, to protect Germany against the invasions of a warlike neighbour, whose ambition had not ceased for centuries to threaten the security and independence of the German population.

It is not the first time that M. de Bismarck has attributed to those he desires to strike designs which he himself entertains. Nor can we admit either the premisses he lays

down or the deductions he draws therefrom. France is not what he wishes to describe her, nor does a partial glance at her history allow an opinion to be formed in reference to her.

Let us review the facts and see what has been the desire of France during the last century. That period is sufficient to make known the real feeling of a people.

It is the duty of nations to be responsible for their past, but this liability does not engage their honour, and progress would be for them a word devoid of meaning were they condemned to walk always in the path in which they have been led by interests which have disappeared, or by passions henceforth without object. Contemporary France is no more like the country governed by Louis XIV than Germany of 1870 resembles the Holy Roman Empire. A war of conquest was then, if not within the rights, at any rate within the common usage, of monarchies. The Revolution of 1789 effected as its result an alteration in politics. Peace is a necessary condition of liberty. France at that time made for herself a new ideal; feeling herself henceforward strong enough to remain an independent nation she sought less to rule the peoples than to enlighten them by her own example. What she had just done in America for the United States she was ready to do again in Europe. Who was it who sought to extinguish that light which France was then diffusing around? Who was it who took up arms to stop in its earliest stages the genius of the French Revolution? No verbal skill, no historical quibble will ever prevail against the fact that the Revolution of 1789 was the opening of a new era and the breaking-up of the traditions of the past: Prussia was the first to fight against it.

The invasion of 1792 initiated those baleful rivalries which were to lead to the present calamity. France repelled the aggressors, but she was carried away, we confess, beyond the limits of legitimate reprisals. She had suffered cruel injuries, she allowed herself to be intoxicated by victory. Jena was the revenge. This was followed by Leipsig and Waterloo, which reminded Frenchmen that if one people was permitted to give up its own independence for a time it could not, with impunity, strike a blow against that of other nations.

France, however, recovered from her misfortunes and conquered herself again. From the time when it became impossible that she should be involved without her own assent what war did she provoke? Where was to be seen that spirit of ambition and that desire for conquest which M. de Bismarck imputes to us? Who in Europe during those bountiful years co-operated more eagerly than we did in the preservation of peace? France had cruelly expiated the faults committed by the First Empire. Modern ideas, trammelled as they still were, exercised an influence which made itself felt more and more in the foreign policy of the country. Wherever there was a people to be rescued, liberties to be defended, a moral grandeur to be acquired, France was found ready to act. The Government of the Restoration went to arms for Greece, the Monarchy of July secured the independence of Belgium. Those ideas had obtained such a hold over the national conscience that the Second Empire understood that it must take them into account, and emphatically declared that it would bring peace.

France believed it. The Empire, however, wanted military prestige, and sought to acquire it; but the wars which it undertook were of a very different nature from those of Napoleon I. For if, occasionally, the Empire opposed the peaceful current of the nation, it did not deviate from the principles which France had adopted as her own. In the Crimea, France, in conjunction with two free nations, fought for the independence of Turkey. It was in order to rescue a friendly nation that our armies crossed the Alps in 1859. The Mexican adventure itself, which the Liberal Party so emphatically and rightly blamed, and so energetically opposed, could be explained only by means of theories which, although chimerical, at least repudiated beforehand all idea of conquest. What connection is there between those principles consecrated by the practice of more than half a century, under four different *régimes*, and the "blood and iron" policy which, since 1864, has been let loose over Europe? What act or what word of France can render her its accomplice? Who despoiled Denmark? Who openly compelled Austria to make war? Who violently annexed Hanover, Hesse, Frankfort, &c., stirred up again all the passions that had been dormant, and who so profoundly disturbed Europe? Throughout those crises France intervened only to hasten and consolidate peace. Mention is made of the warlike tendencies of the nation and of mean jealousies which the Prussian victories had kindled amongst her people. But on the morrow of Sadowa, at the time of the irritating occurrence about Luxemburg, public opinion in France clearly manifested itself against war, and the German publicists themselves were obliged to confess the fact. Moderation was found on our side.

Lastly, when the war broke out in the month of July last, who could deny that Prussia had been doing all she could for the last four years in order to attain this end? Without

insisting on her political conduct or on her wilful neglect to execute the Treaty of Prague, suffice it to say that she was formidably armed and ready within eight days to enter the field. Events have shown how far she had been for a long time pushing on her preparations. How much France, on the contrary, had neglected her preparations is but too well known. Not only were the armaments of Prussia complete, but her alliances had been concluded. Evidently her intentions were to drag us into a formidable conflict.

We can freely speak of this war, for the members of the present Government did everything in their power to avert its horrors from the country. We emphatically declare, in spite of the conduct of Prussia, the motive itself of the struggle was not justified, and M. de Bismarck cannot seriously retort against us the declarations of some writers and the turbulent manifestations of excited crowds. These were individual acts, which found no echo in the country, and which had no further importance than those confused agitations which every public excitement arouses in large cities. M. de Bismarck well knows the value of those things. And besides, where is the people who does not easily yield to excitement at the first war cry? Governments are always certain to rouse enthusiasm whenever they promise glory and triumphs. This is why their responsibility is so great. But at a first defeat, if they are not in harmony with public opinion, their downfall is inevitable. This has been the result under the Second as well as under the First Empire. Both were doomed to succumb because the enterprises which they pursued were unjust. M. de Bismarck's assertion that the Empire has been compelled by public opinion to act as it did is absolutely contradicted by the events themselves. When consulted on the occasion of the legislative elections of 1869 the French people most energetically asserted their love of peace. At the plebiscite of the 8th May, 1870, the same tendencies were evidenced in a very explicit way, so much so that two months later the Government was obliged for the first time for many years to reduce the army contingent. This concession, demanded by public opinion, proves by the clear evidence of fact how far France was, in the month of July last, from meditating any warlike design. The re-election of the Councils-General a short time previously had again offered an opportunity for the manifestation of the same dispositions. But we are in possession of an official document which affords the most positive proof that, far from having been led by public opinion, the Empire was, on the contrary, seriously anxious to know whether it would be followed by it. So little convinced was the Imperial Government that, in declaring war, it was only obeying public opinion, that it considered itself obliged expressly to make inquiries on the subject. The Prefects were ordered to send to the Ministry of the Interior an account of the impressions caused in the Departments by the sudden news. Their replies, which were afterwards published in the "Journal Officiel" of the 2nd of October, do not allow of any doubt. "The first impression has been amazement and surprise," wrote a Prefect. Others said, "This news breaking out in the midst of a profound tranquillity has caused a considerable excitement." "War is considered to be such a scourge that people will not believe that it is coming." The ardent wish to preserve peace appeared everywhere. "I believe that, in reality, war is dreaded;" so wrote the Prefect of one of the most populous and enlightened Departments. "Nobody," said another, "wishes for war, even were it a derivative from the great social uneasiness which pervades the country." "This country wishes for peace," so one wrote again; "it would accept war reluctantly." And elsewhere, "The population certainly do not wish to have war; they ardently desire for peace." Everywhere the sentiment broke forth that war would be accepted only if necessary for the honour of the country. But the people earnestly caught at every hope of peace up to the last moment. "When it is proved," so writes a Prefect, "that everything has been uselessly attempted to attain this object, people will make up their minds to suffer the consequences of a collision which they are now dreading."

The number of these quotations could easily be increased. Out of the Reports of eighty-nine Prefects only eleven state that complete assent prevails. All the others reveal the same anxiety or the same reluctance. It is therefore an indisputable fact that the country submitted to war, but did not call for it.

Thus the proof stands that France was not menacing the integrity of Germany, as every page of her history for the last half century testifies. She was not meditating conquests. Her aspirations went in a quite opposite direction; and, in fact, even were she not urged thereto by her genius, the most evident considerations of her interests would compel her to follow a peaceful path. The public wealth has been changed in its nature since the beginning of this century. The immense development of moveable property, the great importance of credit, make confidence in the maintenance of peace a necessary condition of the prosperity of the country. France has been the first to adopt the system of commercial freedom, and she has thus associated her prosperity with that of her neighbours.

Such is the nation against whose incursions M. de Bismarck wishes to protect Germany, and whose territorial dismemberment appears to him to be the sole efficient guarantee for the tranquillity of the German people. The line of the Rhine, according to him, is no longer sufficient. He wants the line of the Vosges and the Moselle, and he now requires Alsace and Lorraine, at the very moment when Germany has just completely altered her internal constitution. After 1815, Europe, already dreading the expansive strength of the Germanic race, exerted herself to give it a constitution, the bases of which were calculated for defensive aims only; and France, although the Vienna Treaties were directed against her, was left in the state in which she still is. Her frontier on the north side, bordering on Germany, is entirely open. The events of the present war are an indisputable evidence of that fact. And whilst France has made no alteration in her organisation, Germany has transformed herself into the strongest State ever reached by any Power, viz., an absolute military unity, a personal and direct action of the chief who commands, and a military service obligatory upon all. We ask whether France or Germany is now a menacing Power?

Prussia needs no more in 1870 than in 1792 to guard herself against attacks from France. Beyond all doubt the Prussian Government is seeking facilities for offensive designs rather than better defensive lines. How Germany would be better protected by advancing her frontier is not, indeed, easily explained. In case of an invasion the occupied territory would then be the territory annexed to Germany, and the seat of hostilities would be merely transferred from one province into another. And what would be the result of those violent annexations of territories which do not desire to cease to be French? Not to mention the reluctant feeling with which every honest man would see populations annexed to a nationality not in accordance with their aspirations and their past, it would perpetuate war. In fact, can the heart of France ever detach itself from countries which so many misfortunes nobly endured, and so much blood gloriously shed have united to her by indestructible ties? The consequence would be so disturbed a state of affairs that Europe could not henceforth hope for a single moment of rest. It is clearly to be seen that M. de Bismarck, whilst putting forth such pretensions, and asking for such concessions, is himself preparing other wars which are necessary for his attaining the aim to which he is led by an unbridled ambition. The German people wishes for its national unity and political liberty, and liberal France has no objection to that. It is a just cause, and we should deny our own past if we opposed it. But an abyss separates those legitimate aspirations from the doctrine advocated and practised by M. de Bismarck. If the events which have been accomplished in Europe during the last six years are considered it must be acknowledged that Prussia herself has assumed the part which she so unjustly attributes to us. It is no longer possible to entertain a doubt on this subject after the manner in which M. de Bismarck responded to the noble step taken by M. Jules Favre. Should France succumb, Europe would again be threatened by war, which will paralyse all spread of thought and civilization, all increase in the prosperity of nations. France is not only struggling for the integrity of her territory, for her honour and independence—she is also fighting for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe.

Receive, &c.
(Signed) CHAUDORDY.

Inclosure 2 in No. 207.

Circular addressed by M. de Chaudordy to French Representatives abroad.

Monsieur,

Tours, le 10 Octobre, 1870.

NOUS trouvons à la date du 7 de ce mois dans le "Times," journal qui est l'organe habituel de la politique de M. le Comte de Bismarck, une dépêche, datée de Ferrières, 1 Octobre, dans laquelle le Chancelier de la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord réfute l'expression dont s'est servie la Délégation de Tours lorsqu'elle a dit que, d'après le résumé des conversations qui ont eu lieu entre M. Jules Favre et M. de Bismarck, celui-ci voulait réduire la France à l'état de Puissance de second ordre.

Le Chancelier entre à ce propos dans l'examen du chiffre de la population Française, et rappelant la réunion de la Savoie et de Nice à notre territoire, il fait observer qu'en défalquant la population de ces contrées, notre pays perdrait environ 750,000 habitants dans le cas où l'Alsace et la Lorraine lui seraient arrachés. Dans cette situation, ajoutait-il, une Puissance comprenant 38,000,000 d'âmes n'est pas une Puissance de seconde ordre.

Sans vouloir nous appesantir sur cette triste énumération de populations que l'on veut

séparer contre leur gré du sol national, et dont on parle comme on oserait à peine le faire de peuplades encore sauvages, nous dirons qu'en présence de l'agrandissement nouveau qu'obtiendrait ainsi l'Allemagne et alors que la force de notre frontière serait de plus en plus diminuée et même entièrement détruite, il est incontestable que la France passerait immédiatement à l'état de Puissance de second ordre. D'autres pays peuvent ne pas s'apercevoir qu'ils subiraient du même coup un sort semblable. Quant à nous, nous ne nous y trompons pas.

Ce que gagne une nation par le fait d'un agrandissement territorial consenti par un Etat voisin devenu tout à coup puissant est de peu d'importance, et n'égale souvent pas l'absence de sécurité qui en résulte pour sa frontière ; ce qu'elle perd, au contraire, par l'effet de la conquête violente que lui inflige un ennemi vainqueur et désormais menaçant lui ôte à la fois son prestige moral, sa force matérielle, et son repos. De lors, cette Puissance est en déclin. Celle est la situation dont il faut se rendre compte si l'on veut suivre M. de Bismarck dans la comparaison qu'il établit entre l'annexion à la France de la Savoie et de Nice votée par les habitants et la séparation de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine contre leur volonté.

Voici, du reste, ce qu'a écrit M. Jules Favre en réponse aux observations faites sur son rapport par le Chancelier de la Confédération de l'Allemagne du Nord. "Je veux," a dit M. de Bismarck textuellement, "un fort dominant Paris, comme par exemple le Mont Valérien ;" et le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France ajoute, "Ce qu'il veut, c'est nous détruire." Tel est le résumé précis de l'impression que M. Jules Favre a rapportée de ses entretiens de Ferrières. On peut juger par là si l'expression de "Puissance de second ordre" est au-dessous de la vérité.

Recevez, &c.
(Signé) CHAUDORDY.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Tours, October 10, 1870.

WE find in the "Times" of the 7th instant (a journal which is the habitual organ of Count Bismarck's policy) a despatch from Ferrières, dated October 1, in which the Chancellor of the North German Confederation refutes the terms used by the Tours Delegation, when it said that, from the substance of the conversations exchanged between M. Jules Favre and Count Bismarck, it was evident that the latter was desirous to reduce France to the rank of a second-rate Power.

The Chancellor thereupon analyses the census in France, and, referring to the annexation of Savoy and Nice to our territory, observes that, deducting the population of these countries, France would lose about 750,000 inhabitants, should Alsace and Lorraine be wrested from her. In which case, he adds, a country of 38,000,000 of souls is not a second-rate Power.

Without wishing to dwell on the sad enumeration of the population which they desire to sever from the national soil against their will, and which are mentioned in a manner which one would scarcely dare to employ in speaking of uncivilized tribes, we shall say that in view of the new aggrandisement which Germany would thus obtain, and when the strength of our frontier would be more and more decreased, and even entirely destroyed, it is indisputable that France would pass immediately to the rank of a second-rate Power. Other countries might not perceive that they would, by a similar process, suffer a similar fate. We cannot be so deceived.

What a nation gains by a territorial aggrandisement with the consent of a neighbouring State rendered suddenly powerful is of little importance, and is frequently not equivalent to the absence of security for its frontier which results from such a proceeding ; what a nation loses, on the contrary, by the fact of a violent conquest inflicted upon it by a victorious and henceforth threatening enemy, deprived it at the same time of its moral prestige, its material strength, and its tranquillity. Thenceforth, that Power is on the decline.

Such is the situation of which we must not lose sight if we wish to follow Count Bismarck in the comparison he establishes between the annexation to France of Savoy and Nice, voted by the inhabitants, and the separation of Alsace and Lorraine against their own will.

This is what M. Jules Favre wrote in reply to the observations made on his Report by the Chancellor of the North German Confederation :—"I desire," Count Bismarck said textually, "a fort commanding Paris ; as, for example, Mount Valérien ;" and the French Minister for Foreign Affairs adds, "What M. Bismarck desires is to destroy us." Such is the precise impression which M. Jules Favre derived from the interviews

held at Ferrières. It is easy to judge, therefore, whether the term "second-rate Power" is below the truth.

Receive, &c.
(Signed) CHAUDORDY.

No. 208.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 18, 1870.

M. TISSOT called upon me a few days ago, and spoke to me on a subject of great importance. He said he was instructed to inform me that overtures were being made to Italy to give armed support to France, and that there were reasons which might induce Italy to give it. The effect of such assistance would be to give a turn to the fortune of war. One victory would enable France to treat with honour, and would probably diminish the demands now made by Prussia—demands which all must consider hard. Such an alliance would lead to a peace, and not to a prolongation or to an extension of the war. The Provisional Government asked us to encourage Italy to give this assistance, and, at all events, not to advise her to the contrary effect.

I replied by reminding M. Tissot of what had been our policy. We at first desired to prevent the war; when it was declared, we tried to localize it, and to prevent a general European conflagration. We did this in no hostile spirit to either of the belligerents. We thought that France would not benefit herself by drawing Italy into the war.

I had heard nothing from Sir Augustus Paget and M. Cadorna which would give me any reason to believe that Italy was now ready to take the proposed step. She had applied for no advice from us. If she did so, I should consult Mr. Gladstone and my colleagues on the subject; but individually I was sure that they would concur with me in thinking it impossible for us to advise Italy to depart from that neutrality which we had adopted for ourselves.

M. Tissot insisted on the right of the Italian Government to maintain, or to depart from, their neutrality; to acquit the debt of gratitude which they owed to France; and, apart from any question of sentiment, to provide for the safety of their own political interests, which the preponderance of Germany might shortly threaten.

M. Tissot maintained that the intervention of Italy, although an act of war, would tend to increase the chances of an early peace by restoring the balance between France and Germany, and by enabling France to treat on an acceptable basis as soon as a success gave her the opportunity of doing so. So far, therefore, from being a menace to the peace of Europe, the action of Italy would secure it in the present and the future.

M. Tissot added that the French Government was entitled to hope that England would not oppose action on the part of Italy. If the principles of strict neutrality did not allow England to encourage Italy to take part against Prussia, those same principles would forbid her to prevent Italy from taking part with France; he trusted therefore that Her Majesty's Government would, if the case arose, abstain from preventing Italy from acting on her own inspirations.

I rejoined that the only information which I had received of these negotiations was from the French Government; that I should not avail myself of that information in order to do that which France might possibly conceive to be a hostile step towards her; but it was also impossible to make an engagement beforehand as to what answer I should make to any communication I might receive from Italy, and of which I had not the terms before me.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 209.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 18, 1870.

I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Baron Brunnow has informed me that Prince Wittgenstein left Paris five days ago, and went to Versailles, and from thence to Tours, and has since gone back to Paris. Baron Brunnow added, that he was not aware that the Prince was charged with any mission of a political character.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 18, 1870.

I SAW M. Tissot to-day when he told me that M. de Chaudordy had again put to your Excellency the question whether England would not now attempt some intervention. That there was reason to believe that the Prussians were more inclined for peace than they had been; and M. de Chaudordy suggested as an additional reason for such action the great embarrassment which had arisen from the apparent indifference of England towards France. That in the countries which had been accustomed to look to the joint guidance of England and France, such, for example, as Greece, there was a doubt and uncertainty which might be prejudicial to the interests of both countries.

I denied that there was indifference towards France. There was warm sympathy with her in her present misfortunes. But we could not act unless there was a chance of our intervention being of use. Your Excellency had, I believed, pointed out to M. de Chaudordy that the adherence to terms about the fortresses and the territory must, in the present circumstances of the war, be a real obstacle to the chances of peace.

On a further remark from M. Tissot as to the apparent indifference of this country, I assured him again that the contrary was the case, and that our friendly feeling only required a fitting opportunity to show itself.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 19.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 16, 1870.

THE Comte de Chaudordy told me yesterday that the French Government felt bound still to press the Government of Her Majesty to take at once a decided and active part in the present state of affairs in Europe, and to use their influence in a direct manner to bring the war to an end, on terms which it would be possible for France to accept.

He was, he said, employed when I came into his room, in writing a despatch in this sense to M. Tissot, the French Chargé d'Affaires in London. He should desire M. Tissot to point out to your Lordship the serious responsibility which England had incurred by placing herself at the head of the League of Neutrals. By so doing, she had prevented France finding active allies; and surely this rendered it incumbent upon her to take the leading part in uniting the neutral Powers in a common effort to moderate the pretensions of Prussia, and thereby to render peace possible.

M. de Chaudordy proceeded to tell me that M. Jules Favre, in a letter which he had recently received from him, complained of the coldness and unkindness of the British Government towards France, and while expressing in strong terms the sorrow which he felt at the disappointment of the hopes he had built upon England, did not conceal his fears that it might be impossible hereafter, to restore the cordial understanding between the two countries which had been so beneficial to humanity.

Finally, M. de Chaudordy dwelt at some length on the danger that Russia might come to an understanding with Prussia which would make the one undisputed mistress of the east, while the other obtained uncontrolled predominance in the west, of Europe; and he added that there was also a danger that France herself, at the last extremity might be driven to accept help from Russia on whatever terms it could be procured.

I observed to M. de Chaudordy that it appeared to me that he overrated the importance of the simple understanding to which he gave the high-sounding name of the "Ligue de Neutres," and that he did not remember correctly the circumstances under which this agreement among neutrals had been made, or the part which had been taken in the matter by Her Majesty's Government. When the war broke out, it had, I said, been deemed by the principal Powers of Europe to be a matter of the greatest importance to confine the area of hostilities within the narrowest possible limits, and to avert the danger of all Europe becoming involved in the conflagration. Several Cabinets had proposed that with this object the neutral Powers should establish a combined neutrality by solemn compact. Her Majesty's Government had refused to assent to this. They desired to preserve their own freedom of action, and to avoid undue interference with that of other Governments. In deference to wishes which had been expressed to them, they had

announced their willingness to exchange with other Powers assurances that no one of the parties to the understanding would depart from its neutrality, without informing the others of its intentions. These assurances had been given by a simple interchange of notes. Such was the origin, and such the scope of what had been rather pompously termed the "Ligue des Neutres." I would also remind M. de Chaudordy that at the time (the middle of August) at which this agreement was formally proposed to other neutrals by Her Majesty's Government, the French Government had distinctly stated that it could not at the moment accept any offer of mediation, and that the conjuncture was one in which any appeal to a foreign Power for material aid would be peculiarly inopportune and undignified. These statements had been more than once made to me by the Prince de la Tour d'Auvergne, who was Minister for Foreign Affairs, and of whose Cabinet M. de Chaudordy was at the time himself the Chief. The Prince had, moreover, affirmed to me that the French Government felt no objection to the contemplated understanding between neutrals.

I had, I went on to say, thought it right to make these remarks upon the so-called "Ligue des Neutres," as he had given it a prominent place in his fresh demand for the intervention of Her Majesty's Government; but in point of fact it did not appear to me to have much bearing upon the present state of affairs. At the time at which this understanding between neutrals had been come to, Her Majesty's Government had assured the Government of France that while they had certainly no desire to obtrude their mediation on France or on Prussia, their good offices would be freely given and zealously exerted for the restoration of peace, if France desired to have recourse to them. France had not accepted the offer at the time; but the views of Her Majesty's Government had not changed. I could not admit the charge of indifference which was so often brought against England. I had more than once assured M. de Chaudordy that Her Majesty's Government were on the watch for an opportunity of exercising their good offices with effect. They had already been instrumental in bringing M. Jules Favre and Count Bismarck into direct communication with each other, though unfortunately the result had not been such as they had hoped for. They had hitherto been deterred from mediating solely by the conviction that so long as each of the respective parties insisted upon terms of peace wholly irreconcilable with those declared to be indispensable by the other, no third Government could intervene with good effect, or without weakening its influence and diminishing its means of being of use in a more favourable conjuncture. I had recently given M. de Chaudordy a copy of a despatch dated the 4th instant, in which the views of Her Majesty's Government were plainly set forth. While Her Majesty's Government stated distinctly that they were not prepared either themselves to support by force any representations they might make to Prussia, nor to propose to other Powers to do so, the despatch expressed the deepest concern at the misfortunes which had befallen France, and it was evident from the whole tenor of it that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, a great obstacle to peace, and to the effectual exertion of the good offices of England to obtain it, lay in the rigid adherence of the French Government to a basis of negotiation peremptorily rejected by the other belligerent.

M. de Chaudordy continued to urge, in somewhat vague language, that the reserve of England was producing effects most unfavourable to France, and that her influence might be very profitably exerted at this moment with a view to establishing possible conditions of peace. At last, after reminding him that Her Majesty's Government had declared that they could not contemplate going to war with Germany, I begged him to say distinctly what, short of this, he would propose that England should do.

M. de Chaudordy said that he must premise that, whatever England did, must be done of her accord, and must not have any appearance of being prompted by France. After the rejection of M. Jules Favre's overtures, it was plain that France could not address Prussia again. What he would suggest was, that Her Majesty's Government, acting quite apart from France, should invite the other neutral Powers to make a combined application to Prussia. England should, he thought, take the lead in bringing the neutral Powers to an understanding on the subject, or she might act alone. The object, in either case, would be to call upon Prussia to say how far she meant to go; in fact, to declare distinctly on what conditions she would make peace. Having ascertained this, England, and the Powers acting in concert with her, might, in the same way, make themselves acquainted with the views and feelings of France. This being done, the neutral Powers should hold a Conference (or, if this were objected to, communicate their ideas to each other in some other manner), and then pronounce, distinctly and authoritatively, what were, in their opinion, equitable terms of peace, and call upon both belligerents to accept the terms so laid down. Both France and Prussia must be disposed to listen with respect to the voice of united Europe, and each might find it easier to make concessions in

deference to the recommendations of an European Conference, than to yield to each other. Such was the plan M. de Chaudordy would suggest ; and if England was indisposed to take the lead in executing it, she might advise Italy or some other Power to do so. Only, he repeated, whatever was done, must be done altogether independently of France and the French Government: " en dehors de nous " was the expression he used.

Having made this suggestion, M. de Chaudordy reverted to the dangers to Europe, and to England in particular, which must follow if means were not taken, while it was yet time, to prevent the establishment of Prussian supremacy.

I said that, no doubt, the changes in the distribution of power, and in the policy and alliances of the States of Europe, which might be the results of the present war, were matters for grave and anxious reflection. I would, however, confess that these were not the considerations which weighed most with me at this critical moment. My ardent desire was that the horrors of the present war should be put an end to ; and, more particularly, that means should be found of effecting an armistice in time to preserve Paris from the frightful calamities with which it was threatened.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 212.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 19, 1870.*

I APPROVE your Excellency's language to M. Chaudordy on the subject of the postponement of the elections for a Constituent Assembly, as reported in your despatch of the 9th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 213.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 19, 1870.*

I APPROVE your Excellency's language to M. de Chaudordy on the subject of the request made by the Provisional Government of France for formal recognition by Her Majesty's Government, as reported in your despatch of the 8th instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 214.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 19, 1870.*

I APPROVE the language held by your Excellency to M. Chaudordy, as reported in your despatch of the 16th instant, respecting the course pursued by Her Majesty's Government with reference to the war.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 215.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 19, 1870.*

THE Italian Minister communicated to me yesterday a telegram from M. Visconti Venosta, dated the 16th instant, saying he had been informed by M. Nigra that M. de Chaudordy had requested your Excellency to ask Her Majesty's Government to join the other neutral Powers to inquire of Prussia what were the conditions of peace she demanded,

and thereupon to ask the French Government what concessions they were disposed to make; and those points having been ascertained, the neutral Powers might agree on the basis on which peace might be made, and propose them to the two belligerents.

M. Nigra had further stated that he understood your Excellency to have forwarded to Her Majesty's Government M. de Chaudordy's demands; and M. de Cadorna was instructed to inquire what answer had been returned to it.

I told M. de Cadorna that I had not yet heard from your Excellency on the subject, and, having afterwards seen M. Tissot, I apprized M. de Cadorna that he had spoken to me generally to the effect reported by M. Nigra, but without making any definite proposal.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 216.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 20, 1870.

It is needless to state how deeply Her Majesty's Government have deplored the outbreak and continuance of the great war which is still raging between Germany and France.

They did their utmost to prevent it, and, since the declaration of hostilities and their own Proclamation of Neutrality, they have used their influence to prevent its extension; for, if any of those nations which have remained neutral had taken a part, all Europe, it is probable, would have been gradually involved in the calamity, with doubtful advantage to either belligerent.

Nothing would have given more satisfaction to Her Majesty's Government than to contribute in any manner to an honourable and permanent peace. Offers of mediation or of good offices would not have been wanting if Her Majesty's Government had at any time believed that such offers would have been acceptable to both the belligerents.

They could not, however, shut their eyes to the fact that such a state of things had not arisen, and the course which they adopted themselves and which they recommended to others, was to abstain from making unacceptable proposals, or giving ineffective advice, which could only weaken the chance of obtaining at some future time the object they had in view.

They indeed recommended that Count Bismarck and M. Favre should personally communicate their respective views. Such a meeting did take place, but unfortunately with no immediate result, except to show how divergent were their opinions as to a possible basis of negotiation.

After uninterrupted and extraordinary successes on the part of Germany, what is the present phase of the war?

The main body of the German army is engaged in the investment of the French capital; and the reduction, by famine and by bombardment, of the City of Paris appears to be among the measures which are under discussion at the German head-quarters.

Count Bernstorff has communicated to me some of the circulars which have been published by the North German Government on the war; and on the 11th instant he gave me the circular, in which it is stated that the inevitable consequences of the prolongation of the struggle before Paris will be that hundreds of thousands will die of starvation.

The communication of this opinion of the fearful results which may possibly, and even not improbably, arise from a long siege of Paris, makes it a positive duty on the part of Her Majesty's Government to leave nothing undone to avoid so great a calamity.

It is also clear that the war has already exhibited, and if it is prolonged must increasingly present, features which concern not the two belligerents only, but Europe at large.

Her Majesty's Government are confident that the explanation of their views will not be construed as an unfriendly act. It is dictated by a most sincere anxiety for the present and future welfare of two nations, with whom this country has long been on most friendly terms.

I am aware of the strong arguments which may be used in favour of extreme measures against Paris.

I am, however, desirous of inquiring whether there are not considerations which appear perhaps stronger to spectators than to those who are under the influence of extraordinary military success, accompanied by the consciousness of great efforts and vast sacrifices.

It is undoubted that such an operation as the reduction of Paris by famine or bombardment, although without precedent as to its magnitude, is authorized by the practice of war; but it is equally certain that, involving, as stated by Count Bismarck, not only the ruin, but the death, with incidents of peculiar horror, of hundreds of thousands of non-combatants, every one would admit it should not be resorted to until all possible alternatives have been exhausted.

Presuming a successful issue to an attack on Paris at no distant time, it is not unreasonable to compare with its advantages, the prospective disadvantages which may ensue; and the fact that some of these touch the feelings of mankind as much as their reason, does not discourage Her Majesty's Government from laying them before the King and his advisers.

The bitter recollection of the past three months may be effaced by time and by a sense of the conduct and valour of the enemy in the field.

There are degrees of exasperation, and the probability of a fresh and irreconcilable war must be greatly increased if a generation of Frenchmen behold the spectacle of the destruction of a capital, a spectacle associated with the deaths of large numbers of helpless and unarmed persons, and the destruction of treasures of arts, sciences, and historical association of inestimable value and incapable of being replaced.

Frightful as such a catastrophe would be to France, and dangerous as I believe it would be to the chances of future peace to Europe, Her Majesty's Government believe that to none would it be more painful than to Germany and its rulers.

The French Government, acting upon considerations which appear to them conclusive, have, since the meeting of Count Bismarck and M. Favre, declined to propose negotiations for peace.

But Her Majesty's Government have assumed the responsibility of urging the Provisional Government to agree to an armistice which might lead to the convocation of a Constituent Assembly and the re-establishment of peace.

Her Majesty's Government have also not failed to represent to them the importance of making every concession compatible with their honour in the present circumstances of the war.

Her Majesty's Government are not authorized to say so; but they cannot believe that such representations to the French Government will remain without effect.

During this war two moral causes have aided immensely the great material power of the Germans.

They have been fighting to repel the threat of foreign invasion, and to assert the right of a great country to constitute itself in the way most conducive to the full development of its resources.

The glory of these efforts will be increased if it can be truly said in history that the King of Prussia had exhausted every attempt for peace before the orders for the attack on Paris were given, and that the conditions of peace were just, moderate, and in accordance with true policy and the sentiments of the age.

Her Majesty's Government wish that it should be clearly understood, which their conduct has hitherto plainly shown, that they have no wish to offer superfluous or unacceptable advice to the belligerents.

The suggestions which they have now made in a most friendly spirit arise from their attention having been formally drawn to consequences of so formidable a character as, in the judgment of Count Bismarck, are likely to arise from the prolonged investment of Paris.

They cannot remain silent or leave anything untried which may have a tendency to avert such a fearful and unexampled catastrophe.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 217.

Earl Granville to Count Bismarck.

M. le Chancelier,

London, October 20, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Excellency the copy of a despatch which I have addressed to Lord Augustus Loftus.*

I trust your Excellency will be so good as to deal with it at once, as if it had been

* No. 216.

communicated to you by Her Majesty's Representative. Time is precious, as it is important to avoid the delay which might be occasioned by the circuitous road through Berlin.

The pleasure I derived from the short acquaintance which I had the honour of making with your Excellency at Coburg some years ago, makes it gratifying to me to enter into this personal communication with you.

I have, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 218.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord.

Foreign Office, October 20, 1870.

YOUR Excellency has at various times pressed upon the Provisional Government of France the strong desires of Her Majesty's Government to witness a cessation of the present war on terms honourable to both belligerents, and such as might afford reasonable security against a renewed interruption of the general tranquillity of Europe; and you have pointed out that, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, a rigid adherence to the terms on which they have hitherto insisted would prove an obstacle to peace.

But in the present critical position of affairs I have to request your Excellency to state to the Vicomte de Chaudordy that, anxious to contribute to the restoration of peace, which becomes every day more important, Her Majesty's Government desire to urge on the Provisional Government to agree to an armistice with a view to effect that object.

One result of such an armistice might be the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, and the re-establishment of peace.

But the more immediate and pressing necessity for France would seem to be that of averting from her capital the attack with which it is now threatened, and which would not only be attended with great destruction to the buildings, but with great loss of life to the inhabitants. And even though the attack may be deferred, the inhabitants must be exposed to great privations from being deprived of the means of obtaining provisions from beyond the walls; and when those within the walls are exhausted, it is hardly to be doubted that, whether an attack is successful or not, a prolonged siege will involve multitudes in all the horrors of starvation.

It seems to Her Majesty's Government that these considerations should have great weight with the Provisional Government, in inducing them to come to any reasonable understanding with Germany for a suspension of hostilities; and so strongly are Her Majesty's Government impressed with the urgency of the case that they have not hesitated to urge on the Prussian Government the importance of an armistice being speedily concluded, and of moderation in their terms.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 219.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, October 21, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Excellency's note of the 8th instant.

The friendly spirit of your reply to the observations which I addressed to you on the 15th ultimo, on the subject of the attitude of this country as a neutral, and the attention which you have evidently given to the arguments and explanations which I placed before you, encourage Her Majesty's Government in the belief that the calm discussion by the two Governments of the difficult question of the claims of belligerents upon neutrals is calculated to remove present misunderstandings, and possibly to pave the way for an eventual solution. I have also to thank your Excellency for having pointed out certain apparent breaches in the chain of practice which I had described as forming an unbroken precedent for the course now adopted, and thus afforded me an opportunity for giving such further explanations as will establish beyond a doubt its consistency.

The policy of Her Majesty's Government, and the grounds on which it is based, were so fully explained in my former note that I need not again advert to the subject, further than to observe that your Excellency is wrong in supposing that at any time a change took

place in that policy. From the date of the outbreak of the war the Cabinet has never hesitated as to the course which should be pursued. The views of the House of Commons were clearly manifested when, on the 4th of August, an amendment, by which it was proposed to insert in the Foreign Enlistment Act, then under discussion, a clause prohibiting the exportation to belligerents of arms or munitions of war, was rejected by a large majority; and the same opinions were shown to be held in the House of Lords in the debate of 8th August on the same Bill, in which the Lord Chancellor, the Lord Privy Seal, and Lord Cairns took part. I myself, in answer to a question addressed to me in the House of Lords by the Marquis of Clanricarde on the 22nd July, went so far as to express some doubts whether a policy of prohibition was advisable even in self-defence; and in the constant conversations on the subject which I have had with your Excellency since the commencement of the war, I have invariably explained to you that the new Foreign Enlistment Act neither diminished nor added to the powers of the Government as regarded the exportation of munitions of war, and that it was our intention to adhere, on that point, to the usual practice of this country, which practice we believe to be in conformity with the established principles of public law.

I had supposed that, from these various sources of information, your Excellency would have been in a position fully to acquaint the North German Government with the attitude which this country might be expected to maintain, and it is therefore with surprise that I have learnt that, previously to the receipt of my note of the 15th ultimo, you had doubts upon the subject. I can find nothing in my earlier notes to which you refer, which could lead to the inference that there was any hesitation on the part of Her Majesty's Government; those notes, written in reply to specific statements made by your Excellency respecting alleged exportations of munitions of war, contained merely the acknowledgments which were due to your Excellency as a matter of courtesy, promises of inquiry into facts, and brief reports of the results of investigations.

Your Excellency appears to take exception to my having instituted inquiries at all, but upon this point I most respectfully differ. Whatever view may be taken of the principle on which the Government has acted, it is right that the facts should be correctly ascertained. Wild rumours have been in circulation as to the extent to which arms are being supplied by this country to France; bitter articles founded on these rumours have been inserted in the German newspapers; your Excellency based upon them frequent and strong representations; and Her Majesty's Government might, in my opinion, fairly be accused of supineness and neglect if, at the meeting of Parliament, they should be so ill-informed as to be unable to supply any information upon this point. It was possible, moreover, that the shipments of arms might have been of such a nature as to bring them within the operation of the clauses of the Foreign Enlistment Act, forbidding the dispatch of store-ships or the fitting out of military or naval expeditions. It was for these reasons that I felt it to be my duty to investigate any statements brought to my notice by your Excellency, and not to allow them, if unsupported, to pass unchallenged.

The necessity for this inquiry will be the more obvious when the complaints made from time to time by your Excellency are compared with the answers which I have returned to them; and I may here observe that, before returning those answers, I have taken exhaustive steps to test their accuracy, by obtaining independent information, from the Customs officials, from the Board of Trade, from the Police, and from the Small Arms Department of the War Office. I am not aware of the sources from which your Excellency's information is derived. I do not of course suppose that any importance would be attached by you to reports given in return for pecuniary rewards, such as have been offered in newspaper advertisements; but I think it cannot be doubted that the sources which I have above enumerated are likely to be more trustworthy than those to which the able and active Consuls of the North German Confederation have access.

Your Excellency observes that in your notes from the 1st to the 9th of September, you brought to my notice a series of irrefutable facts: it must have escaped your recollection that, in my answer of the 9th of that month, I showed that the majority of those alleged facts were unfounded.

In your note to which I am now replying, you make two further specific statements, the truth of which I have also felt it to be my duty to investigate: that respecting the order supposed to have been given by Count Palikao to a firm in this country on the 23rd of August for 40,000 rifles to be delivered within a week, and that in which the number of fire-arms shipped from this country to France between the 30th of August and the 8th instant is calculated at from 120,000 to 160,000. As regards the former, while observing in passing that Count Palikao's statement, as reported in the "*Journal Officiel*," was merely that these arms had been ordered "*à l'étranger*," I have to state that no trace can be discovered of the order ever having been received in this country, and that it is certain

that, if it was received, it was not executed; and, as regards the latter, that the full returns now before me show that the supplies of arms drawn by France from this country between the two specified dates are less than those drawn by her from the United States, whence no exports have been made approaching the figures mentioned by your Excellency. It is, indeed, understood that there is now some activity at Birmingham in the manufacture of fire-arms, owing to the increasing demand, but experienced persons are of opinion that, in consequence of the recent stagnation of the trade, its present producing power is very limited.

I may here remark that Her Majesty's Government have learnt with some surprise that, while your Excellency has been instructed to make such constant complaints on the subject of the exports of munitions of war from this country, no such instructions had, up to a very recent date, been addressed to your colleague in the United States, who had only made personal representations to the United States' Government, although the latter have adhered in the same manner as Her Majesty's Government to the principle and practice of neutrals, and have consequently not interfered with the exports to which I have above referred. The President of the United States, in his Proclamation of the 22nd of August last, expressly states that "the laws of the United States, without interfering with the free expression of opinion and sympathy, or with the open manufacture or sale of arms or munitions of war, nevertheless impose upon all persons who may be within their territory and jurisdiction the duty of an impartial neutrality during the existence of the contest."

I will next proceed to examine the fresh complaint preferred by you against Her Majesty's Government of violation of international and British law, of which I trust that I can briefly dispose. Your complaint refers to the sale of the "Hypatia" and "Norseman" to the French Government to be used as store-ships. Previously to the receipt of your present note I had received but one communication from you on this subject, that of the 19th of August, in reply to which I informed you, on the 29th of the same month, that the attention of Her Majesty's Government had been already drawn by their own officials to the circumstances of these sales, and that, on investigation, it had been ascertained that in both cases the vessels were dispatched from England before the Foreign Enlistment Act of 1870 came into operation, and that, consequently, the owners, who were not liable to penalties under the previous Enlistment Act, could not be successfully prosecuted under the provisions of the new Act. Having heard nothing further from your Excellency on the subject I concluded that you were satisfied with this explanation; but as I now learn that you are dissatisfied on certain points I think it due to you that I should explain that the information in possession of Her Majesty's Government shows that the vessels sailed from England under the British flag because the actual sale was effected at Cherbourg, at which port the vessels were handed over to the purchasers before the passing of the new Act. I do not understand to what process your Excellency refers in stating that, "up to the 8th ultimo, the transfer of the property to the French owners had not been entered on the ship's books;" but the steps which the law requires were duly complied with by the vendors, the certificates of registry having been given up in the month of August to the proper officers with the notifications that the vessels had been sold abroad. To your Excellency's remark, therefore, that I "declined to proceed" against these vessels, I have only to reply that there was and is no ground whatsoever upon which a prosecution could be based.

I will not follow your Excellency through the passages of your note in which you show that Her Majesty's Government have the power to prohibit the export of arms,—a fact which I have constantly stated to you; nor do I think it necessary to refer to the passage in which you quote the French Law of the 14th July, 1860, further than to observe that the clauses of that Law are, like those possessed by the British Executive, merely permissive, and that a system of bonds is necessarily open to the objection that it merely serves to enhance the price of the arms,—a matter of little account when their acquisition is of national importance.

I may refer incidentally to your Excellency's remark that you do not find in the printed Report of the Neutrality Laws Commissioners any confirmation of my statement that the opinion of those Commissioners was, that to prohibit the export of munitions of war was impracticable and impolitic. It is true that that opinion was not embodied in their Report; but it is none the less true that the subject was discussed by the Commission, and that the opinion pronounced upon it was that which I have recorded, as is shown by the Report not containing any recommendation of the alteration of the law in this respect.

I now come to the points in your Excellency's note which appear to me to

demand a full explanation. I had stated, in my note of the 15th, that the practice of Great Britain as a neutral had always been that which she now follows. Your Excellency disputes this position; and in support of your arguments you adduce two documents,—a letter from the Duke of Wellington to Mr. Canning, dated 30th August, 1825; and an instruction from the Board of Treasury to the Customs, dated 2nd June, 1848. I have not failed to examine most carefully the instances which you specify; and the following is the result of the examination:—

A laborious search has failed to discover any trace of a letter from the Duke of Wellington, of the 30th of August, 1825; but a paper has been found, dated August 3, 1826, which contains the passage quoted by you. This paper is a Minute written by the Duke of Wellington upon a draft despatch addressed by Mr. Secretary Canning to Mr. Stratford Canning, then British Ambassador at Constantinople, at the time of the war between Turkey and Greece, in which, with reference to a rumour that arms were being sent from England for the purpose of equipping abroad vessels to be commanded by Lord Cochrane, in the service of Greece, Mr. Canning stated that such a proceeding was not contrary to law, and could not be prevented by Her Majesty's Government. To the latter part of this statement the Duke of Wellington demurred, referring to the fact that, when Spain was at war with her Colonies, England had prohibited exports to both belligerents, and making use of the words quoted by your Excellency.

Mr. Canning, however, insisted on his view, stating in his rejoinder, "the law *does* permit the exportation of arms as merchandize; and I must authorize Stratford so to say, if he is to state the case of his country truly." The Duke gave way, and no Order in Council prohibiting the export of arms was issued by the Government.

It is also incidentally important to observe that the precedent for such a prohibition, to which reference was made by the Duke, was one in which Great Britain had no option in the matter. She had bound herself by Article III of the Additional Articles, signed at Madrid on August 28, 1814, to the Treaty with Spain of 5th July of the same year, to "take the most effectual measures for preventing her subjects from furnishing arms, ammunition, or any other warlike article to the revolted in America;" and being thus compelled, when Spain was at war with her colonies, to prohibit the exportation of arms to the latter, she subsequently extended the prohibition to Spain herself, in order to avoid the imputation of favouring one belligerent to the exclusion of the other.

The second apparent instance adduced by your Excellency of departure from what I have stated to be the ordinary practice of Great Britain, is the issue of orders to the Customs officials on the 2nd of June, 1848, instructing them to prevent the exportation of arms for the purpose of being employed in hostilities against the Danish Government. I shall have no difficulty in showing that there were exceptional causes which made the issue of these instructions imperative on Her Majesty's Government.

On the 25th of May, 1848, the Danish Minister in London drew attention to the fact that preparations were being made in this country for sending cannon to Hamburg, and called on Her Majesty's Government, in accordance with the stipulations of the Treaty between Great Britain and Denmark of 1670, to prevent those shipments being made. The Treaty appealed to was signed at Copenhagen on the 11th of July, 1670, was supplemented by an Explanatory Article on July 4, 1780, and was confirmed by the XIIIth Article of the Treaty signed at Kiel on the 14th of January, 1814: it provided that "the foresaid Kings for themselves, their heirs and successors, mutually do undertake and promise that they will not aid or furnish the enemies of either party that shall be aggressors with any provisions of war, as soldiers, arms, engines, guns, ships, or other necessities for the use of war, or suffer any to be furnished by their subjects." It is clear that, under the provisions of this stipulation, Her Majesty's Government had no alternative but to issue the orders to which your Excellency has drawn attention.

I have thus shown that the practice of Great Britain has not been different from that which I originally stated it to be; and that, on the contrary, two cases of apparent divergence, on being examined, prove that the departure from the usual practice, when it existed, was dictated by exceptional causes, and thus indirectly confirm the accuracy of my statement that the course now adopted is founded on unbroken precedent.

In conclusion, I should wish to make a few general remarks.

Your Excellency will, I think, admit that, though Her Majesty's Government are not prepared to change the practice of the country in regard to neutrality, they have been vigilant in watching and checking any symptoms of violation by British subjects of existing law. Some weeks before your Excellency drew attention to the cases of the "Hypatia" and "Norseman," the proper authorities of this country had been engaged in investigating them, and the watchfulness shown on those occasions has doubtless been the reason that no attempt has been made to sell or dispatch vessels in contravention of

the Foreign Enlistment Act. A report which had reached Her Majesty's Government that attempts were being made to enlist Irishmen for military service in France was acted upon with the greatest promptitude by the authorities of the Home Office, even at a time when, as it appears from the note which you addressed to me on the 11th instant, it did not appear to you that much importance was to be attached to the rumours. I can assure your Excellency that no effort shall hereafter be spared to deal promptly with any actual or contemplated infractions of the law.

I am glad to find that your Excellency now not only does not insist upon, but disclaims, the doctrine of benevolent neutrality, which appeared to Her Majesty's Government, after a most careful examination of your Memorandum of 30th of August, to be the principal basis on which your representations were founded. That such a doctrine is untenable will now be universally admitted; while it must be as generally admitted that it would be a real departure from neutrality for a neutral to change, without general consent, its practice—a practice, be it observed, in conformity with the views of all writers on international law, because such practice might incidentally be more or less favourable to one of two belligerents.

Good offices may be benevolent, but neutrality, like arbitration, cannot be so.

It would be a serious violation of neutrality if a neutral nation guided itself by any principle or rule of conduct, however just or meritorious in itself, which had not been previously recognized and sanctioned by the usage of nations.

I sincerely rejoice that Prussia, who, as a neutral, has always been a strenuous champion of the rights of neutrals, now, as your Excellency points out, shows a desire to "incline to every progress in the field of increasing the active freedom" of commercial interests in time of war; though I cannot but observe that the special point which your Excellency adduces as evidence of this desire, is a question which may be viewed differently by independent Powers in proportion to their maritime strength.

Her Majesty's Government, at the outset of a war which they deplored, and after an appeal to the belligerents to act in accordance with the 24th Protocol of the Treaty of Paris had been refused by them, declared their neutrality, in the earnest desire to maintain friendly relations with both. It was their wish to exercise all friendly offices compatible with perfect impartiality. They further expressed their determination to exercise their duties and maintain their rights as neutrals. It gave me great satisfaction when your Excellency was good enough to inform me in conversation that you knew of no other subject but the one under discussion, on which Germany had any foundation for complaining of the attitude of this country as a neutral. It is not for the first time that I inform your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government have no jealousy of German unity. They believe it to be a great and worthy object for Germany to endeavour, with the consent of all its members, to consolidate its vast moral, intellectual, and physical powers. An ardent desire that not only the Governments but the people of Great Britain and Germany should be in the most friendly relations induces me to repeat my belief that so just and thoughtful a nation as yours will not permanently entertain feelings of rancour against England, or, I might add, the United States, for adhering as neutrals to the practice which they had always adopted, and which, up to the outbreak of the present war, has been the theory and practice of both the belligerents.

I have, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 220.

Sir E. Thornton to Earl Granville.—(Received October 22.)

My Lord,

Washington, October 10, 1870.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of to-day's date I have the honour to inform your Lordship that my Prussian colleague has stated to me to-day that he has on four or five different occasions remonstrated verbally to Mr. Fish against the export of arms and ammunition from the United States to France; but that he has done so *proprio motu*, not having received any instructions to that effect from his Government. He did not, however, know whether his Government had made any representation upon the subject to Mr. Bancroft, the United States' Minister at Berlin.

Mr. Fish confirmed what Baron Gerolt had stated to me, and added that he had received no intimation from Mr. Bancroft that any such representation had been made to him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. THORNTON.

No. 221.

Sir E. Thornton to Earl Granville.—(Received October 22.)

(Extract.)

Washington, October 10, 1870.

WITH reference to my telegram of the 8th instant I have the honour to inform your Lordship that the French merchant-steamer "Ville de Paris" left New York on the 4th instant for Havre, without any interference from the United States' authorities, having as cargo about 90,000 Remington, Springfield, Enfield, and Spencer rifles and carbines.

Besides these arms the "Ville de Paris" took about 8,000,000 cartridges.

There were also, as passengers, about 600 Frenchmen, who, it is not doubted, intend to join the French army.

The ship was completely full, and was unable to take 3,000 more arms which were to have been sent by her.

Applications have been made to some of the English lines of steamers to take arms either direct to France or to England for transshipment; but, as yet, these lines have thought it more prudent to refuse such freight.

No. 222.

Sir E. Thornton to Earl Granville.—(Received October 22.)

My Lord,

Washington, October 10, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose a copy of a Proclamation which was signed by the President of the United States on the 8th instant, and published yesterday, as to the manner in which, with reference to the war now existing between France and the North German Confederation and its allies, the armed vessels of either belligerent, whether public ships or privateers, are to be treated in the ports of the United States. The contents of this Proclamation are in many respects similar to the orders recently given by Her Majesty's Government with respect to the treatment of such vessels in British ports.

It would seem that the issue of this document has been instigated by the recent conduct of French vessels of war in the neighbourhood of the port of New York. It is said that French gun-boats have lately moored about the entrance of that port, and have sometimes been anchored outside, within three miles of the coast, for the purpose of intercepting any North German vessels which might leave New York, and particularly the German steamers, which, in consequence of the termination of the blockade of the German ports, have renewed their voyages. On one occasion the French gun-boat "Latouche Tréville" steamed up the Bay of New York, round the German steamer "Hermann," went out again, and anchored outside.

A French frigate and two smaller vessels of war arrived lately at New London in Connecticut, on the pretext of requiring repairs; they remained there for some days, although they only had to repair some spars, which could have been done nearly as well at sea as on shore. From that point notice could be given of the sailing of German vessels from New York, and men-of-war stationed at New London could easily have intercepted them.

Mr. Fish told me that he had represented to the French Minister that, although he could not positively allege a violation of international law, he considered that the proceedings of belligerent vessels of war in hovering about the entrance of a neutral port, and, as it were, blockading it, and making the neighbourhood a station for their observations, were contrary to custom, and were unfriendly and uncourteous to the United States. Mr. Fish added that M. Berthémy had written upon the subject to the French Admiral, who, in reply, had denied the fact of hovering about the port, or of using the neighbourhood as a station of observation; but confessed that the proceeding of the "Latouche Tréville" in entering the port of New York for the purpose of observing the German steamer "Hermann" was improper, and that her commander had consequently been severely reproved.

My Prussian colleague, in expressing his satisfaction at the issue of the inclosed Proclamation, has made observations which lead me to suppose that he imagines that by its provisions merchant-vessels are prohibited from exporting arms and ammunition from the ports of the United States for the use of the belligerents, and I fear that he may have telegraphed in that sense to his Government: but though I did not feel called upon to question Baron Gerolt's view of the case, I can find no expressions in the Proclamation

which justify such an interpretation ; indeed, Mr. Fish denies that it was intended to convey any such meaning.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. THORNTON.

Inclosure in No. 222.

By the President of the United States of America.

A Proclamation.

WHEREAS, on the 22nd day of August, 1870, my Proclamation was issued, enjoining neutrality in the present war between France and the North German Confederation and its allies, and declaring, so far as then seemed to be necessary, the respective rights and obligations of the belligerent parties, and of the citizens of the United States :

And whereas, subsequent information gives reason to apprehend that armed cruisers of the belligerents may be tempted to abuse the hospitality accorded to them in the ports, harbours, roadsteads, and other waters of the United States by making such waters subservient to the purposes of war :

Now, therefore, I, Ulysses S. Grant, President of the United States of America, do hereby proclaim and declare, that any frequenting and use of the waters within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States by the armed vessels of either belligerent, whether public ships or privateers, for the purpose of preparing for hostile operations, or as posts of observation upon the ships of war, or privateers or merchant-vessels, of the other belligerent lying within or being about to enter the jurisdiction of the United States, must be regarded as unfriendly and offensive, and in violation of that neutrality which it is the determination of this Government to observe ; and to the end that hazard and inconvenience of such apprehended practices may be avoided, I further proclaim and declare, that from and after the 12th day of October instant, and during the continuance of the present hostilities between France and the North German Confederation and its allies, no ship of war or privateer of either belligerent shall be permitted to make use of any port, harbour, roadstead, or other waters within the jurisdiction of the United States as a station or place of resort for any warlike purpose, or for the purpose of obtaining any facilities of warlike equipment ; and no ship of war or privateer of either belligerent shall be permitted to sail out of or leave any port, harbour, roadstead, or waters subject to the jurisdiction of the United States, from which a vessel of the other belligerent (whether the same shall be a ship of war, a privateer, or merchant-ship) shall have previously departed, until after the expiration of at least twenty-four hours from the departure of such last-mentioned vessel beyond the jurisdiction of the United States. If any ship of war or privateer of either belligerent shall, after the time this notification takes effect, enter any port, harbour, roadstead, or waters of the United States, such vessels shall be required to depart and to put to sea within twenty-four hours after her entrance into such port, harbour, roadstead, or waters, except in case of stress of weather, or of her requiring provisions or things necessary for the subsistence of her crew, or for repairs ; in either of which cases the authorities of the port or of the nearest port (as the case may be) shall require her to put to sea as soon as possible after the expiration of such period of twenty-four hours without permitting her to take in supplies, beyond what may be necessary for her immediate use ; and no such vessel which may have been permitted to remain within the waters of the United States for the purpose of repair shall continue within such port, harbour, roadstead, or waters for a longer period than twenty-four hours after her necessary repairs shall have been completed, unless within such twenty-four hours a vessel (whether ship of war, privateer, or merchant-ship) of the other belligerent shall have departed therefrom, in which case the time limited for the departure of such ship of war or privateer shall be extended so far as may be necessary to secure an interval of not less than twenty-four hours between such departure and that of any ship of war, privateer, or merchant-ship of the other belligerent which may have previously quitted the same port, harbour, roadstead, or waters. No ship of war or privateer of either belligerent shall be detained in any port, harbour, roadstead, or waters of the United States more than twenty-four hours, by reason of the successive departures from such port, harbour, roadstead, or waters, of more than one vessel of the other belligerent. But if there be several vessels of each or either of the two belligerents in the same port, harbour, roadstead, or waters, the order of their departure therefrom shall be arranged as to afford the opportunity of leaving, alternately, to the vessels of the respective belligerents, and to

cause the least detention consistent with the objects of this Proclamation. No ship of war or privateer of either belligerent shall be permitted while in any port, harbour, roadstead, or waters within the jurisdiction of the United States to take in any supplies except provisions, and such other things as may be requisite for the subsistence of her crew, and except so much coal only as may be sufficient to carry such vessel, if without sail-power, to the nearest European port of her own country; or in case the vessel is rigged to go under sail, and may also be propelled by steam-power, then with half the quantity of coal which she would be entitled to receive if dependent upon steam alone; and no coal shall be again supplied to any such ship of war or privateer in the same or any other port, harbour, roadstead, or waters of the United States, without special permission, until after the expiration of three months from the time when such coal may have been last supplied to her within the waters of the United States, unless such ship of war or privateer shall, since last thus supplied, have entered a European port of the Government to which she belongs.

In testimony whereof I have hereunto set my hand, and caused the seal of the United States to be affixed.

Done at the City of Washington, this eighth day of October, in the year of our Lord one thousand eight hundred and seventy, and of the Independence of the United States the ninety-fifth.

(Signed) U. S. GRANT.

By the President:

(Signed) HAMILTON FISH, *Secretary of State*.

No. 223.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 22.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 18, 1870.

I ASKED the Comte de Chaudordy this morning what he knew of the communications which were stated to have passed between Count Bismarck and M. Jules Favre through the American General Burnside.

M. de Chaudordy answered that, so far as his knowledge went, little more had taken place than a simple conversation between General Burnside and M. Favre.

Count Bismarck had, M. de Chaudordy went on to say, sent by General Burnside the answer to the letter in which M. Favre had applied to him for facilities for those members of the Diplomatic Body who were still in Paris to quit the place in the event of a bombardment, and in the meantime to send and receive couriers. Count Bismarck had in this way given M. Jules Favre to understand that General Burnside was to a certain extent in his confidence, and the result had been that the General had conversed with M. Jules Favre on the urgent questions between France and Prussia. At the conclusion of the conversation the General had expressed a desire to return to Count Bismarck and then to come back into Paris again, and M. Jules Favre had readily assented to his doing so.

This was all M. de Chaudordy knew positively on the subject, but his impression was that General Burnside had not conveyed any definite proposals from Count Bismarck. The importance of the matter appeared, he said in conclusion, to lie in the indication it afforded that Count Bismarck perceived that his reception of M. Jules Favre's personal overtures was a mistake and was anxious to re-open communications with him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 224.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 22.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 20, 1870.

I HAD last night the honour to receive your Lordship's telegrams dated 11.20 A.M. and 2.10 P.M. yesterday, communicating to me the intelligence which had been sent to you from Brussels, that a Treaty had been signed by Marshal Bazaine with the Prussians; and also your Lordship's telegram of 4.45 P.M. yesterday, inquiring whether the Government at Tours were cognizant of the alleged Treaty and approved of it.

The three telegrams reached me at the same time. I had seen the Comte de.

Chaudordy a few hours before, and had not received from him the slightest hint that anything of the kind was in contemplation. Nevertheless, I immediately communicated with him again, and was assured by him that the Government here had no knowledge whatever of any Treaty having been signed by Marshal Bazaine.

At a later hour in the night I received your Lordship's telegram inquiring, with reference to my despatch of the 16th instant, whether the French Government authorized the Government of Her Majesty to ask Germany on what conditions she would consent to make peace; and this morning I received your Lordship's telegram dated 12.50 P.M. yesterday, repeating your inquiries respecting the Treaty stated to have been concluded by Marshal Bazaine.

I saw M. Chaudordy as early as possible this morning. He repeated that the Government at Tours had no cognizance of any Treaty negotiated by Marshal Bazaine with Prussia. He said that it seemed to him impossible that any intelligence of this kind could have reached the French Legation at Brussels, for that he was in constant telegraphic communication with M. Taschard, the Chargé d'Affaires, and yet had received no report from him about it. The Government here had been aware that Marshal Bazaine was holding communication of some kind with the Prussian authorities, and had, indeed, had reason to suspect that he was endeavouring to come to an arrangement with them on the basis of the restoration of the Emperor, or of the Regency of the Empress. The last telegram which had come in from M. Taschard was dated the day before yesterday (the 18th), and it stated that Marshal Bazaine's negotiations appeared to have recently assumed a more serious character, and to be directed not as before to a Restoration or a Regency, but to the establishment of the Marshal himself as Dictator.

Passing on from this subject, I pointed out to M. Chaudordy, as I had often done before, the embarrassment caused by the extreme vagueness and reserve of his confidential communications to me on the question of peace. The French Government was, I said, constantly urging the neutral Powers to intervene, but it never offered them any authority to speak on the part of France, or gave them any distinct information as to the concessions which France might be induced to make. I proceeded to tell M. de Chaudordy that a Cabinet Council was to meet in London in the afternoon, and that your Lordship had instructed me to ask whether you could inform your colleagues that France authorized Her Majesty's Government to ask Germany on what condition she would consent to make peace.

M. de Chaudordy said that he was obliged to answer this question in the negative. After the reception which M. Jules Favre's overtures had met with, France could not take any further steps in the same direction. He must hold to the declaration he had made, that whatever steps the neutral Powers now took should be taken by them of their own accord; and while he entreated Her Majesty's Government to act, he must beg that their action might not have the smallest appearance of being prompted by France.

I have already communicated the substance of this despatch to your Lordship by successive telegrams sent last night and this morning.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 225.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

My dear Count,

Bruton Street, October 23, 1870.

M. THIERS is desirous, and has the sanction of the Government at Tours, to communicate personally with the Government at Paris.

Her Majesty's Government consider that, if he were allowed to do so, and to come immediately out again, particularly if Count Bismarck would receive him, it would give a favourable chance for an armistice, with a view to a convocation of a Constituent Assembly and an eventual peace.

Pray telegraph immediately to Count Bismarck, and ask his Excellency, if he entertains the idea, to give all the necessary facilities to M. Thiers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Granville.—(Received October 24.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, October 17, 1870.

I WAITED this evening on Prince Gortchakoff and read to his Excellency a Memorandum containing the substance of your Lordship's telegram of yesterday.

His Excellency said that the only terms of peace with which he was acquainted were those contained in Count Bismarck's Circular despatch, and while he did not believe they would be modified except by the events of the war, nothing had yet occurred to encourage an expectation that any change would take place in those which had hitherto characterized it. Any opinion, therefore, expressed by a neutral Power, if there were no intention to support it by arms, would be disregarded and have no influence on the military operations against Paris. He could not, therefore, see that any advantage could be hoped for from England and Russia agreeing confidentially as to what might be reasonable terms of peace. He intimated that Her Majesty's Government had hitherto expressed themselves unfavourably as to the expediency of any attempt being made to mediate in concert with Russia and other Powers without an invitation from the belligerents, and he did not see that any change of circumstances had occurred to modify that view. He said Russia had acted alone to a certain degree, and had gone further than other Powers, as the Emperor in his private correspondence with the King of Prussia had expressed a hope that no annexation of French territory would be required, and the King had answered that, as he must be guided by the opinion of his allies and of Germany, he could not oppose their unanimous desire to protect themselves by an improved frontier.

I observed that, though no actual change may have taken place in the events of the war, the foresight by which the Prussian Commanders are distinguished may have led them to perceive that the difficulties in the way of a satisfactory arrangement have increased during the last few weeks, and an appeal from the neutral Powers may possibly, therefore, be more favourably listened to now at the Prussian head-quarters than it would have been a month ago.

His Excellency, who did not seem to share this opinion, said that if Her Majesty's Government can devise any terms of peace which both belligerents might be expected to accept, he thought they should either address them on their own part to the Prussian head-quarters, or, if they thought it more expedient, ask for the concert of the other neutral Powers; but he considered that their separate action would be preferable, as any joint representations would have more or less a threatening character.

When I spoke of the moral influence which it might be hoped a joint appeal of the neutral Powers to the King of Prussia would have, his Excellency answered, he had no doubt such an appeal would receive a most conciliatory and civil answer; but it would, nevertheless, remain without any practical effect, and he feared also it would be in vain to recommend moderation to the French Government, as he had just learnt from Berlin that terms of armistice negotiated by General Burnside at the Prussian head-quarters, and which that officer considered reasonable, had been rejected by M. Favre.

This, his Excellency said, was much to be regretted, as an armistice and the convocation of a Constituent Assembly are, in his opinion, the first measures essential to the promotion of peace, as no self-constituted French Minister would accept such terms as Prussia would insist upon.

Our interview terminated by his Excellency offering to submit my Memorandum to the Emperor, and to give me an answer to-morrow forenoon, if I would call upon him.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Granville.—(Received October 24.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, October 18, 1870.

WITH reference to my despatch of yesterday's date, I waited again this morning on Prince Gortchakoff, at Czarskoe Seloe, to receive the Emperor's answer to the inquiries of Her Majesty's Government as to whether it might not be possible for the neutral Powers to take some steps with a view to promote the restoration of peace.

His Excellency, who had just come from the Emperor, said that His Imperial Majesty had learnt with much satisfaction that Her Majesty's Government are desirous to make an

effort in the cause of peace, and His Majesty would be glad to be made acquainted with the terms which Her Majesty's Government are of opinion the belligerents might fairly accept; but he thinks that any agreement between the neutral Powers would prove a barren and unpractical measure ("une œuvre stérile et sans résultat pratique").

If, however, Her Majesty's Government could, through their influence at Paris, induce the Provisional Government established there to endeavour to obtain an armistice for the purpose of convoking a Constituent Assembly with which Prussia could enter into negotiations for the re-establishment of peace, His Majesty has reason to believe that a proposal for that object would meet with a favourable reception at the Prussian head-quarters, and that an armistice for forty days might be obtained on the condition that some minor and second-rate fortresses should be surrendered to the Prussian army and the investment of Paris continued; while the Prussian military authorities would afford every facility for members to the Constituent Assembly being freely elected in the districts occupied by the German troops.

After Prince Gortchakoff had communicated this statement to me in the name of the Emperor, his Excellency observed that the Provisional Government might possibly object to the investment of Paris being continued, as they might look upon it as a means of reducing the garrison by famine; but, in that case, his Excellency thought an arrangement might be made for supplying the town, before the expiration of the armistice, with a certain amount of provisions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 228.

Prince Gortchakoff to Baron Brunnow.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by Baron Brunnow, October 24.)

St. Pétersbourg, le 18^e Octobre, 1870.

LE lendemain, c'est-à-dire hier, je lui ai fait part de la réponse de notre Auguste Maître.

Sa Majesté voit avec satisfaction une disposition de la part du Gouvernement Anglais à accélérer, dans les limites du possible, la conclusion d'une paix universellement désirée. Elle croit qu'une entente entre les neutres sur les conditions de la paix à proposer serait une œuvre stérile, parcequ'aucune des Puissances n'est disposée à soutenir matériellement le programme qui aurait été arrêté en commun; que toute discussion relative à ces conditions devrait être réservée aux parties belligérantes; mais qu'un fait qui aurait une grande importance serait d'obtenir un armistice de durée suffisante (par exemple, quarante jours) qui accorderait la possibilité de réunir l'Assemblée Constituante dont ressortirait un pouvoir moins ballotté que celui actuel et qui aurait une autorité suffisante pour statuer sur la paix.

Nous avons lieu de croire que si le Gouvernement de fait faisait à ce sujet une nouvelle démarche au quartier-général du Roi de Prusse, cette démarche ne serait pas rejetée, au prix de la remise de quelques forteresses de second ordre; que la Prusse cesserait les hostilités devant Paris, tout en maintenant son investissement; et que non seulement elle ne contrecarrerait pas les élections, mais les faciliterait dans les provinces qu'elle occupe.

Si le Gouvernement Anglais voulait prendre l'honorable initiative de disposer les hommes au pouvoir en France à faire une démarche dans ce sens, et aux conditions effleurées ci-dessus, il acquerrait des titres à la reconnaissance de tous les amis de la paix.

Sir A. Buchanan a rédigé sur ma table le télégramme qu'il a adressé à ce sujet à Lord Granville, et je pense que M. le Principal Secrétaire d'Etat de Sa Majesté Britannique n'aura pas d'objections à vous le communiquer.

En profitant du retour du courrier Anglais pour vous envoyer une série de pièces diplomatiques, je vous réitère, &c.

(Signé) GORTCHAKOFF.

(Translation.)

St. Petersburg, October 18th, 1870.

THE next day, that is to say, yesterday, I communicated to him the reply of our august Master.

His Majesty sees with satisfaction a disposition on the part of the English Government to hasten, within possible limits, the conclusion of a universally desired peace. He thinks that an understanding between the Neutrals on the terms of peace to be proposed would be a fruitless work, as no one of the Powers is disposed to sustain materially the programme which might be resolved upon in common; that all discussion relating to these terms ought to be reserved to the belligerent parties, but that an action, which would be of great importance, would be to obtain an armistice of sufficient length (say forty days) to give the possibility of reuniting the Constituent Assembly, whose jurisdiction would be less uncertain than that which now exists, and which would have sufficient authority to determine about peace.

We have reason to believe that if the *de facto* Government made another application on this subject to the Head-quarters of the King of Prussia, this application would not be rejected, at the price of the surrender of some fortresses of the second rank; that Prussia would cease hostilities before Paris, still maintaining its investment, and that not only would she not thwart the elections, but she would facilitate them in the provinces in her occupation.

If the English Government were willing to take the honourable initiative of urging the men in power in France to take a step in this direction, and in the terms above alluded to, it would be entitled to the gratitude of all friends of peace.

Sir A. Buchanan drew up on my table the telegram which he has forwarded to Lord Granville on this subject, and I think that Her Britannic Majesty's Principal Secretary of State will not object to communicate it to you. I avail myself of the return of the English courier to send you a series of diplomatic notes, and I renew, &c.

(Signed) GORTCHAKOFF.

No. 229.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received October 24.)

My Lord,

Berlin, October 22, 1870.

THE messenger Ball delivered to me this morning your Lordship's despatch of the 20th instant.

I immediately waited on Baron Thile, and placed a copy of it in his hands. His Excellency promised that it should be forwarded this evening by messenger to Count Bismarck.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 230.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

My dear Count,

Foreign Office, October 25, 1870.

I THINK it as well to apprise you that I have received reliable information that the Government at Tours, although they do not propose it, have every disposition towards an armistice, which, however, they consider should be based on purely military considerations, and in no degree prejudice the future negotiations for a definitive peace.

I ask you to send to Count Bismarck this information, as there are reasons which, in the interest of humanity, seem to support the opinion of the Provisional Government:—

1st. The great effervescence of feeling at Paris might be calmed in various ways by the cessation of hostilities for a short time, and the inhabitants of that city might be thus more disposed to agree to peace than it is stated that they now are.

2ndly. It would admit of a Constituent Assembly being convoked, which might give a recognized Government to France, and greatly facilitate the conclusion of peace.

Yours, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 25, 1870.

M. TISSOT told me that, in a despatch received from his Government, it was said that they were of opinion that they could make no advance to Prussia, but that it was desirable that England should demand from Germany her terms of peace, should consider them, and reduce them if necessary, and then present them to France.

I told him that the instruction contained in his despatches seemed to be superseded by what has since passed as to M. Thiers' mission; but that I doubted whether it would be wise to adopt the suggestion.

If I asked Count Bismarck for his terms, he would probably place them high; and if I was to negotiate for their reduction, how would it be possible for me to do so without knowing the views of the French Government, and how far they were prepared to concede?

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 25, 1870.

I TOLD M. Tissot that he might communicate confidentially to his Government that I had received a message from the Empress through an Englishman of high standing, informing me of certain facts.

Her Majesty said that she sent me the intelligence not to elicit any opinion, which she knew it would be impossible for me to give, but to show that she was determined to respect the hospitality which England had given her, and to abstain from whatever might bear the semblance of intrigues.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 24, 1870.

YOUR telegram of the 22nd instant reporting what had passed between M. Chaudordy and yourself on your communicating to him the substance, conveyed to you by telegraph, of my despatch of the 20th instant, was received late at night, and with as little delay as possible I requested Count Bernstorff to inform Count Bismarck by telegraph that M. Thiers, having received the sanction of the Government at Tours, was desirous of communicating personally with the Government in Paris, and that Her Majesty's Government were of opinion that if he were allowed to do so, and to come out again immediately, and if, moreover, Count Bismarck would receive him, a favourable chance would be afforded for the conclusion of an armistice, with a view to the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, and an eventual peace. I suggested that if this idea was entertained by Count Bismarck, the necessary facilities for his journey should be afforded to M. Thiers.

The Prussian Ambassador has informed me to-day that he had received from Count Bismarck a telegram dated about noon, and saying that M. Thiers having applied for a safe-conduct to General von Tann at Soissons, one had been sent to him from Versailles, and that, on his arrival there, matters might be discussed between him and Count Bismarck.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 25, 1870.

M. TISSOT called upon me this afternoon, and said that he was instructed by M. de Chaudordy to express the satisfaction with which the French Government had learned that the Government of Her Majesty had decided on taking some step.

He then said that M. de Chaudordy in expressing himself to your Excellency to the same effect had pointed out to you that the course which Her Majesty's Government had taken had originated entirely with themselves, and was not the result of any request on the part of the French Government, or of any authority given by them; that he then stated to your Excellency that, as far as his personal opinion went, he thought that an armistice, thus suggested, would be well received by the Government at Tours; but that, before replying as to the question of the convocation of the Assembly, he must consult the Government at Tours; that subsequently having been authorized by that Government to say that it adhered to the proposal of an armistice, and would forward it to the Government sitting at the Hôtel de Ville, and would support the demand for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, he so informed your Excellency, expressing at the same time the hope that the English Government would endeavour to obtain as favourable terms for the armistice as might be possible; that the armistice, such as was proposed, would only be based on military considerations; that if the Prussian Government sought to introduce into it arrangements contrary to the interests of France, and which would seem to prejudge the course of the negotiations for peace, it would be evident that they wished that the negotiation should come to nothing; that it was for the Powers to remove these difficulties, and, at all events, not to allow the evil results of a failure to bring about an armistice to fall on the French Government; that, as regards the negotiations for peace, entire freedom of action must be left with the negotiators.

M. Tissot having given me this account of M. de Chaudordy's views and language, went on to say that he was instructed to speak to me on another point. It was reported, he said, that communications had taken place between Marshal Bazaine and the Prussian head-quarters; that it was difficult to know what value should be attached to this report, but that the French Government thought they might ask that, if negotiations for an armistice were entered into, Prussia should cease to negotiate separately with the Commander-in-chief of one of the French armies, who, by reason of the state of isolation in which he had been placed for several months, could not possibly know what was going on in France.

I replied to M. Tissot that Her Majesty's Government were clearly of opinion that the first thing to be done was to enter into an armistice:—First, because it would put a stop to the bloodshed which was taking place; secondly, because it would be calculated to calm the effervescence which prevailed in Paris; and, thirdly, because it would enable a Constituent Assembly to be convoked.

I said, however, that I must consider awhile before I could decide whether it would be better for Her Majesty's Government to assign these reasons to Prussia, or whether it would be better to leave them in the competent hands of M. Thiers. But, as regards the conditions of the armistice, although they would of course rest on a principle of leaving each belligerent as much as possible in the same relative position at the end of the armistice as they were at the beginning, Her Majesty's Government were not sufficiently acquainted with the relative position of the belligerents to offer any opinion as to what those conditions should be, the details of which could only be settled by the Representatives of each. All that I could say, with reference to M. Tissot's statement respecting Marshal Bazaine, was that I was informed that the negotiation was for the present at an end, and that it was not impossible, if the proposal of M. Chaudordy was made to Count Bismarck, he would answer that, if agreed to, it must be the consequence, and not the preliminary, of the conclusion of an armistice.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 26.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 21, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship, extracted from the "Moniteur Universel" of this day a Circular dated the 14th instant, addressed by M. de Chandordy to French Diplomatic Agents abroad, replying to the Prussian Circular of the 10th instant, respecting the consequences of the continuance of the siege of Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 235.

Circular addressed by M. de Chandordy to French Representatives abroad.

Monsieur,

Tours, le 14 Octobre, 1870.

LES communications adressées par M. le Comte de Bismarck à ses Agents Diplomatiques, et qui traitent de la guerre actuelle étant immédiatement livrées à la publicité, nous nous trouvons obligés de suivre la même voie. Nous n'avons du reste rien à perdre à ce que la discussion soit ouverte sur les opinions du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale, et sur l'état de notre situation, quelque pénible qu'elle puisse être en ce moment. Plus ces points seront éclaircis, et plus, nous en sommes convaincus, les sympathies de l'Europe se tourneront en notre faveur. Quant aux intérêts des peuples, le développement excessif des prétentions Prussiennes doit les rapprocher intimement de nous, le danger étant devenu le même.

Vous aurez lu le Mémoire Prussien transmis de Berlin au "Times" par dépêche télégraphique, le 10 de ce mois. Il a pour but d'examiner plus spécialement les conséquences du siège de Paris. M. de Bismarck y parle de centaines de milliers d'habitants de la capitale qui doivent mourir de faim s'ils ont la persévérance d'oser défendre leurs foyers, et il fait porter la responsabilité d'un pareil événement sur les membres du Gouvernement Français parce qu'ils n'ont pas consenti à accepter toutes les conditions posées par le Premier Ministre du Roi de Prusse. C'est raisonner singulièrement.

Si cette calamité venait à se produire, nous croyons au contraire que le monde entier, effrayé d'un pareil crime, n'hésiterait pas à la faire retomber sur ceux qui l'auraient laissé accomplir, alors qu'on est venu leur demander de la paix, quoiqu'on ne fût même pas responsable de la guerre.

Toutefois ce manifeste ne saurait inquiéter aucun esprit instruit de la réalité des faits. Il est aisé de se donner perpétuellement le beau rôle et de s'attribuer tous les avantages de la situation. L'auteur du Mémoire Prussien raisonne sur des hypothèses. En face de l'avenir tel qu'il lui plaît de le peindre, voici le présent tel que nous le connaissons. Paris est approvisionné complètement pour un temps très-long. L'ordre social n'y est nullement menacé. La seule approche des Prussiens a suffi pour étouffer tous les conflits d'opinion. En dehors de Paris il se forme des armées nombreuses, et la nation est prête à tous les sacrifices pour délivrer sa capitale. Les engagements dont on parle ont été à notre avantage, et ils ne sont pas les seuls. Les Prussiens n'ont pas encore approché la ligne des forts, et s'ils parlent d'affamer Paris, c'est qu'ils rencontrent des obstacles et une résistance qui surprennent toutes leurs prévisions. S'ils insistent sur la difficulté d'approvisionner Paris, c'est qu'eux-mêmes commencent à souffrir du manque de vives, et qu'ils sont forcés d'affaiblir leur armée pour étendre leurs colonnes de pillage. Cette armée se fatigue et se démoralise : le nombre de ses malades augmente chaque jour d'une manière très-inquiétante. La prolongation de la guerre pendant la mauvaise saison est à notre avantage : les hommes ne manquent pas, et la confiance du pays en ses immenses ressources n'est pas ébranlée, même après tous les désastres qu'il a subis. Voilà la vérité.

Malgré cela la France souhaite la paix de même qu'elle la souhaitait avant l'ouverture des hostilités ; mais elle désire que la paix puisse être durable. L'Europe y est intéressée autant que nous.

Recevez, &c.

Pour le Ministre et par autorisation,
Le Ministre Plénipotentiaire, Directeur Délégué,
(Signé) CHAUDORDY.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Tours, October 14, 1870.

THE communications addressed by Count Bismarck to his Diplomatic Agents, and which treat of the present war, having been immediately made public, we find ourselves compelled to adopt the same course. We have, moreover, nothing to lose in the discussion being open on the opinions of the Government of the National Defence, and the state of our position however painful it may be at the present moment. The more these points are cleared up, the more will the sympathies of Europe, we are convinced, turn in our favour. As regards the interests of peoples, the excessive development of the Prussian pretensions must bring them into closer relations with us, the danger having become the same.

You will have read the Prussian memorandum transmitted by telegraph on the 10th instant from Berlin to the "Times." Its object is to examine more particularly the consequences of the siege of Paris. M. de Bismarck talks in it of hundreds of thousands of inhabitants in the capital who must die of famine if they persevere in daring to defend their homes, and he makes the Members of the French Government bear the responsibility of such an occurrence, because they have not consented to accept all the conditions laid down by the Prime Minister of the King of Prussia. It is a singular mode of reasoning.

If this calamity should happen, we think on the contrary that the whole world, horror-struck at such a crime, would not hesitate to make it fall on those who had allowed it to take place when we went to seek peace from them, although we were not even responsible for the war.

This manifesto could not however, disturb the mind of any one acquainted with the real facts. It is easy to lay claim always to the noble part and to assume all the advantages of the position. The author of the Prussian memorandum bases his arguments upon suppositions. Before the future, such as he pleases to paint it, is the present such as we know it. Paris is fully provisioned for a very long time. Social order is in no way threatened there. The mere approach of the Prussians has sufficed to stifle all differences of opinion. Outside Paris numerous armies are being formed, and the nation is ready for every sacrifice to rescue its capital. The engagements spoken of have been to our advantage, and they are not the only ones. The Prussians have not yet approached the line of the forts, and if they talk of starving out Paris it is because they meet with obstacles and a resistance which startle all their calculations. If they urge the difficulty of provisioning Paris, it is that they themselves are beginning to suffer from the want of provisions, and that they are forced to weaken their army to extend their pillaging columns. This army is wearying and getting demoralized: the number of their sick increases daily to an alarming extent. The prolongation of the war during the bad season is to our advantage: there is no lack of men, and the confidence of the country in its vast resources is unshaken, even after all the disasters which it has undergone. Such is the truth.

Notwithstanding, France wishes for peace just as she wished for it ere hostilities began; but she desires that the peace may be durable. Europe is interested in it as much as we.

Receive, &c.

For the Minister, and by authority,
The Minister Plenipotentiary, Director Delegate,
(Signed) CHAUDORDY.

No. 236.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 26.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 22, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship, extracted from the "Moniteur Universel" of this day, a Circular addressed by M. Jules Favre to the French Representatives abroad.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 236.

Circular addressed by M. Jules Favre to French Representatives abroad.

Monsieur,

JE ne sais quand cette dépêche vous parviendra. Depuis trente jours Paris est investi, et sa ferme résolution de résister jusqu'à ce qu'il ait obtenu la victoire peut prolonger quelque temps encore la situation violente qui le sépare du reste du monde. Néanmoins, je n'ai pas voulu retarder d'un jour la réponse que mérite le rapport rédigé par M. le Comte Bismarck sur l'entrevue de Ferrières; je constate d'abord qu'il confirme en tous points mon récit, sauf en ce qui concerne un échange d'idées sur les conditions de la paix, qui, suivant M. de Bismarck, n'auraient pas été débattues entre nous.

J'ai reconnu que sur ce sujet le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord m'avait opposé dès les premiers mots une sorte de fin de non-recevoir tirée de ma déclaration absolue "que je ne consentirais à aucune cession de territoire;" mais mon interlocuteur ne peut avoir oublié que sur mon insistance il s'expliqua catégoriquement, et mentionna, pour le cas où le principe de la cession territoriale serait admis, les conditions que j'ai énumérées dans mon rapport: l'abandon par la France de Strasbourg avec l'Alsace entière, de Metz, et d'une partie de la Lorraine.

Le Chancelier fait observer que ces conditions peuvent être aggravées par la continuation de la guerre. Il me l'a, en effet, déclaré, et je le remercie de vouloir bien le mentionner lui-même. Il est bon que la France sache jusqu'où va l'ambition de la Prusse; elle ne s'arrête pas à la conquête de deux de nos provinces, elle poursuit froidement l'œuvre systématique de notre anéantissement. Après avoir solennellement annoncé au monde par la bouche de son Roi qu'elle n'en voulait qu'à Napoléon et à ses soldats, elle s'acharne à détruire le peuple Français. Elle ravage son sol, incendie ses villages, accable ses habitants de réquisitions, les fusille quand ils ne peuvent satisfaire à ses exigences, et met toutes les ressources de la science au service d'une guerre d'extermination.

La France n'a donc pas d'illusion à conserver. Il s'agit pour elle d'être ou de n'être pas. En lui proposant la paix au prix de trois Départements qui lui sont unis par une étroite affection, on lui offrait le déshonneur. Elle l'a repoussé. On prétend la punir par la mort. Voilà la situation bien nette.

Vainement, lui dit-on, il n'y a pas de honte à être vaincu, encore moins à subir les sacrifices imposés par la défaite. Vainement ajoute-t-on encore que la Prusse peut reprendre les conquêtes violentes et injustes de Louis XIV. De telles objections sont sans portée, et l'on peut s'étonner d'avoir à y répondre.

La France ne cherche pas une impuissante consolation dans l'explication trop facile des causes qui ont entraîné son échec. Elle accepte ses malheurs et ne les discute pas avec son ennemi. Le jour où il lui a été donné de reprendre la direction de ses destinées, elle a loyalement offert une réparation. Seulement cette réparation ne pouvait être une cession de territoire. Pourquoi? Parce que c'était un amoindrissement? Non; parce que c'était une violation de la justice et du droit dont le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord ne semble tenir aucun compte.

Il nous renvoie aux conquêtes de Louis XIV. Veut-il revenir au *statu quo* qui les a immédiatement précédées? Veut-il réduire son Maître à la Couronne Ducale placée sous la suzeraineté des Rois de Pologne? Si, dans la transformation que l'Europe a subie, la Prusse est devenue d'un Etat insignifiant une puissante Monarchie, n'est-ce pas à la conquête qu'elle le doit? Mais avec les deux siècles qui ont favorisé cette vaste recomposition s'est opéré un changement plus profond et d'un ordre plus élevé que celui qui déterminait jusqu'ici les morcellements de territoire. Le droit humain est sorti des régions abstraites de la philosophie. Il tend de plus en plus à prendre possession du monde, et c'est lui que la Prusse foule aux pieds quand elle essaye de nous arracher deux provinces en reconnaissant que les populations repoussent énergiquement sa domination.

A cet égard, rien ne précise mieux sa doctrine que ce mot rappelé par le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord: Strasbourg est la clef de notre maison. C'est donc comme propriétaire que la Prusse stipule, et cette propriété, elle l'applique à des créatures humaines, dont elle supprime par ce fait la liberté morale et la dignité individuelle. Or, c'est précisément le respect de cette liberté, de cette dignité, qui interdit à la France de consentir à l'abandon qu'on lui demande. Elle peut subir l'abus de la force, elle n'y ajoutera pas l'abaissement de sa volonté.

J'ai eu le tort de ne pas faire sur ce point suffisamment comprendre ma pensée quand j'ai dit, ce que je maintiens, que nous ne pouvons, sans déshonneur, céder l'Alsace et la Lorraine. J'ai caractérisé par là, non l'acte imposé au vaincu, mais la faiblesse d'un complice qui donnerait la main à l'oppresseur et consommerait une iniquité pour se

racheter lui-même. M. le Comte de Bismarck ne trouvera pas un Français digne de ce nom qui pense et agisse autrement.

Et c'est aussi pourquoi je ne puis reconnaître qu'une proposition d'armistice sérieusement acceptable nous ait été faite. Je désirais avec ardeur qu'un moyen honorable nous fût offert de suspendre les hostilités et de convoquer une Assemblée. Mais, j'en appelle à tous les hommes impartiaux, le Gouvernement pouvait-il accéder au compromis qui lui était proposé? L'armistice n'eût été qu'une dérision s'il n'avait rendu possibles de libres élections. Or, on ne lui donnait qu'une durée effective de quarante-huit heures. Pendant le surplus de la période de quinze jours ou trois semaines, la Prusse se réservait la continuation des hostilités, en sorte que l'Assemblée eût délibéré sur la paix et la guerre pendant la bataille qui aurait décidé du sort de Paris. De plus, l'armistice ne s'étendait pas à Metz. Il excluait le ravitaillement et nous condamnait à consommer nos vivres pendant que l'armée assiégeante aurait largement vécu par le pillage de nos provinces. Enfin l'Alsace et la Lorraine n'auraient pas nommé de Députés, par la raison vraiment inouïe qu'il s'agissait de prononcer sur leur sort : la Prusse, ne leur reconnaissant pas ce droit, nous demandait de tenir la poignée du sabre avec lequel elle le tranche.

Voilà les conditions que le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord ne craint pas d'appeler "très-conciliantes," en nous accusant "de ne pas saisir l'occasion de convoquer une Assemblée Nationale, témoignant ainsi notre résolution de ne pas nous débarrasser des difficultés qui empêchent la conclusion d'une paix conforme au droit national, et de ne pas écouter l'opinion publique du peuple Français."

Eh bien, nous acceptons devant notre pays comme devant l'histoire la responsabilité de notre refus. Ne pas l'opposer aux exigences de la Prusse eût été à nos yeux une trahison. J'ignore quelle destinée la fortune nous réserve. Mais, ce que je sens profondément, c'est qu'ayant à choisir entre la situation actuelle de la France et celle de la Prusse, c'est la première que j'ambitionnerais. J'aime mieux nos souffrances, nos périls, nos sacrifices, que l'inflexible et cruelle ambition de notre ennemi. J'ai la ferme confiance que la France sera victorieuse. Fût-elle vaincue, elle resterait encore si grande dans son malheur qu'elle demeurerait un objet d'admiration et de sympathie pour le monde entier. Là est sa force véritable, là sera peut-être sa vengeance.

Les Cabinets Européens, qui se sont bornés à de stériles témoignages de cordialité, le reconnaîtront un jour ; mais il sera trop tard. Au lieu d'inaugurer la doctrine de haute médiation, conseillée par la justice et l'intérêt, ils autorisent, par leur inertie, la continuation d'une lutte barbare qui est un désastre pour tous, un outrage à la civilisation.

Cette sanglante leçon ne sera pas perdue pour les peuples. Et qui sait? L'histoire nous enseigne que les régénérations humaines sont, par une loi mystérieuse, étroitement liées à d'ineffables malheurs. La France avait peut-être besoin d'une épreuve suprême ; elle en sortira transfigurée, et son génie brillera d'un éclat d'autant plus vif qu'il l'aura soutenue et préservée de défaillance en face d'un puissant et implacable ennemi.

Lorsque vous pourrez, Monsieur, vous inspirer de ces réflexions dans vos rapports avec le Représentant du Gouvernement près duquel vous êtes accrédité, la fortune aura prononcé son arrêt. En voyant cette grande population de Paris assiégée depuis un mois, si résolue, si calme, si unie, j'attends avec un cœur ferme et confiant l'heure de sa délivrance.

Recevez, &c.

(Signé) JULES FAVRE.

(Translation.)

Sir,

I DO not know when this despatch may reach you. For thirty days Paris has been invested, and its firm resolution for some time to resist till it has obtained victory may prolong yet some time the violent state of things which separates it from the rest of the world. Nevertheless, I would not delay for one day the answer which is called for by M. de Bismarck's Report on the Ferrières Conference. I state first that it confirms my own narrative in all points, except only in what regards an exchange of ideas as to the conditions of peace, which, according to M. de Bismarck, "were not discussed between us."

I have to acknowledge that on this subject the Chancellor of the North German Confederation had from the first words I spoke opposed a sort of plea in bar in face of my absolute declaration that "I would not assent to any cession of territory." But my interlocutor cannot have forgotten that on my insisting he categorically explained himself, and stated that in the eventuality of the principle of a territorial cession being admitted, the conditions would be those which I enumerated in my Report, viz., the abandonment of Strasburg by France, the whole of Alsace, together with Metz and a portion of Lorraine.

The Chancellor remarks that those conditions might be aggravated by the continuance of war. So, indeed, he declared to me, and I am thankful to him for mentioning it himself. It is good that France should know how far the ambition of Prussia reaches. She does not stop at the conquest of two of our provinces; she coldly pursues her systematic work of annihilation. After having solemnly announced to the world, by the mouth of her King, that she had no quarrel except with Napoleon and his soldiers, Prussia now persists in destroying the French nation. She ravages our soil, burns our villages, overwhelms our peasants with requisitions, has them shot when they cannot satisfy her requirements, and uses all the resources of science to aid a war of extermination.

France, therefore, can have no illusions left. For her it is now a question of being or not being. In proposing peace to her at the price of three Departments, united to her by close ties of affection, what was offered to her was dishonour. This she rejected. It is now proposed to punish her with death. All this makes the situation quite clear.

In vain she is told that being vanquished is no dishonour, and that to submit to sacrifice rendered necessary by defeat is still less so. In vain it is added that Prussia is but recapturing the violent and unjust conquests of Louis XIV. Such objections are of no import, and well may we be surprised at being called upon to answer them.

France does not seek vain consolation in the too easy explanation of the causes which led to her disaster. She accepts her misfortunes, and does not discuss them with her enemy. On the day when she once more assumed the direction of her own destinies she loyally offered reparation. But this reparation could not be a cession of territory. Why? Is it because it would have been a diminution of herself? No; it is because it would have been a violation of justice and of right, which the Chancellor of the North German Confederation does not seem to take at all into account.

He refers us to Louis XIV's conquests. Does he wish to return to the *status quo* which immediately preceded them? Does he wish to reduce his master once more to the ducal crown which was placed under the suzerainty of the King of Poland? If, out of the transformation which Europe has gone through Prussia grew from an insignificant State to be a powerful monarchy, is it not to conquest that she owes it? But during the two centuries which helped this immense redistribution of power, a change took place deeper, and of a higher order than what till then had determined the partition of territories. Human right emerged from the abstract regions of philosophy. It more and more takes possession of the world, and it is that right upon which Prussia tramples when she endeavours to take from us two provinces while confessing that the populations energetically reject her sway.

In this respect nothing gives a more correct definition of her doctrines than the expression used by the Chancellor of the North German Confederation: "Strasburg is the key to our house." It is, therefore, as an owner that Prussia stipulates, and this owner's right she exercises over human creatures whose moral freedom and personal dignity she thus suppresses. It is precisely respect for this freedom and for this dignity which forbids France to consent to the abandonment which is asked from her. She may undergo the abuse of force; she will not add to it the degradation of consent.

I was to blame in not making myself sufficiently well understood on this point, when I said, which I still maintain, that we could not give Alsace and Lorraine without dishonour. By those words I meant to characterize, not the act that would be imposed upon the vanquished, but the weakness of an accomplice who would join hands with the oppressor, and consummate an iniquity in order to redeem himself. Count Bismarck will not find a Frenchman worthy of that name who thinks and acts otherwise, and this is also why I cannot acknowledge that a seriously acceptable proposal for an armistice had been made to us.

I ardently desired that honourable means should have been offered us for the suspension of hostilities, and the convocation of an Assembly. But I appeal to all impartial men, could the Government accept such a compromise as was proposed? The armistice would have been a mere mockery if it had not rendered free elections possible, and for this purpose an actual duration of forty-eight hours only was granted. During the rest of the period of a fortnight or three weeks Prussia reserved to herself the right to continue hostilities, so that the Assembly would have held its deliberations on peace or war while the battle would have been going on which would have decided the fate of Paris. Moreover, the armistice would not have been extended to Metz. It excluded revictualling, and condemned us to the consumption of our provisions, whilst the besieging army would have been largely living upon the pillage of our provinces. Lastly, Alsace and Lorraine would have nominated no representatives, for the really unheard-of reason that their fate was to be decided upon in the Assembly itself. Prussia, by not recognizing their right, was, in fact, asking us to hold the handle of the sword with which she cuts it.

Such are the terms which the Chancellor of the North German Confederation does not fear to qualify as "very conciliatory," accusing us "of not seizing the opportunity to convoke a National Assembly, thus showing (he adds) our resolution not to get rid of the difficulties which prevent the conclusion of a peace in harmony with the national right, or to listen to the public opinion of the French people."

Well, we accept before our country as well as before history the responsibility of our refusal. Not to oppose the demands of Prussia would have been in our eyes an act of treason. I cannot know what our destiny may be; but what I deeply feel is, that had I to choose between the situation of France and that of Prussia, I should desire the first. I prefer our sufferings, our perils, our sacrifices to the inflexible and cruel ambition of our enemy. I entertain the firm hope that France will be victorious. Were she vanquished, she would still remain so great in her misfortunes that she would stand as an object of admiration and sympathy to the whole world. Therein lies her real strength, and therein would, perhaps, be her revenge.

The European Cabinets which have been making only empty demonstrations of cordiality will, at a future day, perceive it; but it will be too late. Instead of initiating the doctrine of high médiation, advised by justice and interest, they by their inertness authorize the continuation of a barbarous struggle which is a disaster to all, and an outrage to civilization.

This bloody lesson shall not be lost on nations, and who knows? History teaches us that human regenerations, through some mysterious law, are narrowly connected with ineffable misfortunes. Perhaps France required to pass through a supreme trial; she will issue from it transfigured, and her genius will shine with so much the more brightness since it will have comforted and saved her from faintheartedness in face of a powerful and implacable enemy.

By the time that you have an opportunity of speaking in the sense of these observations to the Representative of the Government to which you are accredited, fortune may have pronounced her judgment. Seeing that this large population of Paris, which has been besieged for one month, is so resolute, so calm, so united, I am expecting the hour of its deliverance with a firm and hopeful heart.

Receive, &c.
(Signed) JULES FAVRE.

No. 237.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 26.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 22, 1870.

I HAD yesterday the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram dated the day before, 6.40 P.M., and I went without loss of time to the Comte de Chaudordy to make the contents known to him.

I told him that Her Majesty's Government were extremely anxious to do all that lay in them to promote the speedy restoration of peace. It appeared, I said, to them that the importance of arresting hostilities became every day more urgent. They therefore earnestly advised the French Government to agree with Prussia on an armistice, which might lead to the immediate convocation of a Constituent Assembly, and eventually, by the blessing of God, to the restoration of peace. I added that Her Majesty's Government had, on their part, addressed themselves also to Prussia in the manner which would, in their opinion, be most conducive to the attainment of the object.

After some discussion, during which I spoke with some warmth of the practical advantages of the course recommended by your Lordship, and of the heavy responsibility which would fall upon the French Government, if they frustrated the endeavours which Her Majesty's Government were making in favour of peace, I begged M. de Chaudordy to bring your Lordship's suggestions formally before the Government Delegation at Tours, and to obtain for me a deliberate answer from them.

The answer thus obtained was given to me this morning by M. de Chaudordy. It was to the following effect:—

The Government Delegation at Tours have received with great satisfaction and gratitude the communication from Her Majesty's Government. For the reasons which have been so often stated, they consider themselves to be at this moment precluded from making fresh overtures to Prussia, but they would be very much obliged if Her Majesty's Government would ascertain the conditions on which Prussia would consent to an armistice, and would use its influence to make those conditions such as France could accept.

The Government Delegation at Tours agree, for their own part, both to the suggestion of an armistice, and to that of the convocation of the Constituent Assembly, but they cannot make any positive engagement, especially as regards the Assembly; without the concurrence of the Government at Paris. They will, however, recommend both suggestions to the adoption of that Government.

Having delivered this answer to me, M. de Chaudordy told me that M. Thiers, who arrived at Tours the night before last, thoroughly approved the suggestions of Her Majesty's Government, and that both M. Thiers himself and the Government here desired that he should go in person to Paris to obtain the concurrence of the Government there.

From M. de Chaudordy I went to M. Thiers. He told me that the course pointed out by Her Majesty's Government was precisely that which he himself had been prepared to recommend. He was willing to go to Paris to endeavour to make the true state of affairs known there, and to urge an immediate resort to an armistice and a Constituent Assembly. He would even undertake to negotiate the armistice at the Prussian head-quarters, if the French Government wished him to do so. For the moment, however, what was most urgent was that he should obtain the means of entering Paris and of coming out again. He had during his journey abroad made some arrangements with a view to effecting this, but he should be exceedingly obliged if your Lordship would endeavour to procure from the Prussian head-quarters, with the least possible delay, permission for him to go to Paris and to quit it again almost immediately afterwards.

M. Thiers went on to speak of the conditions of the armistice. He conceived that, if Prussia really desired to make peace, she would content herself with demanding, as was usual in such cases, simply such terms as would establish the *status quo* as to the military position, as would, in fact, ensure to each belligerent the same military advantages at the end of the armistice as he was in possession of at the beginning. It would be much better not to make the cessation of hostilities dependent upon any previous agreement as to the basis of peace. In the present temper of the French Government and people, any premature discussion of this basis was only too likely to lead to a summary rejection of the armistice. If his opinion prevailed, not a single word would be said in negotiating the armistice on the subject of the final terms of peace. If hostilities could only once be stopped, he was sure that both parties would shrink from recommencing them; and this feeling might induce each to make concessions which it would refuse during the ardour and irritation of an actual contest in arms. He trusted that the knowledge his recent journeys and negotiations had given him of the disposition of the principal Courts of Europe, as well as his long experience of public affairs in France, would give him weight with the people as well as with the men in power at Paris.

I said that there was one point in particular on which it appeared to me M. Thiers was, more than any other man, entitled to attention from his countrymen at Paris. While it was universally admitted that he had a complete and thorough knowledge of all military matters, he was free from the professional prejudices which were supposed to lead officers trained in regular armies to undervalue the hasty levies and unsystematic organization to which it was necessary to have recourse in critical circumstances. With his admirable talent for seizing the essential points in military matters, even the few days he would pass at Tours would enable him to form a just estimate of the Army of the Loire, and of the expectations which the Parisians would be really entitled to found upon it.

M. Thiers said, that if he succeeded in getting to Paris, it would undoubtedly be his endeavour to bring home to his countrymen there the real truth as regarded the military situation of the country, no less than the state of diplomatic and political affairs.

On leaving M. Thiers I immediately despatched to your Lordship, by telegram, a summary of the communications with him and with M. de Chaudordy which are recounted, with a little more detail, in the present despatch.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 238.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 26.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 23, 1870.

M. THIERS himself and Count de Chaudordy both mentioned to me yesterday that the former had during his journey made some arrangements which would probably enable him to enter Paris.

To-day M. Okouneff, the Russian Chargé d'Affaires, has told me that the Emperor had promised to use his influence with the King of Prussia to obtain for M. Thiers the means of entering Paris, and afterwards going, if he desired it, to the Prussian head-quarters to negotiate. M. Okouneff told me that yesterday he had, at the request of M. Thiers, sent a telegram to St. Petersburg asking for the immediate fulfilment of the Emperor's promise.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 239.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 26.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 24, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship copies of a correspondence respecting the demand addressed to Count Bismarck by those members of the Diplomatic Body who remained at Paris, for notice of a bombardment, and facilities for communication with their Governments.

The correspondence has been communicated to me by the Nuncio.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 239.

M. Jules Favre to Monsignor Chigi.

Monseigneur,

Paris, le 24 Septembre, 1870.

J'AI transmis au Gouvernement ce que vous avez bien voulu me dire lorsque vous m'avez fait l'honneur de venir me voir hier. Le Gouvernement m'a chargé de remercier votre Excellence des sentiments qu'elle m'a témoignés et qui la déterminent elle et plusieurs membres du Corps Diplomatique à ne point s'éloigner de Paris dans les cruelles circonstances que nous traversons. Nous avons le ferme espoir que l'ordre ne sera pas un instant troublé, et que, toute entière au devoir patriotique de la défense, notre population donnera au monde l'exemple de la sagesse en même temps que du courage. Au surplus le Gouvernement ne négligera aucune des mesures de protection qui peuvent garantir votre sécurité et celle de vos collègues. En cas de menace de bombardement il réclamera les immunités qui vous sont dues. Il se prêtera aussi à toutes les combinaisons qui pourront faciliter vos communications diplomatiques, et si votre Excellence le permet demain Dimanche de 2 à 3 heures, j'aurai l'honneur de me présenter chez elle pour me mettre plus complètement encore à sa disposition.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) JULES FAVRE.

(Translation)

Monseigneur,

Paris, September 24, 1870.

I TRANSMITTED to the Government what you were good enough to tell me when you did me the honour of calling upon me yesterday. The Government has directed me to thank your Excellency for the sentiments which you testified to me, and which determine you and several members of the Corps Diplomatique not to leave Paris in the cruel crisis through which we are passing. We indulge in the firm hope that order will not be for an instant disturbed, and that, wholly given up to the patriotic duty of defence, our population will give to the world an example of wisdom and courage combined. The Government will not, moreover, neglect any precautionary measures which can guarantee your safety and that of your colleagues. In the event of a menace of a bombardment, it will demand the immunities which are due to you. It will also comply with all arrangements which can facilitate your diplomatic communications; and, with your Excellency's permission, I shall have the honour of calling on you to-morrow, Sunday, from 2 to 3 o'clock, to place myself more completely at your disposition.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) JULES FAVRE.

Inclosure 2 in No. 239.

M. Jules Favre to Monsignor Chigi.

Monseigneur,

Paris, le 3 Octobre, 1870.

JE reçois seulement aujourd'hui par l'intermédiaire d'un Envoyé Américain la réponse que M. le Comte de Bismarck devait faire à mes deux questions, l'une relative au bombardement, l'autre relative au départ hebdomadaire d'un courrier diplomatique. Je m'empresse de la communiquer à votre Excellence.

Sur la première, M. de Bismarck se retranche dans la rigueur des nécessités de la guerre, et semblant éluder ma demande, se borne à me dire qu'il ne peut préciser le moment ni la nature de son attaque.

Sur la seconde, il concède un courrier diplomatique par semaine à la condition que les dépêches seront ouvertes et ne traiteront aucun sujet touchant la guerre.

Je crains qu'il soit difficile de se conformer à de telles conditions.

Dans ces conjonctures je ne puis que répéter ce que j'ai eu l'honneur de dire à votre Excellence : je demeure à sa disposition, si elle juge encore mon concours utile, et je la prie d'agréer, &c.

(Signé) JULES FAVRE.

(Translation.)

Monseigneur,

Paris, October 3, 1870.

I HAVE only to-day received, by the intermediary of an American Envoy, the answer which Count Bismarck was about to make to my two questions,—the one relating to the bombardment, the other to the weekly departure of a diplomatic courier. I hasten to communicate it to your Excellency.

With regard to the first question, M. de Bismarck pleads the rigour of the necessities of war ; and, apparently evading my request, confines himself to telling me that he cannot fix the time or the nature of his attack.

With regard to the second, he allows a weekly diplomatic courier, provided that the despatches are open, and treat of no subject touching the war.

I fear that it will be hard to agree to such conditions.

Under these circumstances, I can only repeat what I have had the honour of telling your Excellency. I am at your service, if you still think my help of any use ; and I beg you to accept, &c.

(Signed) JULES FAVRE.

Inclosure 3 in No. 239.

Count Bismarck to M. Jules Favre.

M. le Ministre,

Ferrières, le 26 Septembre, 1870.

EN réponse à la lettre que j'ai eu l'honneur de recevoir aujourd'hui de votre Excellence je regrette que des considérations militaires me défendent toute communication sur l'époque et le mode de l'attaque projeté contre la forteresse de Paris.

Il n'est pas admis en général par les usages de la guerre que des correspondances soient autorisées à entrer ou à sortir d'une forteresse assiégée.

Quoique nous soyons disposées à autoriser volontiers la sortie de lettres ouvertes émanant d'Agents Diplomatiques en tant que leur contenu n'offre pas d'inconvénient sous le rapport militaire, il m'est impossible néanmoins de reconnaître comme fondée et d'admettre les conséquences de la manière de voir de ceux qui voudraient considérer l'intérieur des fortifications de Paris comme un centre approprié à des relations diplomatiques. Les Gouvernements neutres, dont les Représentants ont transféré leur résidence à Tours, partagent, à ce qu'il paraît, notre manière de voir à ce sujet.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé) BISMARCK.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

Ferrières, September 26, 1870.

IN reply to the letter which I had the honour of receiving to-day from your Excellency, I regret that military considerations forbid me all communication on the time and the manner of the projected attack on the fortress of Paris.

It is not usually admitted, by the usages of war, that correspondence is allowed to be sent into or out of a besieged fortress.

Although we are disposed to authorize willingly the issue of open letters from Diplomatic Agents, as long as their contents present nothing unfit in a military point of view, it is nevertheless impossible for me to recognize as well-founded, and to allow effect to be given to the views of those who would consider the interior of the fortifications of Paris as a centre adapted for diplomatic relations. The neutral Governments, whose Representatives have transferred their residence to Tours, share, apparently, our views on this subject.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) BISMARCK

Inclosure 4 in No. 239.

The Diplomatic Body at Paris to Count Bismarck.

M. le Comte,

Paris, le 6 Octobre, 1870.

LES Soussignés, membres du Corps Diplomatique résidant à Paris, ont eu le 24 Septembre dernier l'honneur de faire parvenir à votre Excellence l'expression de leur désir qu'un courrier, porteur de leurs dépêches officielles, pût chaque semaine, à des jours à désigner, franchir les lignes de l'armée assiégeante et se rendre jusqu'à une localité d'où le service postal régulier fût assuré.

Par lettre du 3 Octobre, M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères de France vient de nous informer qu'il avait reçu la veille pour réponse de votre Excellence, "qu'un courrier diplomatique ne pourrait traverser les lignes des troupes assiégeantes qu'à la condition que les dépêches seront ouvertes et ne traiteront aucun sujet touchant à la guerre."

Nous nous serions fait un devoir, quant au contenu de nos dépêches, de nous conformer scrupuleusement aux obligations imposées pendant un siège aux Agents Diplomatiques par les règles et usages du droit international.

Par contre, notre position d'Agents Diplomatiques, et nos obligations envers nos Gouvernements, ne nous permettent pas d'accepter l'autre condition, de ne leur adresser que des dépêches ouvertes.

Si cette dernière condition devait être maintenue, il deviendrait impossible, à leur vif regret, aux Représentants Diplomatiques des Etats neutres d'entretenir des rapports officiels avec leurs Gouvernements respectifs.

Veuillez, &c.

(Signé)

Le Nonce Apostolique, FLAVIUS, *Archevêque de Myre.*

KERN, *Ministre de la Confédération Suisse.*

B^{RON}. ADELSWAERD, *Ministre de Suède et Norwège.*

COMTE DE MOLTKE AVITFELDT, *Ministre de Danemarck.*

B^{RON}. BEYENS, *Ministre de Belgique.*

LOPEZ DE AROSEMENA, *Secrétaire, Chargé d'Affaires par interim des Légations des Honduras et du Salvador.*

B^{RON}. DE ZUYLEN DE NYEVELT, *Ministre des Pays Bas.*

M. HENRIQUE L. RATTON, *Chargé d'Affaires du Brésil.*

VICOMTE DE LANCASTRE, *Chargé d'Affaires de Portugal.*

WASHBURN, *Ministre des Etats Unis.*

DUC D'AQUAVIVA, *Chargé d'Affaires de Monaco et San Marino.*

WILLIAM MARTIN, *Chargé d'Affaires de Hawaï.*

JULES THIRION, *Chargé d'Affaires de la République Dominicaine.*

V. DE BALLIVIAN Y ROXAS, *Ministre de Bolivie.*

P. GALVEZ, *Ministre du Pérou.*

(Translation.)

M. le Comte,

Paris, October 6, 1870.

THE Undersigned, members of the Corps Diplomatique, residing in Paris, had the honour to forward to your Excellency, on the 24th of September last, the expression of

their wish that a courier, bearer of their official despatches, might every week, on days to be fixed, pass the lines of the besieging army, and proceed to a spot whence the regular postal service might be safely made.

In a letter, dated 3rd October, the French Minister for Foreign Affairs has just informed us that he had received, the day before, as an answer from your Excellence, "that a diplomatic courier could only cross the lines of the besieging troops on the condition that the despatches are open and shall treat of no subject touching the war."

We should have bound ourselves, as respects the contents of our despatches, to conform scrupulously to the obligations imposed during a siege on Diplomatic Agents by the rules and usages of international law.

On the other hand, our position of Diplomatic Agents, and our duties towards our Governments, do not allow of our accepting the other condition, to transmit to them only open despatches.

If this latter condition were to be maintained it would be impossible for the Diplomatic Representatives of Neutral States, much to their regret, to keep up official relations with their respective Governments.

Accept, &c.

(Signed)

The Apostolic Nuncio, FLAVIUS, *Archbishop of Myra.*

KERN, *Minister of the Swiss Confederation.*

^{B^{RON}}. ADELSWAERD, *Minister of Sweden and Norway.*

COMTE DE MOLTKE AVITFELDT, *Minister of Denmark.*

^{B^{RON}}. BEYENS, *Minister of Belgium.*

LOPEZ DE AROSEMENA, *Secretary, Chargé d'Affaires ad interim of the Legations of Honduras and Salvador.*

^{B^{RON}}. DE ZUYLEN DE NYEVELT, *Minister of the Netherlands.*

M. HENRICO L. RATTON, *Brazilian Chargé d'Affaires.*

VICOMTE DE LANCASTRE, *Portuguese Chargé d'Affaires.*

WASHBURNE, *Minister of the United States.*

DUC D'AQUAVIVA, *Chargé d'Affaires of Monaco and San Marino.*

WILLIAM MARTIN, *Hawaiian Chargé d'Affaires.*

JULES THIRION, *Chargé d'Affaires of the Republic of San Domingo.*

V. DE BALLIVIAN Y ROXAS, *Minister of Bolivia.*

P. GALVEZ, *Minister of Peru.*

Inclosure 5 in No. 239.

Count Bismarck to Monsignor Chigi.

Monseigneur,

Versailles, le 10 Octobre, 1870.

J'AI eu l'honneur de recevoir la lettre en date du 6 Octobre dernier par laquelle les membres du Corps Diplomatique résidant encore à Paris ont bien voulu m'informer qu'il leur deviendrait impossible d'entretenir des rapports officiels avec leurs Gouvernements respectifs si la condition de ne pouvoir leur adresser que des dépêches ouvertes devait être maintenue.

Lorsque la continuation du siège de Paris fut rendue inévitable par le refus d'un armistice par le Gouvernement Français, le Gouvernement du Roi prévint de son propre mouvement, par une note circulaire du Secrétaire d'Etat, M. de Thile, en date du 26 Septembre dernier, dont j'ai l'honneur de vous transmettre une copie, les Agents des Puissances neutres accrédités à Berlin que la liberté des communications avec Paris n'existait plus qu'autant que les événements militaires le permettaient. Le même jour je reçus à Ferrières une communication de M. le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale qui m'informait du désir exprimé par les membres du Corps Diplomatique d'être autorisés à expédier des dépêches à leurs Gouvernements par des courriers partant chaque semaine, et je n'hésitai pas, en me conformant aux règles établies par le droit international, à y faire une réponse dictée par les nécessités de la situation militaire, dont je me permets également de transmettre une copie à votre Excellence.

Les Représentants du pouvoir actuel ont cru convenable d'établir le siège de leur

Gouvernement au milieu des fortifications de Paris et de choisir cette ville et ses environs comme théâtre de la guerre. Si les membres du Corps Diplomatiques accrédités auprès d'un Gouvernement antérieur se sont décidés à partager avec le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale les inconvénients inséparables du séjour dans une forteresse assiégée, ce n'est pas le Gouvernement du Roi qui en porte la responsabilité.

Quelle que soit notre confiance que MM. les Signataires de la lettre du 6 Octobre sauraient personnellement se conformer, dans les communications adressées à leurs Gouvernements aux obligations que leur présence dans une forteresse assiégée selon les règles du droit de guerre peut imposer à des Agents Diplomatiques, il faut cependant tenir compte de la possibilité que l'importance de certains faits pourrait leur échapper au point de vue militaire. Il est évident d'ailleurs qu'ils se trouveraient hors d'état de nous fournir la même garantie pour les messagers qu'ils croiraient devoir employer, et que nous serions obligés de laisser passer et repasser à travers nos lignes.

Il a été créé à Paris un état de choses auquel l'histoire moderne, sous le point de vue du droit international, n'offre aucune analogie précise. Un Gouvernement en guerre avec une Puissance qui ne l'a pas encore reconnu, s'est enfermé dans une forteresse assiégée, et s'y trouve entouré d'une partie des diplomates qui étaient accrédités auprès du Gouvernement à la place duquel s'est mis le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale. En face d'une situation aussi irrégulière, il sera difficile d'établir, sur la base du droit des gens, des règles exemptes de controverse sous tous les points de vue.

Je crois pouvoir espérer que votre Excellence ne méconnaîtra pas la justesse de ces observations, et voudra bien apprécier les considérations qui m'empêchent, à mon vif regret, de donner suite au désir exprimé dans la lettre du 6 Octobre dernier.

Si cependant les signataires ne croyaient pas pouvoir en admettre la justesse, les Gouvernements qu'ils ont représentés à Paris et auxquels je m'empresserai de communiquer la correspondance échangée avec eux, aviseront de leur côté, et se mettront en communication avec le Gouvernement du Roi pour examiner les questions du droit des gens qui se rattachent à la position normale que les événements et les mesures du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale ont créé à Paris.

Veuillez, &c.
(Signé) VON BISMARCK.

(Translation.)

Monseigneur,

Versailles, October 10, 1870.

I HAVE had the honour to receive the letter, dated the 6th of October last, in which the members of the Corps Diplomatique, still resident in Paris, have been good enough to inform me that it would become impossible for them to keep up official relations with their respective Governments if the condition of only being able to forward to them open despatches were to be maintained.

When the continuation of the siege of Paris was rendered inevitable by the refusal of an armistice by the French Government, the Royal Government, in a Circular note from the Secretary of State, M. de Thile, dated the 26th of September last, of its own accord informed the Agents of neutral Powers, accredited to Berlin, that the liberty of communication with Paris existed only as long as military events permitted it. The same day I received at Ferrières a communication from the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of National Defence, which informed of the desire expressed by the members of the Corps Diplomatique to be authorized to forward despatches to their Governments by couriers starting every week; and I did not hesitate, in conformity to the rules established by international law, to reply to it, in an answer dictated by the necessities of the military situation, a copy of which I beg to transmit to you herewith.

The Representatives of the existing power thought fit to establish the seat of their Government amid the fortifications of Paris, and to choose that town and its environs as the theatre of war. If the members of the Corps Diplomatique, accredited to a former Government, have decided to share with the Government of National Defence the annoyances inseparable from a stay in a beleaguered fortress, the Royal Government does not take the responsibility of it.

However confident we may be that the signatories of the letter of the 6th October would personally conform, in the communications addressed to their Governments, to the obligations that their presence in a besieged fortress, according to the rules of the law of war, may impose on Diplomatic Agents, we must, however, not lose sight of the possibility of their divulging certain facts which might be important in a military point of view. It is, besides, clear that they would be unable to furnish us with the same guarantee for the messengers whom they would be obliged to employ, and whom we should be compelled to allow to pass and repass our lines.

A state of things has been created in Paris to which modern history, as far as regards international law, offers no precise analogy. A Government at war with a Power by whom it has not yet been recognized, is shut up in a beleaguered fortress, and is surrounded there by a portion of the Diplomats who were accredited to the Government whose place has been taken by the Government of National Defence. In the presence of so anomalous a situation, it will be difficult to fix, as the basis of the law of nations, rules exempt from every kind of dispute.

I trust that your Excellency will allow the justice of these remarks, and will be pleased to appreciate the considerations which prevent me, to my deep regret, from complying with the desire expressed in the letter of the 6th of October last.

If, however, the signatories are unable to admit their justice, the Governments which they have represented at Paris, and to which I will take care to communicate the correspondence exchanged with them, will consider on their side, and will put themselves in communication with the Royal Government to examine the questions of international law which are connected with the normal position which the events and measures of the Government of National Defence have created at Paris.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) VON BISMARCK.

Inclosure 6 in No. 239.

Circular addressed by M. Thile to Foreign Representatives at Berlin.

(Traduction.)

Berlin, le 26 Septembre, 1870.

LES représentants du pouvoir en France ayant repoussé l'armistice, un Gouvernement reconnu n'existant plus à Paris, et le Gouvernement fonctionnant de fait ayant, à ce qu'on dit, transféré sa résidence à Tours, le Soussigné a l'honneur de prévenir M. que les communications avec Paris n'existent plus qu'autant que les événements militaires le permettront.

Le Soussigné, &c.

(Signé) THILE.

(Translation.)

Berlin, September 26, 1870.

THE representatives of power in France having rejected the armistice, a Government no longer exists at Paris, and the working Government *de facto* having, according to report, transferred its seat to Tours, the Undersigned has the honour to inform Mr. that communications with Paris exist only as long as military events permit.

The Undersigned, &c.

(Signed) THILE.

No. 240.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 26.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 24, 1870.

THE Count de Chaudordy told me this morning that the Austrian Ambassador, the Italian Minister, and the Russian Chargé d'Affaires had each announced to him that he was instructed by his Government to give full support to the representations made by Her Majesty's Government in favour of an armistice, to be followed by a Constituent Assembly. The same information has been also given to me by Prince Metternich, the Chevalier Nigra, and M. Okouneff themselves.

M. de Chaudordy went on to say that there could be no possible chance for the success of the negotiations if they were not absolutely confined to the discussion of the military conditions on which the armistice itself was to be concluded. If any attempt were made to obtain a pledge as to the eventual terms of peace, the Government of National Defence must suppose that it was not really the intention of Prussia to consent to a suspension of hostilities. At all events, it was certain that the present French Government had no authority to give any pledge of the kind. It could not arrogate to itself a right to prejudge the decisions of the future National Assembly. The armistice was the means to an end, and the end was the convocation of an Assembly, which should exercise in all their plenitude the powers of the nation, and should be competent to conclude a binding peace on behalf of France. What the present Government was able

and willing to do, was to agree upon and to enforce such military conditions as would be necessary to establish an equitable armistice, and thereby render the elections and the deliberations of the Assembly possible.

There was also, M. de Chaudordy proceeded to observe, a point of some delicacy, upon which Her Majesty's Government might not be disposed to enter at the present time, but to which it might nevertheless be well to call their attention. It was rumoured that Marshal Bazaine was engaged in separate negotiations on his own account with the Prussians. It was evident that if negotiations for an armistice were undertaken by the French Government for the whole of France, these separate communications between Bazaine and the enemy must cease.

M. Chaudordy said that he had written to the French Chargé d'Affaires in London upon the necessity of confining the negotiations for an armistice to the immediate military conditions, as well as upon the reported proceedings of Marshal Bazaine, and he begged me to report to your Lordship what he had just said to me upon these topics.

I promised to do so, and I added that, in my opinion, the all-important point at the present moment was to obtain a cessation of hostilities, and that the best, if not the only, chance of doing so, was to set entirely aside all subjects of discussion except the actual military arrangements practically necessary for an armistice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 241.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 26.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 24, 1870.

I HAD last night the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram dated yesterday at noon, and this morning the honour to receive that dated yesterday at 3.15 P.M.

I informed M. Thiers this morning that your Lordship had desired me to express to him the satisfaction with which you had heard of his safe arrival at Tours, and to congratulate him upon being enabled by his public spirit to bear so much fatigue and undertake such important labours. I added that your Lordship had, without the smallest delay, requested the Prussian Ambassador in London to apply at the German head-quarters for the safe-conduct necessary to give M. Thiers the means of communicating personally with the Government at Paris, and afterwards with Count Bismarck.

M. Thiers desired me to convey his warm thanks to your Lordship. He said that he had learnt with very great satisfaction that Austria, Italy, and Russia gave their support to the recommendation of an armistice and a National Assembly, and that thus the judicious and opportune proposal of Her Majesty's Government had virtually effected that common understanding between the Great Neutral Powers which he looked upon as the first step towards the restoration of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 242.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 26, 1870.

I REQUESTED Count Bernstorff yesterday afternoon to inform Count Bismarck that the Provisional Government at Tours was prepared to treat for an armistice, and that Her Majesty's Government considered that this course had its advantages, inasmuch as an armistice would not only put a stop to bloodshed, but would also give time for the effervescence prevailing in Paris to subside, and admit of the convocation of a Constituent Assembly.

Not long after my letter to Count Bernstorff was sent, your Excellency's telegram of 3 P.M. yesterday afternoon arrived, from which it appeared that some misunderstanding had arisen at the Prussian head-quarters as to the precise character of M. Thiers' request for a safe-conduct; and I at once begged Count Bernstorff to explain to Count Bismarck that what M. Thiers really wanted was to obtain a safe-conduct to admit of his entering Paris to confer with the Provisional Government there and to receive their authority before

seeing Count Bismarck—a safe-conduct, in short, to admit of his entering Paris and coming out immediately, and then going to the Prussian head-quarters.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 243.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 26, 1870.*
I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to M. de Chaudordy and M. Thiers on the subject of an armistice, as reported in your despatch of the 22nd instant.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 244.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 26, 1870.*
I HAVE to acquaint your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve the language which you held to M. de Chaudordy, as reported in your despatch of the 24th instant, respecting the primary importance at the present moment of obtaining a cessation of hostilities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 245.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord, *Foreign Office, October 27, 1870.*
COUNT BERNSTORFF in informing me that he would send to the Prussian head-quarters my letter of the 25th instant respecting an armistice, has stated that he anticipates that the answer will be that the Provisional Government having categorically refused the Prussian offer made through General Burnside for an armistice for the purpose of convoking a Constitutional Assembly, a fresh offer on the part of Prussia would only be considered as an indication of weakness, and encourage resistance; that consequently the Governments at Tours and in Paris must themselves ask for an armistice if they wish to obtain one; but that every proposal which might be made by France would be considered in a pacific spirit.

Count Bernstorff tells me also that he telegraphed on the 25th respecting a safe-conduct for M. Thiers to enter Paris.

It is desirable that your Excellency should suggest to the Provisional Government not to make public telegraphic declarations, which only make negotiations more difficult.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 246.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received October 28.)

My Lord, *Berlin, October 26, 1870.*
I HAVE the honour to report to your Lordship that I have been informed by the Austrian and Italian Ministers at this Court that they have received instructions from their respective Governments by telegraph to recommend to the Prussian and French Governments, and to support, the proposal submitted by Her Majesty's Government to the belligerent Powers for an armistice, with a view to the convocation of a Constituent Assembly in France and to eventual peace.

Count Wimpffen, the Austrian Minister, and Count de Launay, the Italian Minister, have informed me that they have acquitted themselves of this duty, and have communicated to Baron Thile the telegraphic instruction from their Government.

Baron Thile replied that he would not fail immediately to inform Count Bismarck of the communications they had made him.

M. d'Oubril, the Russian Minister, has not received any instructions from his Government to support the proposal made by your Lordship to the belligerents for an armistice, and has consequently made no communication to the Prussian Government on the subject. But General Werder, the Prussian Military Commissioner at St. Petersburg, has been charged with a letter from the Emperor to the King of Prussia, in which it is said that His Imperial Majesty recommends the acceptance of your Lordship's proposal, and expresses an ardent hope for the conclusion of peace.

It is somewhat singular that the Russian Government, which on several occasions has given proof of its sincere desire for peace, should on the present occasion hold back, and prefer isolated to common action.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 247.

Sir E. Thornton to Earl Granville.—(Received October 29.)

My Lord,

Washington, October 17, 1870.

WITH reference to your Lordship's telegram of the 11th instant, in which inquiry was made as to the import of arms into this country from France and Germany during the late civil war, I thought it best to answer as soon as possible with the data I could then obtain, as I did in my telegram of the 15th instant. The details contained in this telegram were obtained from the Custom-house Returns of arms paying duty. I now inclose a statement derived from those Returns of the values of the arms imported from different European countries during the two years previous to the war and the four years for which the war lasted.

But in the Custom-house Returns there is also a heading amongst the duty-free imports of "Articles of all kinds for the use of the United States."

I also inclose a statement of the values of these articles during the same years. From this statement your Lordship will perceive that during the two years previous to the war no imports were made of such articles; whereas, immediately after its commencement, and during the four years of its duration, large values were introduced, amongst which considerable sums were doubtless paid for arms purchased in Europe by Government agents.

The arms stated as imported from Hamburg and Bremen were probably purchased in Germany, and it is not unlikely that some of those returned as having come from England were really purchased in other European countries. It is notorious that all the arms which could be obtained in Austria and Baden, even including some from the Government arsenals, were purchased for the United States' army.

During the war, the Ordnance Department made contracts for arms with merchants at New York, whilst the War Department sent agents to Europe to make direct purchases for the Government. It was well known at the time, and a matter of some merriment, that the respective agents of the War Department and of the New York merchants, were, in ignorance of the character of their rivals, bidding against each other.

I learn from New York that several applications have been made during the last few weeks to the different English lines of steamers plying between New York and England to carry arms and munitions of war; but as they have till now declined, the British steamer "Avon" at Montreal has been chartered for the purpose, and is expected almost immediately at New York, if she has not already arrived.

A telegram has been received at New York from M. Crémieux, ordering that the Havre line of French steamers be held exclusively for freight to be forwarded for the Government, which can only be munitions of war, subject to the orders of M. Séance, who is not known at New York, but is supposed to be a special agent now on his way to America.

I have reason to believe that the French Government have made a contract with the Remington Arms Company, by which they engage to purchase all the arms they can make beyond those which the Company are bound by contract to supply to the Turkish Government, and that this surplus amounts to about 300 arms a-day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. THORNTON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 247.

STATEMENT of the Value of Fire-arms imported into the United States from Europe during the following years, as entered in the Custom-house Returns.

Year ending	Hamburgh and Bremen.	France.	Belgium.	Italy.	England.
	Dollars.	Dollars.	Dollars.	Dollars.	Dollars.
June 30, 1860 ..	15,590	17,158	44,033	..	281,998
„ 1861 ..	8,481	44,215	11,018	..	257,055
„ 1862 ..	785,774	48,724	20,749	57,260	1,112,098
„ 1863 ..	433,574	2,404	5,969	..	717,409
„ 1864 ..	177,638	1,980	9,829	..	409,887
„ 1865 ..	22,904	2,291	34,008	..	61,780
	1,419,890	55,399	70,555	57,260	2,301,174

Inclosure 2 in No. 247.

STATEMENT of the Value of Articles imported from the below-named Countries into the United States for the use of the United States' Government during the following years, as entered in the Custom-house Returns.

Year ending	Hamburgh and Bremen.	Holland.	Belgium.	France.	England.	East Indies.	Italy.
	Dollars.	Dollars.	Dollars.	Dollars.	Dollars.	Dollars.	Dollars.
June 30, 1860 ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
„ 1861 ..	..	..	..	..	..	..	..
„ 1862 ..	3,640,150	23,319	401,715	138,296	8,316,492	..	..
„ 1863 ..	745,232	..	43,263	144,212	6,778,856	26,235	..
„ 1864 ..	5,238	..	..	..	1,568,407	..	10,000
„ 1865 ..	8,251	264	6,446	4,415	1,853,773	..	4,402
	4,398,871	23,583	451,424	286,923	13,517,528	26,235	14,402

No. 248.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 29.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 27, 1870.

M. DE HERNANDEZ, the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, came to me the day before yesterday to inform me that he had received orders from his Government to give their full support to the proposals of Her Majesty's Government in favour of an armistice and the convocation of a National Assembly. He said that he had already, in execution of these orders, announced to the Comte de Chaudordy the adherence of Spain to the English proposals.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 249.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 29.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 27, 1870.

I HAD the day before yesterday the honour to receive a telegram from your Lordship stating that Count Bismarck had informed the Prussian Ambassador in London that M. Thiers had applied to the General Baron von der Tann, who is in command at Orleans, for a safe-conduct to the German head-quarters; that this safe-conduct had been granted to him, and that thus an opportunity would be obtained of conversing with him at Versailles.

I lost no time in communicating the contents of this telegram to the Comte de Chaudordy and to M. Thiers.

M. Thiers told me that he had in fact received a letter from the Bishop of Orleans inclosing safe-conducts from General von der Tann for the Prussian head-quarters at Versailles. He said that he had immediately written to the Bishop to explain that it was impossible for him to enter into any negotiation with the German authorities until he had first conferred personally with the Government at Paris, and received from them power to do so. He adverted to the promise made by the Emperor Alexander to obtain for him from the King of Prussia the means of entering Paris and coming out again, and also to the application which your Lordship had made through Count Bernstorff to the same effect. Finally, he expressed his regret at being unable to avail himself of the safe-conduct sent by General von der Tann, and expressed his wish to be furnished with documents to enable him to enter Paris and come out again. He begged the Bishop to communicate his letter to General von der Tann. He asked me to explain the misunderstanding to your Lordship.

I accordingly dispatched a telegram to your Lordship, and in answer I received yesterday your Lordship's telegram dated at 1 o'clock the same morning. I immediately informed M. de Chaudordy and M. Thiers that you had requested the Prussian Ambassador to make Count Bismarck aware of the state of the case, and of M. Thiers' real wishes respecting the safe-conduct. M. Thiers informed me that the Russian Chargé d'Affaires had just before brought him a telegram stating that the King of Prussia had promised the Emperor Alexander that a safe-conduct to go to Paris, and afterwards to the Prussian head-quarters, should be granted to M. Thiers. Thanks to this communication from the Emperor of Russia to King William, and to that made by Her Majesty's Government to Count Bismarck, M. Thiers felt no doubt that proper safe-conducts would be sent to him; he wished, however, that the distinct statement of his views and intentions which he had made in his letter to the Bishop of Orleans should be considered by the Prussian authorities, and he conceived that that letter would best constitute his personal request for the safe-conducts he really desired to obtain.

I have seen M. Thiers again this morning. He has not yet received the safe-conduct, and, according to the calculation he makes, it will hardly be possible for it to reach Tours till this evening at the soonest.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 250.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 29.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 27, 1870.

M. THIERS spoke to me this morning of his communications with the Emperor of Russia and His Majesty's Ministers during his recent visit to St. Petersburg.

It had, he said, been rumoured that he had come to some understanding, or entered into some engagement with Russia respecting the future policy of France. Nothing of the kind had taken place. No understanding or engagement existed. If the Emperor of Russia had offered to march an army of 300,000 men against Prussia, M. Thiers might well have been tempted to make some concessions in return. He would not indeed deny that, up to a certain point, the Russian Government had professed more sympathy with France than had been shown by other Powers. The statesmen at St. Petersburg had appeared to desire that it should be felt that Russia, against whom France had fought in the Crimea, was more willing to befriend her in her present difficulties than was England, who had been her companion in arms. They had gone so far as to assure him that they would declare to Prussia that certain conditions of peace would be deemed inadmissible by Russia, and would never receive her sanction. He believed this assurance had been carried into effect by a letter from the Emperor to King William; but nothing had been said or done which could warrant the Russian Government in proposing, or the French Government in contracting, any obligation or understanding respecting the future policy of France.

The Emperor of Russia had given one mark of good will in promising to obtain for M. Thiers a safe-conduct to Paris, and thence to the Prussian head-quarters. A still greater mark of His Majesty's good intentions was, M. Thiers thought, afforded by the prompt and cordial support which he had given to the proposal of Her Majesty's Government in favour of an armistice and the convocation of a National Assembly. His Majesty had always maintained to M. Thiers that he could act only on his own account, and independently of the other neutral Governments. Now, however, by adhering officially

and at once to the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, the Emperor had, in M. Thiers' opinion, established a community of action for the future as well as the present among the great neutral Powers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 251.

Sir A. Paget to Earl Granville.—(Received October 31.)

My Lord,

Florence, October 21, 1870.

M. VISCONTI VENOSTA, in an interview I had with him the day before yesterday, informed me that Chevalier Nigra had telegraphed from Tours to say that Count Chaudordy on the part of the Government of National Defence was anxious that Italy (and his Excellency believed that the same appeal had been addressed through Lord Lyons to Her Majesty's Government) should inquire of Prussia what were her conditions of peace, and being furnished with them should ascertain from the Government of National Defence what concessions they would be prepared to make. In possession of these elements M. de Chaudordy suggested that the neutral Powers should draw up and propose to the belligerents the terms of what should appear to them an equitable basis for peace.

On the receipt of this communication M. Visconti informed me that he had immediately instructed M. Cadorna by telegraph to ascertain the views of Her Majesty's Government upon this mode of proceeding.

For his own part his Excellency expressed the conviction that now was the proper moment for the neutral Powers to act, and that, by bringing a little pressure to bear on both belligerents the terms of peace could be found.

I observed that I was, of course, unable to say what view Her Majesty's Government would take of this new proposal; but that, speaking for myself, I much feared that any representation or appeal to Prussia which was not accompanied by an indication that the French Government was disposed to modify its absolute programme of "not an inch, not a stone," was not likely to forward the ends of peace.

I asked his Excellency if he had endeavoured to convince M. Thiers of the impossibility of adhering to this programme. M. Visconti Venosta replied that he had not liked to go so far as this, but that he had a very strong conviction that if anything at all reasonable in the shape of conditions could be obtained from Prussia, the Government of France might be brought to see the advisability of treating.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 252.

Sir A. Paget to Earl Granville.—(Received October 31.)

My Lord,

Florence, October 22, 1870.

ON my calling on M. Visconti Venosta this morning his Excellency read to me a telegram he had received from M. Cadorna, giving an account of an interview he had with your Lordship yesterday. According to this telegram your Lordship had informed M. Cadorna that a Cabinet Council had been held, where it had been decided to decline acting in accordance with the last proposal emanating from the Delegation of the Government of National Defence, but that Her Majesty's Government had determined that the moment was now arrived when they would propose an armistice to both belligerents, in order that a Constituent Assembly might be elected for the purpose of concluding peace. M. Cadorna explains the nature of the communication which your Lordship proposes to address to France and Prussia respectively; he adds that your Lordship is of opinion that the influence of the Russian Government may with advantage be brought to bear upon that of Prussia, while the counsels of Italy would be calculated to have great weight with the Government of National Defence. In conclusion, M. Cadorna reports the satisfaction expressed by your Lordship at the cordial understanding which unites the British and Italian Governments in the present grave crisis, and your desire for the strictest secrecy being observed in reference to the step which has now been decided upon until some result has been obtained.

M. Visconti Venosta informed me that upon the receipt of this telegram he had

called upon M. Senard, who leaves Florence this afternoon for Tours ; that he had acquainted him with the news he had received from London, and had urged him in the strongest terms to use his utmost influence with the Government of National Defence to agree at once to an armistice, and to convoke as speedily as possible a Constituent Assembly in order that negotiations for peace might be opened.

M. Senard, his Excellency said, had expressed himself in favour of peace, and spoke as if he thought the Provisional Government would be ready to conclude it on the basis of a dismantlement of the fortresses, and the payment of a heavy indemnity. He considered that the convocation of an Assembly would encounter great difficulties ; the state of feeling in Paris, and the general condition of France, would be an obstacle to the elections.

M. Visconti replied to this, that it was only an Assembly which could have sufficient authority to conclude peace. He referred to the absolute programme of the Provisional Government of not yielding "an inch of territory or a stone of a fortress," to their proclamations, &c., as binding them to a system which made it next to impossible for them to accept certain conditions which, after all, the French nation might probably be disposed to accept. That if the people of France were determined to persist in the contest to the last, against all reason and all hope of its ultimately turning in their favour, at all events they should be afforded the opportunity of doing so on their own responsibility, and not forced into it against their will. His Excellency reminded M. Senard that the Republican party accused the Empire of having dragged France into this war against her wishes, and he begged him to caution the Provisional Government against running into the other error of committing France to the continuation of a war of extermination ("guerre à outrance"), when possibly the majority of the nation was desirous of peace, and ready to make the sacrifices which might be found necessary to obtain it. M. Visconti added that he was himself convinced that if an Assembly were convoked it would be found to contain a very strong pacific current.

M. Senard observed that sacrifices to obtain peace entailing a cession of territory would be not concluding peace at all—it would be simply an armistice. France was ready to pay a very heavy indemnity—this would cripple her power for again attacking Germany ; she might, perhaps, agree to dismantle the fortresses, and to bind herself to keep on foot only a certain amount of military force ;—all these conditions would afford the security professed to be desired by Germany : but a cession of territory would be a humiliation which would rankle in every French bosom, and the war would begin again at the very earliest moment when France had recovered from her losses.

M. Visconti Venosta said he would not dispute this point ; he would admit that France would begin the war again as soon as she was prepared to do so ; but at all events it was her interest to end it now, for there was no use, his Excellency said, making any illusions to oneself,—the military resources of France were exhausted, there was no hope whatever of the chances of war turning in her favour, she would go from defeat to defeat ; Paris would be taken and, perhaps, burnt, and he appealed to M. Senard to say whether he thought France was likely to obtain better terms when all this had happened than she was now. Finally, his Excellency urged M. Senard to conjure the Provisional Government not to miss the opportunity of the British Government having now come forward, and not to allow it to be said that for the continuation of the war, with all the additional horrors which must soon attend it, the Provisional Government was alone responsible, by reason of their rejection of the method now proposed for arriving at negotiations for peace.

M. Visconti Venosta having finished his account of his conversation with M. Senard, I observed that I could only say I agreed in every syllable his Excellency had uttered, and I sincerely trusted that his admirable counsels might be attended with good effect.

M. Visconti Venosta informed me that he had telegraphed to Chevalier Nigra to use his utmost efforts in the above sense with the Members of the Provisional Government at Tours, and also with M. Thiers.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 253.

Earl Granville to Sir A. Paget.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, October 31, 1870.

HER Majesty's Government have never given any opinion as to the principle which should guide either of the belligerents in considering the questions to be determined between them, further than expressing their conviction that the rigid adherence by the

French Government to the conditions that not a stone of their fortresses nor an inch of French territory should be required of them, was an obstacle to the conclusion of peace.

No. 254.

Sir C. Wyke to Earl Granville.—(Received October 31.)

My Lord,

Copenhagen, October 24, 1870.

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram of yesterday's date, I have informed this Government that that of Her Majesty have urged Prussia and France to agree to an armistice with a view to a Constituent Assembly and eventual peace, and they are not without hope of its possibly leading to a good result.

The Danish Government has learnt this with the greatest satisfaction, and fervently joins in the hope expressed by your Lordship that the important step thus taken may induce the belligerents to agree to an armistice for the purpose of electing a Constituent Assembly, and thus leading to the conclusion of a permanent peace.

I have, &c.

(Signed) CHARLES LENNOX WYKE.

No. 255.

Sir H. Howard to Earl Granville.—(Received October 31.)

(Extract.)

Munich, October 24, 1870.

IN compliance with the instructions contained in your Lordship's telegram, received last night, I this morning acquainted M. de Daxenberger, who is charged with the direction of the Bavarian Foreign Department during Count Bray's absence, that Her Majesty's Government had urged Prussia and France to agree to an armistice with a view to the meeting of a Constituent Assembly, and to an eventual peace, and that they were not without hope that it might possibly lead to a good result.

M. de Daxenberger, after expressing the gratification with which he had learnt the step thus taken by Her Majesty's Government, and stating that he would immediately communicate it to the King of Bavaria, observed that great thanks were due to Her Majesty's Government for having adopted it, and that he was convinced that Count Bray, who is now at the head-quarters of the King of Prussia, and whose disposition is so conciliatory, would give what support he could to it.

M. de Daxenberger said that yesterday he had received a telegram from the Bavarian Minister at Berlin reporting that your Lordship had made the proposal of an armistice, and that Austria had associated herself to it.

No. 256.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received October 31.)

My Lord,

Vienna, October 25, 1870.

I HAVE had the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch of the 10th instant, recording a communication which Count Apponyi had made to your Lordship upon the subject of a mediation between France and Prussia.

I have read to Count Beust the latter part of your Lordship's despatch, and drew his Excellency's attention to the inutility of attempting more than Her Majesty's Government has done in the sense of mediation, when neither party seemed disposed seriously to treat for peace. To offer advice that would be rejected, I said, was a useless proceeding, but Her Majesty's Government would be ready to avail themselves of the first opening to urge negotiations, when it could be done with advantage. Count Beust admitted the justice of the reasoning of Her Majesty's Government on this subject, and told me that he had received a Report from Count Apponyi of his interview with your Lordship, to which your above despatch refers. He added that he had already informed your Lordship through the Austrian Ambassador of the answer which had been returned to the application of the French Provisional Government for the more active support of the neutral Powers. He observed that he had no definite advice to offer to each belligerent, but was animated, as your Lordship was, with an earnest desire to aid in putting an end to the

war, and was ready to associate with you for this object, in whatever way was most likely to conduce to the restoration of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 257.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received October 31.)

(Extract.)

Vienna, October 25, 1870.

I HAVE not failed, in conformity with your Lordship's instructions, to inform Count Beust of the substance of your Lordship's telegrams of the 23rd and 24th instant.

His Excellency is extremely glad to hear that Her Majesty's Government has entered into communication with Prussia and France on the subject of an armistice, and that there was reason to expect that these communications might lead to further negotiations in the interests of the restoration of peace. He said that Her Majesty's Government could count on the support of the Austro-Hungarian Government in the negotiations in which they were engaged, and he was happy to have received intelligence from Florence that the Italian Government entirely approved of the proceedings of Her Majesty's Government.

No. 258.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received October 31.)

My Lord,

Vienna, October 26, 1870.

AT an interview which I have had with Count Beust, I told his Excellency that I had received from your Lordship, by the last messenger, a despatch containing the summary of a communication made by Count Apponyi of the answer of the Austrian Government to the request of Count Mosbourg on behalf of the Provisional Government of France for more active support, and that he will have no doubt already heard that your Lordship was very thankful for the information thus imparted to Her Majesty's Government.

I added that your Lordship hoped this frank communication would continue between the two Governments, and that although the reasons given by his Excellency in answer to the application of the French Government were not identical with those of Her Majesty's Government, and although he had made some observations in which your Lordship did not concur, yet it was highly satisfactory to your Lordship to see that in all essential points the policy of the two Governments was the same.

Count Beust said he had no hesitation in telling me that he should like to take a more active part in these negotiations, but many things combined to prevent it. He had no particular point to urge, and he was glad to see that Her Majesty's Government had come forward as they had done at the present moment. Austria entirely approved of the course they had adopted. Italy was of the same opinion, but Russia still reserved her opinion as to the proceedings of Her Majesty's Government; at least, he could not extract any expression one way or the other from that quarter. He thought this was a matter of regret, for he considered it most advisable that there should be a general manifestation of opinion by the neutral Powers. This he thought would tend more to advance their object than any isolated action.

He was very glad, on the other hand, to hear that the policy of England and Austria was the same, though they might differ on some minor points, and he should do all in his power to secure their common action at this important crisis.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 259.

Mr. Lumley to Earl Granville.—(Received October 31.)

My Lord,

Brussels, October 29, 1870.

ON the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of October 23, I addressed a note to Baron d'Anéthan, informing his Excellency of the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government with the view of inducing France and Prussia to agree to an armistice; and I

have now the honour to transmit to your Lordship the copy of a note I have received from Baron d'Anéthan in reply to that communication.

I have, &c.
(Signed) J. SAVILE LUMLEY.

Inclosure in No. 259.

Baron d'Anéthan to Mr. Lumley.

M. le Ministre,

Bruxelles, le 28 Octobre, 1870.

J'AI l'honneur d'accuser à votre Excellence la réception de l'office qu'elle a bien voulu m'adresser pour me faire connaître la démarche entreprise par le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Britannique à l'effet d'obtenir que la Prusse et la France consentent à un armistice.

Le Gouvernement du Roi fait des vœux trop sincères en faveur de la paix pour qu'il ne s'associe pas ardemment à l'espérance qu'exprime le Cabinet de Londres de voir réussir cette démarche.

Veillez, &c.
(Signé) B^N. D'ANETHAN.

(Translation.)

M. le Ministre,

Brussels, October 28, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of the note which your Excellency was good enough to address to me, to acquaint me of the step taken by the Government of Her Britannic Majesty to obtain the consent of France and Prussia to an Armistice.

The Government of the King is too sincerely desirous of peace not to join eagerly in the hope expressed by the Cabinet of London of seeing the success of this step.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) B^N. D'ANETHAN.

No. 260.

Count Bismarck to Earl Granville.—(Received November 1.)

My Lord,

Versailles, October 29, 1870.

I HAD the honour of receiving your letter of the 20th instant, inclosing copy of your official communication to Lord Augustus Loftus of the same date. Having dealt with the inclosure according to your desire, by addressing a despatch to Count Bernstorff, I avail myself of the opportunity to thank your Lordship for the kind remembrance of our meeting at Coburg, which has left a not less gratifying recollection to me. I equally share your humane feelings with respect to the inhabitants of Paris, and beg leave to point to the fact that, ever since the achievement of the investment, for now six weeks, we have abstained from any attack, contenting ourselves with repulsing the sorties of the garrison.

I have, &c.
(Signed) VON BISMARCK.

No. 261.

Mr. Jerningham to Earl Granville.—(Received November 2.)

My Lord,

Stockholm, October 25, 1870.

I COMMUNICATED yesterday to Count Wachtmeister the substance of your Lordship's telegram of the 23rd instant, stating that Her Majesty's Government had urged upon France the advisableness of an armistice.

His Excellency said that he had heard from Baron Hochschild to the same effect; but that he feared there could be no probability of any favourable result, considering the attitude of either belligerent.

I have, &c.
(Signed) G. S. S. JERNINGHAM.

No. 262.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received November 2.)

(Extract.)

Tours, October 28, 1870.

M. THIERS, having received safe-conducts with which he was satisfied, set out for Paris this afternoon at 1 o'clock, and I was not able to see him again before his departure; but during the numerous interviews I have had with him since he arrived here, I have discussed so fully with him all the questions bearing upon the proposed armistice that I think I may venture to assure your Lordship that his views on the subject are in complete accordance with those of Her Majesty's Government.

In fact, the opinion of M. Thiers (with which I entirely agree) was that the best, if not the only chance, of bringing the negotiation for an armistice to a successful issue, was to be altogether silent on the eventual conditions of peace, and to confine the discussion solely to the military arrangements for a suspension of arms, during which an Assembly might be elected which would have unquestionable authority to decide upon terms of peace on behalf of the French nation.

No. 263.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received November 2.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 31, 1870.

DJEMIL PASHA, the Ottoman Ambassador, told me two days ago that he had received instructions from his Government to express their approval of the proposals of Her Majesty's Government in favour of an armistice, to be followed by a Constituent Assembly, and that he had informed the Comte de Chaudorly of the adherence of the Porte to this proposal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 264.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 2, 1870.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 28th ultimo, reporting your communications with M. Thiers respecting the principles which should be kept in view in the proposed arrangements for an armistice; and I have to state to your Excellency that Her Majesty's Government approve your views on this question.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 265.

Count Bernstorff to Earl Granville.—(Received November 1.)

(Translation.)

My Lord.

Prussia House, November 1, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Excellency a letter of the Chancellor of the North German Confederation, and also, by his direction, an open letter from Mr. Wodehouse.

At the same time I am instructed to inform your Excellency that the English subjects had indeed not left Paris on the 29th ultimo, but that there was nothing to prevent their departure, and that it will probably take place at once.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BERNSTORFF.

Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by Count Bernstorff, November 3.)

(Translation.)

Versailles, October 28, 1870.

LORD GRANVILLE has been so kind as to communicate to your Excellency the despatch which he addressed to Lord Augustus Loftus on the 20th of this month. Your Excellency is, therefore, aware of its contents.

I can at once proceed to the assurance that the earnest desire expressed therein for the termination of the destructive contest between two great nations, and for the avoidance of the extreme measures sanctioned by the international usages of war, is no less warmly shared, nay, is even the more deeply felt by His Majesty the King, inasmuch as Germany, from the sacrifices which she herself has to make; though victorious in the war, is quite otherwise interested therein than a neutral country, which has only to look on with the sympathetic feelings of humanity, nobly and abundantly proved as we acknowledge they have been.

With this feeling, His Majesty the King has been especially gratified to find from Lord Granville's despatch that the Royal British Government also shares our conviction that, in order to enter into peace negotiations with any chance of success, it is before all things necessary to give the French people an opportunity of electing national Representatives.

We have been convinced of that necessity ever since the events in Paris on the 4th September became known to us, and we have expressed that conviction at every opportunity that has offered.

I may call to mind that, on the proposition of the English Cabinet, His Majesty the King authorized me at Meaux more than a month ago to negotiate with M. Jules Favre on the possibility of convoking a Constituent Assembly. The wish for the establishment of a legal representation of the French people determined His Majesty the King to lay down, in the negotiations at Ferrières, such favourable conditions for the armistice that their moderation was generally acknowledged, and it was strikingly demonstrated by the fall of Toul and Strasbourg a few days afterwards. That the conditions were nevertheless rejected, and how they were rejected, is known.

It is likewise known that His Majesty the King was, notwithstanding this, ready to allow the elections, already appointed by the Government in Paris for the 2nd October, to take place with full freedom in the whole extent of the country occupied by the German troops, and to afford every facility for them, although the convocation had been issued by a Government as yet unacknowledged. Our proceedings with the French Local and Departmental authorities, of which those with the Mayor of Versailles have appeared in the public papers, prove the readiness of the German authorities to promote the achievement of independent elections.

But the Paris Government itself proves how little its intention was to let the nation really proceed to the election, for it not only postponed the elections originally fixed for the 2nd of this month, but even expressly annulled the new summons issued by the Government of Tours for the 16th of the month. The Decree has already been published by the newspapers; the copy of it, with the original signatures of the members of the Government, has fallen into our hands, together with a letter from M. Gambetta, a copy of which I cannot refrain from communicating to your Excellency herewith, as it clearly shows the feeling which prevails in the Paris Government.

The knowledge of these things did not prevent us from offering our co-operation in any fresh attempts of the Paris Government to give the French people an opportunity of making elections, of expressing their opinions, and of participating in the responsibility of the arbitrarily assumed Government of the country. The mediation kindly offered by some distinguished personages belonging to a neutral nation, who went to Paris for the purpose, gave us the opportunity of once more offering to enable the Rulers there to liberate France, by means of elections, from the anarchy which makes negotiations for peace impossible. We declared that we were ready for an armistice for as long as the elections should require, and at the same time offered to allow all the Deputies of the nation to enter Paris; or, in case another place of assembly were preferred, to allow the Paris Deputies to leave the town without hindrance.

These proposals, which were made to the members of the Paris Government, with our consent, on the 9th of this month, met with such a reception from them that even the mediating personages declared that they must now give up the hopes which they had entertained. Immediately afterwards M. Gambetta left Paris in an air-balloon, and his first cry, on reaching the earth, was, according to French authorities, a protest against

the national elections. Experience shows that he has succeeded in preventing them, and in rendering M. Crémieux's efforts in favour of the elections ineffectual.

From this statement of facts it appears that the means justly recommended by the Royal British Government for the promotion of peace, that is, free elections to a Constituent Assembly, do not fail for want of our consent, but for that of the Rulers in Paris, and that we have been ready from the first to give that consent, and have repeatedly offered it, whilst the Government of the National Defence has always rejected those offers.

We were therefore clearly in the right when, in the communication of the 11th instant, to which the English Minister refers, we divested ourselves of all responsibility for the sad results which a resistance of the fortifications of Paris, carried to the last extremity, must bring upon the population of that city.

We anticipated that that communication would not fail to make an impression on the English Cabinet. How much we should lament it if the Rulers of Paris were to carry their resistance to that extreme catastrophe we have shown by calling public attention, and especially that of the neutral Powers thereto, in due time; whilst we hoped that the representations of the latter, especially to the rulers who are sacrificing the property and the lives of the Parisian population to their own ambition, would not remain without effect. We hoped for this all the more for that the Governments of Paris and of Tours have taken upon themselves to conduct the destiny of France on their own responsibility, and without any other sanction than that which may be afforded by arbitrary and violent seizure, with the steady refusal to hear the voice of the nation.

If the Royal British Government should make the attempt to divert those rulers from the violent and dangerous path which they are pursuing, and to render them accessible to considerations which may secure France from the further progress of her political and social derangement, and her brilliant capital from the devastations of the siege, we can but acknowledge it with thanks.

We cannot, indeed, divest ourselves of the fear that, in the infatuation wherein the Paris Government seems to be involved, the benevolent intention of the English Cabinet will be only misunderstood; and that, in the humane sympathy which has occasioned the intervention, the illusion may be found of support from the neutral Powers, and thereby encouragement to further resistance, which might produce just the contrary to what Lord Granville intended.

That, after our experience, no initiative for fresh negotiations can be taken by us, Lord Granville seems, from the contents of his despatch, to be convinced. I beg your Excellency, however, on making him acquainted with the whole contents of this despatch, to assure him, at the same time, that we shall readily entertain any proposal made to us on the part of the French to prepare the way for peace negotiations; and that we shall examine it with a sincere desire for the restoration of peace.

(Signed)

VON BISMARCK.

Inclosure in No. 266.

Letter from M. Gambetta.

Paris, ce 2 Octobre, 1870.

JE vous adresse M. Bonnet (Hippolyte), qui vous remettra le Décret en minute du Gouvernement relatif à l'ajournement des élections pour la Constituante. Je n'ai pas besoin de vous dire l'émotion unanime du Gouvernement en apprenant votre résolution du 29 Septembre. Les considérations les plus graves l'ont décidé à maintenir l'ajournement fixé par le Décret du 29 Septembre. Nous comptons sur votre zèle à faire obéir et respecter ses décisions. Veuillez nous tenir au courant des affaires intérieures et extérieures au point de vue militaire et politique.

Le Ministre de l'Intérieur,

(Signed)

L. GAMBETTA.

(Translation.)

Paris, October 2, 1870.

I DESPATCH to you M. Bonnet (Hippolyte), who will hand you the draft Decree of the Government relating to the adjournment of the elections for the Constituent Assembly. I need not tell you with what emotion the Government has learned your resolution of the 29th September. The gravest considerations have determined us to maintain the adjournment fixed by the Decree of the 29th September. We rely on.

your zeal to cause our decisions to be respected and obeyed. Have the goodness to keep us informed of internal and external affairs in a military and political point of view.

The Minister of the Interior,
(Signed) L. GAMBETTA.

No. 267.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 3, 1870.

M. TISSOT informed me to-day that it appeared from the accounts which had reached Tours from Paris, and particularly from a despatch from M. Jules Favre, that the Government of National Defence had every reason to be satisfied with the attitude of the population.

He said that an armistice which would admit of the convocation of a National Assembly, and which would allow the Government of the Hôtel de Ville to appeal to the whole of France, might spare all Europe from great calamities; and that it was therefore to be desired that the English Cabinet should exert itself to ensure on the side of Prussia the success of the armistice, by making it such as France could possibly agree to. England had taken the first step which might contribute to the peace of Europe and insure general order.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 268.

Earl Granville to Lord Bloomfield.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, November 3, 1870.

COUNT APPONYI yesterday communicated to me the substance of a despatch from Count Beust, dated the 27th ultimo, on the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government to bring about the negotiation of an armistice between France and Prussia.

His Excellency expresses his sincere satisfaction at the endeavour thus made to put an end to a contest which can now only increase the sufferings, without changing the fortunes, of either party.

The Cabinet of Vienna heartily joined in the initiative taken by Her Majesty's Government, wished it every success, and promised it their full support.

I replied to Count Apponyi that I was much obliged for this communication, and for the courteous tone in which Count Beust gave his approbation of the step which had been taken by Her Majesty's Government.

No. 269.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord

Foreign Office, November 4, 1870.

M. TISSOT called upon me yesterday, and made to me the following communication:—

M. de Chaudordy, he said, had always been of opinion that the neutral Powers should call upon the Prussian Government to state the conditions on which it would agree to an armistice and to a peace; that the neutral Powers should then examine those conditions, bring them within fair limits, and then communicate them to the French Government:

That this course had not been exactly followed, but might be resumed; and M. de Chaudordy considered it was the only means of effectually influencing the Prussian Government:

That the Cabinet of St. Petersburg had not hitherto adopted this course. Prince Gortchakoff had indeed declared that he would support the step which Lord Lyons had taken with the French Government to obtain an armistice, but he did not appear to have assented to the English proposal for a simultaneous and identic step being taken towards the Prussian Government:

That it was important that this divergence should disappear, and the Cabinets of Vienna and of Florence were prepared to act accordingly. But would it not be best that

the English Cabinet should frankly adopt the first-named course, and itself demonstrate to Prussia all the reasons for moderation, while endeavouring to moderate pretensions and illusions on the part of Count Bismarck, which were no less dangerous for the future of Prussia than for the general repose of Europe?

That if the Cabinet of London, relying on public opinion in England and in the rest of the world, would declare, in the form which it considered most suitable, that the exaction from France of any territorial cession would be contrary to justice, to humanity, to the interest of Europe, and to that of Prussia herself, it would certainly obtain the concurrence of all Europe in such a declaration, for Russia herself would not hesitate to agree in it:

That peace would then be near at hand, and England would have rendered an immense service to humanity.

I stated to M. Tissot in reply that, in the first place, I should be glad to know on what ground M. de Chaudordy based his conviction that Russia would join Her Majesty's Government in the measures which he proposed; that up to this time their information was of a different character:

That as to the suggestion itself, it appeared to be almost similar to that which had been previously made to Her Majesty's Government by the Provisional Government of Tours:

That the answer to it had been that Her Majesty's Government were not inclined to take steps unless there was reason to believe that they would be acceptable or effective.

Lord Lyons had been told to inform the French Government of the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, that the adherence to the conditions of not yielding an inch of territory or a stone of the fortresses was an obstacle to peace. He had also been directed to suggest whether it was not better to avoid at Tours unnecessary declarations which might render more difficult the progress of negotiations.

As to the conditions of an eventual peace, I said Her Majesty's Government had given no opinion either to France or to Prussia, and they saw no reason to change their course.

I had, indeed, been encouraged by Lord Lyons—I presumed with the concurrence of either M. Thiers or M. de Chaudordy—to impress upon Count Bismarck the importance of not mixing up the questions of a peace with the conditions of an armistice; that the latter should be purely military, with a view to the possible convocation of a Constituent Assembly, which might give an authorized Government to France, and greatly facilitate the conclusion of an honourable peace; and it would not be becoming in me to take any step contrary to the policy which I had thus advised.

I added that it was a pleasure to express my satisfaction at having already been able to contribute in any degree to a proceeding which gave some hopes of relieving France from the horrors of war.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 270.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received November 5.)

My Lord,

Tours, November 2, 1870.

IN pursuance of the instruction conveyed to me by your Lordship's despatch of the 28th ultimo, I gave to the Comte de Chaudordy, on the 30th ultimo, copies of Count Bernstorff's note to your Lordship dated the 8th ultimo, and of your Lordship's answer dated the 21st ultimo, on the subject of the export of munitions of war from Great Britain.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 271.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received November 5.)

(Extract.)

Tours, November 2, 1870.

THE Count de Chaudordy told me this afternoon that he had received a despatch from M. Jules Favre, written at Paris on the 28th ultimo, which had added much to his

hopes, not only that an armistice might now be concluded, but that it might lead to a definitive Treaty of Peace.

He could assure me that nothing could be more prudent and reasonable than the views which M. Favre expressed on his own behalf and on that of the Government at Paris. As regarded the internal administration, M. Jules Favre and his colleagues continued to deprecate violent measures, and in particular expressed their disapproval of all attempts to control elections, or to prevent the people deciding absolutely for themselves, according to their real feelings and wishes, what should be the future Government of France. As regarded foreign countries, M. Jules Favre condemned all attempts to interfere in their affairs, or to influence them in their choice of the Government under which they might choose to live.

M. de Chaudordy went on to say that M. Thiers had not reached Paris when M. Jules Favre wrote, but that the Government there were aware of his intention to go thither, as well as of the proposal made by England for an armistice, to be followed by the immediate convocation of a National Assembly. M. Jules Favre expressed his entire approval of this proposal. He affirmed that the Government was ready and anxious to conclude an armistice on equitable terms; and that it considered that it was most important that the Constituent Assembly should be called together at the earliest possible moment. M. Favre described the state of Paris as in all respects most satisfactory. He stated that there existed perfect tranquillity and good order in the town, and ample supplies of provisions; that the material strength of the defences was daily increasing, and the determination to hold out gaining strength. Still he was entirely in favour of an armistice; but to render one possible he considered it to be necessary that it should not in the slightest degree prejudge the conditions of the definitive peace. To propose to the defenders of Paris to make peace at this moment might lead to an insurrection; but they would, he was sure, be willing to agree to a simple suspension of hostilities, for the purpose of establishing a regular Government, competent to make peace on behalf of France.

M. Jules Favre declared his conviction that if peace were made without any cession of territory, and on terms not dishonourable, there need be no fear that the tranquillity of Europe would be again disturbed by France. On the contrary, he was persuaded that whatever might eventually be the form of government, the country would in that case give itself up to peaceful competition with other nations in science, art, and industry. On the other hand, he did not conceal from himself that a humiliating Treaty of Peace would establish nothing better than a hollow truce.

Finally, M. de Chaudordy told me that M. Jules Favre expressed his impatience to see M. Thiers, and obtain his advice and assistance at this all-important moment.

On leaving M. de Chaudordy I sent off a telegram in order to make your Lordship acquainted as soon as possible with the substance of what he had said to me.

No. 272.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 5, 1870.

THE Italian Minister stated to me yesterday that he had been informed by M. Visconti Venosta that he had strongly supported at Tours the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, and had made a similar communication to the Prussian Government, and that he was instructed to assure me that I might continue to reckon on M. Venosta's good offices in the cause of peace.

Count Beust, M. Venosta said, was anxious that England, Austria, and Italy should continue to act together, and that for himself he thought it would be a subject of regret with reference to future negotiations if the neutral Powers should not do so.

The Italian Minister further said that he had heard from M. Venosta that the French Government had proposed to him that the Powers should declare that territorial cessions would not be warranted on grounds either of defence or of deference to popular wishes, and that being the case the interests and security of Europe were opposed to them.

The opinion of the Italian Government, M. Venosta said, had always been that the conditions of peace should apply mainly to fortresses and armaments, and not to territorial cession; and he was apprehensive lest the French proposal should be intended to supplant the proposal of the British Government in respect to an armistice which should admit of the convocation of an Assembly, as that appeared to be the only means of negotiating for peace on the least onerous conditions: but M. Venosta had not omitted to ascertain the opinion of other Cabinets as to what they thought possible to be done.

I told the Italian Minister, in reply, the substance of what I had said to M. Tissot when he spoke to me in the same sense, as stated in my despatch to your Excellency of yesterday.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 273.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 5, 1870.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 2nd instant, reporting the substance of a communication made to your Excellency by M. de Chaudordy of the tenour of a recent despatch from M. Jules Favre respecting the question of an armistice and other points connected with the present situation of affairs.

I have now to instruct your Excellency, whilst avoiding any expression of opinion as to the possible conditions of a peace, to express the great satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government had become acquainted with the moderate and judicious language of M. Favre respecting an armistice and the free convocation of a Constituent Assembly.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 274.

Sir E. Thornton to Earl Granville.—(Received November 6.)

My Lord,

Washington, October 24, 1870.

IN my telegram of the 22nd instant I had the honour to transmit to your Lordship a statement of the arms and ammunition taken by the French steamer "St. Laurent," which left New York for Havre on the 20th instant. I added that many of these had been purchased from the arsenals of the United States. Of this there can be no doubt; indeed it is notorious. A great number of the arms have been brought in barges directly from the arsenals at Governor's Island and the Navy Yard at Brooklyn, and transferred to the French steamers. The payments for arms for the French Government are made through their Consul at New York. I inclose an extract from the "New York Tribune" of the 19th instant, stating the bids which had been presented to the Ordnance Department for arms which the Government had offered to sell. The article states that an additional number of arms will be offered on the 29th instant. The Government consider themselves not bound to ascertain whether these arms are purchased for the use of either of the belligerents, Prussia or France. It cannot be doubted, however, that the circumstance of the war between those two Powers has instigated the choice of this particular moment for offering arms for sale, the Government being desirous of getting rid, to the best advantage, of the useless arms remaining from the late war, and of continuing in activity their armoury at Springfield in Massachusetts at as little expense as possible.

In my despatch of the 17th instant I stated that M. Séance, who was to be sent to New York to superintend the shipment of munitions of war, was soon expected there. It now seems that the French Government have abandoned this intention, and have commissioned the Remington Arms Company to make the necessary purchases.

I understand that my Prussian colleague has as yet made no written representation to the Government of the United States against the export of arms to France; indeed, it would be difficult to understand what arguments he could make use of, considering the existence of the Treaty of 1799 between Prussia and the United States, by the XIIIth Article of which commerce in contraband of war, with the enemies of either of the Contracting Parties by the other, is, as it were, legalized. I have the honour to inclose a copy of this Article.

I have, &c.
(Signed) EDWD. THORNTON.

P.S.—*October 25th.*—I also inclose three printed copies of an announcement made by the Ordnance Department in this morning's newspaper, that sealed tenders for the arms and ammunition therein mentioned will be received until the 29th instant.

E. T.

Inclosure 1 in No. 274.

*Extract from the "New York Tribune" of October 19, 1870.**Bids for Government Fire-arms.**Washington, October 18, 1870.*

GENERAL DYER, Chief of the Ordnance Bureau, to-day opened the bids for 200,000 Springfield rifled muskets, new, and 110,000 old, but serviceable; also 40,000 new Enfield rifles; 40,000 serviceable and 30,000 arms unserviceable. The following are the bids:—

Charles Wright, New York, for 200,000 new Springfield, 15 dollars 25 cents per gun; 110,000 old, 7 dollars 25 cents; for necessary quantity of ammunition, 14 dollars per 1,000 cartridges.

Austin Baldwin and Co., New York, 40,000, 12 dollars 30 cents; 110,000 old, 9 dollars 30 cents; 25,000,000 cartridges, 16 dollars 30 cents per 1,000. This bid to stand good for the whole or any portion of the Springfield muskets, provided there are to each 150 rounds of ammunition.

J. B. Hussey, New York, 50,000 Springfield, new, 6 dollars 45 cents; 30,000 old at 4 dollars 60 cents; 30,000 new Enfield rifles at 5 dollars each; and 20,000 second class at 4 dollars each.

Messrs. Herman, Baker, and Co., New York, 50,000 Springfield rifles, new, at 12 dollars 10 cents; 20,000 old at 8 dollars 75 cents; and 25,000,000 cartridges at 15 dollars 25 cents per 1,000.

Messrs. Remington and Sons, Ilion, New York, 250,000 Springfield rifles, whether the same are clean and repaired or new, at 9 dollars 5 cents each, and cartridges in connection with them at 14 dollars 5 cents per 1,000. This bid to be taken as a whole.

Mr. James C. Hays, New York, 50,000 Enfield rifles at 4 dollars 75 cents, and 40,000 second class at 3 dollars 50 cents each.

Messrs. Schuyler, Hartley, and Graham, New York, 100,000 Springfield, new, at 12 dollars 5 cents; 100,000 old at 8 dollars 50 cents; 10,000 Enfield, second class, 4 dollars 26 cents; 30,000,000 cartridges at 15 dollars 20 cents per 1,000.

General W. B. Franklin, for the Colt Arms Company, Hartford, 7 dollars 75 cents for all the new Enfields.

Caleb Hughes, New York, 14,000 new Springfields at 10 dollars 75 cents; 2,800,000 cartridges at 12 dollars 50 cents per 1,000.

• Horace E. Brown, 60,000 new Enfields at 6 dollars 10 cents; 40,000 second class at 4 dollars 60 cents.

A. B. Steinberger, 70,000 Springfields, old, 8 dollars 50 cents; 40,000 Enfields, new, 7 dollars 40 cents, and 30,000 Enfields, second class, 5 dollars 35 cents; 40,000,000 cartridges at 14 dollars per 1,000.

The Department reserves the right to reject any or all of the bids if they fall below the appraised prices. A list of the offers has been made out, and will be acted upon in a few days. An additional number of arms will be offered on the 29th instant.

Inclosure 2 in No. 274.

Article XIII of Treaty between the United States and Prussia, 1799.

OF CONTRABAND.

AND in the same case of one of the Contracting Parties being engaged in war with any other Power, to prevent all the difficulties and misunderstandings that usually arise respecting merchandize of contraband, such as arms, ammunition, and military stores of every kind, no such articles carried in the vessels, or by the subjects or citizens of either party, to the enemies of the other, shall be deemed contraband, so as to induce confiscation or condemnation and a loss of property to individuals. Nevertheless it shall be lawful to stop such vessels and articles, and to detain them for such length of time as the captors may think necessary, to prevent the inconvenience or damage that might ensue from their proceeding, paying, however, a reasonable compensation for the loss such arrest shall occasion to the proprietors; and it shall further be allowed to use in the service of the captors the whole or any part of the military stores so detained, paying the owners the full value of the same, to be ascertained by the current price at the place of its destination.

But in the case supposed of a vessel stopped for articles of contraband, if the master of the vessel stopped will deliver out the goods supposed to be of contraband nature, he shall be admitted to do it, and the vessel shall not in that case be carried into any port, nor further detained, but shall be allowed to proceed on her voyage.

Inclosure 3 in No. 274.

Extract from the Washington "Daily Republican" of October 25, 1870.

Proposals for the Sale of Ordnance and Ordnance Stores.

Ordnance Office, War Department, Washington, D. C.,
October 17, 1870.

SEALED proposals will be received at this office until 2 o'clock P.M. on Saturday, the 29th day of October, 1870, for the purchase of the following Ordnance and Ordnance stores, viz :

- 2,500 breech-loading muskets, caliber 58, with cartridges for same.
- 1,000 Ball's repeating carbines, caliber 50, with ammunition.
- 2,500 Gallagher's carbines, adapted for Spencer ammunition.
- 4,000 Maynard's carbines, with 500 rounds of ammunition per gun.
- 1,000 Palmer's carbines, caliber 44, with ammunition.
- 3,600 Remington carbines, caliber 44, with ammunition.
- 2,500 Warner's carbines and ammunition.
- 2,700 Joslyn's carbines and ammunition, caliber 52.
- 40,000 sets carbine accoutrements, serviceable, Blakesly's and other patterns.
- 70,000 sets infantry accoutrements.
- 20,000 Starr's revolvers, caliber 44, with ammunition.
- 5,000 Roger's and Spencer's revolvers, caliber 44, with ammunition.
- 10,000 Remington army revolvers, caliber 44 with ammunition.
- 35,000 pistol holsters.
- 40,000 cavalry sabres.
- 1,000 Spencer rifles.
- 20,000 sets horse equipments.

Field Artillery.

50 batteries of field artillery, complete, with ammunition.

Bids will be entertained for any one or all of the foregoing lots, the bids to specify the price offered for the arms with ammunition; for accoutrements by themselves. The bids for artillery will be for batteries complete, with ammunition,—so much for a battery of light 12-pounder, and so much for a battery of Parrot 3-inch guns, or for batteries and ammunition separately.

The privilege is reserved by this office of rejecting any or all bids which may not be deemed sufficient or satisfactory. A margin of 20 per cent. must be paid at the time of the award, and the residue upon delivery at the stores. All the stores to be delivered at the city of New York within thirty days after the award.

(Signed) A. B. DYER, *Chief of Ordnance.*

No. 275.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Granville.—(Received November 7.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, October 21, 1870.

YOUR Lordship's telegram of yesterday having been delivered to me to-day, I immediately waited upon Prince Gortchakoff at Czarskoe-Seloe, and acquainted him with the steps taken by Her Majesty's Government after receiving my telegram of the 18th.

His Excellency said they were a very good beginning, and he hoped they might lead to the conclusion of an armistice; and on my saying that I hoped they would meet with the support from Russia expected by Her Majesty's Government, he answered that he sent instructions, after my communications to him of the 18th instant, to the Russian Chargé

d'Affaires at Tours to give his support to whatever representations Lord Lyons might be directed to make to the French Government in favour of an armistice, with a view to the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, and the eventual restoration of peace. He had also, he said, spoken in support of such a measure to the French Chargé d'Affaires, and had told him that he could not accept the arguments against it used by M. Gambetta in a despatch which M. de Gabriac had communicated to him to-day.

But when I expressed a hope that he would also make urgent representations at Berlin in support of those which Her Majesty's Government had addressed to the Government of Prussia, he answered that the Emperor could not speak more earnestly than he had already done in favour of moderation in his correspondence with the King of Prussia; and his Excellency did not believe that His Majesty could say more on the subject. He would, however, submit to His Majesty a memorandum which I left with him of the substance of your Lordship's telegram, and it will be for His Majesty to decide whether, after the representations which he has addressed directly to the King, it will be expedient to make any diplomatic communications on the subject to the Prussian Government.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 276.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Granville.—(Received November 7.)

(Extract.)

St. Petersburg, October 23, 1870.

SINCE I had the honour of addressing to your Lordship my despatch of the 21st instant I have not seen Prince Gortchakoff, but I have reason to believe that the Imperial Government are very unwilling to employ pressure upon Prussia by diplomatic representations in support of the proposal of Her Majesty's Government for an armistice.

No. 277.

Sir A. Buchanan to Earl Granville.—(Received November 7.)

My Lord,

St. Petersburg, October 24, 1870.

IN conformity with the instructions conveyed to me in your Lordship's telegram of the 23rd instant, I have informed Prince Gortchakoff that Her Majesty's Government have addressed representations to the Governments of France and Prussia, urging them to agree to an armistice in order that a Constituent Assembly may be convoked in France, with a view to the opening of negotiations for peace.

I have also stated to his Excellency that Her Majesty's Government are not without hopes that a good result may attend the steps which they have taken.

On my inquiring whether the Russian Government had addressed any diplomatic representations to the Prussian Government in support of the proposal of Her Majesty's Government, with the nature of which I had already acquainted his Excellency confidentially, he said that correspondence on that subject would be carried on directly between the Emperor and the King of Prussia, as the Emperor preferred expressing his opinions upon it in his private correspondence with His Majesty.

I have, &c.

(Signed) ANDREW BUCHANAN.

No. 278.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received November 7.)

(Extract.)

Berlin, November 5, 1870.

I TOOK the opportunity to observe to Baron Thile that I had not heard of any formal remonstrances having been addressed to the United States' Government on account of the exportation of arms and munitions of war to France, as had been addressed to your Lordship by Count Bernstorff, although a very considerable exportation had lately taken place of arms, some of which it was reported had been purchased from the Government arsenals.

Baron Thile made no reply, professing to have received no information on the subject.

No. 279.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 7, 1870.

WITH reference to your Excellency's observations to Baron Thile, reported in your despatch of the 5th instant, that no remonstrances had been addressed by Prussia to the United States' Government on account of the exportation of arms and munitions of war to France, such as had been addressed to me by Count Bernstorff, I beg to inform you that representations have been made by the Prussian Representative at Washington, but without instructions from home.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 280.

Earl Granville to Sir A. Buchanan.

Sir,

Foreign Office, November 8, 1870.

M. TISSOT informed me the other day that, in reply to an inquiry which I had requested him to make, he had received from M. de Chaudordy the substance of a telegram from the French Chargé d'Affaires at St. Petersburg, from which it appeared that the Emperor of Russia had written to the King of Prussia, and also to the Queen of Wurtemberg his sister, recommending them to renounce the idea of territorial concessions which were calculated to render peace impossible.

This account, so far as it goes, confirms what Prince Gortchakoff told your Excellency, as reported in your despatch of the 19th October.

M. Tissot did not inform me whether the result of this communication from the Emperor to the King of Prussia, and the impression thereby made upon Prince Gortchakoff that it was useless for the neutral Powers to give any opinion upon the conditions of peace, were also communicated to the French Government.

It is certainly to be feared that if this was not done, the partial communication was likely to mislead the Provisional Government as to the support which they might receive from Russia.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 281.

Sir A. Paget to Earl Granville.—(Received November 11.)

My Lord,

Florence, November 2, 1870.

I HAVE this moment seen M. Visconti Venosta, who tells me that M. Clery, the gentleman who is in charge here of the affairs of the Special Mission confided by the Government of National Defence to M. Senard, who has now left Florence, came to him the night before last to read a telegram he had received from Tours, and which, after saying that the capitulation of Metz was a disaster which might give rise to suspicions of treason, &c., and that the Government were more determined than ever to continue resistance, appealed to the Italian Government to know whether they would not join with other Governments in a declaration, in the form which might be thought most convenient, to the effect that a peace founded on a cession of territory by France would be a danger to the equilibrium of Europe, and an act at variance with humanity and justice to the populations concerned.

M. Visconti replied that the Italian Government had at different times expressed the opinion that a peace in which Germany should seek her guarantees by the dismantling of the fortresses, &c., would afford better securities for its duration than one which would be likely to create a new question of nationalities; and they would still be glad if such a peace were possible. In regard, however, to the new proposition of the French Government, he must confer with the other Governments consulted before giving an answer. But, at the same time, it would be with sincere regret that he should learn that the Provisional Government had receded from the English proposition which they had accepted in principle, and the adoption of which was more than ever necessary since the

fall of Metz, as giving the neutral Powers an opportunity of exercising their good offices between Germany on the one hand, who was ready to afford facilities for the election of a Constituent Assembly, and consequently ready, it might be inferred, to agree to an armistice, on conditions which did not prejudice too absolutely the conditions of peace, and the regular Government which the Constituent Assembly might elect.

He consequently strongly advised the Provisional Government to adhere to the English proposition, and to lose no time in agreeing to an armistice, and in convoking an Assembly.

Time does not admit of my adding more.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 282.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 11, 1870.

IN a conversation which I had yesterday with M. Tissot, he informed me that in a communication which he had received from Tours, dated the 9th instant, the French Government stated that they adhered to the position in which they stood in consequence of the proposals of and the advice given by England in regard to the question of the armistice; that is to say, an armistice with the condition attached of re-victualling Paris, and elections to be freely held throughout France: and the French Government at the same time expressed the hope that the neutral Powers would exert their influence in this sense with the Cabinet of Berlin.

I told M. Tissot that I did not understand the allusion to the terms of the armistice. All that Her Majesty's Government had recommended to both parties was an armistice, the conditions of which were to be discussed and settled by the Representatives of both belligerents, and which were to be treated apart from the ultimate question of the conditions of peace.

I said that I would consider whether I could make any use of the information which I had received from your Excellency as to the readiness of the French Government to make some concessions as to the length of the armistice, and the exact amount of provisions to be allowed to Paris for each day.

I added, that the opinion of Her Majesty's Government was in favour of holding elections, even in the absence of an armistice; and that, without presuming to give the reasons which appeared obvious as to a matter of internal government, there would be great advantages resulting from the recognition of a regular Government in France, in its international relations.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 283.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received November 12.)

My Lord,

Tours, November 8, 1870.

I HAD yesterday the honour to receive your Lordship's despatch of the 4th instant, giving an account of a conversation which you had had the day before with M. Tissot, the French Chargé d'Affaires.

I find that M. Tissot, in pursuance of instructions from the Comte de Chaudordy, again pressed Her Majesty's Government to make a formal declaration of their sentiments respecting the conditions on which peace ought to be made; and I observe that in the course of the conversation your Lordship said to M. Tissot that you had been encouraged by me, you presumed with the concurrence of M. Thiers or of M. de Chaudordy, to impress upon Count Bismarck the importance of not mixing up the questions of a peace with the conditions of an armistice.

My suggestions that the negotiation for an armistice should be confined to the military conditions of the armistice itself, and should exclude all discussion of the terms of the definitive peace, were undoubtedly made not only with the full concurrence both of M. de Chaudordy and M. Thiers, but by the express desire of M. de Chaudordy speaking on behalf of the Government here.

My despatches of the 22nd and 24th of October, and your Lordship's despatch of the 25th ultimo, leave no possible doubt on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 284.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received November 12.)

My Lord,

Tours, November 9, 1870.

YESTERDAY, in execution of the instructions contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 5th instant, I expressed to M. de Chaudordy the great satisfaction with which Her Majesty's Government had become acquainted with the moderate and judicious language of M. Jules Favre respecting an armistice, and the convocation of a Constituent Assembly.

I was, in obedience to your Lordship's orders, careful not to say anything implying an opinion as to the possible conditions for a peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 285.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received November 12.)

My Lord,

Tours, November 9, 1870.

M. THIERS arrived here yesterday; and the result of his mission to Versailles, and the conclusions to which the French Government had come, after hearing his report, were communicated to me this afternoon by the Comte de Chaudordy.

The negotiation between M. Thiers and Count Bismarck had, M. de Chaudordy said, gone on with every appearance of success for the first days. The proposals of the French Government were:—that the duration of the armistice should be twenty-five days; that a proportionate quantity of provisions should be supplied to Paris—that is to say, that Paris should receive provisions sufficient for one day's consumption during each day that the armistice lasted; finally, that free elections for a National Assembly should take place in the provinces occupied by the enemy as well as in the rest of France. Count Bismarck had at first made no serious objection to any of these conditions, and had even entered into a discussion as to the exact quantity of provisions which Paris would be fairly entitled to receive. Somewhat suddenly, however, he had announced to M. Thiers that the military authorities considered it impossible to allow any provisions whatever to go into Paris during the armistice. He had also made some observations respecting elections in Alsace and Lorraine. It was unnecessary, however, to take these into consideration, as the refusal to allow Paris to be provisioned, of course, put an immediate end to the whole negotiation. M. Thiers went to the French outposts to meet M. Jules Favre, and report to him, and through him to the whole Government in Paris, what had happened. On the following day he received instructions from the Government to break off the negotiation and leave Versailles immediately. He had acted upon these instructions, and had come direct to Tours, and given a detailed account of all that had taken place to the Government Delegation here.

Having given me this account of the negotiation, M. de Chaudordy said that he had already dispatched telegrams and letters to communicate the views of the Government to the French Representatives abroad, and that he would proceed to state those views to me.

The French Government must leave it to the neutral Powers to appreciate the amount of consideration which their counsels had received from Prussia. It was quite plain that by refusing to allow Paris to receive provisions during the armistice, Prussia had rejected an armistice altogether. She was endeavouring to reduce Paris by famine, and to ask for a suspension of hostilities, on the terms she proposed, was simply to insist on continuing this operation without encountering any resistance on the part of France: it was, in fact, equivalent to a demand for the surrender of Paris. Prussia had thus absolutely set at nought the proposals of the neutral Powers. The French Government, on the other hand, maintained its acceptance of those proposals. It was still willing to conclude an armistice; it still desired to convoke a Constitutional Assembly as soon as possible. It would, therefore, urge the neutral Powers to represent to Prussia that if she

be sincere in desiring that an Assembly having undoubted authority to treat on behalf of France may be constituted, she must consent to an armistice on reasonable terms. The French Government was not disposed to be punctilious about details; it would not be unyielding as to the length of the armistice, or the exact amount of provisions; provided Paris were *bond fide* victualled during the suspension of hostilities. Count Bismarck had, indeed, suggested that the elections might take place without an armistice, but this the French Government held to be quite impossible. It was true that the Delegation at Tours had proposed to hold the elections a month ago, but the extent of the foreign invasion of the territory had very materially increased during the intervening time; and even then it had been found practically impossible to proceed with them, and they had been postponed by order of the Government at Paris. There were, therefore, two points which the neutral Powers might well press upon Prussia: first, that an armistice was absolutely necessary in order that free elections should be held throughout the country; and, secondly, that an armistice during which Paris should not be supplied with provisions was utterly impossible.

These, M. de Chaudordy said, were the views of the French Government with regard to the state of things produced by the rupture of the negotiation undertaken by the advice of England and the other great neutral Powers. He had himself addressed a circular on the subject to the French Representatives abroad, and he had subsequently received a copy of one addressed to them on the 7th instant by M. Jules Favre. He put into my hand a copy of the Paris "Journal Officiel" of the 8th instant, in which M. Jules Favre's circular is published, and I have the honour to transmit it herewith to your Lordship.

I have lost no time in communicating to your Lordship, by telegraph, the substance of what M. de Chaudordy said to me.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 285.

Circular addressed by M. Jules Favre to French Representatives abroad.

Monsieur,

Tours, le 10 Novembre, 1870.

LA Prusse vient de rejeter l'armistice proposé par les quatre Grandes Puissances neutres, l'Angleterre, la Russie, l'Autriche, et l'Italie, ayant pour objet la convocation d'une Assemblée Nationale. Elle a ainsi prouvé, une fois de plus, qu'elle continuait la guerre dans un but étroitement personnel, sans se préoccuper du véritable intérêt de ses sujets, et surtout de celui des Allemands, qu'elle entraîne à sa suite. Elle prétend, il est vrai, y être contrainte par notre refus de lui céder deux de nos provinces. Mais ces provinces, que nous ne pouvons ni ne voulons lui abandonner, et dont les habitants la repoussent énergiquement, elle les occupe, et ce n'est pas pour les conquérir qu'elle ravage nos campagnes, chasse devant ses armées nos familles ruinées, et tient, depuis près de cinquante jours, Paris enfermé sous le feu des batteries derrière lesquelles elle se retranche. Non: elle veut nous détruire pour satisfaire l'ambition des hommes qui la gouvernent. Le sacrifice de la nation Française est utile à la conservation de leur puissance. Ils le consomment froidement, s'étonnant que nous ne soyons pas leurs complices, en nous abandonnant aux défaillances que leur diplomatie nous conseille.

Engagée dans cette voie, la Prusse ferme l'oreille à l'opinion du monde. Sachant qu'elle froisse tous les sentiments justes, qu'elle alarme tous les intérêts conservateurs, elle se fait une système de l'isolement, et se dérobe ainsi à la condamnation que l'Europe, si elle était admise à discuter sa conduite, ne manquerait pas de lui infliger. Cependant, malgré ses refus, quatre Grandes Puissances neutres sont intervenues et lui ont proposé une suspension d'armes, dans le but défini de permettre à la France de se consulter elle-même en réunissant une Assemblée. Quel de plus rationnel, de plus équitable, de plus nécessaire? C'est sous l'effort de la Prusse que le Gouvernement Impérial s'est abîmé. Le lendemain, les hommes que la nécessité a investis du pouvoir lui ont proposé la paix, et, pour en régler les conditions, réclamé une trêve indispensable à la constitution d'une représentation nationale.

La Prusse a repoussé l'idée d'une trêve en la subordonnant à des exigences inacceptables, et ses armées ont entouré Paris. On leur en avait dit la soumission facile. Le siège dure depuis cinquante jours; la population ne faiblit pas. La sédition promise s'est fait attendre longtemps; elle est venue à une heure propice au négociateur Prussien, qui l'a annoncée au nôtre comme un auxiliaire prévu; mais, en éclatant, elle a permis au peuple de Paris de légitimer par un vote imposant le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale, qui acquiert par là aux yeux de l'Europe la consécration du droit.

Il lui appartenait, donc, de conférer sur la proposition d'armistice des quatre Puissances ; il pouvait, sans témérité, en espérer le succès. Désireux avant tout de s'effacer devant les mandataires du pays, et d'arriver par eux à une paix honorable, il a accepté la négociation et l'a engagée dans les termes ordinaires du droit des gens.

L'armistice devait comporter :—

L'élection des Députés sur tout le territoire de la République, même celui envahi ;

Une durée de vingt-cinq jours ;

Le ravitaillement proportionnel à cette durée.

La Prusse n'a pas contesté les deux premières conditions. Cependant elle a fait à propos du vote de l'Alsace et de la Lorraine quelques réserves que nous mentionnons sans les examiner davantage, parce que son refus absolu d'admettre le ravitaillement a rendu toute discussion inutile.

En effet, le ravitaillement est la conséquence forcée d'une suspension d'armes s'appliquant à une ville investie. Les vivres y sont un élément de défense. Les lui enlever sans compensation, c'est créer une inégalité contraire à la justice. La Prusse oserait-elle nous demander d'abattre chaque jour, par son canon, un pan de nos murailles sans nous permettre de lui résister ? Elle nous mettrait dans une situation plus mauvaise encore en nous obligeant à consommer, un mois, sans nous battre, alors que, vivant sur notre sol, elle attendrait, pour reprendre la guerre, que nous fussions harcelés par la famine. L'armistice sans ravitaillement, ce serait la capitulation à terme fixe sans honneur et sans espoir.

En refusant le ravitaillement, la Prusse refuse donc l'armistice. Et cette fois ce n'est pas l'armée seulement, c'est la nation Française qu'elle prétend anéantir en réduisant Paris aux horreurs de la faim. Il s'agit, en effet, de savoir si la France pourra réunir ses Députés pour délibérer sur la paix. L'Europe demande cette réunion. La Prusse la repousse en la soumettant à une condition inique et contraire au droit commun. Et cependant, s'il faut en croire un document publié sans être démenti, et qui émanerait de sa Chancellerie, elle ose accuser le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale de livrer Paris à une famine certaine ! Elle se plaint d'être forcée par lui de nous investir et de nous affamer !

L'Europe jugera ce que valent de telles imputations. Elles sont le dernier trait de cette politique qui débute par engager la parole du Souverain en faveur de la nation Française, et se termine par le rejet systématique de toutes les combinaisons pouvant permettre à la France d'exprimer sa volonté. Nous ignorons ce qu'en penseront les quatre Grandes Puissances neutres, dont les propositions sont écartées avec tant de hauteur ; peut-être devineront-elles enfin ce que leur réserverait la Prusse, devenue, par la victoire, maîtresse d'accomplir tous ses desseins.

Quant à nous, nous obéissons à un devoir impérieux et simple en persistant à maintenir leur proposition d'armistice comme le seul moyen de faire résoudre par une Assemblée les questions redoutables que les crimes du Gouvernement Impérial ont permis à l'ennemi de nous poser. La Prusse, qui sent l'odieux de son refus, le dissimule sous un déguisement qui ne peut tromper personne. Elle nous demande un mois de nos vivres ; c'est nous demander nos armes. Nous les tenons d'une main résolue, et nous ne les déposerons pas sans combattre. Nous avons fait tout ce que peuvent des hommes d'honneur pour arrêter la lutte. On nous ferme l'issue, nous n'avons plus à prendre conseil que de notre courage, en renvoyant la responsabilité du sang versé à ceux qui, systématiquement, repoussent toute transaction.

C'est à leur ambition personnelle que peuvent être immolés encore des milliers d'hommes. Et quand l'Europe émue veut arrêter les combattants sur la frontière de ce champ de carnage, pour y appeler les Représentants de la nation et essayer la paix : Oui, disent-ils, mais à la condition que cette population qui souffre, ces femmes, ces enfants, ces vieillards, qui sont les victimes innocentes de la guerre, ne recevront aucun secours, afin que, la trêve expirée, il ne soit plus possible à leurs défenseurs de nous combattre sans les faire mourir de faim.

Voilà ce que les chefs Prussiens ne craignent pas de répondre à la proposition des quatre Puissances. Nous prenons à témoin contre eux le droit et la justice ; et nous sommes convaincus que si, comme les nôtres, leur nation et leur armée pouvaient voter, elles condamneraient cette politique inhumaine.

Qu'au moins il soit bien établi que jusqu'à la dernière heure, préoccupé des immenses et précieux intérêts qui lui sont confiés, le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale a tout fait pour rendre possible une paix qui soit digne.

On lui refuse les moyens de consulter la France. Il interroge Paris, et Paris tout entier se lève en armes pour montrer au pays et au monde ce que peut un grand peuple quand il défend son honneur, son foyer, et l'indépendance de la patrie.

Vous n'aurez pas de peine, Monsieur, à faire comprendre des vérités si simples et à en faire le point de départ des observations que vous aurez à présenter lorsque l'occasion vous en sera fournie.

Agréé, &c.
Le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères,
(Signé) J. FAVRE.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Tours, November 10, 1870.

PRUSSIA has just rejected the armistice proposed by the four neutral Great Powers, England, Russia, Austria, and Italy, the object of which was the convocation of the National Assembly. She has thus once more proved that she was continuing the war with a strictly personal object, without caring for the real interests of her subjects, and especially the interests of the Germans whom she drags along in her wake. She pretends, it is true, to be forced to it by our refusal to cede two of our provinces, but she occupies these provinces, which we neither can nor will give up to her, and whose inhabitants energetically repel it, and it is not to conquer them that she ravages our fields, drives our ruined armies before her armies, and for nearly fifty days keeps Paris shut in under the fire of batteries behind which she shields herself. No; she wishes to destroy us to satisfy the ambition of the men who govern her. The sacrifice of the French nation is useful for the preservation of their power. They are accomplishing it coldly, wondering at our not being their accomplices, and giving in to the weaknesses which their diplomacy advises.

Having taken up this position, Prussia shuts her ears to the opinion of the world. With the knowledge that she clashes against all just feelings, that she is giving the alarm to all conservative interests, she creates for herself a system of isolation, and thus escapes the condemnation which Europe, if it were suffered to discuss her conduct, would not fail to pass upon her. Nevertheless, in spite of her refusals, four neutral Great Powers have intervened, and have proposed to her a suspension of arms, with the definite object of permitting France to be herself consulted by the meeting of an Assembly. What could be more rational, more equitable, more necessary? The Imperial Government sank beneath the efforts of Prussia. The morrow, the men whom necessity invested with power, proposed peace to her, and, to regulate its conditions, demanded a truce as indispensable for the constitution of a national representation.

Prussia rejected the idea of a truce by making it dependent on unacceptable claims, and her armies surrounded Paris. Its easy submission had been foretold. The siege has lasted fifty days; the population shows no sign of weakness. We have waited a long time for the promised revolt; it came at a propitious time for the Prussian negotiator, who announced it to ours as a foreseen ally; but, on its outbreak, it permitted the people of Paris to render legitimate, by an imposing vote, the Government of National Defence, which acquires thereby a consecration of its right in the eyes of Europe. It became, then, its duty to confer on the proposition for an armistice made by the Four Powers; it could, without rashness, hope for its success. Desirous, above all, of retiring in favour of the representatives of the country, and of arriving by their means at an honourable peace, it accepted the negotiation, and entered upon it in the usual terms of international law. The armistice was intended to allow:—

The election of Deputies throughout the whole territory of the Republic, even that invaded;

A duration of twenty-five days;

A proportional re-victualling of the capital.

Prussia did not dispute the two first conditions; she made, however, some reservations with regard to the vote in Alsace and Lorraine, which we mention without examining them further, because her absolute refusal to admit the re-victualling rendered all discussion useless.

In fact, the re-victualling is the necessary consequence of a suspension of arms applied to an invested town. The provisions in it are an element of defence. To take them away without compensation would be an act of unfairness and contrary to justice. Would Prussia dare to ask us to destroy daily with her cannon a portion of our walls without permitting us to resist? She would put us in a still worse situation by forcing us to consume food for a month, without fighting, whilst, living on our soil, she would wait to recommence the war till we were harassed by famine. An armistice without re-victualling would be a capitulation at a given moment without honour and without hope.

By refusing the re-victualling Prussia rejects, then, the armistice. And this time it is not only the French army, it is the French nation, that she seeks to annihilate by reducing Paris to the horrors of a famine. The question, in fact, is to know if France will be able

to assemble Deputies to deliberate upon the question of peace. Europe demands this Assembly; Prussia refuses it by subjecting it to an iniquitous condition contrary to every right. And nevertheless, if we must put any trust in a document published without being contradicted and which purports to proceed from her Chancery, she dares accuse the Government of National Defence of giving Paris up to certain famine! She complains of being forced by it to invest and starve us.

Europe will judge of the value of such imputations. They are the last feature of a policy which commences by pledging the word of the Sovereign in favour of the French nation, and terminates by a systematic rejection of every combination which would allow France to express her will. We do not know what the four neutral Great Powers will think of it, whose propositions are set aside with such haughtiness; perhaps they will guess at last what will be reserved for them by Prussia, risen by victory into a position to accomplish her designs.

As regards ourselves, we obey an imperious and simple duty, by persisting to maintain that their proposal for an armistice is the only means of obtaining a solution by an Assembly of the tremendous questions which the crimes of the Imperial Government have permitted the enemy to place before us. Prussia, which receives the odious character of her refusal, dissimulates it under a disguise which can deceive no one. To ask us for a month's provisions is to ask of us our arms. We resolutely hold them in our hands, and will not lay them down without fighting. We have done everything that men of honour could do to stop the conflict. The issue of it has been closed against us, and we can henceforth take counsel only of our courage, throwing back the responsibility of the blood shed upon those who systematically refuse all compromise.

It is to their personal ambition that thousands of men may perhaps still be immolated, and when Europe, moved by the spectacle, wishes to arrest the combatants upon the frontier of this field of carnage, in order to summon together the representatives of the nation, and seek a basis for peace, they say, "Yes, but on condition that this suffering population, these women, these children, these old men, the innocent victims of the war, shall receive no succour; so that the truce having expired, it may be impossible for their defenders to fight us without causing them to die of hunger."

This is what the Prussian chiefs do not fear to reply to the propositions of the Four Powers. We call right and justice to witness against them, and we are convinced that if, like ours, their army and their nation were able to give a vote, they would condemn this inhuman policy.

Let it be at least well understood that up to the last moment the Government of National Defence, absorbed by the immense and valuable interests confided to it, has done everything in its power to render an honourable peace possible.

The means of consulting France were refused to it. It thereupon interrogates Paris, and all Paris, in reply, rises in arms to show the country and the world what a great people can do when it defends its honour, its homes, and the independence of its country.

You will have no difficulty, Sir, in making such simple truths understood, and in making them the starting-point for the observations which you will have to make when the occasion presents itself to you.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) JULES FAVRE,
Minister for Foreign Affairs.

No. 286.

*Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.**

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 12, 1870

COUNT BERNSTORFF read to me to-day the project of armistice which M. Thiers had proposed to Count Bismarck. I told his Excellency I was not competent and had no desire to give any opinion as to the fairness or the reverse of the proposal, but that the impression I held with many others was that both parties had been extreme in their demands, and that a compromise might have been agreed to.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

* A similar despatch was addressed to Lord A. Loftus.

No. 287.

*Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.**

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 12, 1870.

COUNT BERNSTORFF told me to-day that he had been directed by Count Bismarck to inform me that, although the proposals made by M. Thiers were unacceptable, yet, if the Provisional Government are sincerely desirous of an armistice and of the convocation of an Assembly, a renewed direct communication between the Provisional Government and the Prussian head-quarters would be welcomed at Versailles. The Prussian Government were still willing to allow elections without an armistice. Count Bernstorff added that if the Provisional Government were in earnest, it would be much better on their part to make direct communication to the head-quarters at Versailles.

I answered that, if I might use the expression without offence, it appeared strange on the part of a great country like Germany in the plenitude of its power and success to be so sensitive as to the friendly action of any other Power; that I could repeat my assurances that Her Majesty's Government had no *amour-propre* in the matter; that we had no wish to put ourselves forward unnecessarily; that we did wish for peace, and should equally rejoice at it, by whatever means it was promoted; that we should rejoice at such conclusion, whether it was brought about directly or indirectly by any friendly Power, and that it would have given us great satisfaction if an individual like General Burnside had succeeded.

Count Bernstorff assured me that there was no sensitiveness on the part of his Government, but that Count Bismarck believed that these communications only encouraged the French Government to believe that they could rely on the neutral Powers and thus prolong their resistance.

I answered, the French Government complained of the want of encouragement from us, and that the dead-lock seemed to be created by the Germans declining to make advances, while the French, from feeling possibly increased by the defeats which they have suffered, were at the least equally indisposed to take first steps.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 288.

Earl Granville to Sir A. Buchanan.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, November 12, 1870.

THE Russian Ambassador at this Court informed me to-day that he had received a telegram from Prince Gortchakoff acquainting him that he had told Sir Andrew Buchanan, in reply to my inquiry, that the Emperor in his last communication had recommended to the King of Prussia moderation in the annexation of territory.

I told Baron Brunnow, in reply, that I had received information from your Excellency to the effect that Prince Gortchakoff had informed you that the Emperor had merely recommended moderation to the King of Prussia.

No. 289.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received November 16.)

My Lord,

Tours, November 13, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a letter addressed to me by M. Thiers, which contains a most able and interesting account of the negotiations respecting an armistice in which he was recently engaged at Versailles.

I have also the honour to inclose a copy of the answer which I have made to this communication.

M. Thiers' letter was put into my hand yesterday by the Comte de Chaudordy, and I have given my answer, unsealed, to M. de Chaudordy, and begged him to deliver it.

Letters identical with that to me have been written by M. Thiers to the Representatives of Austria, Italy and Russia, at Tours; and similar letters, with only a slight formal variation, have been addressed by M. Thiers to the Turkish Ambassador and Spanish Chargé d'Affaires.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

* A similar despatch was addressed to Lord A. Loftus.

Inclosure 1 in No. 289.

M. Thiers to Lord Lyons.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Tours, le 10 Novembre, 1870.

JE crois devoir aux quatre Grandes Puissances qu'ont fait ou appuyé la proposition d'un armistice entre la France et la Prusse un compte succinct mais fidèle de la négociation grave et délicate dont j'avais consenti à me charger. Muni des saur-conduits que Sa Majesté l'Empereur de Russie et le Cabinet Britannique avait bien voulu demander pour moi à Sa Majesté le Roi de Prusse, j'ai quitté Tours le 28 Octobre, et après avoir franchi la ligne qui séparait les deux armées je me suis rendu à Orléans. Sans perdre de temps j'ai pris la route de Versailles, accompagné d'un officier Bavaïois que M. le Général Baron de Tann avait eu l'obligeance de m'adjoindre pour lever les difficultés que je pourrais rencontrer sur ma route. Pendant ce difficile trajet, j'ai pu me convaincre par mes propres yeux, et malheureusement dans une province Française de tout ce que la guerre avait d'horrible. Obligé de m'arrêter trois ou quatre heures de la nuit à Arpajon, je suis arrivé à Versailles, Dimanche matin, 30. Je ne m'y suis arrêté que quelques instants, étant bien convenu d'avance avec M. le Comte de Bismarck que mes entretiens avec lui ne commenceraient qu'après avoir complété à Paris les pouvoirs nécessairement incomplètes que j'avais reçus de la Délégation de Tours.

Accompagné des officiers parlementaires qui devaient me faciliter le passage des avant-postes, j'ai franchi la Seine au-dessous du pont de Sèvres actuellement coupé, et je suis descendu à l'Hôtel des Affaires Etrangères pour rendre plus faciles et plus promptes nos communications avec les Membres du Gouvernement. La nuit s'est passée en délibérations, et après une résolution prise à l'unanimité, j'ai reçu les pouvoirs nécessaires pour négocier et conclure l'armistice dont les Puissances neutres avaient conçu l'idée et pris l'initiative.

Toujours soucieux de ne pas perdre un temps dont chaque minute était marquée par l'effusion du sang humain, j'ai repassé les avant-postes le Lundi soir 31 Octobre, et le lendemain 1 Novembre à midi, j'étais en conférence avec M. le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord.

L'objet de ma mission était parfaitement connu de M. le Comte de Bismarck, qui avait reçu, comme la France, la proposition des Puissances neutres. Après quelques réserves sur l'immixtion des neutres dans cette négociation, réserves que j'ai dû écouter sans les admettre, l'objet de notre mission a été parfaitement précisé et établi entre M. le Comte de Bismarck et moi. Il s'agissait de conclure un armistice qui fît cesser l'effusion du sang entre deux des nations les plus civilisées du globe, et permît à la France de constituer par des élections librement faites un Gouvernement régulier avec lequel on pût traiter valablement. Cet objet était d'autant mieux indiqué que plusieurs fois la diplomatie Prussienne avait dit que dans la situation des choses en France, elle ne savait à qui s'adresser pour entâmer des négociations.

A cette occasion M. le Comte de Bismarck m'a fait remarquer, sans du reste y insister, qu'il y avait en ce moment à Cassel, et cherchant à se reformer, les restes d'un Gouvernement qui jusqu'ici était le seul reconnu par l'Europe ; mais qu'il faisait cette observation uniquement pour préciser la situation diplomatique, et nullement à se mêler à quelque degré que ce fût du gouvernement intérieur de la France. J'ai répondu sur le champ à M. le Comte de Bismarck que nous l'entendions bien ainsi ; que du reste le Gouvernement qui venait de précipiter la France dans l'abîme d'une guerre follement résolue, ineptement conduite, avait pour toujours terminé à Sedan sa funeste existence, et serait à jamais pour la nation Française un souvenir de honte et de douleur. Sans contester ce que je disais, M. le Comte de Bismarck a de nouveau protesté contre toute idée d'ingérence dans nos affaires intérieures, et a bien voulu ajouter que ma présence au quartier-général Prussien, et l'accueil que j'y recevais, était la preuve de la sincérité de cette déclaration, puisque sans tenir compte de ce qui se passait à Cassel, le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord s'empressait de traiter avec l'Envoyé Extraordinaire de la République Française.

Ces observations préliminaires franchies, nous avons fait un premier examen sommaire des questions que soulevait la proposition des Puissances neutres :—

1. Principe de l'armistice, ayant pour but essentiel d'arrêter l'effusion du sang, et de fournir à la France le moyen de constituer un Gouvernement reposant sur le vœu exprimé de la nation.

2. Durée de cet armistice motivée par les délais qu'entraîne la formation d'une Assemblée Souveraine.

3. Liberté des élections pleinement assurée dans les provinces actuellement occupées par les troupes Prussiennes.

4. Conduite des armées belligérantes pendant l'interruption des hostilités.

5. Enfin, ravitaillement des places assiégées, et spécialement de Paris, pendant la durée de l'armistice.

Sur ces cinq questions, et particulièrement sur le principe même de l'armistice, M. de Bismarck ne m'a pas semblé avoir d'objections insurmontables ; et j'ai pu croire, à la suite de cette première conférence, qui n'avait pas duré moins de quatre heures, que nous pourrions nous entendre sur tous les points, et conclure une Convention qui serait le premier acte d'une pacification ardemment désirée dans les deux mondes.

Les conférences se sont succédé et le plus souvent deux fois par jour, car j'étais impatient d'atteindre un résultat qui devait faire cesser le bruit du canon que nous entendions constamment, et dont chaque éclat me faisait craindre de nouveaux ravages, de nouvelles immolations de victimes humaines.

Voici quelles ont été pendant ces conférences les objections et les solutions sur les divers points ci-dessus énumérés.

Quant au principe et à l'objet de l'armistice, M. de Bismarck m'a affirmé qu'il désirait autant que les Puissances neutres la fin des hostilités, ou du moins leur suspension ; et qu'il désirait voir constituer en France un pouvoir avec lequel il pût contracter des engagements à la fois valables et durables. Il y avait donc accord complet sur cet objet essentiel, et toute discussion devenait superflue.

Quant à la durée de l'armistice j'ai demandé à M. le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord de vingt-cinq à trente jours, et vingt-cinq au moins. Il fallait, lui ai-je dit, douze jours pour que les électeurs pussent se concerter et arrêter leurs choix, un jour pour voter, quatre ou cinq jours que les candidats élus pussent, dans l'état des chemins, se réunir en un lieu déterminé, et de huit à dix jours enfin pour une vérification sommaire de pouvoirs et la constitution de la future Assemblée Nationale. M. le Comte de Bismarck n'a point contesté ces calculs, et s'est borné à me dire que moins grande serait la durée, moins grandes aussi seraient les difficultés que pourrait présenter la conclusion de l'armistice proposé. Mais il a paru s'arrêter avec moi à une durée de vingt-cinq jours.

Venait ensuite la grave question de la liberté des élections. M. de Bismarck a bien voulu m'affirmer qu'elles seraient dans les pays occupés par l'armée Prussienne aussi libres qu'elle avaient jamais pu l'être en France. Je l'ai remercié de cette assurance, dont je me serais contenté si M. le Comte de Bismarck, qui n'avait d'abord demandé aucune exception pour cette liberté d'élections, n'avait cependant fait quelques réserves à l'égard de certaines parties du territoire Français voisines de nos frontières, et Allemandes, disait-il, d'origine et de langage. J'ai répondu sur le champ que l'armistice, si on voulait le conclure promptement, ainsi que c'était le désir général, devait ne préjuger aucune des questions qui pourraient être agitées à l'occasion d'un Traité de Paix définitif, que pour ma part je me refusais en ce moment à en aborder aucune, et qu'en agissant ainsi j'obéissais à mes instructions et à mes sentiments personnels. M. le Comte de Bismarck m'a répondu qu'il était d'avis lui aussi de ne toucher à aucune de ces questions, et il m'a proposé de ne rien insérer à ce sujet dans le libellé de l'armistice ; qu'ainsi rien ne serait préjugé à cet égard, que s'il n'admettait pas l'agitation électorale dans les provinces dont il s'agissait, il ne refuserait pas qu'elles fussent représentées dans la future Assemblée Nationale par des notables dont nous arrêterions la désignation sans qu'il s'en mêlât, et qui jouiraient d'une liberté complète d'opinion comme tous les autres Représentants de la France.

Cette question, la plus grave de toutes, étant ainsi en voie de solution, nous nous sommes occupés de la conduite des armées pendant la suspension des hostilités. M. de Bismarck avait dû en référer aux Généraux Prussiens réunis et présidés par Sa Majesté le Roi, et tout examiné, voici ce qui nous a semblé acceptable de part et d'autre et le plus conforme aux usages adoptés dans tous les cas semblables.

Les armées belligérantes seraient tenues de s'arrêter là même où elles se trouvaient le jour de la signature de l'armistice, une ligne reliant tous les points où elles se seraient arrêtées formerait la ligne de démarcation qu'elles ne devraient pas dépasser, mais en dedans de laquelle elles pourraient se mouvoir, sans toutefois se livrer à aucun acte d'hostilité.

Nous étions pour ainsi dire d'accord sur les divers points de cette négociation, lorsque s'est présentée la dernière question, celle du ravitaillement des places assiégées, et spécialement de Paris. M. le Comte de Bismarck n'avait sur ce sujet élevé aucune objection fondamentale, et n'avait semblé contester que l'importance des quantités demandées, ainsi que la difficulté de les réunir et de les introduire dans Paris (ce qui du reste ne regardait que nous seuls), et quant aux quantités elles-mêmes je lui avais formellement déclarée qu'elles seraient un objet de discussion amiable et même de concessions importantes de notre part. Cette fois encore, le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord avait demandé à en référer aux autorités militaires, auxquelles plusieurs difficultés avaient

déjà été soumises, et nous sommes convenus de remettre au lendemain, Jeudi 3 Novembre, la solution définitive de cette question.

Le Jeudi 3, M. Bismarck, que je trouvai soucieux et préoccupé, me demanda si j'avais des nouvelles de Paris, à quoi je dus répondre que depuis le Lundi soir, jour de ma sortie, je n'en avais aucune. M. de Bismarck était lui-même dans le même cas. Il me fit lire alors des rapports d'avant-postes qui parlaient d'une révolution à Paris, et de la proclamation d'un nouveau Gouvernement. Ce Paris d'où les moindres nouvelles partaient jadis avec la promptitude d'électricité pour se répandre en quelques minutes dans le monde entier, avait pu être en ce moment le théâtre d'une révolution sans que trois jours après on en sut rien à ses portes. Profondément contristé de ce phénomène historique j'affirmai à M. le Comte de Bismarck que si le désordre avait pu triompher un moment dans Paris, l'énergique amour de l'ordre chez la population Parisienne, égale à son patriotisme, rétablirait bientôt l'ordre troublé.

Cependant je n'avais plus de pouvoirs si les nouvelles répandues étaient fondées. Je dus donc suspendre cette négociation jusqu'à de nouvelles informations. Ayant obtenu de M. de Bismarck les moyens de communiquer avec Paris, je pus dans cette même journée du Jeudi savoir ce qui s'était passé le Lundi, et m'assurer que je ne m'étais pas trompé en affirmant à M. le Comte de Bismarck que le triomphe du désordre n'avait pu être que de quelques heures.

Je me rendis dans la même soirée chez M. le Comte de Bismarck et nous reprîmes et continuâmes pendant une partie de la nuit la négociation interrompue le matin. La question de ravitaillement de la capitale fut vivement débattue entre nous, toujours restant bien affirmé de ma part que mes demandes, sous le rapport des quantités, pourraient être modifiées après une discussion détaillée. Bientôt je pus apercevoir que ce n'était pas une question de détail, mais de fond, qui venait de s'élever. Je fis valoir auprès de M. de Bismarck le grand principe des armistices qui veut que chaque belligérant se trouve à la fin d'une suspension d'hostilités dans l'état où il était au commencement; que de ce principe fondé sur la justice et la raison avait découlé l'usage de ravitailler les places assiégées, et de remplacer chaque jour les vivres consommés dans la journée; "car sans cette précaution," dis-je à M. de Bismarck, "un armistice suffirait pour prendre les plus fortes places du monde."

Il n'y avait rien à répliquer, je le crois du moins, à cette énonciation de principes et d'usages incontestés, incontestables.

M. le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord, s'exprimant alors non en son nom mais au nom des autorités militaires, me déclara que l'armistice était absolument contraire aux intérêts Prussiens; que nous donner un mois de répit c'était procurer à nos armées le temps de s'organiser; qu'introduire dans Paris des quantités de vivres difficiles à déterminer c'était lui donner le moyen de prolonger indéfiniment sa résistance; que l'on ne pouvait pas par conséquent nous accorder des avantages pareils sans des équivalents militaires (expression de M. de Bismarck lui-même). Je me hâtai de répondre que sans doute l'armistice pouvait avoir pour nous certains avantages matériels, mais qu'il avait dû le prévoir d'avance en admettant le principe de l'armistice; que d'ailleurs apaiser les passions nationales, préparer et rapprocher ainsi la paix, déférer surtout aux vœux formels de l'Europe, étaient des avantages politiques pour la Prusse qui valaient bien les avantages matériels qu'elle pouvait nous concéder. Je demandai alors quels étaient les équivalents militaires qu'on nous demandait, car M. le Comte de Bismarck mettait un soin extrême à ne pas les désigner. Il me les énonça afin, toujours avec une certaine réserve. "C'était," me disait-il, "une position militaire autour de Paris;" et comme j'insistais, "un fort," ajouta-t-il, "peut-être plus d'un." J'arrêtai sur le champ M. le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord. "C'est Paris," lui dis-je, "que vous nous demandez; car nous refuser le ravitaillement pendant l'armistice, c'est nous retirer un mois de notre résistance; nous demander un ou plusieurs forts, c'est nous demander nos murailles; c'est en un mot nous demander Paris en vous donnant les moyens de l'affamer ou de le bombarder. Or, en traitant avec nous d'un armistice vous n'avez jamais pu supposer que la condition en serait de vous livrer Paris lui-même, — Paris notre principale force, notre grande espérance, et pour vous la grande difficulté que vous n'avez pu surmonter après cinquante jours de siège."

Arrivés à ce point nous ne pouvions plus faire un pas; je le fis remarquer à M. de Bismarck; et il me fut facile de reconnaître que l'esprit militaire l'emportait en ce moment dans les résolutions de la Prusse, sur l'esprit politique qui conseillait la paix, et tout ce qui pouvait y conduire.

Je demandai alors à M. le Bismarck la faculté de me rendre de nouveau aux avant-postes pour m'entretenir de cette situation avec M. Jules Favre, à quoi il se prêta avec une courtoisie que j'ai toujours rencontrée dans tout ce qui concernait les relations personnelles.

En me quittant, M. le Comte de Bismarck me chargea de déclarer au Gouvernement Français que si on voulait faire les élections sans armistice, il leur laisserait une liberté entière dans tous les pays occupés par les armées Prussiennes, et y ajouterait de facilités de communication entre Paris et Tours pour tout ce qui concernait l'objet des élections. Je recueillis cette déclaration et je me rendis le lendemain 5 Novembre aux avant-postes Français. Je les franchis pour m'aboucher avec M. Jules Favre dans une maison abandonnée. Je lui fis un exposé complet de la situation tout entière sous les rapports politiques et militaires, en lui laissant jusqu'au lendemain pour m'adresser la réponse officielle du Gouvernement, avec tous les moyens pour me la faire parvenir à Versailles. En effet je la reçus le lendemain Dimanche 6 Novembre. Elle m'invitait à rompre la négociation sur la demande repoussée du ravitaillement, à quitter immédiatement le Quartier-Général Prussien pour me rendre à Tours, et y rester, si j'y consentais, à la disposition du Gouvernement au cas que mon intervention pût encore être utile à des négociations ultérieures. Je communiquai cette résolution à M. de Bismarck, lui répétant que nous ne pouvions lui livrer ni la subsistance ni les défenses de Paris, et que je regrettais amèrement de n'avoir pu conclure un acte qui aurait été un acheminement vers la paix.

Tel est l'exposé fidèle de cette négociation que j'adresse aux quatre Puissances neutres qui avaient eu la bonne inspiration de désirer, de vouloir, de proposer une suspension d'armes, laquelle aurait rapproché le moment où l'Europe entière pourra respirer, reprendre les travaux de la civilisation, et ne plus dormir d'un sommeil agité avec la cruauté de voir à chaque instant surgir quelque accident terrible qui propage sur le Continent tout entier l'incendie de la guerre.

C'est maintenant aux Puissances neutres à juger s'il a été tenu assez compte de leurs conseils, et ce n'est pas à nous, j'en suis certain, qu'elles pourront reprocher d'avoir manqué de déférence à ces conseils. Nous les faisons juges, du reste, de la conduite des eux Puissances belligérantes, et je les remercie pour ma part, au double titre d'homme et de Français, de l'appui qu'elles m'ont prêté dans les efforts que j'ai tentés pour rendre à ma patrie les bienfaits de la paix, qu'elle a perdu non par sa faute, mais par celle d'un Gouvernement dont l'existence est la seule faute de la France, car c'en est une bien grande, bien irréparable de s'être donné un tel Gouvernement et de lui avoir sans contrôle abandonné toutes ses destinées.

Agrérez, &c.
(Signé) A THIERS.

(Translation.)

I. l'Ambassadeur,

Tours, November 10, 1870.

I BELIEVE I owe to the four Great Powers which made or supported the proposal for an armistice between France and Prussia, a concise but faithful account of the grave and delicate negotiation with which I consented to be intrusted. With the safe-conducts which His Majesty the Emperor of Russia and the British Cabinet had been good enough to request for me from His Majesty the King of Prussia, I left Tours on the 28th of October, and, after having crossed the line which separated the two armies, I proceeded to Orleans; thence I at once proceeded to Versailles, accompanied by a Bavarian officer, whom General Von der Tann had been obliging enough to attach to me, in order to obviate any difficulties I might encounter on the road. During this difficult journey I was able to convince myself, with my own eyes, and unhappily in a French province, of the horrors of war. Compelled to stay at Arpajon at night for three or four hours, I reached Versailles on Sunday morning, the 30th ultimo. I remained there only a few moments, as it was well understood with Count Bismarck that I should not have an interview with him until I had completed at Paris the powers, necessarily incomplete, which I had received from the Delegation at Tours.

Accompanied by officers as parlementaires, who were to facilitate my passage through the outposts, I crossed the Seine below the Sèvres bridge, now cut, and alighted at the Foreign Office, to communicate more easily and quickly with the members of the Government. The night was spent in deliberations; and after a resolution was unanimously adopted, I received the necessary powers to negotiate and conclude the armistice, the idea and initiative of which had been conceived and taken by the neutral Powers.

Always anxious not to lose time when every minute was marked by the effusion of human blood, I again passed through the outposts on Monday evening, the 31st of October; and, on the next day, the 1st of November, at noon, I was conferring with the Chancellor of the Northern Confederation.

The object of my mission was perfectly well known to Count Bismarck, who, like

France, had been made aware of the proposal of the neutral Powers. After some reservations on the interference of neutrals in this negotiation,—reservations which I listened to without admitting them,—the object of my mission was stated, and defined by Count Bismarck and myself with a perfectly accurate precision. It was to conclude an armistice which should put an end to the effusion of blood between two of the most civilized nations of the world; and should allow France to constitute, through elections freely held, a regular Government, with which it would be possible to treat in a valid form. This object was the more clearly indicated since on several occasions Prussian diplomacy had contended that in the present state of affairs in France it did not know to whom to apply to commence negotiations.

On that point Count Bismarck remarked to me, without, however, dwelling upon the subject, that some remains of a Government, which, until now, was the only one recognized in Europe, were at that moment at Cassel, seeking to reconstitute itself; but that he made the observation solely in order to state precisely the diplomatic situation, and not at all to interfere in any degree whatever with the internal Government of France. I at once answered Count Bismarck that we understood it so; that, moreover, the Government which had just precipitated France into the abyss of a war, foolishly resolved, senselessly conducted, had for ever terminated at Sedan its fatal existence, and would remain for the French nation a shameful and painful reminiscence.

Without objecting to what I said, Count Bismarck again protested against all idea of interfering in our internal affairs, and was good enough to add, that my presence at the Prussian head-quarters, and the reception I had there met with, were proofs of the sincerity of that statement, since, without taking into account what was going on at Cassel, the Chancellor of the Northern Confederation was ready to treat with the Extraordinary Envoy of the French Republic.

These preliminary observations gone through, we made a first and summary survey of the questions to which the proposal of the neutral Powers gave rise:—

1. The principle of the armistice, having for its essential object to stop the effusion of blood, and to afford France the means of constituting a Government founded upon the expressed will of the nation.
2. The duration of this armistice dependent on the delays required for the formation of a Sovereign Assembly.
3. The freedom of the elections fully secured in the provinces now occupied by Prussian troops.
4. The conduct of the belligerent armies during the interruption of hostilities.
5. Lastly, the revictualling of the besieged fortresses, and specially of Paris, during the duration of the armistice.

On these five points, and especially on the principle itself of the armistice, Count Bismarck did not appear to me to entertain any insuperable objections; and at the conclusion of this first conference, which lasted at least four hours, I believed that we should be able to agree on all points, and conclude a convention which would be the first step towards the peaceful settlement so ardently desired by both hemispheres.

Conferences succeeded one another, and mostly twice a day, for I was anxious to arrive at a result which would put an end to the din of cannon which we constantly heard, and every shot of which caused me to fear fresh devastations and fresh sacrifices of human victims.

The objections made and solutions offered on the various points above mentioned during those conferences are the following:—

As regards the principle and object of the armistice, Count Bismarck declared that he was as anxious as the neutral Powers could be for the termination, or, at least, the suspension of hostilities, and that he wished for the constitution in France of a Power with which he could contract engagements both valid and durable. There was then a complete agreement on this essential point, and all discussion was superfluous.

As regards the duration of the armistice, I asked the Chancellor of the Northern Confederation that it should be from twenty-five to thirty days—twenty-five at the least. Twelve days were required, I told him, to allow the electors to concert and to agree as to their choice; one day for voting; four or five days more to give the elected candidates sufficient time, in the present state of the roads, to assemble at an appointed place; and, lastly, eight or ten days more for a summary verification of their powers and for the constitution of the future National Assembly. Count Bismarck did not contest these calculations, and only remarked that the shorter the duration the less would be the difficulties in concluding the proposed armistice. He seemed, however, to determine, like myself, on a twenty-five days' duration.

Then came the grave question of the liberty of the elections. Count Bismarck was good

enough to assert that in the districts occupied by the Prussian army they would be as free as they ever were in France. I thanked him for this assurance, with which I was satisfied, if Count Bismarck, who at first had asked for no exception to this freedom of elections, had not made some reservations relative to certain portions of French territory, bordering on our frontiers, and which were, he said, German by their origin and language. I at once answered that the armistice, if there was any wish to conclude it speedily, as was generally desired, must not prejudice any of the questions which might be agitated on the occasion of a definite Treaty of Peace; that for my own part I declined at that moment to enter into any of them, and that in thus acting I obeyed both my instructions and my own personal feelings. Count Bismarck replied that it was also his opinion that none of these questions were to be touched, and he proposed to me that we should insert nothing on that subject in the draft of the armistice, that thus nothing would be prejudged on that point; that, although he would not allow any electoral agitation in the provinces in question, he would not object to their being represented in the future National Assembly by notables, whose designation we should determine without any interference on his part, and who should enjoy as complete a freedom of opinion as all the other Representatives of France.

This question, the most important of all, being thus in a fair way of solution, we proceeded to examine what the conduct of the belligerent armies should be during the suspension of hostilities. Count Bismarck had to refer to the Prussian Generals, assembled under the presidency of His Majesty the King, and, all being considered, this is what appeared to us to be equitable on both sides, and in strict conformity with the usages adopted in all similar cases:—

The belligerent armies should remain on the very places they occupied on the day of the signature of the armistice; a line connecting all the points where they had stopped would form the line of demarcation, which they were not to pass, but within which they could move, without, however, engaging in any act of hostility.

We were, I should say, agreeing on the various points of this negotiation, when the last question presented itself, namely, the revictualling of the besieged fortresses, and specially of Paris. Count Bismarck had not raised any fundamental objection on this subject, and had seemed inclined only to contest the importance of the quantities claimed, as well as the difficulty of collecting them, and having them introduced into Paris (which, however, concerned us alone); and as regards quantities, I had positively declared to him that they should be the subject of an amicable discussion, and even of important concessions, on our part. This time, again, the Chancellor of the Northern Confederation wished to refer to the military authorities, to whom several other difficulties had already been submitted, and we agreed to adjourn until the next day, Thursday, the 3rd November, the definitive solution of that point.

On Thursday, the 3rd instant, Count Bismarck, whom I found anxious and pre-occupied, inquired of me whether I had news from Paris, to which I replied that I had none since the Monday evening, the day of my leaving the city. Count Bismarck was similarly situated. He then handed to me the reports of the outposts, which spoke of a revolution in Paris and the proclamation of a new Government. Was this Paris, from which the most insignificant news formerly was despatched with lightning speed to be diffused within a few minutes throughout the whole world? Could she, then, have been the scene of a revolution of which three days later nothing was known at her very gates! Profoundly saddened by this historical phenomenon, I replied to Count Bismarck that, should disorder have been for a moment triumphant in Paris, the disturbed tranquillity would soon be restored, owing to the strong love of the Parisian population for order, which was equal to its patriotism.

However, my powers were no longer valid if the reports were well founded. I was thus obliged to suspend my negotiations until information was received. Having obtained from Count Bismarck means of communicating with Paris, I was able, on the same day (Thursday), to ascertain what had occurred on the Monday, and to learn that I had not been mistaken in my assertion that the triumph of disorder could have been but temporary.

The same evening I proceeded to Count Bismarck, and we resumed and continued during a portion of the night the negotiation which had been interrupted in the morning. The question of revictualling the capital was sharply debated between us, it being firmly maintained on my part that any demands as to quantities could be modified after a detailed discussion. I could soon perceive that it was not a question as to details but a fundamental one which had been raised. I urged on Count Bismarck the great principle of armistices, which requires that each belligerent should, at the termination of the suspension of hostilities, find himself in the same situation as he was at the commencement; that from the principles founded on justice and reason the usage had sprung of

revictualling besieged fortresses, and of providing each day the food for the day; and that without such a precaution, I said to Count Bismarck, an armistice would suffice to capture the strongest fortress in the world.

No reply could be made, so at least I believe, to this statement of principles and usages unquestioned and unquestionable.

The Chancellor of the Northern Confederation, speaking then not in his own name, but in the name of the military authorities, declared to me that the armistice was absolutely opposed to Prussian interests; that to give us one month's respite was to afford time for the organization of our armies; that to introduce into Paris certain quantities of food difficult to be defined was to give to that city the means of indefinitely prolonging her resistance; that such advantages, therefore, could not be granted to us without military equivalents (an expression of Count Bismarck himself). I hastened to reply that undoubtedly the armistice might bring us some material advantages, but that the Prussian Cabinet must have anticipated it while admitting its principle; that, besides, to appease the national passions, thus to prepare peace and bring it nearer, and, above all, to show a proper deference to the declared wish of Europe, were such political advantages for Prussia as were fully equivalent to the material advantages which she might concede to us. I then asked what were the military equivalents which were required from us; but Count Bismarck was extremely careful not to point them out. He at last stated them, always with a certain reserve. "It was," he said to me, "a military position about Paris;" and, as I further insisted, "a fort," he added, "more than one, perhaps." I at once stopped the Chancellor of the North German Confederation. It is Paris, I said, that you ask us for; for to deny us the revictualling during the armistice is to take from us one month of our resistance; to require from us one or several of our forts is to ask for our ramparts. It is, in fact, to demand Paris, while we should give you the means of starving or bombarding her. In treating with us for an armistice you could never suppose that its conditions should be that we should give up Paris herself to you—Paris, our chief strength, our great hope, and for you the great difficulty which, after fifty days of siege, you have not been able to overcome.

At this point we could proceed no further. I remarked to Count Bismarck that it was easy to perceive at that moment in the resolution of Prussia that the military prevailed over the political spirit, which latter advised peace and all that could lead to it.

I then asked Count Bismarck for authority to proceed once more to the outposts, in order to consult on the situation with M. Jules Favre, to which he consented with that courtesy which I have ever experienced from him in all that concerned personal relations. On taking leave of me Count Bismarck charged me to declare to the French Government that if there was a wish to hold the elections without an armistice he would allow them to be held with perfect freedom in all the districts occupied by the Prussian armies, and would also provide for easy communication between Paris and Tours, so far as regarded everything that concerned the elections. I kept this declaration in my mind, and on the next day—the 5th of November—I proceeded to the French outposts. I passed them in order to confer with M. Jules Favre in a deserted house. I laid before him a full statement of the whole situation, both from a political and military point of view, giving him until the following day to send me the official answer of the Government, and providing him with the means of its reaching me at Versailles. I received it on the next day, Sunday, the 6th of November. In it I was requested to break off the negotiations on the question of revictualling, to leave the Prussian head-quarters immediately, and to proceed to Tours, where I should remain, if I would consent, at the disposal of the Government, in case that my intervention should still be useful for future negotiations. I communicated this resolution to Count Bismarck, and repeated to him that we could give up neither the question of subsistence nor any of the defences of Paris, and that I bitterly regretted having been unable to conclude a measure which would have been a preliminary step to peace.

Such is the faithful account of this negotiation which I address to the Four Neutral Powers, who had the good inspiration of desiring and proposing a suspension of arms, which would have brought us nearer to the moment when all Europe might breathe again, resume the works of civilisation, and no longer sleep a restless sleep, in constant fear lest some lamentable accident should arise and extend the conflagration of war over the whole Continent.

It belongs now to the Neutral Powers to judge if sufficient attention has been paid to their advice; and I am sure that it is not we who can be reproached with a want of deference for their counsels. We, after all, make them the judges of the conduct of the two belligerent Powers, and, for my own part, both as a man and as a Frenchman, I thank them for the support which they have accorded to me in my endeavours to restore

the blessings of peace to my country—of that peace which she lost, not by her own fault, but by that of a Government the existence of which is the sole error of France, for it is a great and irretrievable error to have chosen such a Government for herself, and, uncontrolled, to have trusted it with her destinies.

Receive, &c.
(Signed) A. THIERS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 289.

Lord Lyons to M. Thiers.

Sir,

Tours, November , 1870.

THE Count de Chaudordy has been so good as to deliver to me the letter dated the 10th instant, in which you have done me the honour to communicate the particulars of the negotiation in which you were recently engaged at Versailles. I shall hasten to forward this important document to Her Majesty's Government, by whom it will be read with the deepest interest. They will fully appreciate the noble and patriotic spirit by which you have been animated; and while they will deeply regret the failure of the negotiation, they will, I am sure, still cherish an earnest desire that means may yet be found of arresting hostilities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 290.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received November 16.)

My Lord,

Tours, November 14, 1870.

I HAD yesterday the honour to receive your Lordship's telegrams of the day before, dated respectively 4.10 P.M. and 5 P.M. I thought it desirable that the Government here should be informed as soon as possible of the willingness manifested by Count Bismarck to resume the negotiation for an armistice.

I went accordingly to the Comte de Chaudordy, and told him that Count Bismarck had informed your Lordship, through the Prussian Ambassador in London, that although M. Thiers' proposals were unacceptable, yet, if the Provisional Government were sincerely desirous of an armistice and the convocation of an Assembly, a renewed direct communication between the Provisional Government and the Prussian Head-quarters would be welcomed at Versailles. I added, that Count Bismarck had at the same time informed your Lordship that the Prussian authorities were still willing to facilitate the election of an Assembly without an armistice.

M. Thiers and Prince Metternich happened to be in M. de Chaudordy's room when I made this communication to him, and they stayed and took part in the conversation which ensued.

The general result of what was said appeared to be that there was every reason to believe that the French Government would gladly resume the negotiation, provided it was distinctly ascertained that the revictualling of Paris for the number of days the armistice lasted was admitted by the Prussians as the basis of the negotiation.

Both M. Thiers and M. de Chaudordy maintained that a negotiation on any other basis was absolutely out of the question, but they were of opinion that if the principle were admitted, the French need not be exacting as to the precise quantity of provisions to be furnished, or even as to the duration of the armistice.

In a summary, contained in the ordinary newspaper telegrams, of a Circular of Count Bismarck's, giving an account of the recent negotiations, Count Bismarck is made to say that the French had demanded "un large approvisionnement." Referring to this, M. Thiers said that it ought to be distinctly remembered that the Prussians had absolutely refused to allow any provisions at all to enter Paris during the armistice. He had, he observed, consented during his discussions with Count Bismarck, to reduce considerably the quantities he had at first demanded, and had intimated his readiness to make still further abatements. It was only on Count Bismarck's declaring categorically that the military authorities would not consent to Paris being re-victualled in any measure whatever, small or great, that he had felt bound to break off the negotiations.

M. Thiers added that he should himself be quite willing to return to Versailles to

negotiate the armistice, if the revictualling of Paris were admitted in principle as the basis of it.

A question was started as to the probability of Prussia's demanding some military equivalent if she consented to the revictualling. M. de Chaudordy abstained from making this question the subject of anything like official discussion. The general opinion, however, of those present appeared to be that the French Government would never agree to give any equivalent which would in the least compromise the defence of Paris, but that it might listen to proposals for an arrangement of some other kind, such, for instance, as one which would facilitate the Prussian communications or the provisioning the German army during the armistice.

As regards the election of an Assembly without an armistice, M. de Chaudordy re-affirmed positively the declaration of the Government here that this was quite impossible.

In conclusion, I begged M. de Chaudordy to convey confidentially to the Government the information which had been given to your Lordship by Count Bismarck, and to let me know whether they desired, on their part, to make any communication to you in return.

On leaving M. de Chaudordy I dispatched a telegram to your Lordship to acquaint you with the general impression the conversation had made upon my mind.

This morning M. de Chaudordy told me that, having communicated with the Government, he was authorized by them to beg me to assure your Lordship that they highly appreciated your Lordship's good will, and should be very much obliged if you would continue your endeavours to render a suspension of hostilities possible. I might, M. de Chaudordy said, assure your Lordship that the French Government were sincerely and earnestly desirous of an armistice, and of the early convocation of a National Assembly. They must hold to their declaration that the election of an Assembly was impossible without an armistice, and that an armistice was impossible without the revictualling of Paris; but they were quite ready to resume the negotiations if the revictualling were admitted in principle as the basis of it.

M. de Chaudordy, referring to the conversation which he had had with Prince Metternich, M. Thiers, and me, the day before, observed that he was not authorized to say anything, in behalf of the Government, on the subject of a military equivalent to Prussia for any concession she might make respecting the provisioning of Paris.

I have already made known to your Lordship, by telegraph, the substance of the communication which I thus received this morning from M. de Chaudordy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 291.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 17, 1870.

M. TISSOT stated to me yesterday that the Government of National Defence considers that an armistice without revictualling, and elections without an armistice, are equally impossible.

At a time when it is necessary for France to defend herself on all points of her territory, when all the male population are called to arms, removed for the most part from their Departments, frequently scattered about in detached corps, even as sharp-shooters, it is impossible to obtain a vote in a country where universal suffrage prevails. A few days would not suffice for the elections; time and security would be required. It would be necessary, moreover, that Paris should have free communication with the provinces.

The French Government desires to be enabled to carry on the elections seriously, so that it should be impossible hereafter to dispute their result. It desires that this measure may hasten peace. It appeared to it, therefore, that it was for the interest of the Neutral Powers to act in accordance with this view.

M. Tissot further said the Government of National Defence desired therefore an armistice, with revictualling and freedom of election throughout the whole of France; and the Cabinet of London, which had taken the initiative in the question of armistice, would doubtless deem it right to renew its efforts.

I begged M. Tissot to understand that I had no intention of giving advice to the Provisional Government as to matters of internal administration, although there seemed to be obvious reasons why an Assembly would be an advantage; but that I suggested the importance of one in an international point of view, as regarded both belligerents and Neutral Powers.

I had always held the same language as to the conditions of an armistice, that it was an impossible thing for a Neutral Power to judge of a matter which depended so much upon the knowledge which each belligerent had of its resources and necessities; that I did not, therefore, give an opinion as a Minister on the subject, but as an individual I agreed with what appeared to be the general opinion, namely, that each party had been extreme in the conditions which they had laid down, and that some compromise might have been found.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 292.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, November 17, 1870.

M. TISSOT informed me to-day that he had heard from M. de Chaudordy that, in his last interview with your Excellency, he had pointed out, with reference to the last suggestions made to me by Count Bismarck, that it was impossible for the Government of National Defence to accept an armistice without the revictualling of Paris; that he did not think it possible to convoke the electoral colleges without an armistice, as the result of the elections without this indispensable suspension of arms would be liable to be contested or at least violently attacked.

The French Government, M. de Chaudordy said, had nothing to modify in the language held by M. Thiers, and if new propositions were to be made they must emanate from the Cabinet of Berlin.

He thought, however, that the presence of Mr. Odo Russell at the King's headquarters might afford the Cabinet of London facilities for a combination which might admit of a negotiation on the principle of an armistice, which must nevertheless have for its basis the revictualling of Paris. So long as the Prussian Government refused to admit their principle, it would be useless to send a Plenipotentiary to Versailles. The Neutral Powers could not fail to perceive that the French Government left it to them to pave the way for Conferences which might have practical results for the restoration of peace.

M. de Chaudordy had held the same language to the Representatives of Austria, Italy and Spain, who had telegraphed accordingly to their Governments.

Such, M. de Chaudordy said, was the opinion of the French Government, and, while thanking that of Her Majesty for the efforts it had already made, the delegacy at Tours desired again to press upon it the opportunity afforded by Mr. Odo Russell's Mission, and to urge it to endeavour to devise some solution which might prepare the way for peace, for which all parties were so anxious.

I told M. Tissot that I could only refer to the language which I had already held to him on this subject, and of which I have given your Excellency an account in my despatch of yesterday.

No. 293.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville—(Received November 23.)

(Extract.)

Tours, November 21, 1870.

M. DE CHAUDORDY told me this morning that the Delegation at Tours were extremely desirous of communicating with the Government at Paris before returning an answer to the Russian Circular respecting the Treaties of 1856.

The Delegation, however, abstained from applying for a safe-conduct for a person to enter Paris for this purpose, because they still hoped that they might receive through the neutral Powers a declaration of the assent of Count Bismarck to renew the negotiation of an armistice on the basis of a proportionate revictualling of Paris. If this hope should be fulfilled, the means of communicating with Paris would be given them as a matter of course. If, however, Count Bismarck should reject all overtures for an armistice on reasonable terms, the Delegation would probably be obliged to apply to the Prussian Head-quarters for a pass to enable them to send one of their members, or a person possessed of their confidence, to confer with the Government at Paris on the questions raised by the Russian Circular.

If no means of communicating with Paris could be found, the Delegation must, M. de Chaudordy said in conclusion, at last answer the Russian Circular on its own responsibility.

Earl Granville to Lord Bloomfield.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, November 23, 1870.

COUNT APPONYI told me, in conversation, that Prince Metternich has informed the Austrian Government that the Provisional Government at Tours had asked that Mr. Odo Russell might be instructed to endeavour to facilitate the conclusion of an armistice, and that Italy and Spain were ready to support that request.

If this were true, Count Apponyi said he was authorized by his Government to use his endeavours in the same sense.

I told his Excellency that, as I had already informed him, I had communicated to Count Bismarck, through Count Bernstorff, Lord Lyons' opinion that the French Government would not be exacting ("seraient coulants") if negotiations were resumed as to the time of the armistice, and as to the exact amount of provisions to be sent into Paris during its continuance.

I had informed Lord Lyons that Count Bismarck said that the proposals of M. Thiers were inadmissible, but that if the Provisional Government were really sincere in their desire for an armistice, and for the convocation of a Constituent Assembly, direct negotiations from that Government would be welcome at Versailles.

The Provisional Government had made no mention of Mr. Odo Russell, and it was evident that the Prussian Government, if negotiations were resumed, wished them to be direct. I knew nothing of Spain or Italy having taken any steps in the matter.

The day after this communication to Count Apponyi, M. Tissot suggested to me the expediency of instructing Mr. Russell to negotiate for an armistice; but as I had been positively informed by Count Bernstorff that a direct communication would be more likely to succeed, I have not acted upon the suggestion of the Provisional Government.

Earl Granville to Lord Bloomfield.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, November 23, 1870.

I AM anxious that Count Beust should not misunderstand the extent to which Her Majesty's Government have pronounced themselves on the question of territorial cession by France. They have never expressed an opinion to the French Government that its perseverance in maintaining the question of territorial entirety was a serious obstacle to peace. Their language on the subject has been strictly confined to the observation repeated by me to Count Apponyi—that the adherence to the formula of not giving up a stone of a fortress or an inch of territory was an obstacle to peace.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, November 23, 1870.

WHEN I saw M. Tissot yesterday, I asked him whether there was any truth in the report that M. de Chaudordy was going to the Prussian head-quarters at Versailles. He replied that he believed there was a question of his doing so, although he could give me no certain information.

I expressed a hope that M. de Chaudordy would not go with the same proposals as those upon which the negotiations with M. Thiers were broken off, as I believed that in that case much good could not be expected from the step; whereas if it were undertaken with a desire to consider all the possible alternatives of an armistice, it might lead to that most desirable result.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received November 29.)

My Lord,

Tours, November 25, 1870.

YOUR Lordship will have learnt from M. Thiers' Report, a copy of which was inclosed in my despatch of the 13th instant, that Count Bismarck suggested to him that the elections for a Constituent Assembly might take place without an armistice. The same suggestion was subsequently made to your Lordship in a message from Count Bismarck delivered to you by the Prussian Ambassador in London, and communicated by me to the Comte de Chaudordy on the 13th instant. On the following day M. de Chaudordy informed me in reply that the Government Delegation at Tours held to their declaration that elections were impossible without an armistice, and an armistice impossible without the revictualling of Paris. I reported to your Lordship what had passed on the subject in my despatch of the 14th instant.

Until to-day the Delegation here had no distinct information of the view taken by the Government at Paris of Count Bismarck's suggestion. This afternoon, however, a letter from M. Jules Favre dated the 19th instant was brought to M. de Chaudordy while I was with him.

M. de Chaudordy told me that M. Jules Favre wrote in this letter that the Members of the Government of National Defence were more than ever anxious to be delivered from the horrible burthen which had been on their shoulders since the 4th of September last, and were extremely desirous of convoking an Assembly as soon as possible. They were, M. Jules Favre affirmed, quite ready to conclude an armistice for this purpose, but they were unanimously of opinion that it would be impossible to hold the elections without an armistice, and altogether out of the question to consent to an armistice without stipulating for the revictualling of Paris.

Having listened to this announcement on the part of the Paris Government, I asked M. de Chaudordy what steps had been taken or would be taken by the Government respecting the fresh offer to receive a direct communication from them on the subject of an armistice, which had accompanied Count Bismarck's suggestion that the elections might take place without one.

M. de Chaudordy said that for the present the Government remained passive in the matter; that they continued to hope that Count Bismarck's views respecting the revictualling of Paris might be elicited by Mr. Odo Russell during his visit at Versailles, and that in the meantime it did not appear that anything could be done.

In answer to an observation from M. de Chaudordy, I told him that I had, as he had desired me, mentioned confidentially to your Lordship that he had expressed to me a hope that Mr. Odo Russell would ascertain Count Bismarck's present sentiments respecting an armistice. I reminded him, however, that Mr. Odo Russell's mission to Versailles related to an entirely different matter, and that it was very possible that Count Bismarck might not give him any information respecting the armistice.

I have already despatched a telegram to your Lordship to communicate to you the views of the French Government at Paris, as stated in the letter from M. Jules Favre to M. de Chaudordy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received December 3.)

My Lord,

Tours, November 28, 1870.

THE Comte de Chaudordy read to me yesterday a part of a Report from M. Tissot giving a detailed account of a conversation with your Lordship; and he went on to say that he was afraid that your Lordship threw the blame of the rupture of the negotiation for an armistice on France more than on Prussia.

I replied that this did not appear to me to be a fair inference from M. Tissot's report, and that certainly your Lordship had expressed no such opinion to me. Your Lordship had uniformly maintained that as regarded the actual conditions of the armistice, it was impossible for a neutral Power to be a competent judge of a matter which could not be determined without the full knowledge of their respective resources and necessities which the belligerents themselves could alone possess. Your Lordship

had indeed expressed unofficially an opinion that in the recent negotiation at Versailles both parties had been extreme in their demands, and regret that some compromise had not been found. You had moreover said to M. Tissot that you hoped that if M. de Chaudordy intended (as you had heard) to go to Versailles to reopen the negotiation, he would not simply renew the same proposals as those which had already failed, but would look in all directions for conditions by which the armistice, so much to be desired, might be rendered possible.

On M. de Chaudordy's returning to the subject this afternoon, I said that I had looked again at your Lordship's despatches and had found that the sketch I had given him yesterday from memory of your Lordship's language was in substance sufficiently accurate.

He said that the French Government were obliged to hold to the principle of the revictualling of Paris, but that as he had already told me more than once, they were disposed to be as conciliatory as possible with regard to the details, and even as to the number of days and the quantity of provisions.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 299.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received December 5.)

My Lord,

Tours, December 1, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith, extracted from the "Moniteur" of this day, a circular from the Comte de Chaudordy, dated the 12th ultimo, to French Representatives abroad concerning the armistice negotiation.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 299.

Circular addressed by M. de Chaudordy to French Representatives abroad.

Monsieur,

Tours, 12 Novembre, 1870.

VOUS aurez reçu la dépêche que j'ai adressée le 7 de ce mois à nos Agents à l'étranger, aussitôt que nous avons appris l'issue des négociations pour l'armistice. Depuis, je me suis empressé de vous transmettre la Circulaire, en date du 8, dans laquelle le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères expose si éloquemment la marche de ces négociations et la pensée du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale. Le Memorandum que M. Thiers a remis avant hier aux Représentants des Grandes Puissances neutres, conformément aux instructions qu'il avait reçues de Paris, et que je vous ai envoyé, vous a fait connaître avec la plus grande clarté possible, l'historique de la nouvelle mission dont il avait bien voulu se charger. Je ne reviendrai pas sur ces points si complètement traités.

Je désire aujourd'hui appeler votre attention sur les raisons qui ne nous ont pas permis d'accepter les propositions incidentes émises par M. le Comte de Bismarck, je veux dire l'armistice sans ravitaillement ou des élections sans armistice.

Le refus opposé par M. de Bismarck au ravitaillement de Paris étant la principale cause de rupture des négociations, nous nous trouvons naturellement amenés à rechercher si cette prétention du Cabinet de Berlin est légitime, et dans quel ordre d'idées s'étaient placés le Gouvernement Britannique et le Premier Ministre Prussien, lors des pourparlers qui ont précédé ces négociations. Il résulte de la dépêche adressée par Lord Granville à l'Ambassadeur d'Angleterre à Berlin, que cet armistice devait être purement militaire, et ne préjuger en rien les conditions de la paix future. Lord Granville se borne, en effet, à le considérer comme "appelé à favoriser la convocation d'une Assemblée Constituante et le rétablissement de la paix." De son côté M. de Bismarck, dans sa dépêche à M. de Bernstorff, en date du 21 du même mois, rappelait que le cabinet de Berlin avait "déclaré consentir à un armistice assez long pour qu'on puisse procéder à des élections régulières, et être disposé à laisser entrer librement à Paris tous les Députés de la France, ou sortir de la capitale les Députés de Paris, si l'Assemblée se réunissait dans une ville de province." C'était ainsi qu'avait été présentée la proposition de l'Angleterre et que nous l'avions comprise; il était évident que l'armistice s'appliquait à la réunion d'une Assemblée Nationale: or, s'il est difficile d'admettre, comme nous le démontrerons tout à l'heure, des élections sans armistice, est-il possible de comprendre un armistice sans ravitaillement?

Dans la langue du droit des gens, les termes ont une valeur qu'on ne peut pas dénaturer, et le principe d'un armistice accepté par M. de Bismarck implique nécessairement, quand il est question d'une place assiégée, le ravitaillement de cette place. Ce n'est pas là un objet de libre interprétation, mais bien une conséquence naturelle de l'expression même dont on s'est servi et que nous ne pouvions entendre dans un autre sens que celui qui est universellement adopté. Pour tous les peuples, en effet, la condition du ravitaillement est implicitement contenue dans le principe de l'armistice, puisque chaque belligérant doit se trouver, à la fin de la suspension d'hostilités, dans l'état où il se trouvait au commencement. Or, comment la France aurait-elle été dans la même situation, lorsque Paris, pendant vingt-cinq jours, aurait vu diminuer, dans une sensible mesure, la somme des ressources qui lui permettent de soutenir le siège ? M. de Bismarck a beau, dans sa dernière circulaire en date du 8 de ce mois, énumérer les bienfaits qui seraient résultés pour nous d'un armistice ainsi conclu ; n'est-il pas clair pour tout le monde que nous aurions été, au contraire, affaiblis dans des proportions redoutables ? Était-ce là véritablement le "*status quo* militaire" dont parle le Chancelier de l'Allemagne du Nord ? Quoi donc ! tandis que les Prussiens auraient maintenu leurs positions, nous aurions bénévolement altéré les moyens de conserver les nôtres ; nous aurions, il est vrai, gardé les munitions dont M. le Comte de Bismarck regrette, avec une commisération tout à fait désintéressée, le gaspillage inutile et incompréhensible (si bien compris cependant depuis deux mois par l'armée assiégeante) ; mais nous aurions abrégé, de notre plein gré, le temps précieux et irréparable pendant lequel il nous est permis de nous en servir avec une prodigalité qui ne nous cause aucune inquiétude. A ce compte, plus l'armistice eût été long, plus il nous eût été funeste, et si la Prusse en avait indéfiniment prolongé la durée, la prise de Paris, sans coup férir, eût été l'inévitable résultat de sa condescendance. Est-il nécessaire d'insister sur ce point, et nos ennemis ont-ils jamais pu croire que nous admettrions une condition qui eût été pour nous l'équivalent d'une défaite ? Ne nous trompons pas, c'est en vue de situations analogues que les principes ont été établis et reconnus. En voyant la Prusse se refuser à les admettre, poser comme une concession ce qui n'était, dans l'espèce, que l'application du droit le plus évident, considérer même le ravitaillement comme "une exigence s'écartant d'une façon insolite des usages militaires," nous avons lieu de nous demander si M. de Bismarck regarde la Prusse comme se trouvant en possession d'un droit des gens qui lui soit particulier, et qui n'a rien de commun avec celui des autres nations.

En n'acceptant pas la condition qui lui était imposée, indépendamment des autres motifs d'ordre supérieur qui lui inspiraient sa décision, le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale s'est donc borné à appliquer simplement les règles ordinaires du droit. De même qu'il avait dû comprendre, en consentant à l'armistice, que le ravitaillement de Paris en était la suite nécessaire, de même il a dû refuser d'y souscrire du moment qu'il s'est vu en présence d'une prétention étrange, qui ne pouvait amener qu'une situation dont les termes s'excluent ; séparer, en effet, l'idée du ravitaillement de celle de l'armistice, ce serait changer absolument le caractère de l'acte qu'on prétend conclure ; en un mot, ce ne serait plus faire un armistice.

Ainsi que le constate le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord, c'était "sur le désir des Puissances neutres" que la France avait déclaré "être prête à conclure un armistice ;" nous aimons à espérer que ces mêmes Puissances, dont la pensée était conforme aux vrais principes, et qui n'ont pu voir sans étonnement la Prusse substituer arbitrairement son appréciation personnelle à celle qui leur était suggérée à elles-mêmes par le droit des gens, ne négligeront pas de faire ressortir aux yeux du Comte de Bismarck la singulière contradiction qui a coupé court aux négociations dont elles ont pris l'initiative, et qu'elles chercheront à pénétrer les causes d'une divergence qui les a amenées à se trouver sur un terrain si différent de celui où M. de Bismarck a prétendu se placer.

Quant à nous, fidèles aux règles du droit, nous restons dans les mêmes dispositions qu'au moment où les négociations ont été entamées, et nous nous maintenons sur la base de l'armistice avec le ravitaillement qui en est la conséquence naturelle, et des élections générales sur toute l'étendue de notre territoire.

Je viens à la seconde proposition indiquée par M. de Bismarck dans les entretiens de Versailles. Le Premier Ministre Prussien a paru penser que des élections pourraient avoir lieu sans qu'il fût nécessaire de conclure un armistice, et nous avons lieu de croire qu'il est disposé à répondre en ce sens aux Puissances neutres, et à opposer cette opinion comme un argument à leurs nouvelles démarches. Vous savez déjà que le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale n'a pas cru devoir y souscrire, mais il importe que vous soyez fixé sur les motifs de cette décision. Il suffit, pour les apprécier, d'envisager à la fois notre situation présente et les conditions nécessaires pour que des élections soient possibles en même temps que libres et vraiment sérieuses. La France est en ce moment en armes sur tous les points de son territoire, dont une partie est occupée par les armées étrangères. Absorbée par le

noble souci de sa défense, animée d'une ardeur que justifie l'étendue des périls qui la menacent, elle doit, pour accomplir l'œuvre à laquelle sa volonté consacre un effort suprême, ne se laisser distraire par aucune autre préoccupation ; réserver enfin tous ses ressources, aussi bien que toute l'énergie de son intelligence et de son cœur, à la tâche difficile qui lui est imposée et qui n'est pas au-dessus de son indomptable courage. Disséminés, soit dans d'armée régulière, soit en des corps séparés, soit dans des bataillons de tirailleurs, tous les hommes valides se trouvent sous les drapeaux. En un mot, les électeurs, ou du moins un très-grand nombre, sont engagés dans la lutte et dispersés loin de leurs foyers ou même de leurs départements.

En cette situation, un vote pourrait-il avoir lieu dans un pays de suffrage universel ? M. de Bismarck sait aussi bien que nous qu'il faut un peu de temps et de sécurité. Un armistice est nécessaire pour permettre aux esprits de retrouver un calme temporaire, et, en quelque sorte, aux éléments de suffrage universel de se reconnaître. Une Assemblée appelée à une mission si grave, et qui doit être l'expression de la pensée du pays en des circonstances si solennelles, ne s'improvise pas au milieu du bruit des armes et des inquiétudes continuelles. La nation a besoin de s'interroger et de se recueillir, lorsqu'il s'agit de prononcer sur sa destinée et de résoudre des problèmes qui engagent à la fois son présent et son avoir. Faut-il ajouter que, dans l'état actuel des choses, le Gouvernement se trouvant dans Paris, et la capitale ne pouvant se mettre en communication régulière et suivie avec les électeurs, il pourrait manquer à un vote ainsi exprimé le caractère de manifestation nationale qui doit en assurer l'incontestable valeur.

Le Gouvernement Français souhaite vivement les élections. En mettant la nation dans la pleine possession de ses droits, elles contribueront à aplanir les difficultés, et à amener une pacification qui n'a jamais cessé d'être l'objet de ses vœux les plus chers. Sur ce point, les dénégations de M. de Bismarck, dans sa dernière circulaire, ne sauraient faire illusion à personne. Mais en même temps il est nécessaire que les élections s'accomplissent dans des conditions aussi régulières que possible.

Telles sont, Monsieur, les raisons graves qui, mûrement pesées par le Gouvernement, lui ont dicté sa résolution. Quelque grand que fût son désir de préparer les voies à un avenir meilleur, il ne pouvait ni compromettre la défense de Paris par une concession funeste, ni laisser faire des élections qui eussent pu ne pas être l'expression exacte du suffrage universel. Epuiser nos vivres ou perdre notre temps, c'eût été également livrer nos armes. Le Gouvernement de la Défense, qui siège à Paris, s'est trouvé unanime pour se refuser à une pareille transaction. Dans les graves instants où nous sommes, il ne convient pas qu'il reste une ombre sur les faits qui se produisent, et c'est pourquoi il faut que les conditions de la paix ou de la guerre soient conformes au droit, que le peuple Français, appelé dans ses comices, soit en mesure de s'y prononcer dans la plénitude de sa libre souveraineté, et nous avons la ferme confiance que les Puissances neutres, dans l'intérêt de tous, en jugeront comme nous.

Agréez, &c.

Pour le Ministre des Affaires Etrangères et par autorisation,

Le Délégué,

(Signé) CHAUDORDY.

(Translation.)

Monsieur,

Tours, December 12, 1870.

YOU will have received the despatch that I addressed on the 7th of this month to our representatives abroad, as soon as we learnt the result of the negotiations for an armistice. Since then, I lost no time in sending you the Circular dated the 8th instant, in which the Minister for Foreign Affairs eloquently sets forth the course of these negotiations and the view of the Government of National Defence. The memorandum that M. Thiers had the day before yesterday sent to the Representatives of the neutral Great Powers, in conformity with instructions he had received from Paris, and which I send you, has made known to you with the greatest clearness possible the history of the fresh mission which he was so good as to take upon himself. I will not again touch upon these points, which have been so completely explained.

I wish now to call your attention to the reasons which prevented us accepting the incidental propositions put forth by Count Bismarck, I mean an armistice without revictualling, or the elections without an armistice.

The refusal which Count Bismarck opposed to the revictualling of Paris was the chief cause of the rupture of the negotiations, and we are naturally led to examine whether this pretension of the Cabinet of Berlin is legitimate, and in what order of ideas the British Government and Prussian Prime Minister were placed, at the time of the pourparlers which preceded these negotiations. It seems from the despatch addressed by Lord Granville

to the English Ambassador at Berlin that this armistice was to be a purely military one, and was in no sense to prejudge the conditions of the future peace. Lord Granville, indeed, confines himself to consider it as "destined to aid the convocation of a Constituent Assembly and the re-establishment of peace." On his side M. de Bismarck, in his despatch to M. de Bernstorff, dated the 21st of the same month, observes that the Cabinet of Berlin had "declared to agree to an armistice long enough to allow the regular elections to be proceeded with, and to be disposed to let all the Deputies of France have a free entry into Paris, or the Deputies of Paris have a pass from the capital, should the Assembly meet in a provincial town." In such a sense England had put forth the proposition, and as such we understood it; it was evident that the Armistice applied to the reunion of the National Assembly. Now, if it is difficult to admit, as we shall presently show, elections without an armistice, is it possible to understand an armistice without revictualling?

In the language of the law of nations, the terms have a meaning which it is impossible to distort, and the principle of an armistice accepted by M. de Bismarck necessarily implies, when a besieged town is in question, the revictualling of that place. That is no object for free interpretation, but on the contrary a natural consequence of the very expression made use of and which can bear no other interpretation than the one universally adopted. For every nation, in fact, the condition of revictualling is implicitly contained in the principle of an armistice, since each belligerent should, at the end of the suspension of hostilities, be in the same state as at the commencement. Now, how could France be in the same condition, when Paris would for five-and-twenty days have seen her stock of resources, which enabled her to bear the siege, sensibly diminished? M. de Bismarck, in his Circular of the 8th of this month, enumerates in vain the benefits which would accrue to us from an armistice thus concluded; on the contrary, is it not clear to all the world that we should have been enfeebled to a great degree? Was this really then the military *status quo* of which the North German Chancellor speaks? What then! whilst the Prussians would have maintained their position, we should have benevolently thrown away the means of keeping our own; it is true we should have saved the munitions of war, whose useless and incomprehensible waste M. de Bismarck regrets with such disinterested commiseration (waste nevertheless so well understood for the last two months by the besieging army); but we should have shortened, of our own accord, the precious and irreparable time during which it is permitted us to make use of them with a prodigality which is no cause of inquietude to us. By this reckoning, the longer the armistice lasted, the more fatal to us it would have been, and if Prussia had indefinitely prolonged it, the capture of Paris, without a blow being struck for it, would be the inevitable result of her condescension. Is it necessary to persist upon this subject, and did our enemies ever dream that we should have agreed to a condition which to us would be the equivalent of a defeat? Do not let us be mistaken; it is in view of analogous situations that the principles have been established and recognized. In seeing Prussia refusing to admit them, laying down as a concession what was in substance but the application of the clearest right, even considering the revictualling as "an exigency deviating in an unusual manner from military customs." We were in a position to ask if M. de Bismarck looks upon Prussia as possessing a law of nations peculiar to herself, and which has nothing in common with that of other nations.

In declining the condition which was imposed, independently of the other motives of a higher order which prompted its decision, the Government of National Defence confined itself, therefore, to simply applying the ordinary rules of law. As they were bound to understand, in consenting to the armistice, that the revictualling of Paris was the necessary consequence, so were they bound to refuse to subscribe to it from the moment that they found themselves in presence of an unusual pretension, which could only lead to a situation the terms of which are out of the question; to separate, in fact, the idea of revictualling from that of the armistice would be to change entirely the character of the act they claim to conclude; in a word, it would be no longer an armistice.

As the Chancellor of the Confederation of the North shows, it was "on the desire of the neutral Powers" that France had declared "itself ready to conclude an armistice;" we like to hope that these same Powers, whose sentiments were in conformity with the true principles, and who could not have seen without astonishment Prussia arbitrarily substituting her personal opinion in the place of that which was suggested to them by the law of nations, will not neglect to set before the eyes of Count Bismarck the singular contradiction which has cut short the negotiations in which they took the initiative, and that they will seek to fathom the reasons of a divergence which has led them to find themselves on a footing so different from that on which M. de Bismarck professed to take his stand.

As regards ourselves, faithful to the rules of law, we remain in the same dispositions

as at the moment when the negotiations were begun, and we maintain ourselves on the basis of the armistice with revictualling, which is its natural consequence, and of general elections throughout the whole extent of our territory.

I come to the second proposition pointed out by M. de Bismarck in the interviews of Versailles.

The Prussian Prime Minister appeared to think that elections could take place without it being necessary to conclude an armistice, and we have reason to believe that he is disposed to answer the neutral Powers in this sense, and to oppose this opinion as an argument to their recent steps. You already know that the Government of National Defence did not consider it its duty to subscribe to it, but it is important that you should be convinced of the motives for that decision. It is sufficient, to appreciate them, to consider at the same time the present condition and the conditions necessary to render the elections possible as well as free and really genuine.

France is at this moment in arms on all the points of her territory, part of which is occupied by foreign armies. Absorbed by the noble care of her defence, animated by an ardour which is justified by the magnitude of the perils which menace her, she ought, in order to accomplish the work to which her will devotes a supreme effort, not to allow herself to be distracted by any other pre-occupation; to reserve, in fact, all her resources, as well as all the energy of her intelligence and of her heart, for the difficult task which is imposed on her, and which is not above her indomitable courage. Distributed either in the regular army, or in separate corps, or in battalions of riflemen, all able-bodied men are with the colours. In a word, the electors, or at least a very great number, are engaged in the struggle and dispersed far from their homes or even from their departments.

In this situation could a vote take place in a country of universal suffrage? M. de Bismarck knows as well as we that a little time and security are necessary. An armistice is necessary to allow minds to recover a temporary calm, and, in some manner, the elements of universal suffrage to organize themselves. An Assembly called for so grave a mission, and which ought to be the expression of the sentiment of the country in such solemn circumstances, is not improvised in the midst of the noise of arms and of continual uneasiness. The nation has need of interrogating itself and of collecting itself, when it is a question of pronouncing on its fate and of solving problems which compromise at once its present and its future. Is it necessary to add that, in the present state of things, the Government being in Paris, and the capital being unable to place herself in regular and connected communication with the electors, there might be wanting in a vote thus expressed the character of national manifestation which should guarantee its inestimable value.

The French Government eagerly desires the elections. In placing the nation in full possession of its rights they will help to level the difficulties and lead to a pacification which has never ceased to be the object of their dearest wishes. On this point the denials of M. de Bismarck in his last Circular could deceive no one. But at the same time it is necessary that the elections should be accomplished under conditions as regular as possible.

Such are, Sir, the grave reasons which, carefully weighed by the Government, have dictated their resolution. However great their desire was to prepare the way to a better future, they could neither compromise the defence of Paris by a fatal concession, nor allow elections to take place which might not be the exact expression of universal suffrage. To exhaust our provisions or to lose our time, both would equally be a surrender of our arms. The Government of Defence which sits at Paris was unanimous in refusing such a transaction. In the important moments we are now in, it is not proper that a shadow should rest on the facts which take place, and it is for this reason necessary that the conditions of peace or of war should be conformable to law; that the French people called in their Assemblies should be ready to pronounce upon them in the plenitude of their free sovereignty, and we have the firm conviction that the neutral Powers in the interest of all, will think like us.

Agree, &c.

For the Minister for Foreign Affairs, and by authorization,

The Delegate,

(Signed) CHAUDORDY.

No. 300.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received December 5.)

My Lord,

Tours, December 2, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the "Moniteur Universel," a circular from M. Jules Favre, dated the 21st ultimo, relating to the armistice negotiations.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 300.

Circular addressed by M. Jules Favre to French Representatives abroad.

Monsieur,

Paris, le 21 Novembre, 1870.

VOUS avez eu certainement connaissance de la Circulaire par laquelle M. le Comte de Bismarck explique le refus opposé par la Prusse aux conditions de ravitaillement proportionnel que comportait naturellement la proposition d'armistice émanée des Puissances neutres. Ce document rend une rectification d'autant plus nécessaire que, par une préoccupation très-conforme d'ailleurs à toute sa politique antérieure, le Représentant de la Prusse y a négligé des faits importants, dont l'omission ne pourrait manquer d'induire l'opinion publique en erreur.

En lisant son travail, on doit croire que M. Thiers a demandé au nom du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale l'ouverture d'une négociation, et que la Prusse l'a acceptée par un sentiment d'égards pour le caractère personnel de notre Envoyé, et par le désir d'arriver, s'il était possible, à une conciliation.

Le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord paraît oublier—et il est indispensable de le rappeler—que la proposition d'armistice sur laquelle M. Thiers est venu conférer appartient aux Puissances neutres, et que l'une d'elles a bien voulu faire auprès de la Prusse la démarche qui a donné à notre négociateur l'occasion d'entrer en pourparlers. Ce bon office n'était point un fait isolé. Dès le 20 Octobre, Lord Granville adressait à Lord A. Loftus une dépêche communiquée au Cabinet de Berlin, et dans laquelle il exposait, avec une grande autorité, les raisons d'intérêt Européen qui devaient amener la cessation de la guerre.

Parlant de la continuation du siège et de l'éventualité de la prise de Paris, le chef du Foreign Office disait :—" Il n'est pas déraisonnable de mettre dans la balance les avantages et les désavantages qui accompagneront un tel fait, et ces désavantages touchent tellement au sentiment de l'humanité que le Gouvernement de la Reine se croit obligé les signaler au Roi et à ses Ministres. Le souvenir amer des trois derniers mois peut être un jour effacé par le temps et par le sentiment de la bravoure de l'ennemi sur les champs de bataille.

" Mais il y a des degrés dans l'amertume ; et la probabilité d'une guerre nouvelle et irréconciliable sera considérablement augmentée si toute une génération de Français a devant les yeux le spectacle de la destruction d'une capitale, accompagnée de la mort de personnes sans armes, de la destruction de trésors d'art et de science, de souvenirs historiques d'un prix inestimable, impossibles à remplacer. Une telle catastrophe sera terrible pour la France et dangereuse pour la paix future de l'Europe ; en même temps, elle ne sera, comme le Gouvernement de la Reine le croit, à personne plus pénible qu'à l'Allemagne et à ses Princes. Le Gouvernement Français a décliné les négociations de paix depuis l'entrevue de M. de Bismarck et de M. Jules Favre ; mais le Gouvernement de la Reine a pris sur lui d'insister auprès du Gouvernement Provisoire pour qu'il consente à un armistice qui pourrait aboutir à la convocation d'une Assemblée constituante, et au rétablissement de la paix. Le Gouvernement de la Reine n'a pas omis de faire sentir à Paris la nécessité de faire toutes les concessions compatibles, dans la situation actuelle, avec l'honneur de la France.

" Le Gouvernement de la Reine ne se croit pas autorisé à l'affirmer, mais il ne peut pas croire que les représentations faites par lui resteront sans effet. Pendant cette guerre, deux causes morales ont, à un degré incalculable, servi l'immense puissance matérielle des Allemands : ils ont combattu pour repousser l'invasion étrangère, et affirmer le droit d'une grande nation à se constituer de la manière la plus propre à développer ses aptitudes. La gloire de leurs efforts sera rehaussée si l'histoire peut dire que le Roi a épuisé tous les moyens pour rétablir la paix, et que les conditions de paix étaient justes, modérées, en harmonie avec la politique et les sentiments de notre époque."

Au moment où le Ministre Anglais tenait ce langage à la Prusse, son Ambassadeur insistait à Tours sur les mêmes considérations, sans jamais mettre en doute que l'armistice ne dût être nécessairement accompagné du ravitaillement. Il m'est permis d'ajouter que sur ce point, qui a été le seul objet du débat, l'opinion du Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord ne pouvait être différente, puisqu'il avait eu connaissance de la mission officieuse du Général Burnside, auquel il avait parlé d'un armistice sans ravitaillement que le Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale n'avait pu accepter.

C'était donc dans les termes du droit commun, c'est-à-dire, avec un ravitaillement proportionnel à la durée, que l'Angleterre conseillait l'armistice ; c'est aussi dans ces termes qu'il fût compris par les autres Puissances, et directement proposé à la Prusse par une correspondance et des télégrammes auxquels elle adhéra. Dans sa conférence avec les membres du Gouvernement, le 30 Octobre, M. Thiers n'admettait pas que cette condition put être contestée en principe ; seulement, il avait l'ordre, auquel il s'est certainement conformé, de ne point être trop rigoureux pour son application. Aussi est-ce par erreur que le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord affirme qu'il aurait déclaré "ne pouvoir accepter un armistice que si l'on y comprenait la faculté pour Paris de s'approvisionner sur une grande échelle." Cette assertion est inexacte.

Les chiffres d'une consommation journalière et modérée avaient été minutieusement arrêtés par le Ministre du Commerce, et seuls ils servaient de base à notre réclamation, strictement limitée au nombre de jours de l'armistice. En cela nous étions d'accord avec l'usage et l'équité, avec l'intention des Puissances neutres, et, nous le croyions, avec l'intention de la Prusse elle-même. Peut-être n'eût-elle pas songé à le retirer sans la reddition de Metz et sans la funeste journée du 31 Octobre, accueillie par elle avec une satisfaction mal dissimulée.

Le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord insiste sur les inconvénients auxquels l'armistice exposait l'armée assiégeante. Mais il ne tient pas compte de ceux bien autrement graves du non-ravitaillement pour la ville assiégée. Ces inconvénients sont tels qu'ils rendraient dérisoire la convocation d'une Assemblée, réduite forcément à l'impuissance à l'heure de ses délibérations, et condamnée par la plus dure des nécessités à subir la loi du vainqueur. L'armistice sans ravitaillement, pour faire statuer au bout d'un mois sur la paix ou sur la guerre, n'était donc ni équitable ni sérieux ; il n'était pour nous qu'une déception et un péril.

J'en dis autant de la convocation d'une Assemblée sans armistice. S'il avait cru une pareille combinaison compatible avec la défense, le Gouvernement l'aurait adoptée avec joie. La Prusse peut lui reprocher "de n'avoir pas voulu laisser l'opinion du peuple Français s'exprimer librement par l'élection d'une représentation nationale." Le besoin de diviser et d'affaiblir la résistance du pays explique suffisamment cette accusation. Mais quel homme de bonne foi voudra l'admettre ? Qui ne sent l'immense intérêt qu'ont les membres du Gouvernement à écarter la terrible responsabilité que les événements et le vote de Paris font peser sur leur tête ? Ils ont constamment cherché, avec le désir ardent de réussir, les moyens les plus efficaces d'amener la convocation d'une Assemblée, qui était et qui est encore leur vœu le plus cher.

C'est dans ce but que j'abordai M. le Comte de Bismarck à Ferrières. Je laisse à la conscience publique le soin de juger de quel côté ont été les obstacles, et si le Gouvernement doit être dénoncé au blâme de l'Europe pour n'avoir pas voulu placer les Députés de la France sous le canon d'un fort livré à l'armée Prussienne. Une convocation sans armistice nous aurait, il est vrai, épargné cette humiliation ; mais elle nous en aurait encore réservé de cruelles. Les élections auraient été livrées au caprice de l'ennemi, aux hasards de la guerre, à des impossibilités matérielles énervant notre action militaire et ruinant d'avance l'autorité morale des mandataires du pays. Et cependant nous sentions si énergiquement le besoin de nous effacer devant les représentants réguliers de la France, que nous eussions bravé ces difficultés inextricables, si, en descendant au fond de nos consciences, nous n'y avions trouvé, impérieux, inflexible, supérieur à tout intérêt personnel, ce grand et suprême devoir de l'honneur à sauvegarder et de la défense à maintenir intacte.

Nous avons maudit et condamné cette guerre ; quand des désastres inouïs dans l'histoire ont mis en poussière ses criminels instigateurs, nous avons invoqué, pour la faire cesser, les lois de l'humanité, les droits du peuples, la nécessité d'assurer le repos de l'Europe, offrant d'y concourir par de justes sacrifices. On a voulu nous imposer ceux que nous ne pouvions accepter ; et la Prusse a continué la lutte, non pour défendre son territoire, mais pour conquérir le nôtre. Elle a porté dans plusieurs de nos départements le ravage et la mort ; elle investit depuis plus de deux mois notre capitale, qu'elle menace de bombardement et de famine, et c'est pour couronner ce système scientifique de violence qu'elle nous convie à réunir une Assemblée, élue en partie dans ses camps, et appelée à discuter paisiblement quand gronde le canon de la bataille !

Le Gouvernement n'a pas cru une telle combinaison réalisable. Elle le condamnait à discontinuer la défense ; et discontinuer la défense sans armistice régulier, c'était y renoncer. Or, quel est le citoyen Français qui ne s'indigne à cette idée ? le pays tout entier proteste contre elle. On lui demande de voter, — il fait mieux, il s'arme. Nos soldats, victorieux sur la Loire, effacent par leur généreux sang les hontes de l'Empire. Paris, dont la Prusse devait forcer l'enceinte en quelques jours, résiste depuis plus de deux mois, et il demeure plus que jamais résolu, après l'avoir rendue inexpugnable. Ses chefs militaires, que la trahison de Sedan avait laissés sans ressources, ont dû improviser une armée et son matériel, former la garde mobile, organiser la garde nationale. Leurs travaux ne seront pas stériles ; et dans cette crise suprême, que nous avons essayé de conjurer par tous les moyens que l'honneur commandait, nous avons la certitude que chacun fera son devoir.

Le Gouvernement n'a donc pas, comme l'en accuse le Chancelier de la Confédération du Nord, cherché à se concilier l'appui de l'Europe en paraissant se prêter à une négociation qu'il avait en réalité le dessein de rompre. Il repousse hautement une pareille imputation. Il a accepté avec reconnaissance l'intervention des Puissances neutres, et s'est loyalement efforcé de la faire réussir dans les termes que l'une d'elles avait indiqués en rappelant dans son télégramme "les sentiments de justice et d'humanité auxquels la Prusse devait se conformer." A cette heure suprême il s'en remettrait volontiers au jugement de ceux dont la voix bienveillante n'a point été écoutée. Ce n'est pas d'eux que lui viendrait un conseil de défaillance.

Après lui avoir donné son appui moral, ils estimeront qu'il continue à le mériter en défendant énergiquement le principe qu'ils ont posé ; il est prêt à convoquer une Assemblée, si un armistice avec ravitaillement le lui permet. Mais il faut qu'il soit bien entendu qu'en le refusant, la Prusse, malgré toutes ses déclarations contraires, cherche à augmenter nos embarras en nous empêchant de consulter la France ; c'est donc à elle seule que doit être renvoyée la responsabilité d'une rupture démontrant une fois de plus qu'elle est déterminée à tout braver pour faire triompher sa politique de conquête violente et de domination Européenne.

Je crois, Monsieur, avoir exactement traduit les sentiments qui ont inspiré le Gouvernement, et je vous prie de vous en pénétrer lorsque vous serez appelé à vous en expliquer.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Paris, November 21, 1870.

YOU have doubtless seen the Circular in which Count Bismarck explains the refusal made by Prussia to the conditions of proportionate revictualling which the proposition of an armistice emanating from the neutral Powers naturally entailed. This document renders a correction so much the more necessary as, by a prepossession quite conformable moreover to all his former policy, the Representative of Prussia has neglected in it some important facts, the omission of which could not fail in leading public opinion into error.

In reading his report, one is bound to believe that M. Thiers asked, in the name of the Government of National Defence, for the opening of a negotiation, and that Prussia accepted it from a feeling of regard for the personal character of our envoy, and by the desire of arriving, if it were possible, at a conciliation.

The Chancellor of the Confederation of the North appears to forget—and it is indispensable to recall it—that the proposition of an armistice, on which M. Thiers came to confer, belongs to the neutral Powers, and that one of them was good enough to take towards Prussia the step which gave to our negotiator an opportunity of entering into communications. This good office was not an isolated fact. On the 20th October Lord Granville addressed to Lord A. Loftus a despatch communicated to the Cabinet of Berlin, in which he set forth, with great authority, the reasons of European interest which ought to lead to a cessation of the war.

Speaking of the continuation of the siege, and of the eventuality of the capture of Paris, the Chief of the Foreign Office said, "It is not unreasonable to compare with its advantages the prospective disadvantages which may ensue ; and the fact that some of these touch the feelings of mankind as much as their reason does not discourage Her Majesty's Government from laying them before the King and his advisers. The bitter recollection of the past three months may be effaced by time and by a sense of the conduct and valour of the enemy in the field.

"There are degrees of exasperation ; and the probability of a fresh and irreconcilable war must be greatly increased if a generation of Frenchmen behold the spectacle of the destruction of a capital, a spectacle associated with the deaths of large numbers of helpless

and unarmed persons, and the destruction of treasures of arts, sciences, and historical association of inestimable value, and incapable of being replaced.

"Frightful as such a catastrophe would be to France, and dangerous as I believe it would be to the chances of future peace to Europe, Her Majesty's Government believe that to none would it be more painful than to Germany and its rulers.

"The French Government have, since the meeting of Count Bismarck and M. Favre, declined to propose negotiations for peace, but Her Majesty's Government have assumed the responsibility of urging the Provisional Government to agree to an armistice, which might lead to the convocation of a Constituent Assembly and the re-establishment of peace. Her Majesty's Government have not omitted to represent to Paris the necessity of making every concession compatible with the honour of France under the present circumstances of the war.

"Her Majesty's Government are not authorized to say so, but they cannot believe that the representations made by them will remain without effect. During this war two moral causes have aided immensely the great material power of the Germans. They have been fighting to repel the threat of foreign invasion, and to assert the right of a great country to constitute itself in the way most conducive to the full development of its resources.

"The glory of these efforts will be increased if it can be truly said in history that the King of Prussia had exhausted every attempt for peace, and that the conditions of peace were just, moderate, and in accordance with true policy and the sentiments of the age."

At the time that the English minister held this language to Prussia, the English ambassador insisted at Tours on the same considerations, without ever placing in doubt that the armistice ought necessarily to be accompanied by re-victualling.

I may be allowed to add that on this point, which has been the sole subject of discussion, the opinion of the Chancellor of the Confederation of the North could not be different, since he was aware of the officious mission of General Burnside, to whom he spoke of an armistice without re-victualling, which the Government of National Defence had been unable to accept.

It was then in the terms of international law, that is to say, with a re-victualling proportionate to the duration, that England counselled the armistice; it is also in those terms that it was understood by the other Powers, and directly proposed to Prussia by a correspondence and telegrams, to which she adhered. In his conference with the members of the Government on the 30th of October, M. Thiers did not admit that that condition could be contested in principle, only he had the order, to which he certainly conformed, not to be too rigorous as to its application. It is also in error that the Chancellor of the Confederation of the North affirms that he declared "he was unable to accept an armistice unless it comprised the power of Paris provisioning itself on a large scale." This assertion is inexact. The amount of a daily and moderate consumption had been minutely drawn up by the Minister of Commerce, and that alone served as a basis for our demand, strictly limited to the number of days of the armistice. On that we were agreed with custom and equity, with the intention of the neutral Powers, and, we believe, with the intention of Prussia herself. Perhaps she would not have dreamt of retracting it but for the surrender of Metz, and but for the fatal day of the 31st of October, received by her with an ill-dis-simulated satisfaction.

The Chancellor of the Confederation of the North insists on the inconveniences to which an armistice would expose the besieging army, but he does not take into account the far graver one of non-revictualling for the besieged town. These inconveniences are such that they would render derisive the convocation of an Assembly, forcibly reduced to incapacity at the moment of its deliberation, and condemned by the hardest of necessities to suffer the law of the conqueror. The armistice without re-victualling, to determine at the end of the month on peace or war, was therefore neither equitable nor serious; it was for us but a deception and a danger.

I say the same of the convocation of an Assembly without an armistice. If they had thought such a combination compatible with the defence the Government would have adopted it with joy. Prussia may reproach them "of not having been willing to allow the opinion of the French people to express itself freely by the election of a national representation." The need to divide and to weaken the resistance of the country sufficiently explains that accusation. But what man of good faith will be willing to admit it? Who does not perceive the immense interest which the members of the Government have to remove the terrible responsibility which events and the vote of Paris cause to weigh on their heads? They have constantly sought, with the ardent desire to succeed, the most efficacious means to bring about the convocation of an Assembly, which was and still is their dearest wish.

It was with this aim that I met Count Bismarck at Ferrières. I leave to the conscience of the public the task of judging on which side were the obstacles, and if the Government ought to be denounced to the censure of Europe for not having wished to place the Deputies of France under the cannon of a fort delivered over to the Prussian army. A convocation without an armistice would, it is true, have spared us that humiliation; but it would have yet reserved for us some cruel humiliations. The elections would have been given up to the caprice of the enemy, to the hazards of the war, to material impossibilities enervating our military action, and ruining beforehand the moral authority of the Representatives of the country. And yet we felt so fully the need of retiring in favour of the regular Representatives of France, that we would have braved these inextricable difficulties if, in sounding the depths of our consciences, we had not found there, imperious, inflexible, superior to every personal interest, that grand and supreme duty of preserving honour and of maintaining the defence intact.

We have censured and condemned this war: when disasters unheard of in history brought to the dust its criminal instigators, we invoked, in order to terminate it, the laws of humanity, the right of nations, the necessity of assuring the repose of Europe, offering to further them by just sacrifices. Those which we could not accept, were sought to be imposed upon us, and Prussia has continued the struggle, not to defend her territory but to conquer ours. She has carried into several of our Departments rapine and death; she invests for more than two months our capital, which she threatens with bombardment and starvation; and it is to crown this scientific system of violence that she invites us to invoke an Assembly, elected partly in her camps, and called to discuss peacefully, when the cannon is thundering!

The Government did not believe such a combination capable of being realized. She condemns them to discontinue the defence; and to discontinue the defence without a regular armistice would be to renounce it. Now, what French citizen is there who is not indignant at this idea? The whole country protests against it. It is asked to vote; it does better, it arms. Our soldiers, victorious on the Loire, efface by their generous blood the disgraces of the Empire. Paris, whose enceinte Prussia was to force in a few days, resists during more than two months, and remains more resolute than ever, after having made it unassailable. Her military chiefs, whom the treason of Sedan had left without resources, have to improvise an army and its material, to form the garde mobile, to organize the national guard. Their labours will not be sterile: and in this supreme crisis, which we have endeavoured to avoid by all the means which honour dictated, we have the conviction that every one will do his duty.

The Government has not then, as the Chancellor of the Confederation of the North accuses it of doing, sought to conciliate the support of Europe by appearing to lend itself to a negotiation which they really designed to break off. They loudly repelled such an imputation. They accepted with gratitude the intervention of the neutral Powers, and loyally did all in their power to make it succeed in the terms which one of them had indicated in calling to mind in its telegram "the sentiments of justice and humanity to which Prussia ought to conform." At this supreme hour they would willingly put it to the judgment of those whose benevolent voice has not been listened to. It is not from them that a counsel of weakness would come.

After having given to them their moral support, they will consider that they merit it by energetically defending the principle they have laid down; they are ready to convoke an Assembly, if an armistice with revictualling will permit them. But it is necessary that it should be well understood that in refusing it, Prussia, notwithstanding all the declarations to the contrary, seeks to increase our embarrassment in preventing us from consulting France: it is therefore on her alone that the responsibility of a rupture should recoil, demonstrating once more that she is determined on braving everything in order to cause her policy of violent conquest and of European domination to triumph.

I believe I have, Sir, exactly interpreted the feelings which have inspired the Government, and I beg you to make yourself thoroughly acquainted with them when you are called upon to explain them.

No. 301.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received December 5.)

(Extract.)

Berlin, December 3, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith, in translation, a Royal Edict signed by the King of Prussia, publishing the law, with the assent of the Federal

Council and of the Federal Parliament, authorizing a loan of 100,000,000 dollars for the extraordinary war expenses.

I am informed that negotiations have taken place with certain capitalists in London for their participation in this loan.

Inclosure in No. 301.

Royal Decree.

(Translation.)

NORTH GERMAN CONFEDERATION.

Law respecting the Additional Supplies for carrying on the War, of November 29, 1870.

WE, William, by the Grace of God, &c., decree in the name of the North German Confederation, with the concurrence of the Federal Council and Parliament, as follows:—

§ 1. The Federal Chancellor is empowered, in order to meet the extraordinary outlay for the military and naval service on account of the war, in addition to the amount of 120,000,000 thalers fixed by the law of July 21, 1870 (Federal Law, page 491), to take a further credit of 100,000,000 thalers, and to issue Treasury bonds bearing interest in accordance with the Law of July 19, 1868 (Federal Law, page 339), for such nominal amount as may be necessary for the providing of 100,000,000 thalers.

§ 2. The terms of the Treasury bonds may be fixed at a longer period than a year, and special interest coupons may be granted for the same by order of the Federal Chancellor.

The Exchequer bills and Treasury bonds to be issued as well as the interest coupons attached to them may be made payable altogether, or in part, in foreign value, or also on a fixed scale, at the same time, in home or foreign values.

The fixing of the relative value, as well as the other arrangements for payment, allowed will be settled by the Federal Chancellor.

Lastly, the provisions of the Law of July 21, 1870 (Federal Law, page 491), take effect as regards the loan and Treasury bonds.

Given under Our august hand with the Federal Seal attached.

Given at Head-quarters, Versailles, November 29, 1870.

(L.S.)

WILLIAM.

(Signed)

COUNT VON BISMARCK-SCHONHAUSEN.

No. 302.

Earl Granville to Mr. Odo Russell.

Sir,

Foreign Office, December 5, 1870.

I HAVE informed Count Bernstorff that the Government at Paris are still of opinion that there can be no armistice without revictualling, and no Assembly without an armistice; but that the time of an armistice might be shortened, and the details of the revictualling might be arranged. In that case the French Government would immediately proceed to the elections. I told his Excellency that the shade of difference between this and the last proposal which I asked Count Bernstorff to forward to Count Bismarck, and which was rejected by the latter, was hardly sufficient to encourage me to place it before his Excellency.

But it was possible, although I was not authorized to say so, that while treating for an armistice negotiations might be begun for a peace, on conditions which M. Favre (after his declarations) would not sign, but which he might prepare for the signature of others.

Count Bernstorff asked me on what conditions it was possible that M. Favre might be disposed to treat. I replied, that I had no authority to mention any.

I send this for your information, in case Count Bismarck speaks to you on the subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

GRANVILLE

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received December 8.)

My Lord,

Tours, December 4, 1870.

I HAD the honour to report to your Lordship that the Comte de Chaudordy had expressed a hope that Mr. Odo Russell would, while at Versailles, ascertain what Count Bismarck's real views were about an armistice, and whether he was willing to consent to the re-victualling of Paris on any terms which could possibly be accepted. In my despatch of the 25th ultimo I informed your Lordship that M. de Chaudordy had returned to the subject, and that I had reminded him that Mr. Russell's Mission to Versailles related to an entirely different matter, and that it was very possible that Count Bismarck might not give him any information respecting the armistice. Your Lordship was moreover so good as to inform me in your despatch of the 17th ultimo that M. Tissot had, on behalf of M. de Chaudordy, represented to you that the presence of Mr. Odo Russell at the King of Prussia's Head-Quarters might afford the Cabinet of London facilities for a combination which might admit of a negotiation on the principles of an armistice.

M. de Chaudordy told me yesterday that he had just received a despatch from Paris, dated the 29th ultimo, which showed that the suggestions which he had made respecting Mr. Odo Russell's visit to Versailles were entirely in accordance with the views of M. Jules Favre. He went on to say that, in this despatch, M. Jules Favre urged strongly that Her Majesty's Government should take advantage of the means of communicating with the Prussian Authorities which were afforded by Mr. Russell's Mission, and should endeavour to obtain for France an armistice based on a proportionate revictualling of Paris.

M. de Chaudordy begged me to communicate this request from M. Jules Favre without any loss of time to your Lordship, and I accordingly dispatched a telegram to you on the subject as soon as possible after I left him.

This afternoon M. de Chaudordy spoke to me again of Mr. Odo Russell's visit to Versailles, and expressed an earnest desire to know with the least possible delay whether anything had passed between him and the Prussian Authorities respecting an armistice. I promised M. de Chaudordy to inquire at once of your Lordship, and accordingly addressed a telegram to you immediately.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 9, 1870.

I HAVE to state to your Excellency that I have been informed by Count Bernstorff that he has received a telegram from Count Bismarck, in which he states that it is impossible to consent to an armistice on the basis of the revictualling of Paris, and in which he further observes that any armistice agreed to without preliminaries of peace would be attended with no advantage, since the elections, in whatever way conducted, could take place without an armistice being previously arranged.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 10, 1870.

M. TISSOT has communicated to me the substance of a despatch from M. de Chaudordy dated the 6th instant, and instructing him earnestly to press for the good offices of the British Government.

M. Tissot is directed to recall to my recollection the ancient relations of friendship subsisting between England and France, their alliance during one of the last great wars, their Treaties of Commerce conceived under the idea of an intimate union, and to remind me how much the fate and future of England depended on those of France.

M. de Chaudordy is anxious that the idea of an armistice, coupled with the revictualling of Paris, should be again brought forward, in order that France might proceed with elections; and he applies for more effective co-operation on the part of the Powers on whom France has some right to, or hope that she may, rely.

M. de Chaudordy observes that the fate of Europe is involved in the course to be taken. If the Powers would depart from the state of isolation in which each has entrenched itself, it would be possible at the present time to exert a combined action of considerable importance, and calculated to avert the misfortunes which are preparing for Europe at no distant day. His Excellency had already spoken to you in that sense, and M. Tissot was to hold the same language to me, and to report as soon as possible the answer that he received.

M. Tissot has also informed me that in a telegram dated the 8th instant, M. de Chaudordy dwelt upon the necessity which made it now more urgent than ever for the great Powers to interfere officiously in the existing war.

Prussia having requested England to propose to France to take part in the Conference, it was but natural that the means of doing so should be afforded to her. It would be very difficult for the French nation to admit that its Envoy should assist at the settlement of the question of the Black Sea, when its cities were in flames, their inhabitants slaughtered, and France deluged with blood. An armistice would render the part which France was invited to play one that she could accept; but that armistice was itself not to be accepted without a clause for revictualling according to the principles of martial law. No exception could be allowed in the case of Paris.

It is the duty of the European Powers to act: any longer delay in taking effectual steps would have the effect of creating for the Governments remorse, and for the peoples eternal regrets.

Austria and Italy were favourable to the demand for an armistice with revictualling, but the action of England would have the greatest weight, and Mr. Odo Russell's mission could not but render the task which she was requested to undertake more easy for her.

I have assured M. Tissot of the sympathy which Her Majesty's Government felt for France in the misfortunes to which she was now subject, and how earnestly they wished that they could contribute to the conclusion of a peace.

I told him that I had yesterday informed your Excellency by telegraph that Count Bernstorff had stated to me that Count Bismarck had replied to a message which at my request he had sent to him, that there could be no armistice with revictualling, and that an armistice would not be of much advantage, as elections could be held in any form without one; and that I had also informed you that Mr. Odo Russell was of opinion that there was no use in proposing temporizing expedients at Versailles.

I reminded M. Tissot that I had always insisted on the expediency of convoking an Assembly; that I did not pretend to advise as regarded internal affairs, but that in respect of international arrangements it seemed to be of great importance.

I said I was convinced that diplomatic representations from a portion of Europe would have no effect upon the decisions of Germany at this time; that the great struggle which has been continued during the last few weeks in the face of immense difficulties has shown the spirit and the power of endurance of the French people; and if the Provisional Government is of opinion that the continuation of the struggle cannot procure for the nation a better position, would it not be wise and patriotic for them at once to seek direct negotiation with the head-quarters at Versailles, or by the convocation of an Assembly to put themselves in the position to do so in a short time?

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 306.

Earl Granville to Mr. Odo Russell.

(Extract.)

Foreign Office, December 10, 1870.

I HAVE as yet entirely refrained from giving an opinion on the subject of the conditions of peace.

As regards mediation and good offices I have confined myself to saying that I should not offer them unless they were acceptable to both the belligerents, or were likely to be effective; but I have not restricted myself from giving advice to either party in case it should appear expedient.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 14, 1870.

YOUR Excellency has already acknowledged by telegraph the receipt of my despatch of the 10th instant, in which I recorded the answer which I had returned to M. Tissot to the appeal which he had been instructed by the Count de Chaudordy to make to Her Majesty's Government for their assistance in bringing about an armistice, and for effective aid in staying the progress of the war.

To guard against any possible misconception of the meaning intended to be conveyed by the last paragraph of that despatch, which is also identical with a passage in a private letter which I addressed to M. Tissot on the same day, I have to request your Excellency to make it clearly understood, if any question should arise as to the exact meaning of the paragraph in question, that it was not at all my intention to recommend to the French Government the acceptance of any particular conditions of peace.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 14, 1870.

M. TISSOT introduced to me yesterday M. Reitlinger, friend and Private Secretary to M. Jules Favre.

M. Reitlinger had left Paris not long ago in a balloon. He had come from Vienna through Germany. He addressed me with ability and great fervour, using arguments similar to those which have been urged before, that it was for our dignity and for our interest to come to the support of France, and to hold firm language to Germany, to be supported, if necessary, by arms. He said if England would do so he would take upon himself to guarantee that Prussia would yield, and on the other hand to promise to use all his influence with M. Favre and with the other members of the Government, to be moderate as to the conditions of peace.

I repeated the arguments which I had used with others making similar proposals, and ended by telling him that it was only friendly to him to let him understand that I believed mere diplomatic interference from a portion of Europe would not have any considerable influence on Prussia. Her Majesty's Government, while reserving a perfect liberty of action, did not think they would be justified in involving this country in the war.

After describing to him what we had done to remove the cause of war and to prevent it, I said that what advice I had taken the liberty of offering had not been found acceptable by the Provisional Government.

I had always dwelt upon the international advantage of France convoking an Assembly; that an Assembly, even if it did not represent those parts of France which were occupied by the Prussians, would give strength to the Government; that as objections were made as to the impossibility of holding elections during hostile operations; there was a suggestion which I had made some weeks since of treating the late Conseils-Généraux, elected by universal suffrage, as constituencies. He said such an Assembly would not now be considered as representing the present opinion of the people.

He suggested an armistice for ten days without revictualling. I said such a proposal would probably have been accepted by the Prussians a short time ago; that I doubted about it at present: but had he authority to make it? He said that he had not. But he concluded by saying that M. Tissot was right in telling him not to entertain illusions that England was prepared to support France in an effective manner. He asked whether it would be possible for him to get a safe-conduct into and out of Paris. I asked with what object he proposed to go there. He replied, with great earnestness, that it would be for the purpose of confirming M. Favre in his pacific desires, and to explain away the illusions about Europe which the Government still entertained. Upon which I sent a note to the following effect to Count Bernstorff:—

That a French gentleman, M. Reitlinger, introduced to me by M. Tissot as an intimate friend and the Private Secretary of M. Jules Favre, had paid me a long visit on the 12th instant; that he had left Paris a short time since, and had come here from

Vienna; that he wished to have a safe-conduct into and out of Paris; and stated that his desire was to destroy illusions which exist in Paris about Europe, and to advise against carrying on war to extremities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 309.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received December 17.)

My Lord,

Tours, December 8, 1870.

THE Comte de Chaudordy informed me this afternoon that he had received a letter from M. Jules Favre, which did not convey the formal answer of the Government at Paris to the proposal to France to join in a Conference on the Russian question, but which expressed the feelings with which the proposal was regarded by that Government.

It appeared, M. de Chaudordy said, to be considered sad and incongruous that a French Plenipotentiary should be sent to London to talk about the Black Sea, while France itself was suffering the utmost rigour of war at the hands of the Prussians. As England had, at the request of Prussia, invited France to the Conference, the Government at Paris conceived that Her Majesty's Government had undoubtedly the right to insist upon such concessions being made by Prussia as would render it possible for France to send a Plenipotentiary to the Conference and to appear at it with dignity and decorum. For this purpose it would be necessary that the Government of National Defence should have the means of convoking a National Assembly and of deliberating with some calmness. They accordingly once more earnestly requested Her Majesty's Government to use every effort to obtain for France an armistice on reasonable conditions, which must of course include the revictualling of Paris for the time the suspension of hostilities continued.

M. de Chaudordy observed that it must surely be shocking to all Christian feeling that the season of Christmas and the New Year should be desecrated by the continuance of such hostilities as were now carried on in France.

At M. de Chaudordy's request I immediately made known to your Lordship by telegraph the sentiments of the Paris Government.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 310.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received December 17.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, December 12, 1870.

I HAD this morning the honour to receive, with your Lordship's despatch of the 5th instant, copies of Prince Gortchakoff's despatch to Baron Brunnow of the 8th ultimo, and of your Lordship's despatch to Sir Andrew Buchanan of the 20th ultimo. In obedience to your Lordship's instructions I at once gave a copy of the latter document to the Comte de Chaudordy.

I at the same time asked M. de Chaudordy whether he was able to announce to me the acceptance by the French Government of the proposal to them to take part in the proposed Conference on the Russian Question.

M. de Chaudordy said that he had received nothing from Paris on the subject since he had spoken to me on the 8th instant, and he proceeded to express the sentiments of the Paris Government in very much the same terms which he used on that occasion, and which were reported to your Lordship in my telegram and despatch of the same day. He observed that the French Government were placed in a very cruel and embarrassing situation by the proposal that they should take part in a Conference at this moment without any assurance that the questions which were matters of life and death to them would be mentioned at it, and without the means which an armistice could alone afford, of preparing to appear at it with propriety and dignity.

M. de Chaudordy added that he was informed that Count Beust had suggested to your Lordship a collective representation from England, Austria, and Italy to Prussia in favour of an armistice, and that your Lordship had rejected the suggestion.

I said that I was not aware of this, but that I knew that your Lordship was extremely

desirous that an armistice should be obtained, and I added that if you had in fact received and rejected any such proposal as that he had mentioned, you must certainly have done so under the conviction that the interference of the neutral Powers would only tend to defeat the object.

Adverting to the question M. de Chaudordy had put to me some time before, I told him that your Lordship had not instructed Mr. Odo Russell to originate a negotiation with Count Bismarck respecting an armistice, because you were sure that any such instruction would do harm instead of good. You had, I said, communicated to Count Bismarck, through the Prussian Ambassador in London, all the information likely to have a good effect, which you were authorized to give respecting the views of the French Government, and you had thus taken the steps which you deemed best calculated to facilitate the success of any direct communication into which the French Government might enter with the Prussian authorities. Her Majesty's Government had, I added, been most anxious to afford their assistance in every way in which it could be practically useful towards procuring a suspension of hostilities, but they had not thought that in the present position of affairs they could address, without positive injury to the cause they had at heart, a dictatorial summons to Prussia.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 311.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received December 17.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, December 10, 1870.

ON the afternoon of the day before yesterday, the Comte de Chaudordy informed me verbally that the Government Delegation had determined to quit Tours at once, as it was found that its presence there embarrassed the operations of the armies. In the evening I received from him the note (of which I have the honour to inclose a copy) stating that a special train would be placed at the disposal of the Diplomatic Body on the following morning to convey them to Bordeaux.

I accordingly set out yesterday from Tours by the train thus offered, and arrived here late last night. I brought with me Mr. Malet, Mr. Sheffield, Mr. Saumarez, and Mr. Lee Hamilton, as well as the Queen's Messengers, Mr. Drury and Captain Haworth. Colonel Feilding started on the same morning to rejoin General Chanzy's army on the Loire.

The Government officers have all been transferred from Tours to this place. Of the four members of the Government Delegation outside Paris, two, M. Crémieux and Admiral Fourichon, are already at Bordeaux. M. Gambetta went from Tours yesterday to visit the army of General Chanzy, and M. Glais-Bizoin to inspect the camp of Colnie in Brittany, but they will, it is believed, soon join their colleagues here.

The Papal Nuncio, the Austrian and Ottoman Ambassadors, the Italian and Portuguese Ministers, and the Chargés d'Affaires of Greece, Spain and Sweden, have come from Tours to Bordeaux.

The Comte de Chaudordy is also at this place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 311.

Count Chaudordy to Lord Lyons.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Tours, le 8 Décembre, 1870.

LA présence à Tours de la Délégation du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale gênant les opérations militaires, il a été décidé qu'elle se transporterait à Bordeaux. J'ai l'honneur de vous en informer, et de vous prévenir en même temps qu'un train sera mis demain, Vendredi 9, à la disposition des Membres du Corps Diplomatique et de leur suite.

Il partira de la gare à 10 heures 45 du matin.

Il est préférable de s'y trouver un peu en avance. Je vous serais obligé de me faire savoir le nombre de places que je dois y faire retenir pour le personnel de votre Ambassade.

Agréez, &c.
(Signé) CHAUDORDY.

2 1 2

(Translation.)

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Tours, December 8, 1870.

AS the presence at Tours of the Delegation of the Government of National Defence interferes with the military operations, it has been determined that it should remove to Bordeaux. I have the honour to inform you thereof, and to acquaint you at the same time that a train will be placed to-morrow, Friday the 9th, at the disposition of the members of the Corps Diplomatique and of their attendants.

It will leave the station at 10 45 A.M.

It is advisable to be there a little beforehand. I should be much obliged to you if you would inform me of the number of places which I am to have retained for the *personnel* of your Embassy.

Accept, &c.
(Signed) CHAUDORDY.

No. 312.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received December 17.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, December 11, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith, extracted from the "*Moniteur Universel*," of this day, the official announcement of the removal of the seat of the Government Delegation from Tours to Bordeaux.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 312.

Extract from the "*Moniteur*" of December 11, 1870.

Bulletin Officiel de la Délégation du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale.

Tours, le 10 Décembre, 1870.

A LA suite des derniers événements militaires accomplis sur la Loire, et de l'évacuation d'Orléans, le Gouvernement a décidé la création de deux armées distinctes, ayant à opérer dans les deux régions séparées par le cours du fleuve, en conservant la jonction avec Paris comme objectif immédiat et suprême. Dans cette situation, il importe avant tout que la liberté des mouvements stratégiques de ces deux armées ne puisse être entravée ni de près ni de loin par des préoccupations politiques ou administratives.

En conséquence, la proximité du siège du Gouvernement à Tours pouvant gêner les opérations des deux armées, il a été décidé que l'ensemble des services serait transporté à Bordeaux, qui, par la facilité de ses communications de terre et de mer avec le reste de la France, offre de précieuses ressources pour l'organisation de nos forces et la continuation de la guerre.

Quant au Ministère de l'Intérieur et de la Guerre, il se rend dès demain aux armées, où est sa place dans les circonstances actuelles, pour assister aux efforts des soldats de la France vers Paris.

Nous, Président de la Délégation, Garde des Sceaux, Ministre de la Justice :

Vu le rapport à nous fait par notre collègue le Ministre de la Guerre, et de l'avis unanime de la Délégation :

En vertu des pouvoirs que nous confère l'Article 3 du Décret du 12 Septembre, 1870, ainsi conçu :—

" M. Crémieux, membre du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale, établira son siège à Tours, et pourra le transporter partout où l'exigeront les nécessités de la défense ;"

Décrétons :

Le siège du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale, délégué à Tours, est transféré à Bordeaux.

Fait à Tours, le 8 Décembre, 1870.

(Signé) AD. CREMIEUX.

(Translation.)

Tours, December 10, 1870.

IN consequence of the last military events which have taken place on the Loire, and of the evacuation of Orleans, the Government has determined on the formation of two distinct armies, to operate in the two districts separated by the course of the river, the immediate and chief object being the co-operation with Paris. Under these circumstances, it is of the first importance that the freedom of the strategic movements of the two armies is not fettered either close at hand or afar off by political or administrative cares.

Consequently, as the proximity of the seat of the Government at Tours might interfere with the operations of the two armies, it has been determined that all the Administrations shall remove to Bordeaux, which, from the facility of its land and sea communications with the rest of France, offers valuable resources for the organization of our forces for the continuance of the war.

As regards the Ministry of the Interior and of War, it will proceed to-morrow to the armies, where its place is, under present circumstances, to assist in the efforts of the soldiers of France in the direction of Paris.

We, President of the Delegation, Keeper of the Seals, Minister of Justice:

Seeing the report made to us by our colleague the Minister of War, and the unanimous opinion of the Delegation;

In virtue of the powers conferred on us by Article 3 of the Decree of the 12th September, 1870, in the following terms:—

“M. Crémieux, member of the Government of National Defence, will establish its seat at Tours, and will remove it anywhere that the necessities of defence may require;”

Decree:

The seat of the Government of National Defence, delegated at Tours, is transferred to Bordeaux.

Done at Tours, December 8, 1870.

(Signed) AD. CREMIEUX.

No. 313.

Sir E. Thornton to Earl Granville.—(Received December 19.)

My Lord,

Washington, December 3, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inform your Lordship that the American steamer “Erie,” of 2,900 tons, left New York for Cowes on the 29th ultimo, carrying the following arms and ammunition for the French Government:—120,800 muskets, 1,760 carbines, 21,356 cases of cartridges.

The French steamer “Ville de Paris” left New York for Havre on the 1st instant with the following contraband of war, also for the French Government:—17,600 muskets, 28,320 rifles, 5,200 carbines, 10,267 cases of cartridges, 25 cases of harness.

It is reported that on these large shipments of contraband of war for France being brought to the attention of the North German Consul-General, he stated, in reply, that he had been instructed by his Government not to concern himself about them, because there was no international law which forbade its export from a neutral country, though destined for a belligerent.

I have not deemed it necessary to incur the expense of reporting to your Lordship by telegraph the sailing of these two vessels with contraband of war, because its free export to a very large extent is now an acknowledged fact, and has not been in any way interfered with by the authorities of the United States.

I have, &c.

(Signed) EDWD. THORNTON.

No. 314.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 19, 1870.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 10th instant, in which you report your having removed to Bordeaux with the Members of your Embassy, upon receiving an intimation from the Count de Chaudordy that the Government had determined to leave Tours for that city, and I approve of your Excellency's proceedings in this matter.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 315.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, December 19, 1870.

COUNT BISMARCK, who has been made acquainted with the terms of your Excellency's telegram of the 16th instant, has replied that it is quite impossible to accede to any one of the three demands of the French Government as therein stated: namely, either an armistice with the condition of revictualling, in order to elect a Constituent Assembly; or the conclusion of peace without any cession of territory; or the assembly of an European Congress which should discuss the questions at issue between France and Prussia; and his Excellency added, moreover, that any German Government which should accede to such proposals, without being obliged to yield to force of arms, would find itself in the position of being compelled to abdicate.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 316.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received December 20.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, December 15, 1870.

YOUR Lordship's telegram dated 9th December, 7 P.M., did not reach me here till the 12th instant. On receiving it, I thought it desirable that the French Government should without delay be made acquainted with the present views of Count Bismarck respecting an armistice. Accordingly on the day before yesterday, I told the Comte de Chaudordy that you had learned from the Prussian Ambassador in London that the German authorities declared that it was altogether impossible to agree to an armistice on the basis of the revictualling of Paris; and that Count Bismarck maintained that elections might take place without a suspension of hostilities, and that consequently an armistice would have no advantage unless it were accompanied by an agreement on the preliminaries of peace.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 317.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received December 22.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, December 16, 1870.

YOUR Lordship's despatch of the 10th instant was delivered to me on the 16th instant by Mr. Lascelles.

On the same day I saw the Comte de Chaudordy, and told him that the substance of a despatch from him dated the 6th instant, and of a telegram from him dated the 8th instant, both pressing for the more active intervention of Great Britain and other friendly Powers in the existing struggle between France and Prussia, had been communicated to your Lordship by M. Tissot, the French Chargé d'Affaires in London.

M. de Chaudordy having observed that he had not yet received from London any

report of the impression made by these communications upon your Lordship, I repeated to him in the exact terms of your despatch the whole of what you said to M. Tissot on the occasion.

M. de Chaudordy observed that he regretted to see that there was no change in the disposition of Her Majesty's Government, and added that he had hoped they would have felt that the time was come for pressing upon Prussia the necessity of concurring in some arrangement which might tend to bring the war to an end.

There were, he said, three different arrangements possible, any one of which might have the desired effect. The first was an armistice, on the condition of Paris being revictualled for the time it lasted. This would render the elections of a National Assembly possible.

The second was a peace without any cession of territory.

The third was a European Congress to determine the conditions of peace. To such a Congress France might make concessions, to which she could never be brought if she were left to negotiate with Prussia alone.

One of these three arrangements was, M. de Chaudordy affirmed, certainly required by Paris.

He proceeded to urge that Her Majesty's Government should at least take upon itself to inquire of Prussia on what terms she would conclude a Treaty of Peace. I asked whether he meant to authorize Her Majesty's Government to make this inquiry on behalf of France. He answered that he was very far from meaning this; that, on the contrary, the inquiry must be made by Her Majesty's Government as coming from themselves, and not as being in any way prompted by France.

I have already transmitted the substance of this despatch to your Lordship by telegraph.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 318.

Sir A. Paget to Earl Granville.—(Received December 26.)

My Lord,

Florence, December 17, 1870.

SIGNOR VISCONTI VENOSTA having referred, in an interview I had with him yesterday, to the recent communications he had had with your Lordship through the Italian Minister in London, on the subject of a demand which had been addressed to Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Italy by the Government Delegation in France, with the view to further efforts being made to obtain an armistice on the condition of the revictualling of Paris, I read to his Excellency the copy of your Lordship's despatch of the 10th instant, to Lord Lyons, pointing out to his Excellency at the same time, that by the last paragraph of it your Lordship was not to be understood as recommending any particular conditions of peace.

Signor Visconti Venosta said he perfectly understood this, and expressed his thanks for the communication I had made to him.

I have, &c.
(Signed) A. PAGET.

No. 319.

Lord Bloomfield to Earl Granville.—(Received December 26.)

My Lord,

Vienna, December 21, 1870.

WITH reference to your Lordship's despatch to Lord Lyons of the 10th instant, informing his Excellency of a communication which had been made to you by M. Tissot of the substance of a despatch from M. de Chaudordy, instructing the French Chargé d'Affaires to press the British Government to employ their good offices in endeavouring to induce the Prussian Government to agree to an armistice, I have taken an opportunity of alluding to this communication in conversation with Count Beust.

I explained to his Excellency that, anxious as Her Majesty's Government must naturally be to see an end of this war, and desirous as they were to contribute by every means in their power to this end—and Italy and Austria could not be more willing to assist than England was—it appeared in the present temper of Germany that it was useless to propose an armistice with a clause for revictualling.

Count Beust seemed to believe this was really the case, and to have received accounts which tended to confirm this opinion; but it is evidently a disappointment to him, for he and other members of the Imperial Government have been under the impression that a collective move and a firmer attitude, on the part of the neutral Powers, would have had more effect in inducing Prussia to come to terms with France than was to be expected from isolated action.

I have, &c.
(Signed) BLOOMFIELD.

No. 320.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received December 26.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, December 21, 1870.

HAVING been informed by your Lordship's telegram of the day before yesterday of the opinion expressed by Count Bismarck on the three suggestions made by the Comte de Chaudordy as conditions on any one of which Paris might be content to come to terms with Germany, I thought it well to let M. de Chaudordy know that all these conditions were considered by the German authorities to be inadmissible.

Accordingly, I took an opportunity of informing him this afternoon that Count Bismarck had stated to the Prussian Ambassador in London that it was quite impossible to accede to a demand for an armistice with re-victualling in order to elect an Assembly, or to a demand for a Treaty of Peace without any cession of territory, or to a demand for a European Congress, to which the questions between France and Prussia should be submitted. Count Bismarck had, I said, expressed an opinion that public feeling in Germany would render it impossible for any German Government to subscribe to any one of the conditions under present circumstances.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 321.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received January 1, 1871.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, December 27, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a Decree respecting the Conseils Généraux, and the Conseils d'Arrondissement, which has appeared in the "Moniteur Universel" to-day.

Your Lordship is aware that, under the Imperial Government in the Departments of the Seine and the Rhone, of which Paris and Lyons are respectively the capitals, Commissioners named by the executive power were substituted for the Conseils Généraux, which, in other Departments, were elected by universal suffrage. This system is applied by the new Decree to the whole of France; the existing Conseils Généraux are dissolved, and their functions are to be discharged by Commissions established by the Government.

The Conseils d'Arrondissement appear to be dissolved, without any provision for the appointment of new ones, either by election or nomination.

The suppression of the Conseils Généraux at this moment has attracted the more attention, as there had, as your Lordship is aware, been a notion that they might, in an emergency, have been used as constituencies to elect a National Assembly.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 321.

Extract from the "Moniteur" of December 27, 1870.

LES membres du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale, délégués pour représenter le Gouvernement et en exercer les pouvoirs:—

Vu les Décrets des 12 et 16 Septembre, 1870;

Vu le Décret du 13 Septembre, 1870, daté de Paris, par lequel le Gouvernement de

la Défense Nationale a réglé les mesures Françaises nécessaires pour assurer les services Départementaux en 1871, et suppléer à l'action des Conseils Généraux et des Conseils d'Arrondissement ;

Vu la Circulaire Ministérielle du 17 Décembre, présent mois ;

Décrètent :

Article 1. Les Conseils Généraux et les Conseils d'Arrondissement sont dissous. Sont également dissoutes les Commissions Départementales dans les Départements où il en a été institué.

Art. 2. Les Conseils Généraux seront remplacés par des Commissions Départementales, composées d'autant de membres qu'il y a de cantons dans le Département. Elles seront instituées par le Gouvernement, sur la proposition d'urgence des Préfets.

Art. 3. Le Budget Départemental sera réglé conformément au Décret du 13 Septembre, 1870, et à la Circulaire du 17 Décembre de la même année.

Art. 4. Le Ministre de l'Intérieur est chargé de l'exécution du présent Décret.

Fait à Bordeaux, le 25 Décembre, 1870.

(Signé)

AD. CRÉMIEUX.
LEON GAMBETTA.
GLAIS-BIZOIN.
FOURICHON.

(Translation.)

THE members of the Government of National Defence, delegated to represent the Government, and to exercise its powers,

Seeing the Decrees of the 12th and 16th September, 1870,

Seeing the Decree of the 13th September, 1870, dated from Paris, by which the Government of National Defence has regulated the French measures necessary to assure the services of the Departments in 1871, and to supplement the action of the Conseils Généraux and Conseils d'Arrondissements ;

Seeing the Ministerial Circular of December the 17th of the present month ;

Decree :

Article 1. The Conseils Généraux and the Conseils d'Arrondissements are dissolved ; are also dissolved the Departmental Commissions in the Departments where they were instituted.

Art. 2. The Conseils Généraux will be replaced by Departmental Commissions, composed of as many members as there are cantons in the Departments. They will be instituted by the Government, on the urgent proposal of the Prefects.

Art. 3. The Departmental Budget will be regulated in conformity with the Decree of the 13th September, 1870, and with the Circular of 17th December of the same year.

Art. 4. The Minister of the Interior is charged with the execution of this Decree.

Done at Bordeaux, December 25, 1870.

(Signed)

A. D. CREMIEUX.
LEON GAMBETTA.
GLAIS-BIZOIN.
FOURICHON.

No. 322.

Earl Granville to Mr. Odo Russell.

Sir

Foreign Office, January 9, 1871.

I HAVE had two conversations recently with Count Bernstorff on the subject of the war, in which he asked my opinion as to whether the fall of Paris would put an end to the war. I answered that I was not competent to judge ; that the surprises of the war had been so great that it was difficult to foresee what would now happen ; that my original impression had been that as Paris and France were each separately much encouraged by belief in the other, the capitulation or capture of Paris would lead to an early peace ; that I found, however, that this impression was not shared by Lord Lyons, who was of opinion that continued resistance would be the result. I added that, if Germany was unable to conclude the war at once, obtaining her own terms of peace,

she would regret the persistent way in which she had shown her objection to make use or to allow of the friendly offices of the neutral Powers. I quite understood that being successful in a great war of which she had to bear all the brunt and all the sacrifices, she had determined not to be dictated to by those who had stood aloof. It was probably the same feeling which had prevented the Imperial Government from consenting to any mediation. The Republican Government had made different appeals to us, to which we had invariably answered that we could not interfere unless our mediation or advice would be acceptable to both parties or would be likely to be effective. If the war was continued, if France became totally disorganized, a curse to herself and to Europe, incapable of indemnifying Germany for the costs of the war, and Germany had no resource but to seize and occupy vast territories, filled with unwilling inhabitants, blame would attach to her for having rejected, not the intervention, but the good offices of some of the neutral Powers, of a character which had so often led to satisfactory results in international disputes.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 323.

Mr. Odo Russell to Earl Granville.—(Received January 7, 1871.)

(Extract.)

Versailles, December 27, 1870.

FROM the despatch to Lord Lyons of the 10th instant I learn that your Lordship informed M. Tissot that I was of opinion that it would be useless to propose temporizing expedients at Versailles, and I may now add that I see no reason to modify the opinion I held a month ago before the relieving French Armies of the Loire and of the North had been defeated, and the sorties of the Paris Garrison repulsed by the Germans.

The conviction which I ventured to telegraph to your Lordship on the 8th instant that the position of Prussia was already so strong that no peace negotiations short of unconditional surrender would be entertained by Count Bismarck, has, I perceive, been confirmed by your Lordship's telegram of the 19th instant to Lord Lyons.

Even admitting, in deference to the opinions of the press, that the day may come when the French will compel the Germans to levy the siege of Paris, and drive them back towards the Rhine, the object for which France continues the war could not be attained; and it is, therefore, that I see, with deep regret, the admirable patriotic spirit and power of endurance displayed by the people of France expended on a hopeless struggle.

No. 324.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 14, 1871.

M. TISSOT communicated to me to-day a despatch from M. de Chaudordy, stating that under existing circumstances the French Government felt bound again to raise the question of its official recognition by that of Her Majesty.

At the moment that the Conference was about to meet they felt it necessary again to press the question, and to set forth the motives which they consider should influence the decision of the neutral Powers.

The question was to be looked at under two points of view; one as it bears on the internal condition of France; the other as it concerns more particularly the general interest in Europe. The French Government are satisfied that, viewed under either aspect, the demand which they make is fully warranted, both by the facts and by the principles on which the recognition of a Government by other States is founded.

Events during several months have proved that the Government of National Defence was accepted by the country. Paris has confirmed it by a vote, and the provinces, by the most active and devoted concurrence, have demonstrated in the most indisputable manner that they hold it to be the representative of sovereign authority. They supply, without difficulty, in the midst of the formidable crisis through which France is passing, the money and men required for this long and painful war, and this twofold evidence of confidence, which the best established Powers find it often difficult to obtain, affords the

surest proof of the general assent of France. The very magnitude of the struggle, in which all citizens bear their share with incomparable energy, establishes the national character of the Government engaged in carrying it on.

Looking at the question, on the other hand, with special reference to the view that England may take of it, it cannot be supposed that she should refuse to solve it in favour of France. France, in fact,—and Europe cannot be deceived on this point,—is fighting not only for herself, but also for the most sacred principles of international law. She is not alone concerned in the result of the contest, but all other States are so likewise; for not one of them, however powerful it may be, but would suffer seriously if France were overwhelmed. The French Government have never ceased, since the commencement of the war, to impress this truth on Europe, being assured that in doing so they only spoke the language of prudence, of justice, and, they do not hesitate to add, of sound policy and of history. While admitting that such language has failed to call forth the energetic resolves which it seemed calculated to inspire, the French Government are nevertheless aware that it has been appreciated; and in calling at the present time upon all the Cabinets to recognize the Government of National Defence, they feel that they are only inviting them to place on record, by a solemn act, their own opinions on European affairs, and to clothe in an official form the sentiments of sympathy which they have never ceased to manifest for France.

The opening of the Conference, while it affords a further inducement to the French Government to press the point, appears to add to the motives which should influence all other Cabinets and especially that of London. All the great Neutral Powers have, in fact, invited France to attend it; England has done so officially, after having exerted herself to induce France to agree to be represented in it. Doubtless the French Government consider it to be very seasonable that France should appear in the Conference on an indisputably equal footing with the other Powers; but would England consider it proper, after the pressure she has put upon France, that Prussia should raise any objection to her being represented in the Conference? Are not the interests for which the Conference is to provide likely to suffer from such a state of things? And does not this circumstance constitute as it were a personal motive for the English Cabinet, independently of all other political considerations which, in the opinion of the French Government, should induce it to take that decision? If, moreover, occasion should arise for more complete action, if even the question of peace should come before the Conference, does not England comprehend the advantage which would be derived from recognition?

Italy, Spain, Portugal, Greece, the United States, Switzerland, Chile, and Peru have already recognized the French Government, and France would rejoice to receive such a proof of friendship from England.

I thanked M. Tissot for his communication, and I informed him that I would not fail to bring it under the consideration of my colleagues.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 325.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received January 17.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, January 11, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to transmit herewith to your Lordship extracted from the "Gazette de France" of this day, a protest of the Comte de Chambord against the bombardment of Paris.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 325.

Extract from the "Gazette de France" of January 11, 1871.

Protestation de M. le Comte de Chambord contre le Bombardement de Paris.

"L'UNION," la "Gazette de France," et la "Guienne" d'hier au soir publient le document suivant sur, lequel nous reviendrons:—

"Il m'est impossible de me contraindre plus longtemps au silence.

"J'espérais que la mort de tant de héros tombés sur le champ de bataille, que la résistance énergique d'une capitale résignée à tout pour maintenir l'ennemi en dehors de ses murs, épargnerait à mon pays de nouvelles épreuves : mais le bombardement de Paris arrache à ma douleur un cri que je ne serais contenir.

"Fils des roi Chrétiens qui ont fait la France, je gémis à la vue de ses désastres. Condamné à ne pouvoir les racheter au prix de ma vie, je prends à témoin les peuples et les rois, et je proteste comme je le puis, à la face de l'Europe, contre la guerre la plus sanglante et la plus lamentable que fût jamais.

"Qui parlera au monde, si ce n'est moi, pour la ville de Clovis, de Clotilde et de Geneviève; pour la ville de Charlemagne, de Saint Louis, de Philippe-Auguste et de Henri IV; pour la ville des sciences, des arts, et de la civilisation?

"Non! je ne verrai pas périr la grande cité que chacun de mes aïeux a pu appeler :
MA BONNE VILLE DE PARIS.

"Et puisque je ne puis rien de plus, ma voix s'élèvera de l'exil pour protester contre les ruines de ma patrie; elle crierà à la terre et au ciel, assurée de rencontrer la sympathie des hommes, et attendant tout de la justice de Dieu.

"7 Janvier, 1871.

(Signé) "HENRI."

(Translation.)

THE "Union," the "Gazette de France," and the "Guienne," of yesterday evening, publish the following document, to which we shall recur:—

"It is impossible for me to keep silence any longer.

"I hoped that the death of so many heroes fallen on the field of battle, that the energetic resistance of a capital resigned to everything in order to keep the enemy outside her walls, would spare my country new trials; but the bombardment of Paris forces from my anguish a cry which I cannot restrain.

"Son of the Christian Kings who have made France, I groan at the sight of her disasters.

"Condemned to be unable to redeem them at the price of my life, I call to witness peoples and Kings; and I protest as I am able, in the face of Europe, against the bloodiest and most lamentable war that has ever been.

"Who will speak to the world, if it is not I, for the town of Clovis, of Clotilde, and of Geneviève, for the town of Charlemagne, of Saint Louis, of Philip Augustus, and of Henry IV; for the town of sciences, of arts, and of civilization?

"No! I will not see the great city perish, which each one of my ancestors could call
'MY GOOD TOWN OF PARIS.'

"And since I can do no more, my voice will raise itself from exile to protest against the ruin of my country; it will cry to earth and to Heaven, certain to meet with the sympathy of men, and expecting everything from the justice of God.

"January 7, 1871.

(Signed) "HENRY."

No. 326.

Count Bismarck to Count Bernstorff.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by Count Bernstorff, January 16.)

(Translation.)

Versailles, January 9, 1871.

YOUR Excellency will, like myself, have noticed in the newspapers a document signed by Count Chaudordy, which is filled with accusations against the German Commanders and troops, and is said to have been communicated to the neutral Powers in the name of the Government of the National Defence. Whether that has really been done I do not know, and should be inclined almost to doubt it, so evidently is the document calculated for a French public and for the exigencies of that part of the press of other countries which is inimically disposed towards us. It is hardly to be believed that Count Chaudordy and the persons who instructed him should have assumed in any Government that unacquaintance with foreign matters upon which they could found their calculations in France. In other countries, however, people are accustomed to make the state of the cultivation of foreign nations an object of study and observation. The world knows the system of education, and its fruits in Germany and in France, the general liability to military service with us, and the conscription, with exemption by purchase, amongst our adversaries; it is aware what elements in the German armies are opposed to the substitutes, the Turcos, and the convict battalions; it calls to mind from the history of

former wars, and in many parts from its own experience, how French troops are wont to behave in an enemy's country. Representatives of the European and of the American press, who have been readily admitted among us, have observed and testify how the German soldier can unite valour with humanity, and how tardily the rigorous measures are carried out, though justified by international law and the usages of warfare, which the German Commanders have been constrained to order by the conduct of the French opposed to international law, and for the protection of their own troops against assassination. Even the greatest and most persevering perversion of the truth will not avail to obscure the fact that it is the French who have given to this war a character which every day must stain more deeply and broadly. It is now several months ago, after repeated cases had convinced us that the French troops fundamentally disregarded the general international law, as well as the special Conventions in which France had taken part; after the bearers of our flags of truce had been repeatedly—one might also say as a rule—fired upon, and rude hostilities contrary to treaty had been practised against surgeons and ambulances, that I requested your Excellency to protest against these matters to the Government of London. During the time that has since elapsed we have not only been able to collect the documentary proofs then reserved, but have also had to verify a long series of fresh cases.

Under circumstances which wholly preclude the supposition of an accident or a mistake on the part of the French troops, flags of truce, with a white banner, and accompanied by a trumpeter blowing his instrument, have been fired upon on the twenty-one occasions mentioned in Inclosure No. 1, sometimes with small arms, sometimes with shells, at times with single shots, at times with volleys. Some trumpeters have been killed, and some flag-bearers wounded. The judicial statements which prove these cases are before me and will be printed.

After the battle of Weissenburg it was found, as your Excellency will remember from my despatch of 27th September last, that not only the wounded whom we had taken prisoners, but also French military surgeons of superior rank, knew nothing at all of the Geneva Convention, and that some of the latter, after they had been instructed by our delegates, made for themselves the prescribed insignia in a miserable and unrecognizable manner. We can indeed be the less surprised at this, since we have learned from the official despatches of July and August last, published by the Parisian rulers, how imperfectly prepared France was for this war, so long intended and so wantonly brought about. They, on the French side, have gradually made themselves so well acquainted with the Geneva Convention, that they know how to claim its advantages to the full, but as to the fulfilment of the corresponding obligations there is no improvement. Whilst we are careful to carry out even the unsuitable stipulations of the Convention at the cost of great inconveniences and military detriment, whilst more than a hundred French military men are moving about here at head-quarters with the greatest freedom as surgeons and attendants on the sick, whilst French delegates have been admitted into prison dépôts in Germany, although it might have been expected, as appears to be the fact, that treacherous plottings would be the result of such intercourse, the attacks upon dressing-stations and ambulances, the ill-treatment and robbery of surgeons, delegates, hospital assistants, and bearers of the sick, and the murder of wounded men, have continued on the part of the French up to the most recent time; and when surgeons have fallen into the power of the hostile troops they have not unfrequently been ill-treated and imprisoned; in the most favourable cases their effects have been stolen and they themselves sent by difficult roads to the Swiss or Italian frontier. Amidst the present movements of the troops and the sanitary columns it has not yet been possible to obtain judicial proof of all the cases mentioned. From the abundant materials at hand the examples briefly stated in Inclosure No. 2 may be sufficient. Yet I cannot refrain from communicating here at once more at length a deposition of the Swiss surgeon, Dr. Burkhard, dated Puiseaux, December 18:—

“The Geneva Convention has often been violated in the actions in the forests of Orleans. On the 30th of November I saw a French military surgeon, of whom it was not only asserted by French prisoners, but he himself openly acknowledged, that he had shot many Prussian prisoners with his revolver.

“Numerous wounded tell us that many Franc-tireurs pulled Geneva bands out of their pockets when retreating. The wounded were often fired at.”

In face of such persistent disregard of the Geneva Convention the allied German Governments will be forced to take it into consideration whether, or within what limits, they can look upon themselves as any longer bound by it in regard to France.

Besides those mentioned in my Circular of 27th September last, contraventions of another kind against Treaty, international law, and warlike usages of civilized nations, have also occurred on the French side. At the battle of Wörth it was noticed that musket-

bullets entered the ground and then threw up the earth with a very audible detonation. Immediately after this was observed, Colonel von Beckedorff was dangerously wounded by an explosive bullet. A shot of the same kind struck Lieutenant von Oertzen of the 2nd Pomeranian Uhlan Regiment, in the action near Tours on the 20th of December last. In the course of investigations, which are not yet concluded, explosive shot for the so-called "fusil à tabatière" have been found among the ammunition captured at Strasburg. I reserve it to myself to address a special communication on this violation of the Petersburg Convention to those who signed it. But it deserves to be recalled to memory now at once that a French commander accuses the Baden troops—who have no explosive shot for hand fire-arms, any more than the rest of the German armies—of using explosive shot contrary to Convention, and on that account he has officially threatened the Baden population with the fate of the inhabitants of the Palatinate under Lewis XIV, "même les femmes."

Nearly related to this mode of warfare is the fact that in the pockets of French prisoners a cartridge has been found, the ball of which is a leaden bullet cut up into sixteen angular pieces, and loosely put together again. One of the many specimens of this shot, the effects of which are equivalent to those of hacked lead, has been sent to the Foreign Office at Berlin, and will be shown there to the Representatives of the foreign Powers.

In the naval warfare the French have likewise scouted international law. The French war-steamer "Desaix" has destroyed, by burning or sinking on the high seas, three German merchantmen which it had captured, the "Ludwig," the "Vorwärts," and the "Charlotte," instead of taking them to a French port and obtaining the sentence of a prize court. The German ships will therefore be directed to make reprisals on French ships.

It cannot be a matter of surprise that rulers who pay so little respect to laws and treaties, should have still less scruple in casting aside the customs of modern nations, and in going back to modes of proceeding of long past periods of civilization; even sanctioning things which at all times, and in all nations that have any notion, however peculiar, of honour, have been deemed especially disgraceful.

How the French prisoners, of whom we have an unexampled multitude to provide for, the wounded and sick as well as the healthy, are treated in Germany, unasked-for testimony has been given in their own names and from their own observation by those who have come from neutral States to attend upon the sick. The German prisoners in France, although they do not reach a tenth part of that number, have been treated in many places with inhuman harshness and neglect.

A convoy of about 300 Bavarian sick "captured" in the hospitals of Orleans, who were mostly suffering from typhus and dysentery, or were wounded, were penned up together in the cells and passages of the prison of Pau, with a truss of straw to lie on, and no other sustenance than bread and water for six days together, when some German and English ladies interested themselves for them, assisted them from their own means, and prevailed upon the resisting authorities to take some care of them. At other places, especially, with the army of General Faidherbe, the prisoners were kept in lofts that could not be warmed, and without blankets, in sixteen degrees of cold; not even provided with warm or sufficient nourishment; whilst in Germany all places intended for the reception of prisoners of war were provided with stoves at the beginning of the winter. The crews of German merchant-ships are not only confined as prisoners of war, but were at first treated as criminals, chained together two and two, transported from place to place, and supplied with food that was insufficient both by nature and quantity for the sustenance of a man. A civilian, who was illegally made prisoner, and complained of some money that had been sent for him being withheld, was officially informed in writing that prisoners were not entitled to consideration. Prisoners who are taken through other towns than Paris are not even now protected against violent ill-treatment by the populace. In Germany, perhaps, not a single case has occurred in which the populace have violated, even by a mortifying word, the respect which misfortune meets with from educated nations. Notwithstanding the barbarities committed by the Turcos, not one of them has been insulted or at all ill-treated in Germany.

The cruelties and generic bestialities perpetrated on the wounded by the Turcos and Arabs are less to be charged upon them, even according to the grade of their civilization, than upon a European Government which, with full knowledge of their habits, brings these African hordes upon a European theatre of war. The "Journal des Débats" has retained so much human feeling and shame as to express indignation that Turcos, with their thumbs, gouge the eyes out of the heads of the wounded or prisoners. But the "Indépendance Algérienne," and after it other French papers, address the newly-formed African mercenaries, the Gums, recommending to them an invasion of Germany, as follows:—

"We know you, we prize your courage, we are aware that you are energetic, impetuous, enterprising; go and cut heads off; the more, the higher you will rise in our esteem. Away with compassion! Away with feelings of humanity! The Gums will gain honour, if we give them the word: Death, pillage, conflagration!"

It may also be laid to the account of the Turcos that not only dead bodies, but also wounded men, had their heads cut off in the village of Coulours, near Villeneuve-le-Roi, and their noses and ears in the village of Auxon, near Troyes, and elsewhere.

Perhaps it is to be attributed to the many years' connection with Algiers and the offspring of the Berbers, that French authorities allow their fellow-citizens to commit acts, and even give them instructions, in which every military custom of Christian nations and all military feeling of honour are ignored. Whilst in the other European nations the soldier makes it a point of honour to be recognized as what he is, as an enemy, by the enemy,—Luce-Villiard, the Prefect of the Department Côte d'Or, for example, issued to the Sub-Prefects and Mayors, on the 21st of November last, a Circular in which assassination by persons not in uniform is recommended and extolled:—

"The country," it is therein said, "does not require of you that you should assemble in arms and openly oppose the enemy; it expects of you that three or four resolute men should sally every morning from their communes and establish themselves at a spot indicated by nature itself, from whence they can fire on the Prussians without danger. Above all, they must fire on the enemy's horsemen, whose horses they are to deliver at the chief place of the arrondissement. I shall award them a premium, and publish their heroic deeds in all departmental newspapers and in the 'Journal Officiel.'"

A renunciation not only of the military point of honour but even of the most customary rectitude is to be perceived in the present rulers in reference to the breach of their word of honour by French officers, upon which I expressed myself in my Circular of the 14th of December. As is therein observed, the question is not so much that of passing judgment on a comparatively small number of individuals in the position of French officers, who break their word of honour after pledging it, and thereby craftily obtaining the liberty of going about within a German town; but it is chiefly that of appreciating the conduct of a Government which sanctions, in fact, a breach of parole by receiving the parole-breaker into the army, and encourages it by agents and premiums. We have lately obtained proof that the present Minister of War expressly sanctions breach of parole, incites thereto, and promises to reward it by payment of ready money. A Decree of the Minister of War, dated the 13th of November, which has fallen into the hands of our troops, "*désirant encourager les officiers à s'échapper des mains de l'ennemi*," promises to every one that escapes out of Germany a donation of 750 francs, besides the indemnification for losses sustained, which is allowed according to previous resolutions.

A Government which calculated on remaining at the head of the country under ordinary circumstances, would disdain such measures out of regard for the future interests of its native land. But the dictatorship which has appropriated power to itself in France by a stroke of hand, only takes the future into consideration in so far as is suitable to its own interests and passions. The rulers in Paris and Bordeaux repress the desire exhibited by the people for the chance of declaring their will, just as violently as they do every free expression of opinion by speech and writing. By a reign of terror, which would be possible in no other European country, they force the people to render their money and their strength, and to prolong the war, because they foresee that its termination will also put an end to their usurpation. Such a Government requires for its existence the continuance of the rancorous passions and the mutual animosity of the two contending nations, because it requires the continuation of the war to retain the dominion over its fellow-citizens. This end is served by a kind of warfare which is opposed to the moral ideas of the age, and for which, apart from the innate African elements of the French army, essential parts thereof could only have been so far prepared by the disuse of European customs of warfare in contests beyond the seas, that they no longer find any general condemnation in the military traditions of France. If it were the intention of the Rulers in France not to increase the hatred between the two contending nations, but to enable them to restore peace, they would afford the French people the opportunity of learning the truth and of expressing their opinions by the infallible means of a free press, and they would hasten to share the responsibility which weighs upon them with the representatives of the nation. Instead of this we see that the press in France, as the monopoly of a despotic Government, is only made use of for the misrepresentation of events, for the falsification of the state of affairs, and for profiting by the prejudices which the French political education has systematically instilled into Frenchmen in regard to their superiority and their claim to dominion over other nations.

The Government of the National Defence excites the passions of the people without any effort whatever to restrain their operations within the bounds of civilization and international law; it does not wish for peace, for it deprives itself, by its language and demeanour, of the chance of getting peace accepted, even if it so desired, in face of the temper of the masses which it has generated. It has let loose forces which it is unable to govern and cannot keep within the bounds of international law and the military usage of Europe. If we, with this manifestation before us, are compelled, in exercising the rights of war, to a severity which we regret, and which is not consonant with the national character of the Germans, nor with our traditions, as is shown by the wars of 1864 and 1866, the responsibility thereof falls upon those persons who, without call or justification, have undertaken and have forced upon the French nation the continuation of the Napoleonic war against Germany, and renounced therein the traditions of European warfare.

I respectfully request your Excellency to deliver a copy of this despatch and its inclosures to the Minister for Foreign Affairs.

(Signed) VON BISMARCK.

Inclosure 1 in No. 326.

SUMMARY of the Cases in which German Flags of Truce have been Fired upon by French Troops.

No.	Date.	Locality.	Name of the Officer with the Flag of Truce.	Remarks.
	1870			
1	August 9	Before Lichtenberg ..	Captain Schill.	
2	" 12	" Marsal ..	Captain Ladendorff.	
3	" 14	At Vremy ..	First Lieutenant von Klüber.	
4	" 15	Before Toul ..	Lieutenant Prince zu Hohenlohe.	
5	" 19	" Metz ..	Lieutenant-Colonel von Verdy ..	The trumpeter wounded.
			Captain von Winterfeld.	
6	" 22	" Vitry ..	Lieutenant Remy.	
7	" 24	" Verdun ..	First Lieutenant von Schimpf ..	The trumpeter killed.
8	" 24	" Metz ..	Lieutenant von Kurowski.	
9	" 25	" Strasburg ..	Lieutenant-Colonel von Leszynski.	
10	September 2	" Mezières ..	Captain Count von Monts.	
11	" 3	" Mezières ..	First Lieutenant Baron von Reitzenstein.	
12	" 3	" Montmédy ..	First Lieutenant von Jagow ..	The trumpeter killed.
13	" 10	" Metz ..	Lieutenant Burckhardt.	
14	" 16	" Toul ..	Captain von Rochow.	
15	End of September	" Strasburg ..	First Lieutenant Baron von La Roche.	
16	October 1	" Metz ..	Lieutenant Baron von Röder and Lieutenant Mangold.	
17	" 1	" Paris ..	Lieutenant von Rissing ..	The flag-bearer wounded.
18	" 15	" Thionville ..	Major von Prittwitz.	
19	" 18	Same place ..	Captain Baron von Eickstedt.	
20	December 4	Before Péronne ..	Captain Jouanne ..	} All three taken prisoners.
			Lieutenant Liegniez ..	
			A trumpeter ..	
21	" 23	" Paris ..	First Lieutenant von Uslar.	

Versailles, January 1, 1871.

Inclosure 2 in No. 326.

SUMMARY of the Violations of the Geneva Convention by the French, hitherto found out.

In all the following cases the persons, carriages, and localities were furnished with the prescribed marks of distinction. Cases in which a possibility of mistake or accident, from the position and remoteness of the assailants is stated, are not entered here.

[Explanation of the abbreviations:—S.D., Sanitary Detachment; A.C., Army Corps; C.W., Carrier of Wounded; H.A., Hospital Assistant; D.P., Dressing Place.]

No.	Date.	Locality.	Object.	Kind of Hostility.	Result.
1	1870 Aug. 6	Spicheren ..	2 S.D. of the 3rd A.C., when seeking and bringing away wounded.	Infantry fire ..	1 C.W. wounded.
2	" ..	Wörth ..	2 S.D. of 5th A.C., the same ..	The same.	
3	" 16	Mars la Tour ..	1 S.D. of 10th A.C., the same ..	Fire of Cavalry patrol.	Sub-officer Ihle taken prisoner.
4	" 17	Marie aux Chênes ..	Chief Staff Surgeon Hagens and H.A. ..	Shots by a civilian.	
5	" 18	Gravelotte ..	2 S.D. of 3rd A.C., when dressing and carrying away	Infantry fire ..	1 wounded man, 2 C.W. wounded.
6	" 30	Beaumont ..	Dr. Nigst, Chief Lieutenant Dachs, and C.W. of 1st Hospital A.C. at the D.P.	Infantry fire ..	1 ambulance damaged: 1 C.W., 1 train soldier, wounded.
7	" 31	Suburb Mouzon ..	Staff Surgeon Bertog, 7 Field Hospital, 4th A.C., when erecting a hospital		
8	" ..	Poir ..	Reg. Surgeon Szrzcicka, 1 Brand. Ul. Reg., when seeking wounded		
9	Sept. ..	Charly ..	3 S.D., 9th A.C., when carrying away.		
10	" (11	Metz, Bois de Faily ..	A. P. Surgeon Hille, 2 Siles. Gren. Reg. at the dressing place	Shell fire.	
11	" ..	Givonne ..	A. P. Surgeon Buckart, 3 Guard Ul. Reg., and assistants, when carrying away	Infantry fire.	
12	" ..	Floing ..	2 S.D. of 11th A.C., when marching ..	Shell fire.	
13	" ..	St. Albert ..	" .. at the D.P. ..	" ..	A horse killed.
14	" ..	Floing and St. Albert ..	1 S.D. of 11th A.C., when putting wounded in carriage	Naked arms ..	2 men wounded.
15	" ..	Bazeilles ..	Civilian attendant of sick when receiving	Small-arm fire from houses	2 attendants and 1 wounded man wounded.
16	" ..	Sedan ..	C.W. of 5th Bavarian Jager Batt., when receiving	Infantry fire ..	1 C.W. wounded.
17	Sept. ..	Balan ..	3 Hosp. S. Company ..	Gun-fire from houses ..	1 ambulance damaged; 2 C.W. taken and plundered.
18	" 19	Petit Bicêtre ..	Hospital ..	Shell fire.	
19	" 19	Villa Coublay ..	1 and 2 S.D. of 5th A.C., when seeking wounded	Shell and Infantry fire.	
20	" 20	Bric ..	S. Train of Wurtemb. Field Division ..	Shell fire.	
21	" 29	Isle Adam ..	Staff Surgeon Dr. Berger, when looking for wounded	Fire by Francs-tireurs.	Dr. Berger shot at a distance of 50 paces.
22	" 30	Before Fort Ivry ..	C.W. of 6th A.C., when looking for wounded	Shells.	
23	Oct. 2	Bellevue ..	3 S.D. of 7th A.C., at the collecting place for the wounded	Infantry fire.	
24	" 7	" ..	3 S.D. of 1st A.C., when carrying away and at D.P.	Shell fire at red lantern.	
25	" ..	Pithiviers ..	3 S.D. of 11th A.C. ..	" ..	Dr. Michels taken and conducted to Lyons.
26	" ..	Orleans ..	Bavarian Field Hospital ..	" ..	The field hospital and private property of the Surgeons taken away, the latter carried off, taken to the Swiss frontier with Gendarmes.
27	" ..	Tours ..	Delegate Count Lewis Arco.		
(No 28 in orig.)					
29	Nov. ..	Lommoye ..	Reg. Surgeon Dr. Lucke, Magd. Hus. Reg. No. 10.	" ..	Medicine carts, surgical instruments, private effects taken away.
30	Dec. 2	Patay, near Orleans	Military Surgeons Drs. Schönleben, Schmidt, von Stransky, Keyl, Degen, when dressing (wounds)	" ..	Taken prisoners, carried by Bordeaux, Marseilles, Nice, to the Italian frontier.
31	" 11	La Fère ..	12 Ambulance with about 100 wounded and sick	" ..	The whole ambulance seized and taken to Calais.
32	" ..	Between Valleyon and Gray	Baden Sanitary Column on the march.	Attacked by Francs-tireurs	1 driver killed, 1 H.A. seized and taken away; Staff Surgeons Fritchli and Stöckert plundered.

On the retreat from Orleans to Blois in December the French left several thousands of wounded behind without any surgical attendance.

Versailles, January 1, 1871.

*Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.**

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 20, 1871.

COUNT BERNSTORFF has communicated to me Count Bismarck's Circular of the 9th instant, on the conduct of the war by the French, in answer to a Circular of M. Chaudordy commenting upon the excesses alleged by him to have been committed by the German armies.

It is now three months since (in answer to another Circular of the Chancellor of the North German Confederation, describing with but too much truth what would be the increasing horrors of the great struggle between Germany and France) I thought it my duty in the name of Her Majesty's Government, without contesting the rights which war may give, to urge those arguments, founded upon policy and upon humanity, which would be most likely to influence a victorious nation to avoid such an extreme measure as the bombardment of Paris.

That appeal to the wisdom and generosity of Germany and its rulers was met at the time in a corresponding spirit, and, although not ultimately successful, led to a practical step which might have had a favourable result.

Since then Her Majesty's Government have not been encouraged by any prospect of success to depart from the reserve which they feel it their duty to maintain.

The renewed appeal, however, to the public opinion of Europe made by the present Circular, induces Her Majesty's Government to communicate again to the Imperial Government in a spirit of friendliness some observations with a view to promote the cessation of a conflict, the continuance of which must be a subject of deep regret to the Government of the North German Confederation.

It has been said that it is for those who are worsted in the contest to make the first proposal for peace, and that it is upon them that neutral nations should exercise their pressure; but the reluctance on the part of the French to sue for peace is not unnaturally increased by the magnitude of the reverses which they have suffered.

Her Majesty's Government have abstained from exciting the hopes of France; they have even been reserved in the expression of sympathy which, without any reference to the merits of the case as regards either belligerent, must be felt with a neighbouring country with which we have long been intimately connected, and who is so deeply afflicted as France now is.

But they do not feel justified in pressing advice which from its very nature might be more or less discouraging, on a people who are defending their territory, and who are the judges of what their own honour and interest require.

No such consideration applies to a frank communication to Germany, who in the amplitude of her power and in the full tide of her victories cannot fear any misconstruction of her motives in endeavouring to bring to an end the misery of this great war.

Up to this time no distinct intimation has been given of the demands of Germany. Her Majesty's Government do not assume to offer any suggestions as to the terms on which Germany should be prepared to treat for peace, but they believe that a declaration of the views of the Imperial Government and of its readiness to negotiate might hasten a cessation of the calamities of the siege of Paris, the horrors of the war, and the losses of even the victorious armies in France.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 20, 1871.

I STATED to your Excellency in my despatch of the 14th instant, the substance of an appeal made to me on that day by M. Tissot, for the official recognition of the existing Government of France. By official recognition I understood nothing more than the issue of regular credentials on behalf of the British Ambassador in France to the actual head of the Government of that country.

In conformity with the promise that I had made to M. Tissot, I yesterday brought

* A similar despatch was addressed to Mr. Odo Russell.

before my colleagues the question which he had pressed upon me; and in requesting you to inform M. Chaudordy at the conclusion at which we arrived, I need scarcely add that the matter was considered by us in the most friendly spirit towards the French nation, and with an earnest desire to meet, if circumstances admitted of our doing so, the wishes of the Government of National Defence.

But M. de Chaudordy will not be surprised to learn that we could find no grounds for departing from the view which I had expressed to M. Thiers, and which has been repeated more than once since his Excellency's visit to this country,—that the first element of recognition was still wanting, and that as the Government of National Defence itself admitted that it did not possess that stability which a formal vote of a Constituent Assembly could alone bestow upon it, it would be premature in Her Majesty's Government to recognize, as the national Government of France, a Government which is only administering the affairs of the country pending its decision as to the form of government under which it may ultimately elect to live.

It is fully admitted that France, by her heroic and patriotic co-operation with the Government of National Defence, has fully recognized that Government in the capacity which it has claimed for itself by the name it has adopted.

Her Majesty's Government, however, are not satisfied that it would be for the interest of France herself at the present moment, as regards foreign Powers, to comply with the request for recognition on the part of England; but such a measure on their part would seem to prejudge the ultimate decision of the French nation, and admit of the construction that it carried with it an intimation on the part of England that she would view with special favour one particular form of Government. But it is the ruling principle of this country scrupulously to abstain from interfering in the internal affairs of foreign nations, and from indicating a preference as to the particular form of Government to which the nation would do best to confide its interests.

Again, with regard to the position of the French Plenipotentiary at the Conference, I have already informed your Excellency of all the steps which I have taken to assure myself that he would be treated with the respect due to a representative of France; but an official recognition of the Government of National Defence by England, if it should not be generally agreed to, might weaken his position and probably destroy the engagements on which I have relied.

Her Majesty's Government would very much regret if the want of a nationally constituted Government in France carried with it any cessation of international relations between England and that country. But such is not the case; the absence of official recognition on the part of this country has not precluded Her Majesty's Government from maintaining with the existing Government, provisional though it be, the most intimate and confidential intercourse, nor has it influenced them to withhold their sympathy from France during the severe trials which she is now undergoing.

Her Majesty's Government have regretted, as M. de Chaudordy well knows, that circumstances should have occurred to delay that appeal to the national voice which would have enabled France to claim from them and from Europe the recognition of a formally constituted Government. Such recognition would have been heretofore, as it would now be, promptly and cordially given by Her Majesty's Government, though practically it would not have brought the two nations more closely together in their mutual relations than they have been during the last critical months, and it is the earnest hope of Her Majesty's Government that the same friendly relations will continue to be maintained hereafter, whatever may be the form of Government established in France.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 329.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received January 23.)

My Lord,

Berlin, January 16, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inclose to your Lordship herewith a translation, by Mr. O'Connor, of a Royal Decree, signed by the King of Prussia, and countersigned by Count Bismarck and General Roon, the Prussian Minister of War, and dated Versailles, 15th December, 1870, prescribing severe penalties against all persons in the Government of Alsace and Lorraine who join the French forces.

I have, &c.

(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 329.

Royal Prussian Decree.

(Translation.)

WE, William, King of Prussia, ordain for the Government of Alsace and Lorraine what follows :—

Article 1. Whoever joins the French forces will be punished by confiscation of his present and future income and by ten years' banishment.

Art. 2. Verdict is given by order of the Governor-General which, three days after it appears in the official portion of a newspaper of the Governor-General has all the force of a legal judgment, and is to be carried into execution by the civil and military authorities.

Art. 3. Every payment and delivery which shall later be made to the condemned is to be considered as not made.

Art. 4. Every disposition made by the condemned of his property or portions of it amongst living persons or in case of death, after the issue of this Decree, is null and void.

Art. 5. Whoever desires to leave his domicile must apply for the permission of the Prefect stating the reasons of his departure. Whoever without such permission is longer than eight days absent from his domicile will be legally considered to have joined the French forces. This presumption suffices for judgment.

Art. 6. The Prefects have to look after and control the keeping of the lists of domicile of all persons of the male gender.

Art. 7. The amount of the confiscation is to be paid into the Treasury of the Governor-General.

Art. 8. Returning from exile entails the penalties laid down by Article 33 of the Code Penal.

Art. 9. This Decree comes into force on the day of its publication.

Given at our Head-quarters at Versailles; the 15th December, 1870.

No. 330.

Earl Granville to Mr. Odo Russell.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 26, 1871.

HER Majesty's Government earnestly hope that the negotiations which are said now to be in progress at Versailles may lead to the immediate cessation of the bombardment of Paris, or even to a speedy termination of the war, and they trust that they may not be too sanguine in entertaining this hope. You are at full liberty, in any conversations which you may have in any quarters in which it may be likely to be of service to the cause of peace, to express yourself in this sense; and I should also wish you to take every reasonable opportunity of letting it be known that it is the ardent wish of Her Majesty, her Government, and her people that the siege of Paris and the war in France may speedily be terminated by the exercise of justice and moderation on the part of those to whom the conduct of the negotiations may be entrusted.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 331.

Earl Granville to Mr. Odo Russell.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 29, 1871.

I HAVE instructed Lord Lyons by telegraph, in the event of the Delegation at Bordeaux hesitating to accept the terms of the capitulation of Paris, agreed upon between Count Bismarck and M. Jules Favre, to exert his influence to induce them to agree to the armistice and to assent to the Convocation of an Assembly.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 332.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received January 31.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, January 26, 1871.

I SPOKE yesterday to the Count de Chaudordy in the sense of your Lordship's despatch of the 20th instant, which had reached me that morning, on the subject of the answer of Her Majesty's Government to his fresh demand for the formal recognition of the Government of National Defence.

I pointed out to him that by official recognition your Lordship understood nothing more than the furnishing the British Ambassador with regular credentials to the regular head of the Government of France. I mentioned also particularly that Her Majesty's Government deemed it to be right, in conformity with the ruling principle of England, to abstain scrupulously from indicating a preference as to the particular form of Government to which the interests of France would be best confided, and that they conceived it to be more respectful to the French nation not to prejudge its ultimate decision.

I observed, too, that your Lordship had not failed to take into consideration the argument put forward by M. de Chaudordy respecting the position of the French Plenipotentiary in the Conference, but that you considered that, so far from strengthening the position, the immediate recognition which was asked for might materially weaken it. You had, I said, taken pains to assure yourself that the French Plenipotentiary would be treated with all the respect due to a Representative of France; but you feared that an official recognition by England of the Government of National Defence at this moment might have the effect of destroying the engagements on which you relied.

Lastly, I dwelt upon the friendly expressions with which your Lordship's despatch abounds, and reminded M. de Chaudordy of the intimate and cordial relations which Her Majesty's Government had in practice maintained with the existing Government in France.

M. de Chaudordy had already been informed by M. Tissot of the decision of Her Majesty's Government. He repeated briefly some of his former arguments on the subject of recognition, but did not appear to be disposed to discuss the subject at length on this occasion.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 333.

Mr. Odo Russell to Earl Granville.—(Received February 2.)

My Lord,

Versailles, January 28, 1871.

ON the morning of the 23rd instant M. Favre applied for an interview with Count Bismarck, and came himself to Versailles at 8 P.M., and was lodged at No. 1, Boulevard du Roi, in an apartment occupied by the Chief of the Prussian Police, Geheimerath von Stieber.

M. Favre supped with Count Bismarck, and returned to Paris at about 4 P.M. on the 24th instant. On the 25th he returned from Paris with his Private Secretary, in time to dine with the Chancellor, and left again at 2 P.M. on the 26th instant.

At 6 A.M. on the following morning, carriages were sent to the Bridge of Sevres to meet M. Favre, General Beaufort d'Hautepoule, and three French officers, who dined with Count Bismarck, and returned to Paris at night.

The bombardment of Paris ceased at 1 A.M.; and has not since been renewed.

This morning General Vinoy and other officers came from Paris and were closeted all day with Count Bismarck, General Moltke, and M. Favre.

At 7 P.M. an armistice for twenty-one days was signed by them.

To-morrow the forts will be occupied by the Prussians, while the French garrison will remain in Paris to keep order.

Two gates and two lines of railway to the north will be left to the French authorities to revictual Paris.

Negotiations for a general peace have already commenced.

That is all I have been able to learn, as the greatest secrecy has been observed by the negotiators.

Your Lordship will know all details by telegraph before this despatch can reach London.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

Major-General Walker to Earl Granville.—(Received February 3.)

Dear Lord Granville,

January 31, 1871.

I HAVE no time to cover this with a despatch. If it is the first copy received I shall be very glad. I hope to send the annex to-morrow.

Your, &c.

(Signed) BEAUCHAMP WALKER.

Inclosure in No. 334.

Convention between Count Bismarck and M. Jules Favre for an Armistice, signed at Versailles, January 28, 1871.

ENTRE M. le Comte de Bismarck, Chancelier de la Confédération Germanique, stipulant au nom de Sa Majesté l'Empereur d'Allemagne, Roi de Prusse, et M. Jules Favre, Ministre des Affaires Etrangères du Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale, munis de pouvoirs réguliers, ont été arrêtés les Conventions suivantes :—

ARTICLE I.

Un armistice général sur toute la ligne des opérations militaires en cours d'exécution entre les armées Allemandes et les armées Françaises, commencera pour Paris aujourd'hui même, pour les Départements dans un délai de trois jours. La durée de l'armistice sera de vingt-et-un jours à dater d'aujourd'hui de manière que, sauf le cas où elle serait renouvelée, l'armistice se terminera partout le 19 Février, à midi.

Les armées belligérantes conserveront leurs positions respectives, qui seront séparées par une ligne de démarcation. Cette ligne partira de Pont l'Evêque sur les côtes du Département de Calvados, se dirigera sur Lignéres dans le nord-est du Département de la Mayenne en passant entre Briouze et Fromental; en touchant au Département de la Mayenne à Lignéres, elle suivra la limite qui sépare ce Département de celui de l'Orne et de la Sarthe jusqu'au nord de Morannes et sera continuée de manière à laisser à l'occupation Allemande les Départements de la Sarthe, de l'Indre et Loire, de Loir et Cher, du Loiret, de l'Yonne, jusqu'au point où à l'est de Quarré les Tombes se touchent les Départements de la Côte d'Or, de la Nièvre, et de l'Yonne. A partir de ce point le tracé de la ligne sera réservé à une entente qui aura lieu aussitôt que les Parties Contractantes seront renseignées sur la situation actuelle des opérations militaires en exécution dans les Départements de la Côte d'Or, du Doubs, et du Jura. Dans tous les cas elle traversera le territoire composé de ces trois Départements, en laissant à l'occupation Allemande les Départements situés au nord, à l'armée Française ceux situés au midi, de ce territoire.

Les Départements du Nord et du Pas de Calais, les forteresses de Givet et de Langres avec le terrain qui les entoure à une distance de 10 kilomètres, et la Péninsule du Havre jusqu'à une ligne à tirer d'Etretat dans la direction de Saint Romain, resteront en dehors de l'occupation Allemande. Les deux armées belligérantes et leurs avant-postes de part et d'autre se tiendront à une distance de 10 kilomètres au moins des lignes tracés pour séparer leurs positions.

Chacune des deux armées se réserve le droit de maintenir son autorité dans le territoire qu'elle occupe et d'employer les moyens que ses commandants jugeront nécessaires pour arriver à ce but.

L'armistice s'applique également aux forces navales des deux pays en adoptant le méridien de Dunkerque comme ligne de démarcation, à l'ouest de laquelle se tiendra la flotte Française et à l'est de laquelle se retireront aussitôt qu'ils pourront être avertis les bâtiments de guerre Allemands qui se trouvent dans les eaux occidentales. Les captures qui seraient faites après la conclusion et avant la notification de l'armistice seront restituées, de même que les prisonniers qui pourraient être faits de part et d'autre dans des engagements qui auraient lieu dans l'intervalle indiqué. Les opérations militaires sur le terrain des Départements du Doubs, du Jura, et de la Côte d'Or, ainsi que le siège de Belfort, se continueront indépendamment de l'armistice jusqu'au moment où on se sera mis d'accord sur la ligne de démarcation dont le tracé à travers les trois Départements mentionnés a été réservé à une entente ultérieure.

ARTICLE II.

L'armistice ainsi convenu a pour but de permettre au Gouvernement de la Défense Nationale de convoquer une Assemblée librement élue qui se prononcera sur la question de savoir si la guerre doit être continuée ou à quelles conditions la paix doit être faite.

L'Assemblée se réunira dans la ville de Bordeaux.

Toutes facilités seront données par les commandants des armées Allemandes pour l'élection et la réunion des Députés qui la composeront.

ARTICLE III.

Il sera fait immédiatement remise à l'armée Allemande par l'autorité militaire Française de tous les forts formant le périmètre de la défense extérieure de Paris, ainsi que de leur matériel de guerre. Les communes et les maisons situées en dehors de ce périmètre ou entre les forts pourront être occupées par les troupes Allemandes jusqu'à une ligne à tracer par des commissaires militaires. Le terrain restant entre cette ligne et l'enceinte fortifiée de la ville de Paris sera interdit aux forces armées des deux parties. La manière de rendre les forts et le tracé de la ligne mentionnée formeront l'objet d'un Protocole à annexer à la présente Convention.

ARTICLE IV.

Pendant la durée de l'armistice l'armée Allemande n'entrera pas dans la ville de Paris.

ARTICLE V.

L'enceinte sera désarmée de ses canons, dont les affûts seront transportés dans les forts à désigner par un Commissaire de l'armée Allemande.

ARTICLE VI.

Les garnisons (Armée de Ligne, Garde Mobile, et Marins) des forts et de Paris seront prisonniers de guerre, sauf une division de 12,000 hommes que l'autorité militaire dans Paris conservera pour le service intérieur.

Les troupes prisonnières de guerre déposeront leurs armes, qui seront réunies dans les lieux désignés et livrées suivant règlement par Commissaires suivant l'usage ; ces troupes resteront dans l'intérieur de la ville, dont elles ne pourront pas franchir l'enceinte pendant l'armistice. Les autorités Françaises l'engagent à veiller à ce que tout individu appartenant à l'armée et à la Garde Mobile reste consigné dans l'intérieur de la ville.

Les officiers des troupes prisonnières seront désignés par une liste à remettre aux autorités Allemandes.

A l'expiration de l'armistice tous les militaires appartenant à l'armée consignée dans Paris auront à se constituer prisonniers de guerre de l'armée Allemande si la paix n'est pas conclue jusque-là.

Les officiers prisonniers conserveront leurs armes.

ARTICLE VII.

La Garde Nationale conservera ses armes ; elle sera chargée de la garde de Paris et du maintien de l'ordre. Il en sera de même de la gendarmerie et des troupes assimilées, employées à un service municipal, telles que Garde Républicaine, douaniers, et pompiers ; la totalité de cette catégorie n'excèdera pas 3,500 hommes.

Tous les corps de Francs-tireurs seront dissous par une Ordonnance du Gouvernement Français.

ARTICLE VIII.

Aussitôt après la signature des présentes et avant la prise de possession des forts, le Commandant-en-Chef des armées Allemandes donnera toutes facilités aux Commissaires que le Gouvernement Français enverra tant dans les Départements qu'à l'étranger, pour préparer le ravitaillement et faire approcher de la ville les marchandises qui y sont destinées.

ARTICLE IX.

Après la remise des forts et après le désarmement de l'enceinte et de la garnison stipulés dans les Articles V et VI, le ravitaillement de Paris s'opérera librement par la circulation sur les voies ferrées et fluviales.

Les provisions destinées à ce ravitaillement ne pourront être puisées dans les terrains

occupés par les troupes Allemandes, et le Gouvernement Français s'engage à en faire l'acquisition en dehors de la ligne de démarcation qui entoure les positions des armées Allemandes, à moins d'autorisation contraire donnée par le commandement de ces dernières.

ARTICLE X.

Toute personne qui voudra quitter la ville de Paris devra être munie de permis réguliers délivrés par l'autorité militaire Française et soumis au visa des avant-postes Allemands. Ces permis et visas seront accordés de droit aux candidats à la députation en province et aux Députés à l'Assemblée.

La circulation des personnes qui auront obtenu l'autorisation indiquée ne sera admise qu'entre six heures du matin et six heures du soir.

ARTICLE XI.

La ville de Paris payera une contribution municipale de guerre de la somme de 200,000,000 de francs. Ce paiement devra être effectué avant le quinzième jour de l'armistice. Le mode de paiement sera déterminé par une Commission Mixte Allemande et Française.

ARTICLE XII.

Pendant la durée de l'armistice il ne sera rien distrait des valeurs publiques pouvant servir de gage au recouvrement des contributions de guerre.

ARTICLE XIII.

L'importation dans Paris d'armes, de munitions, ou de matières servant à leur fabrication sera interdite pendant la durée de l'armistice.

ARTICLE XIV.

Il sera procédé immédiatement à l'échange de tous les prisonniers de guerre qui ont été faits par l'armée Française depuis le commencement de la guerre. Dans ce but les autorités Françaises remettront dans le plus bref délai des listes nominatives des prisonniers de guerre Allemandes aux autorités militaires Allemandes à Amiens, au Mans, à Orléans, et à Vesoul. La mise en liberté des prisonniers de guerre Allemands s'effectuera sur les points le plus rapprochés de la frontière. Les autorités Allemandes remettront en échange sur le même point et dans le plus bref délai possible un nombre pareil de prisonniers de guerre Français de grade correspondants aux autorités militaires Françaises.

L'échange s'étendra aux prisonniers de condition bourgeoise, tels que les capitaines des navires de la marine marchande Allemande et les prisonniers Français civils qui ont été internés en Allemagne.

ARTICLE XV.

Un service postal pour des lettres non-cachetées sera organisé entre Paris et les Départements par l'intermédiaire du quartier-général de Versailles.

En foi de quoi les Soussignés ont revêtus les présentes Conventions de leurs signatures et de leurs sceaux.

Fait à Versailles, le 28 Janvier, 1871.

(L.S.) BISMARCK.

(L.S.) FAVRE.

(Translation.)

BETWEEN M. le Comte de Bismarck, Chancellor of the Germanic Confederation, stipulating in the name of His Majesty the Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, and M. Jules Favre, Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Government of the National Defence, both furnished with regular powers, have been determined the following arrangements :—

ARTICLE I.

A general armistice over all the line of military operations in course of execution between the German and the French armies shall begin for Paris on this very day, and for

the Departments within the term of three days. The duration of the armistice shall be for twenty-one days, dating from to-day ; so that, unless it shall be renewed, the armistice will terminate on the 19th of February, at noon.

The belligerent armies will preserve their respective positions, which will be separated by a line of demarkation. This line will commence from Pont Evéque, on the coast of the department of Calvados, and be continued upon Lignières, in the north-east of the Department of the Mayenne, passing between Briouze and Fromental. Touching the Department of the Mayenne at Lignières, it will follow the limit which separates that Department from the Departments of the Orne and of the Sarthe, to the north of Morannes, and will be continued in such a way as to leave in German occupation the Departments of the Sarthe, Indre-et-Loire, Loir-et-Cher, Loiret, and Yonne, as far as a point at which, to the east of Quarre-les-Tombes, the Departments of the Côte d'Or, the Nièvre, and the Yonne touch each other. Setting out from this point the tracing of the line will be reserved for an understanding which shall take place as soon as the contracting parties shall be informed as to the actual situation of the military operations which are being executed in the Departments of the Côte d'Or, of the Doubs, and of the Jura. In any case the line will pass through the territory composed of these three Departments, leaving to German occupation the Departments situated to the north, and to the French army those situated to the south, of this territory.

The Departments of the North and of the Pas de Calais, the fortresses of Givet and Langres, with the territory which surrounds them to a distance of ten kilometres, and the peninsula of Havre as far as a line drawn from Etretat in the direction of St. Romain, will remain outside the limits of the German occupation. The two belligerent armies and their advanced posts on either side will remain at a distance of at least ten kilometres from the lines drawn to separate their positions. Each of the two armies reserves for itself the right of maintaining its authority in the territory that it occupies, and of employing the means which its commanders may judge necessary to attain that end.

The armistice applies equally to the naval forces of the two countries, adopting the meridian of Dunkerque as the line of demarcation, to the west of which the French fleet will remain, and to the east of which, so soon as they can be warned, will withdraw the German ships of war which find themselves in western waters. The captures which are made after the conclusion, and before the notification, of the armistice, will be restored as well as the prisoners who may be taken in the interval indicated. The military operations in the territory of the Departments of Doubs, Jura, and Côte d'Or, as well as the siege of Belfort, shall continue independently of the armistice, until an agreement shall be arrived at regarding the line of demarcation—the tracing of which through the three Departments mentioned has been reserved for an ulterior understanding.

ARTICLE II.

The armistice thus agreed upon has for its object to permit the Government of National Defence to convoke an Assembly, freely elected, which will pronounce upon the question whether the war shall be continued, or on what conditions peace shall be made.

The Assembly will meet in the city of Bordeaux. ●

Every facility will be given by the commanders of the German armies for the election and the meeting of the Deputies who will compose that Assembly.

ARTICLE III.

There shall be immediately surrendered to the German army by the French military authorities, all the forts forming the perimeter of the exterior defence of Paris, as well as their material of war. The communes and houses situated outside that perimeter, or between the forts, may be occupied by the German troops as far as a line to be drawn by military commissioners. The ground between this line and the fortified *enceinte* of the city of Paris will be interdicted to the armed forces of the two sides. The manner of surrendering the forts, and the drawing of the line already mentioned, will form the object of a protocol to be annexed to the present Convention. °

ARTICLE IV.

During the armistice the German army shall not enter the city of Paris.

ARTICLE V.

The *enceinte* shall be disarmed of its guns, the carriages of which will be transported into the forts designated for that purpose by a commission of the German army.

ARTICLE VI.

The garrisons (Army of the Line, Mobile Guard, and Marine) of the forts and of Paris shall be prisoners of war, excepting a division of 12,000 men, which the military authorities in Paris will preserve for service inside the city.

The troops who are prisoners of war shall lay down their arms, which will be collected in the places designated, and given up according to arrangements made by a Commissioner, in the usual manner. These troops shall remain in the interior of the city, of which they will not be allowed to pass the *enceinte* during the armistice. The French authorities bind themselves to take care that every individual belonging to the army and to the Mobile Guard shall remain in the interior of the town.

The officers of the captured troops shall be designated in a list to be delivered to the German authorities.

At the expiration of the armistice all the combatants belonging to the army confined in Paris will have to constitute themselves prisoners of war to the German army, if before that time peace is not concluded.

The officers made prisoners will retain their arms.

ARTICLE VII.

The National Guard will retain its arms. It will be charged with the protection of Paris and the maintenance of order. The same will be the case with the gendarmerie and the assimilated troops employed in the municipal service, such as the Republican Guard, the Douaniers, and the Pompiers—the whole of this category shall not exceed 3,500. All the corps of Franc-tireurs shall be dissolved by ordinance of the French Government.

ARTICLE VIII.

Immediately after the signature of these presents, and before the taking possession of the forts, the Commander-in-Chief of the German armies will give every facility to the Commissioners whom the French Government will send, whether into the Departments or abroad, to take steps for the revictualling, and to bring to the city the commodities which are destined for it.

ARTICLE IX.

After the surrender of the forts, and after the disarmament of the *enceinte* and of the garrison, stipulated in Articles V and VI, the revictualling of Paris will be effected freely by transit upon the railroads and the rivers.

The provisions intended for this revictualling shall not be drawn from the districts occupied by the German troops; and the French Government engages itself to obtain provisions outside of the line of demarcation which surrounds the position of the German armies, except in the case of an authorization to the contrary effect given by the commander of the latter.

ARTICLE X.

Every person wishing to quit the City of Paris must be furnished with the regular permits, delivered by the French military authority, and submitted to the *visa* of the German authorities. Permits or *visas* will be granted, in right of their position, to candidates, to the provincial deputations, and to the deputies of the Assembly.

The free movement of the persons who have received the authorization indicated will be permitted only between 6 in the morning and 6 in the evening.

ARTICLE XI.

The City of Paris shall pay a municipal contribution of war amounting to 200,000,000 francs. This payment must be effected before the 15th day of the armistice—the mode of payment to be determined by a mixed German and French Commission.

ARTICLE XII.

During the armistice nothing shall be taken away from the public objects of value which may serve as pledges for the recovery of war contributions.

ARTICLE XIII.

The transport into Paris of arms, of munitions, or of articles entering into their manufacture, is forbidden during the term of the armistice.

ARTICLE XIV.

Immediate steps shall be taken for the exchange of all prisoners of war made by the French army since the commencement of the war. For this end the French authorities will hand, as promptly as possible, nominal lists of the German prisoners of war to the German military authorities at Amiens, at Le Mans, at Orleans, and at Vesoul. The liberation of the German prisoners of war will be effected upon the points nearest to the frontier. The German authorities will deliver in exchange, on the same points and in the briefest possible time, to the French military authorities, a like number of French prisoners of war of corresponding grades.

The exchange will extend to civil prisoners, such as captains of ships of the German merchant navy, and the civilian French prisoners who have been interned in Germany.

ARTICLE XV.

A postal service for letters, not sealed, will be organised between Paris and the Departments, through the medium of the head-quarters at Versailles.

In faith of which the Undersigned have appended to the present Convention their signatures and their seals.

Done at Versailles, the 28th of January, 1871.

(L.S.) BISMARCK.

(L.S.) FAVRE.

No. 335.

Major-General Walker to Earl Granville.—(Received February 4.)

My Lord,

Versailles, February 1, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward a copy of the Annex to the Convention transmitted yesterday to your Lordship by the field-post.

I have, &c.

(Signed) BEAUCHAMP WALKER,

Inclosure in No. 335.

Annex to the Convention of February 28, 1871.

Article 1.—*Lignes de Démarcation devant Paris.*

LES lignes de démarcation seront formées du côté Français par l'enceinte de la ville ; du côté Allemand—

1. Sur le front sud, la ligne partant de la Seine à la hauteur de l'extrémité nord de l'Ile St. Germain, longera l'égout d'Issy et continuera entre l'enceinte et les forts d'Issy, de Vanvres, de Montrouge, de Bicêtre, d'Ivry, en se tenant à une distance d'environ 500 mètres des fronts des forts jusqu'à bifurcation des routes de Paris à Porte à l'Anglais et d'Alfort.

2. Sur le front est, depuis le dernier point indiqué la ligne traversera le confluent de la Marne et de la Seine, longeant en suite les lizières de l'ouest et du nord du village de Charenton pour se diriger directement à la porte de Fontenay en passant par le rond point de l'obélisque. Puis la ligne se dirigera vers le nord jusqu'à un point à 500 mètres à l'ouest du ford de Rosny et au sud des forts de Noisy et de Romainville jusqu'à l'endroit où la route de Pantin touche au bord du canal de l'Ourcq. La garnison du Château de Vincennes sera d'une compagnie de 200 hommes et ne sera pas relevée pendant l'armistice.

3. Sur le front nord la ligne continuera jusqu'à 500 mètres au sud-ouest du fort d'Aubervilliers et du canal de St. Denis, traversant le dernier à 500 mètres au sud de la

2 M 2

courbe, gardant une distance égale au sud des ponts du canal et se prolongeant en droite ligne jusqu'à la Seine.

4. Sur le front ouest à partir du point où la ligne indiquée touche à la Seine, elle en longera la rive gauche en amont jusqu'à l'égout d'Issy.

De légères déviations de cette ligne de démarcation seront permises aux troupes Allemandes, autant qu'elles seront nécessaires pour établir leurs avantpostes de la manière qu'exige la sûreté de l'armée.

Article 2.—*Passage de la Ligne de Démarcation.*

Les personnes qui ont obtenu la permission de franchir les avantpostes Allemandes ne pourront le faire que par les routes suivantes :—

Route de Calais.

„ Lille.
 „ Metz.
 „ Strasbourg (porte de Fontenay).
 „ Bâle.
 „ d'Antibes.
 „ de Toulouse.
 „ No. 189.

Puis enfin sur les ponts de la Seine, comprenant celui de Sèvres, dont la reconstruction est permise.

Article 3.—*Reddition de Forts et Redoutes.*

La reddition s'opérera dans la journée du 29 Janvier, 1871, à partir de 10 heures du matin, de la manière suivante :—

Les troupes Françaises auront à évacuer les forts et le terrain neutre, en laissant dans chacun des forts le commandant de place, le garde du génie, le garde d'artillerie, et le portier consigne.

Aussitôt après l'évacuation de chaque forts un officier d'Etat-Major Français se présentera aux avantpostes Allemandes afin de donner les renseignements qui pourraient être demandés sur ce fort ainsi que l'itinéraire à suivre afin de s'y rendre.

Après la prise de possession de chaque fort et après avoir donné les renseignements qui pourraient leur être demandés, le commandant de place, le garde du génie, le garde d'artillerie et le portier consigne, rejoindront à Paris la garnison du fort.

Article 4.—*Remise de l'Armement et du Matériel.*

Les armes, pièces de campagne, drapeaux, et le matériel seront remis aux autorités militaires Allemandes dans un délai de quinze jours à partir de la signature de la présente Convention, et déposés par les soins des autorités Françaises à Sévran. Un état d'effectif de l'armement et du matériel sera remis par les autorités Françaises aux autorités Allemandes avant le 4 Février prochain.

Les affûts des pièces qui arment les remparts devront être également enlevés avant cette époque.

(Translation.)

Article 1.—*Lines of Demarcation before Paris.*

THE lines of demarcation will be formed on the French side by the enceinte of the town; on the German side—

1. On the south front, the line leaving the Seine at the northern extremity of the island of St. Germain, will run along the sewer of Issy, and will proceed between the enceinte and the forts of Issy, Vanvres, Montrouge, Bicêtre, and Ivry, keeping at a distance of about 500 metres of the fronts of the forts as far as the bifurcation of the Paris roads to Porte à l'Anglais and d'Alfort.

2. On the east front, from the point last indicated the line will cross the confluence of the Marne and Seine, skirting in succession the western and northern outskirts of the village of Charenton and strike off straight for the gate of Fontenay, passing by the round point of the Obelisk. Then the line will lead to the north up to a point 500 metres west of the Fort of Rosny, and to the south of the Forts of Noisy and Romanville, up to the place where the Pantin road touches the bank of the Ourcq canal. The garrison of the Castle of Vincennes will consist of a company of 200 men, and it will not be relieved during the armistice.

3. On the northern face the line will continue to 500 metres of the south-west of the fort of Aubervilliers and of the St. Denis Canal, crossing the latter to 500 metres from the south of the bend, and keeping an equal distance to the south of the canal bridges, and thence continuing in a straight line down to the Seine.

4. On the west front from the point where the line above indicated joins the Seine, it will continue along the left bank upwards to the sewer of Issy.

Slight deviations from this line of demarcation will be permitted to the German troops such as will enable them to establish their outposts in the way that the safety of the army requires.

Article 2.—Passage of the Line of Demarcation.

Individuals who have obtained permission to pass the German outposts are only allowed to do so by the following routes :—

By Calais.
 „ Lille.
 „ Metz.
 „ Strasburg (Fontenay Gate).
 „ Basle.
 „ d'Antibes.
 „ Toulouse.
 „ No. 189.

And also by the bridges over the Seine, including the bridge of Sèvres, the rebuilding of which is allowed.

Article 3.—Surrender of the Forts and Redoubts.

The surrender shall take place on the 29th of January, 1871, commencing at 10 A.M. in the following manner :—

The French troops to evacuate the forts and neutral territory, leaving in each fort the commandant, the engineer guard, the artillery guard, and the password keeper.

Immediately after the evacuation of each fort a French staff-officer shall proceed to the German outposts to give any information that may be required respecting the fort or the road to it.

After possession has been taken of each fort and the required information given, the commandant, the engineer guard, the artillery guard, and the password keeper will rejoin the garrison of the fort in Paris.

Article 4.—Surrender of the Armament and Matériel.

The arms, field pieces, flags, and matériel shall be handed over to the military German authorities within a fortnight after the signature of this Convention, and shall be deposited under the direction of the French authorities at Sévran. An inventory of the armament and matériel shall be handed by the French authorities to the German authorities before the 4th of February next.

The carriages of the guns which arm the ramparts are also to be removed before that date.

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. No. 2 (1871).

CX. 7. 22.

CORRESPONDENCE

WITH

LORD LYONS

RESPECTING HIS

DEPARTURE FROM PARIS,

AND

PROVISION

MADE FOR THE

WITHDRAWAL OF BRITISH SUBJECTS.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1871.

LONDON:

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Correspondence with Lord Lyons respecting his Departure from
Paris, and Provision made for the Withdrawal of British
Subjects.

No. 1.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received August 27.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 26, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith to your Lordship, extracted from the "Journal Officiel" of this day, a Decree of the Governor of Paris concerning the expulsion of persons without the means of subsistence.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

• Inclosure in No. 1.

Extract from the "Journal Officiel" of August 26, 1870.

LE Gouverneur de Paris,

Vu la Loi du 9 Août, 1849, sur l'état de siège ;

Vu le Décret du 7 courant, par lequel Paris a été déclaré en état de siège ;

Vu l'Article 75 du Décret du 24 Décembre, 1811, relatif à l'organisation et au service des Etats-Majors des places, lequel porte :—

"Dans toute place en état de guerre, si le Ministre ou le Général d'Armée en donne l'ordre, ou si les troupes ennemies se rapprochent à moins de trois journées de marche de la place, le Gouverneur ou Commandant est, sur-le-champ et sans attendre l'état de siège, investi de l'autorité nécessaire :—

"1. Pour faire sortir les bouches inutiles, les étrangers et les gens notés par la police civile ou militaire, &c. ;"

Vu la Loi du 9 Juillet, 1852, relative à l'éloignement du Département de la Seine des repris de justice, vagabonds, mendiants, et autres gens adonnés à des pratiques périlleuses pour les personnes et les propriétés ;

Arrête ce qui suit :—

Article 1. Tout individu dépourvu de moyens d'existence, dont la présence à Paris constituerait un danger pour l'ordre public, ou la sécurité des personnes et des propriétés, ou qui s'y livrerait à des manœuvres de nature à affaiblir ou à entraver les mesures de défense et de sûreté générale, sera expulsé de la capitale.

Art. 2. L'infraction aux arrêtés d'expulsion sera déférée aux Tribunaux Militaires.

Paris, le 24 Août, 1870.

(Signé) Général TROCHU.

(Translation.)

IN virtue of the Law of the 9th of August, 1849, on the state of siege ;

In virtue of the Decree of the 7th instant, by which Paris has been declared in a state of siege ;

In virtue of Article 75 of the Decree of the 24th of December, 1811, relative to the organization and service of the Staff of fortified places, which says :—

"In every place in a state of war if the Minister or the General gives the order, or if the enemy's troops come within less than three days' march of the place, the Governor

or Commandant is immediately, and without awaiting the state of siege, invested with the necessary authority :—

“1. To send away the useless mouths, foreigners and persons pointed out by the civil or military police ;”

In virtue of the Law of the 9th of July, 1852, relative to the dismissal from the Department of the Seine of criminals, vagabonds, beggars, and other people addicted to practices dangerous to persons or property ;

The Governor of Paris decrees as follows :—

Article 1. Every individual without the means of subsistence whose presence at Paris would constitute a danger to public order, or to the security of persons and property, or who should do anything likely to weaken or hinder the measures of defence and general safety, shall be expelled from the capital.

Art. 2. Any infraction of the decrees of expulsion will be brought before the Military Tribunals.

Paris, August 24, 1870.

(Signed) General TROCHU.

No. 2.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received August 27.)

My Lord,

Paris, August 26, 1870.

IN my previous despatch of to-day I have transmitted an extract from the “Journal Officiel,” containing an order of the Governor of Paris. This document recites a Decree of 1811, which authorizes the Governor of places threatened by the enemy to send away all “useless mouths,” and refers to other enactments of a similar kind ; and it orders the immediate expulsion from Paris of persons without means of subsistence, whose presence may be considered dangerous.

The order is already in course of execution, and has already been applied to several English subjects.

The result of this, and of still more stringent measures which are likely to be adopted, will create great distress among numerous British subjects, and place those who have not the means of paying their passage to England in a very awkward—not to say very dangerous—situation. Under the circumstances, I might perhaps take upon myself to direct the Consul to provide for the conveyance of these persons to England, under the Circular of the 1st April last. But as the cases are likely to be extremely numerous, I think it right to direct your Lordship’s attention to the subject without delay.

Probably the most practical way of insuring economy and a satisfactory investigation of the cases of British subjects requiring assistance to go to England under present circumstances, would be to confide to the Committee of the Charitable Fund the management of a sum granted for the purpose.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 3.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 8, 1870.

I HAVE received your Excellency’s despatch of the 26th August, representing that great distress might be caused among numerous British subjects, and that those who had not the means of paying their passage to England might be placed in a very awkward, not to say perilous, situation, by a Decree issued by the French Government on the 24th of that month, ordering the immediate expulsion from Paris of persons without means of subsistence, whose presence might be considered dangerous, which Decree was likely to be followed by still more stringent measures. Your Excellency further says that, as the cases are likely to be extremely numerous, you think it right, instead of acting under the present authority contained in the Circular of the 1st April last, and directing the Consul to provide for the conveyance of such persons to England, to call my attention to the matter without delay, suggesting at the same time that the most practical way of insuring economy and satisfactory investigation, would be to entrust the Committee of the British Charitable Fund with the management of a sum granted for this purpose of assisting such indigent persons to return to England.

I lost no time in communicating with the Board of Treasury. But I am only able to-day to inform your Excellency that, although in principle the relief of persons who have gone abroad for their own purposes, and who suffer by war or by other general calamities, appears to that Department to be a charge rather on private charity than on public funds, yet their Lordships do not desire to exclude from consideration the most extreme cases, in which persons unexpectedly thrown out of employment in a foreign country, and obliged by the Government to depart, are left absolutely without means, either of their own or from charitable sources.

The Board of Treasury say, therefore, that they are prepared to sanction the relief from public funds in cases of this kind, where it clearly appears that no other resource is left; and I have, accordingly, to authorize your Excellency to give relief in conformity with the views of that Department in urgent cases.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 4.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 12.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 9, 1870.

YOUR Lordship did me the honour to inform me that you had received assurances from the Prussian Government that the members of the Diplomatic Body at Paris would receive at the hands of the Prussian authorities all the usual courtesy to which they were entitled, although it was difficult to specify beforehand the particular course which would be adopted.

I observe, however, that in answer to a request conveyed by M. Jules Favre from the Diplomatic Body remaining in Paris, to be warned, in case it should be intended to bombard the town, and given the means of quitting the place, Count Bismarck, in a letter dated on the 26th ultimo, at Ferrières, answers that military considerations forbid his making any communications respecting the time and manner of an attack upon the fortress of Paris.

I cannot conceal from your Lordship the anxiety which this letter causes me to feel for the safety of the members of Her Majesty's Embassy, whom I have left in Paris, as well as for that of the numerous British subjects who have, I fear, in despite of my warnings, imprudently remained there. As regards these last, your Lordship is aware, that both by advice given specially to individuals, and by general notices, I did all in my power to induce Her Majesty's subjects to withdraw in time; and that I published in the newspaper, and distributed among them a printed caution, that those of them who remained after the warnings given, would do so at their own risk and peril; and that if they delayed any longer, they might not afterwards be able to get away. Notwithstanding my pressing counsels, some remained voluntarily, while others were, from illness or other causes, unable to move. I cannot, therefore, help submitting to your Lordship a request that the Prussian authorities, if they really resolve on bombarding Paris, should be pressed to give these inoffensive neutrals an opportunity of previously quitting the place. The funds which were in the hands of the British Charitable Fund would, I should hope, suffice to pay the expense of removing those who are unable to pay for their own journey; and, in case of need, Mr. Wodehouse might be authorized to act upon the instruction contained in your Lordship's despatch of the 8th ultimo.

But it is naturally with regard to the Members of the Embassy that I feel most uneasiness. Count Bismarck states in his letter that he cannot defer to the opinion of those who regard the interior of the Paris ramparts and redoubts during a siege as a proper place for carrying on diplomatic intercourse. This observation may be to a certain extent well founded, so far as it regards those Chiefs of Missions who, having of their own free will chosen to remain in Paris, ask for special facilities for sending or receiving despatches. But I submit that it cannot at all apply to a case like that of Mr. Wodehouse, who has stayed in Paris by order of his official superiors, in order to give as long as possible protection to his fellow-subjects, and to preserve as far as possible the archives of the Embassy and the Government property from injury. Nor can Count Bismarck's objection affect the case of Captain Hore, who was too ill to leave Paris before it was invested. Captain Hore had, indeed, been for some time previously so seriously unwell, as, notwithstanding the zealous efforts he made, to be scarcely able to discharge his duties. During several days before I came away he was confined to his bed in a very

critical state, and I was prevented from taking him with me by the declaration of his physicians that he was not in a state to be moved. There are, moreover, servants of the Embassy and servants of my own, who have been kept in Paris in discharge of their duties.

I trust therefore that your Lordship will not deem me presumptuous in earnestly requesting that special representations may be made to the Prussian authorities in order to induce them to give the persons belonging to or employed by the Embassy the means of acting upon the instructions which I left with them to come away if the place should be threatened with bombardment or there should be any other imminent danger.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 5.

Earl Granville to Count Bernstorff.

M. l'Ambassadeur,

Foreign Office, October 14, 1870.

ON the departure from Paris of Her Majesty's Ambassador, he felt it his duty to leave behind him one of the Second Secretaries of the Embassy, Mr. Wodehouse, in order that he might afford, as long as possible, protection to such subjects of Her Majesty as from various causes had not already withdrawn from Paris, and that he might, as far as he was able, preserve the archives of the Embassy and other property belonging to Her Majesty's Government from injury. Together with these he directed to remain certain servants attached to the Embassy, and to himself, for the discharge of their usual duties.

Colonel Claremont, Military Attaché to the Embassy, and Captain Hore, the Naval Attaché, the latter being wholly incapacitated by illness from leaving Paris, remained behind under the instructions and with the sanction of Her Majesty's Ambassador after his departure.

My object in now addressing your Excellency is to request you, without loss of time, to bring the case of these public officers and servants, and generally of the remaining British residents, before the King of Prussia and those acting under His Majesty's orders, whether in a civil or military capacity, and to express the earnest hope of Her Majesty's Government that, before the operations at Paris assume a character by which their lives may be endangered, those persons who are in the service of the British Government, and residing hitherto in Paris, in execution of their public duties, as well as all other inoffensive British subjects, may be allowed an opportunity to quit the place; and Her Majesty's Government do not doubt that such a request will readily be acceded to by the King of Prussia and His Majesty's advisers.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 6.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 15, 1870.

WITH reference to your Excellency's despatch of the 9th instant, I inclose, for your information, a copy of a letter which I have addressed to Count Bernstorff,* requesting him to obtain from the King of Prussia permission for the members of Her Majesty's Embassy, together with the servants and other British subjects, to leave Paris.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 7.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, October 18, 1870.

I TRANSMITTED to your Excellency, in my despatch of the 15th instant, a copy of a letter which I had addressed to Count Bernstorff, requesting him to obtain for the members of the British Embassy remaining in Paris, and such inoffensive British subjects as might wish to accompany them, permission to withdraw from the French capital before a bombardment.

Count Bernstorff informed me yesterday, as I have stated to your Excellency by telegraph, that the permission would be granted, and that a nominal list of the British subjects desiring to avail themselves of it should be drawn up by Mr. Wodehouse.

Count Bismarck said further that he concluded your Excellency would communicate with the Government at Tours on the subject, which I accordingly requested you at once to do, and to inform me of the result, and, if possible, to make it known at the Prussian Head-quarters, either directly to Count Bismarck or through Colonel Walker.

In requesting Count Bernstorff to thank Count Bismarck for his compliance with the wishes of Her Majesty's Government in this respect, and informing him that I had communicated it to your Excellency, I have further said that, as I could only communicate with Mr. Wodehouse through the Prussian Head-quarters, I should be obliged to Count Bismarck if he would send to Mr. Wodehouse a message from me, apprizing him of the consent of the Prussian Government, and desiring him at once to prepare and forward to the Prussian Head-quarters a list of British subjects who might desire to leave Paris; and I told him that your Excellency was instructed to communicate with the Government at Tours on the subject. I added that, as regards Colonel Claremont, he should follow the course adopted by the Military Attachés of other countries who may have remained in Paris.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 8.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 22.)

My Lord,

Tours, October 18, 1870.

I HAD this morning the honour to receive your Lordship's telegram of yesterday informing me that the Prussian authorities had consented to allow the members of the Embassy and other British subjects who should accompany them from Paris to pass the lines of the German army.

I went immediately to the Comte de Chaudordy, and after placing in his hand a Memorandum on the subject, begged him to move the Government Delegation here to do all that depended upon it to facilitate the departure of my countrymen from Paris.

M. de Chaudordy said that he could answer at once for the willingness of the Government here to do all in its power; but that, of course, the necessary arrangements must be made at Paris with the Government and the military authorities there. If, however, I would compress an instruction to Mr. Wodehouse into a very small compass, he would undertake to send it for me to Paris in a way which he had reason to hope would prove to be both speedy and safe.

I accordingly entrusted to M. de Chaudordy a short letter in cypher, in which I informed Mr. Wodehouse that your Lordship had received through the Prussian Ambassador in London an assurance that the members of the British Embassy, and inoffensive British subjects, coming out of Paris would be allowed by the German military authorities to pass. I added, that it would be necessary that a list of these British subjects should be drawn up by Mr. Wodehouse for communication to the German authorities; and I desired him to settle the arrangements with the French Government at Paris, and, if possible, to make the result known to Count Bismarck either directly or through Colonel Walker. I further recommended Mr. Wodehouse to take every means to give notice to all British subjects of this opportunity for them to leave Paris; and I directed him, moreover, to make such arrangements for the safe custody of the archives and of the Embassy house and property as should appear to be most advisable under the circumstances. Finally, I desired him to take advantage of any means he might have of communicating with me.

Some hours after I had delivered the letter to Count Chaudordy for transmission to Mr. Wodehouse, I received your Lordship's telegram of this day, informing me that you had requested the Prussian Ambassador in London to beg Count Bismarck to forward a communication from you to Mr. Wodehouse on the subject of the removal of the members of the Embassy and other British subjects from Paris. I trust that the result will be that Mr. Wodehouse will thus receive, in a more certain and regular way than that to which I have been obliged to have recourse, complete instructions from your Lordship respecting this matter.

I have the honour to inclose a copy of the Memorandum which I gave to M. de Chaudordy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 8.

Memorandum.

LE Gouvernement Prussien est prêt à laisser passer librement le personnel de l'Ambassade d'Angleterre qui se trouve encore à Paris, ainsi que les sujets Britanniques inoffensifs qui voudraient l'accompagner, et dont une liste serait rédigée par M. Wodehouse.

Lord Lyons est chargé par Lord Granville de se concerter sans retard à ce sujet avec le Gouvernement Français.

Tours, le 18 Octobre, 1870.

(Translation.)

THE Prussian Government is ready to allow a free pass to the *personnel* of the English Embassy now in Paris, as well as to the inoffensive British subjects who may wish to accompany them, and a list of whom may be drawn up by Mr. Wodehouse.

Lord Lyons is charged by Lord Granville at once to concert arrangements on the subject with the French Government.

No. 9.

*Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received October 29.)**

My Lord,

Tours, October 25, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to transmit a copy of a despatch in which I have inclosed to Mr. Wodehouse copies of your Lordship's instructions respecting his withdrawal from Paris, and respecting the relief of British subjects. I hope to have an opportunity of forwarding the despatch to Mr. Wodehouse by Prince Wittgenstein, the Military Attaché to the Russian Embassy, who is expected daily at Tours on his return to Paris.

I venture to suggest to your Lordship's consideration the question whether the mere authority to act upon your despatch to me of the 8th ultimo conveys beyond a doubt to Mr. Wodehouse sufficient latitude with regard to expenditure in the present emergency.

The permission granted by the Prussian authorities to British subjects to quit Paris appears to be confined to those of whom a list shall be drawn up by Mr. Wodehouse, and who shall withdraw from the place in company with him. Mr. Wodehouse will, therefore, have the arduous and laborious task, first, of taking steps to insure notice of the opportunity coming, if possible, to the knowledge of all the British subjects scattered over Paris; next, of forming a complete list of those who desire to go; then of bringing them all together at a given day and hour; then of making arrangements that they may have means of conveyance through a tract of country in which not only is all communication by railroad impossible, but in which the bridges have been broken down and the ordinary roads obstructed; and lastly, of providing under unusual difficulties for the subsistence of the whole party, until they have passed both the Prussian and French lines, and reached a district in which the ordinary modes of locomotion and subsistence are available.

It is to be observed also that Mr. Wodehouse will probably be unable, at all events at the moment, to count upon any considerable contribution to the expenses, either from the majority of the English leaving Paris or from charitable sources. The great bulk of

the English now there are people in a humble class of society, who have been deprived of their livelihood by the consequences of the siege; and even among those in more fortunate circumstances we have reason to suppose that many are in temporary distress from the impossibility of obtaining remittances of money from England.

I would venture, therefore, to suggest that a sum of money adequate to the emergency should be placed at Mr. Wodehouse's disposal. I have said in the despatch to him that I presume the bankers of the Embassy, Messrs. de Rothschild, would make no difficulty in furnishing him with the money necessary; but I cannot be quite sure that this will be the case under present circumstances: and I therefore trust that your Lordship will cause measures to be taken to insure his not being exposed to any embarrassment on this head, and, above all, to guard against his being obliged by want of funds to leave behind any one who may desire to come away from the perils of the siege.

It would be difficult to form an estimate of the sum required without a knowledge of various particulars, which I cannot obtain here. Among these are the number of the English who would choose to leave Paris, the route which the military authorities would require them to take, and the price of conveyances and subsistence.

I cannot doubt that the Prussian authorities, having agreed to permit the departure of British subjects, will be willing to facilitate such communications between Her Majesty's Government and Mr. Wodehouse as are essential to give effect to that permission, and they will, of course, give Mr. Wodehouse the means of settling with them the necessary arrangements for the journey through their lines.

Your Lordship will see that in my despatch to Mr. Wodehouse I have suggested that Mr. Atlee and Mr. Lascelles, or one of them, might be sent to his assistance. I am, moreover, inclined to think that, if the party of English should prove to be very numerous, it might be advisable that he should have at his disposal some person possessing practical experience in arranging and managing expeditions of the kind.

I purpose sending a copy of this despatch by Prince Wittgenstein to Mr. Wodehouse.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 9.

Lord Lyons to Mr. Wodehouse.

Sir,

Tours, October 25, 1870.

I INCLOSE for your information and guidance the following papers relative to your own withdrawal and that of other British subjects from Paris:—

1. Copy of despatch from me to Earl Granville of the 9th instant.
2. Copy of despatch from Lord Granville to me of the 15th instant.
3. Copy of note from Lord Granville to Count Bernstorff, dated 14th instant.
4. Copy of despatch from Lord Granville to me of 18th instant.

I have, moreover, received a telegram from Lord Granville, in which, in consequence of having received from you information that there was great distress among British subjects, and that some of them, even if a free passage were granted, would be unable to avail themselves of it for want of money, his Lordship desires me to authorize you to act on his instruction to me of the 8th ultimo. Consequently, I add a copy of that instruction to the other papers inclosed herein.

I have, in obedience to Lord Granville's orders, addressed myself to the Government Delegation here, and have been answered that they are quite willing to do all in their power to facilitate the departure from Paris of yourself and all other British subjects who may be desirous of quitting the place; but that, of course, the necessary arrangements must be made with the Government and military authorities there. I have, accordingly, to desire you to settle these arrangements with the Government at Paris, and, if possible, to make the result known to Count Bismarck, either directly, or through Colonel Walker. You should also take advantage of any opportunity you may have of communicating it to me.

You will, naturally, use every means in your power to cause notice of this opportunity of leaving Paris to be brought to the knowledge of all the British subjects left in the place.

You will make such arrangements for the safe custody of the archives, and of the Embassy House and property, as may appear to you to be most advisable under the circumstances.

I presume that the bankers of the Embassy—Messrs. de Rothschild—will make no

difficulty in furnishing you with the money necessary to enable you to carry out Lord Granville's instructions for the relief of British subjects.

You may, perhaps, desire to have some more assistance than you can procure at Paris under present circumstances, in the very arduous and laborious task of giving notice to British subjects, drawing up the list of them, collecting them, and bringing them through the lines of the French and German Armies. In that case Mr. Atlee and Mr. Lascelles, or one of them, might be directed to go to your assistance, and to convey to you, if necessary, money to defray the expenses of the relief and removal of the indigent British subjects. Her Majesty's Government would, I feel sure, easily obtain from the German authorities safe-conducts for these members of the Embassy.

I hope that you will have the means of making your wishes known to Lord Granville or to me. You need not hesitate to send your despatches on these subjects to his Lordship or to me open, if their passage through the Prussian lines would be thereby facilitated. In a matter of humanity, in which the lives of many of our inoffensive countrymen may be at stake, any formal scruples on this head would be entirely out of place. I shall myself send the present despatch to you unsealed.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 10.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received January 1, 1871.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, December 27, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to submit to your Lordship a copy of a letter, dated Paris, 23rd November, and signed "Pollock," which reached me the day before yesterday. I know nothing of the writer.

The object of the letter is to call attention to the cases of the large number of British subjects who are still in Paris, and who are now desirous of getting away.

Major-General Claremont will, no doubt, have been able to give your Lordship full information as to the prospect there may be of enabling these British subjects to quit Paris. So far as my knowledge of the matter goes, I have reason to believe that the obstacles are now caused by the French as much as by the German authorities; and that, in fact, the removal of any considerable number of persons from Paris under flag of truce is necessarily attended by circumstances seriously embarrassing the operations of the besieged garrison.

Your Lordship is well aware of the urgency with which I pressed British subjects to leave Paris before I came away myself, and of the distinct notice I gave, that those who remained after the warnings they had received, would do so at their own risk and peril, and might not be able to get away afterwards. Still, I venture to recommend the matter to your Lordship's attention, and to suggest in particular that an opportunity of leaving the place should certainly be given to neutrals, if there be any immediate danger of its being bombarded.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 10.

Mr. Pollock to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Paris, November 23, 1870.

I HAVE the honour to recall to your Excellency's attention that there still remain here about 100 of Her Majesty's subjects very unwilling prisoners, and to earnestly solicit an early intercession on their behalf.

My personal dread of having to spend Christmas (usually a season of happy family reunion) in this desolate city decides me to write also to influential friends in the House to lay our unfortunate case before Lord Granville.

Trusting that your Lordship's firm representation will suffice to change the present capricious decision of the authorities, I have, &c.

(Signed) POLLOCK.

No. 11.

Earl Granville to Mr. Odo Russell.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 23, 1871.

I TELEGRAPHED to you on the 21st instant, stating that Her Majesty's Government were anxious to make arrangements for the safe withdrawal from Paris of such British subjects as might wish to escape from the dangers to which they were exposed by the bombardment; and I requested you to inquire whether permission would be granted to a British Diplomatic or Consular officer to enter Paris for the purpose of making such an arrangement. I added that, if the requisite permission were granted, there were several courses open, any one of which might be adopted as might seem most expedient: either it might be advisable to send Mr. Wodehouse or Mr. Atlee from England; or a general authority might be given to Count Bernstorff to grant a pass to Versailles to any person named to him; or some Englishman might be found at Versailles or in Paris to whom the task might be confided.

The telegram which I received from you on the 22nd, stating that the military authorities refused to permit any one to enter Paris until after the capitulation, made it clear that none of these courses were practicable except, to a limited extent, that last mentioned; and I therefore telegraph to you to-day to confine yourself to endeavouring to arrange with Mr. Blount for the protection of his fellow-countrymen in Paris, and for extending to them further relief, if the sum now placed at the disposal of the charitable fund should, contrary to expectation, prove insufficient for the purpose of relieving the immediate pressure both up to and after the capture of the city. I added that I should wish you to inform me without delay of the steps which you might take in the matter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 12.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received January 29.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, January 20, 1871.

IN my despatch of the 27th ultimo I spoke of the British subjects still in Paris, and suggested that an opportunity of leaving the place should certainly be given to neutrals, if there should be any immediate danger of its being bombarded.

The bombardment has since been actually begun, and, so far as I know, without any previous notice having been given, and without any means having been afforded for neutrals to escape from the city.

I have just been informed by the Italian Minister and the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires here that their Governments have been in communication with the Prussian authorities at Berlin on the subject, and have been given reason to expect that the Commanders of the German forces will allow each of them to send a Diplomatic or Consular officer into Paris to make arrangements for the removal of his countrymen. My two colleagues have accordingly determined to dispatch at once Secretaries of their Legations to Versailles and Paris for this purpose.

The French Government here furnishes the Secretaries with safe-conducts to secure their passing unmolested through the French lines.

I have thought it right to forward this information to your Lordship as speedily as possible by telegraph.

I am, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

No. 13.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received January 29.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, January 23, 1871.

ON the receipt of your Lordship's telegram of the day before yesterday I went to the Comte de Chaudordy, and begged him to send at once to the French Chargé d'Affaires in London instructions to give a letter for the Government at Paris and

a safe-conduct to any Diplomatic or Consular officer who might be selected by Her Majesty's Government to proceed to the bombarded city to make arrangements for removing British subjects.

M. de Chaudordy promised to send a telegram at once to M. Tissot to this effect. He said that he presumed that the French military authorities would everywhere recognize and respect the safe-conduct from the Embassy in London, especially as the bearer of it would be also provided with a letter from the Chargé d'Affaires to the Paris Government. He suggested, however, that it would still be well that the person sent by your Lordship should have a safe-conduct from the Delegation here if one could be sent to him in time.

I understand that the Secretary sent by the Italian Minister is to go, in the first instance, to Berlin, while the Secretary of the Spanish Legation is to endeavour to pass through the French and Prussian lines, and thus reach Versailles by the direct route from this place.

I am myself of opinion that this endeavour will be attended with considerable risk, and that in all probability the Spanish Secretary will not gain anything in point of time by attempting to take the direct route.

I may, perhaps, suggest that, in any case, a letter from your Lordship to the Government at Paris would have very great weight in inducing them to permit the withdrawal of British subjects and to afford facilities for effecting it.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

No. 14.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received January 31.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, January 26, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship herewith a letter which I have written to Mr. Blount, 3, Rue de la Paix, Paris, who has, as your Lordship has just done me the honour to inform me, been appointed Her Majesty's Consul in that city. It contains a list of some pressing applications which have been made to me respecting persons and property in Paris, and which I desire to recommend to Mr. Blount's attention.

I shall be much obliged if your Lordship will direct the letter to be sent to Paris in the most expeditious manner. It is open, and there is no objection to its being forwarded in that state, and submitted, if necessary, to the inspection of any French or German authorities.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 14.

Lord Lyons to Mr. Blount.

Sir,

Bordeaux, January 26, 1871.

I SUBJOIN a list of applications which have been made to me respecting persons and property in Paris, and I shall be very much obliged if you will give such attention to the cases as circumstances may allow, when this despatch reaches you.

I am, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 14.

List of Applications made to Lord Lyons respecting Persons and Property in Paris.

Mr. Alfred Sisley, 41, Rue Nollet Batignolles. His father sends the accompanying cheque and linen.

Mr. Hodgson, Hotel de la Grande Bretagne, 14, Rue Caumartin. His sister, Miss

Hodgson, writes on the 20th of October to beg that 25*l.* may be given to him, and promises to pay that sum to any banker; his sisters were then well.

Mr. Watari, a Japanese, 102, Rue du Faubourg Poissonnière. *Mr. J. R. Hooper* of 32, Great St. Helens, London, to whose care he was consigned, is anxious for intelligence and that Watari should be cared for, and a small sum of money placed at his disposal. *Mr. Hooper's* letter is dated 28th October.

Madame Mégret, an inmate of the Government Lunatic Asylum at Charenton. Her brother, *Mr. Beddington*, of 16, Sussex Place, Regent's Park, London, applied to Lord Granville to assist in having her removed from Paris. She was originally placed by her husband under the care of Dr. Luys at Ivry; but in consequence of the events of the war she was removed to Charenton and placed under the care of Dr. Foville. Lord Granville authorized her name to be inserted in the list of the persons desiring to leave Paris, which was to be drawn up by Mr. Wodehouse, but observed that Her Majesty's Embassy could not arrange for the removal from Paris of an invalid, and that her family must make the necessary arrangements. It is not believed to have been possible to get the name to *Mr. Wodehouse* before his departure.

M. Michell, Hotel Byron, Rue des Champs Elysées. A portmanteau belonging to the Honourable Caroline Norton left at the hotel in his charge by Miss Hunter.

M. Duré, Maison Routt, 5, Rue Harlay Marais. To protect *Miss Bury's* property. All she possesses in the world was left, it seems, in the room she occupied in his house. She wrote to Lord Lyons from No. 34, Camden Street, Dublin, at the end of December.

Salvador Carazo, a subject of Salvador, student at the Pension Menorval, Rue Beaumarchais. The Salvadorean Minister in London applied to Lord Granville on the 15th October and 17th November, to assist in removing this youth from Paris. He obtained the Prussian Ambassador's promise to submit the request for his removal to Count Bismarck.

Mrs. Louisa Jones, No. 11, Rue de Traktir, fifth floor, and *Mrs. Fitzgerald*, Nos. 5 and 7, Place d'Eylan, also fifth floor, are in anxiety for property left by them in their lodgings. Rear-Admiral Layton wrote to Lord Lyons on the subject on the 9th of November.

Mrs. Ponsford, 23, Rue de Turin, and two children. Her husband, of Azenby Dairy, 6, Lyndhurst Road, Camberwell, London, writes on the 30th of December, to beg that 10*l.* may be given to them on his account.

Mrs. Jenner, a lady of unsound mind, now in a Maison de Santé, 10, Rue Picpus. Sir Armine Morris, Baronet, her brother, wrote on the 1st of January, to request that means might be found of moving her from Paris.

Mr. J. M. Crawford, correspondent of the "Daily News," writes at Bordeaux, 24th January, for protection for property belonging to him at No. 79, Boulevard de Courcelles, second floor, consisting of furniture, plate, books, jewellery, and effects, as well as of wine in the cellar. He estimates the value at 20,000 francs.

He writes also for protection for property belonging to his mother-in-law, *Mrs. Johnstone*, in a small apartment in the entresol of the same house, left hand, value 5,000 francs.

M. Dubieff, Directeur du Collège de Ste. Barbe. Her Majesty's Minister at Dresden applies on behalf of Madame P. de Chilinska for news of her son, a boy of 13 years, at this College.

Miss Walker and *Miss Atkins*, 24, Rue Balzac. Lady Roden has begged for protection for them, through Mr. Bonar, Her Majesty's Minister at Berne, and has sent him 10*l.* for them.

Mr. Charles Coles, a very old gentleman, bedridden, at 3, Cité Odier, Paris. To let him know that his widowed niece, Mrs. Cowper Coles, and children are well. He is uncle to Captain Cowper Coles who went down in the "Captain."

Abbé Rebours, 44, Rue du Bac. His sister writes, 22nd November: Almir is well at Aix la Chapelle; Alia at Brussels sends him money. Odoard at Cuileers; he and his all well. Edgard at La Roche; Ernestine at Algiers with her sister. In general all parents and friends well.

Sister Elizabeth of the Cross, Carmelite Convent, 25, Rue d'Enfer.

M. Varcollier writes on the 29th that her sister-in-law, Madame Henri Marchand, has been brought to bed of a girl. Both mother and child as well as possible.

Sister Mary of St. Joseph (formerly Lady Minna Howard), Sub-Prioress of the Carmelite Convent, No. 25, Rue d'Enfer. Lord Lyons' niece.

No expense to be spared to provide for the safety and comfort of this lady and the other nuns of her convent. Her brother, the Duke of Norfolk, will most gratefully repay any sum spent for this purpose.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received March 1.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, February 26, 1871.

I PERCEIVE that observations have been made in both Houses of Parliament on the fact of my having left Paris in the month of September last, and on the steps which I took to provide for the protection of British subjects there during my absence.

I do not think it necessary to say much here on the first point. I was advised to remove to Tours by M. Jules Favre, and pressed to accompany them to that place by the Representatives of the Great Powers of Europe. I travelled to Tours with the Representatives of Austria, Italy, Russia, and Turkey, and we were followed immediately by the Spanish Chargé d'Affaires, and afterwards by the Representatives of other Powers. In fact, the only Chief of a Diplomatic Mission from a Great Power who stayed at Paris was Mr. Washburne, the United States' Minister. As representing a nation which punctiliously abstains from taking part in the political affairs of Europe, Mr. Washburne had not the same reasons as the Representatives of European Powers for removing to a place at which he could serve as a means of communication between his Government and the Government of France, and as being charged with the protection of North German subjects in France he was allowed by the German military authorities facilities for correspondence during the siege which were denied to the Representatives of other Governments. I conceived, at the time, that it was my duty neither to reject the advice of the French Minister for Foreign Affairs, nor to separate myself from my principal colleagues, and I thought it would be on all accounts inexpedient for me to allow myself to be shut up in Paris and to be deprived of all speedy and satisfactory means of communicating with your Lordship. My subsequent experience has, I confess, confirmed me in these opinions. On the day after I left Paris, all communication by road with that place was intercepted; and on the following day the last telegraph wire was cut. The Diplomats who were left in the besieged city were refused by the German authorities positively all facilities for corresponding with their Governments otherwise than by letters left open for the inspection of those authorities. My having resided at the seat of the Delegation of the Government at Tours, and having followed them to Bordeaux, have been accepted by the French as manifest proofs of the desire of Her Majesty's Government to maintain intimate and friendly relations with them, while my doing so has afforded Her Majesty's Government the readiest and most effectual means of maintaining such relations in fact.

On the question of the provision made by me for the protection of British subjects when I, myself, left Paris, it may, perhaps, be desirable that I should make some explanation in addition to the Reports which I addressed to your Lordship at the time. The objections made against the course I took appear to resolve themselves into a complaint that I did not leave Mr. Atlee the Consul at Paris, instead of or in addition to Mr. Wodehouse, one of the Secretaries of the Embassy.

What happened was this. When it became apparent that an attack upon Paris was imminent I naturally became desirous of reducing the number of members of the Embassy, whom I kept with me there, to the lowest point compatible with the performance of the work. Much of the ordinary business, and in particular the not inconsiderable part of it caused by the passage of Queen's messengers, and the necessity of transmitting without delay despatches brought by them, was sure to be suspended by the siege: consequently, I thought that the services of two of the members of the Chancery might be temporarily dispensed with. It so happened that two of these had wives and families, while the rest were unmarried. I therefore selected, as most proper to send away, the two married men, of whom Mr. Atlee was one.

As your Lordship is aware, although Mr. Atlee holds a commission as Consul, his principal functions are those of Attaché-Librarian and Registrar to the Embassy. In ordinary times there are some technical advantages in having a person with the character of Consul in immediate connection with the Embassy, among which may be reckoned his collecting, on account of Her Majesty's Government, Consular fees which considerably exceed in amount the Consular salary allowances.

Under the circumstances, however, under which my departure took place, there were certainly no special functions which could be better discharged by a Consul than by a Secretary of the Embassy. I had no power to take out of the hands of the Committee of the British Charitable Fund the management of the charitable contributions for the relief of distressed British subjects. I had most certainly no wish to do so. On the

contrary, I had the fullest confidence in the members of that Committee, whom the most generous motives induced to stay in Paris; and the noble and unwearied devotion with which they have discharged the benevolent duties they undertook have more than justified the high opinion I had formed of them. In fact, the object which rendered the presence of a member of the Embassy in Paris desirable, was that he should communicate officially with the French Government and exercise an influence with them on behalf of Her Majesty's subjects; and it appeared to me that I should better provide for the attainment of this object by presenting a Secretary to the Minister for Foreign Affairs as Representative of the Embassy than by simply leaving a Consul in the town. I accordingly presented Mr. Wodehouse to M. Jules Favre in that capacity. In fact, while Mr. Wodehouse could perfectly well perform all the functions that could be discharged by a Consul, he was in a much better position than a Consul could have been for communicating efficiently with the Minister for Foreign Affairs or other French authorities.

I was naturally anxious not to expose any of Her Majesty's servants unnecessarily, and I conceived that, by stationing Mr. Wodehouse and General Claremont, the Military Attaché at Paris, I made the best provision in my power for the protection of the British subjects who remained there.

I left with Mr. Wodehouse orders to come away from Paris himself if the place should be threatened with immediate bombardment; and in that case to do his utmost to obtain a safe passage out for all British subjects. I considered that in such a contingency the protection of any of our countrymen who might still remain could not be transferred to better hands than to those of General Claremont, who, from his intimacy with General Trochu and his large acquaintance among French military men and well-known influence with them, would have peculiar means of befriending and assisting British subjects if actual danger from military operations should be imminent.

As the Minister of Marine was established at Tours, and as it was manifest that no naval intelligence could be obtainable during the siege, I should have brought Captain Hore, the Naval Attaché, away with me if he had not been too ill to travel.

The orders I left with him were, as your Lordship is aware, to rejoin me as soon as his health should admit of his doing so.

Since I left Paris I have had no other active duty to perform in the matter than to endeavour to forward orders from your Lordship to Mr. Wodehouse. But I feel confident that your Lordship will consider that my whole correspondence with you, both before and since I left Paris, shows that I have been in constant anxiety respecting the British subjects there, and earnestly desirous that every effort should be made for their practicable relief.

I subjoin a list of some of the principal despatches I have had the honour to address to your Lordship on the subject.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

NOTE.—See also "Franco-German War Papers, No. 1 (1871)," Nos. 51, 60, 84, 86, 112, 113, 130, 146, 147, 153, 239, 265, 311, and 314; and previous despatches in this series.

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. No. 2
(1871).

CORRESPONDENCE with Lord Lyons respecting his
Departure from Paris, and Provision made for the
Withdrawal of British Subjects.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Com-
mand of Her Majesty. 1871.*

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. No. 3 (1871).

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

PECUNIARY DEMANDS OF PRUSSIA

ON

FRANCE.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1871.

LONDON:

PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

[C.—266.] *Price 1d.*

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Correspondence respecting the Pecuniary Demands of Prussia on France.

No. 1.

*Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.**

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 24, 1871.

HER Majesty's Government, without being informed of the other proposed terms of peace, understand from the Ambassador of France that the war indemnity demanded by Germany is six milliards of francs (240,000,000*l.*) to be paid almost immediately, and subject to some deductions not yet settled.

His Excellency has represented to the Government of Her Majesty that it would be impossible for the Government of France to pay such a sum, and that it would be dishonest on their part to enter into an engagement for a payment which they know it would be absolutely beyond their power to fulfil, and they urge the Government of Her Majesty to represent to the German Government the impossibility of such a payment.

Her Majesty's Government feel the difficulties which arise from their ignorance of the offers made on the side of France, and they bear in mind that this country is one only among the neutral Powers, all bound by the obligations of friendship to both parties.

But Her Majesty's Government are willing, in consideration of the extreme pressure of time, to make representations to Germany on the amount of this indemnity, and to tender their good offices in the spirit of friendship to both parties, under the conviction that it is the interest of Germany, as well as of France, that the amount of the indemnity should not be greater than that which it is reasonable to expect could be paid.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 2.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, February 25, 1871.

I TRANSMIT to your Excellency herewith a copy of a letter from M. Jules Favre, with reference to the Duc de Broglie's appointment as Ambassador for France at this Court, and which was placed in my hands by his Excellency.

I expressed to the French Ambassador my thanks for the friendly tenor of this communication, but I observed there was one phrase in it, namely, that which, whilst referring to the friendly relations which have so long existed between England and France, implied some disappointment that in the hour of her present trial England had withheld her support, which I could not on our side admit. That I perfectly understood that France should have felt some irritation, whether reasonable or not, at an old ally not coming actively to her assistance; but that we decided upon neutrality as the line which this country felt bound to adopt in a struggle which they had vainly attempted to prevent; but that in that neutrality we had been actuated by the most friendly feeling compatible with its impartial duties.

The Duc de Broglie replied, that France felt our conduct to be cold; that there had been a disappointment as to our non-recognition of the Republic, and at our indifference

* Copies of this despatch were communicated on the 24th of February to Count Bernstorff and to Mr. Odo Russell.

whilst France was suffering so much; but that any questions of this nature were now resolved, and that he wished only to talk to me of the present and future.

Her Majesty's Government had been told that M. Favre knew the terms of peace; this, the Duke added, was not the case; M. Favre did not know them at the time this was said.

The Duke said he was not well informed about them. He had seen M. Thiers after his first interview with Count Bismarck this week. It had turned exclusively upon the prolongation of the armistice which was absolutely necessary, and which had to be extracted from the Emperor and his Minister. He had also seen M. Thiers after his second interview. M. Thiers had thought it right to be reticent to him on the political and territorial questions, but he had mentioned the financial claim of six milliards, and had spoken of the absolute impossibility of meeting it, adding that it would not be honest to promise what could not be fulfilled.

The Duc de Broglie said, in these circumstances, that however much the old principles of European right were laid aside, the French Government thought they had a right to ask England whether she had no proposal to make. Speeches had been made in Parliament stating that Her Majesty's Government would not neglect a favourable opportunity of promoting a permanent peace, and the time was pressing.

He reserved to himself the right of bringing before us the territorial and political questions, but the financial subject was simple, and a matter almost of fact. Could we do nothing in this?

I explained to the Duc de Broglie the difficulties of the situation. I pointed out that our non-recognition of the Government arose from the late Government declining to call an Assembly to sanction it, a refusal which I knew M. Thiers had disapproved.

There is, moreover, a want of agreement among all of the Powers of Europe even to examine any proposal which France might make, and we were not prepared to use stronger language than that to which we intended to adhere; that individually I doubted whether any friendly advice which the Germans were adverse to receiving would not weaken whatever party there might be at Versailles in favour of moderation; that with regard to any proposals which the Duc de Broglie might make, I could answer for their being considered by my colleagues in the most friendly spirit, and with a strong desire to do whatever might be practically useful.

I begged his Excellency to state in what way he thought we could be useful in the financial question.

The Duc de Broglie said that what he asked us to do was to demand from Germany that the armistice should be prolonged in order that the negotiations should not be withdrawn from all cognizance on the part of Europe; and that, in the second place, we should offer arbitration with respect to the amount of indemnity, which was an object of importance to the conquerors and the conquered, and a matter of deep interest to all commercial countries to whom the financial perturbation caused by an excessive sum might be of great detriment.

I promised to bring the matter before my colleagues, and the Duc de Broglie reserved his right of appealing to us with respect to the territorial and political conditions.

Your Excellency is already aware, that a Cabinet having been immediately summoned on the subject of the Duc de Broglie's communications to me, I informed him that, with regard to the first proposal that Her Majesty's Government should urge Germany to prolong the armistice for the object stated by his Excellency, the Cabinet was of opinion that such a step would not promote the object which his Excellency had in view, but that Her Majesty's Government had embodied in the despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus (of which I communicated copies both to your Excellency and to the Duke) the substance of the second proposal which the French Ambassador had conveyed to me in order to arrive at a satisfactory arrangement as to the amount of indemnity to be paid by France.

I subsequently pointed out to the Duc de Broglie that, in directing Her Majesty's Ambassador at Berlin, as stated in my despatch, to make representations to Germany on the amount of indemnity demanded of France, and to tender their good offices, in the spirit of friendship, to both parties, Her Majesty's Government had been guided by the wish which his Excellency had so strongly expressed on behalf of the French Government; and I said that I had moreover asked Count Bernstorff in the evening of the 24th to telegraph to Count Bismarck, as I had myself telegraphed to Mr. Odo Russell at Versailles the substance of my despatch to Lord Augustus Loftus.

I added, with reference to a remark that he had made to me as to the importance of time, that, as his Excellency had only arrived in the morning of the 24th, that I saw him

at half-past 10, and presented him to the Queen at half-past 1, after which it was necessary for me to consult my colleagues, in a Cabinet specially summoned for that purpose, on the statements he had made to me, and thereupon took measures at once for making a representation to the German Government, I considered that I had shown that Her Majesty's Government, no less than his Excellency, were fully sensible of the importance of acting without delay.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

Inclosure in No. 2.

M. Jules Favre to the Duc de Broglie.—(Communicated to Earl Granville by the Duc de Broglie, February 25.)

M. le Comte,

Paris, ce 22 Février, 1871.

J'ÉPROUVE une vive satisfaction en confiant M. le Duc de Broglie la mission de représenter la France, auprès du Gouvernement de Sa Majesté la Reine d'Angleterre. L'adhésion que votre Excellence a bien voulu donner à ce choix m'est un sûr garant qu'il répondra pleinement au désir sincère du Chef du pouvoir Exécutif de la République Française et de son Cabinet tout entier, de renouer avec votre nation les liens d'amitié qui ont si longtemps fait notre mutuelle force en contribuant puissamment au maintien de la paix en Europe. Je ne puis dissimuler à votre Excellence que j'aurais été heureux, dans nos jours de cruelles épreuves, que cette longue tradition ne parût point momentanément s'affaiblir; et néanmoins, je n'oublie point la bienveillance que votre Excellence m'a témoignée et dont personnellement je lui demeure reconnaissant, non plus que les égards qu'elle a montrés à la France, en retardant pour elle dans des termes dont je suis vivement touché les travaux de la Conférence. J'ose croire que les communications que M. le Duc de Broglie est chargé de faire à votre Excellence fortifieront ces sentiments, et pourront devenir le point de départ d'une action efficace que je ne crains pas de solliciter au nom de mon pays, la croyant d'ailleurs conforme aux intérêts comme aux inspirations du peuple Anglais, destinée à servir utilement sa politique, en même temps à jeter les bases d'une paix désirable pour toute l'Europe.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) JULES FAVRE.

(Translation.)

M. le Comte,

Paris, February 22, 1871.

I FEEL much satisfaction in entrusting to the Duc de Broglie the mission of Representative of France to the Government of Her Majesty the Queen of England. The assent which your Excellency has been so good as to give to this selection is a sure pledge to me that it will fulfil the sincere desire of the Chief of the Executive Power of the French Republic and of his whole Cabinet, to renew with your nation the relations of friendship which have so long constituted our mutual strength, and have greatly contributed to the maintenance of peace in Europe. I cannot conceal from your Excellency that I should have been glad, in the days of our cruel trials, if this long-standing tradition had not appeared to be momentarily weakened; and yet I do not forget the kindness your Excellency has shown me, and for which I remain personally grateful to you, nor the regard which you have shown for France in postponing for her the labours of the Conference in terms by which I am deeply touched. I venture to hope that the communications which the Duc de Broglie is instructed to make to your Excellency will confirm those sentiments, and may give rise to a course of effective action, which I do not fear to solicit in the name of my country, believing it, moreover, to be in conformity alike with the interests and the feelings of the English people, calculated to be usefully subservient to their policy, and at the same time to lay the foundation of a peace which is desirable for the sake of all Europe.

I have, &c.
(Signed) JULES FAVRE.

No. 3.

Mr. Odo Russell to Earl Granville.—(Received March 4.)

(Extract.)

Versailles, February 26, 1871.

YOUR Lordship's telegram of the 24th instant 11.45 p.m., respecting the war indemnity, was delivered to me at 11 p.m. last night, soon after I had come home from a visit to the Crown Prince's head-quarters, where I learnt that the war indemnity of six milliards had been reduced to five milliards, and had been agreed to by M. Thiers.

I conclude that your Lordship's telegram, through Count Bernstorff, must have reached yesterday morning early, but I have not been able to see the Chancellor myself, who is too much engaged with the French negotiators to receive any one to-day.

The negotiations must be concluded before midnight, when the armistice ends and hostilities will be resumed if the preliminaries are not accepted.

No. 4.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received March 6.)

My Lord,

Berlin, February 28, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 24th instant, which was delivered to me yesterday morning by the messenger Harbord.

I waited on Baron Thile shortly after its receipt, and communicated it to his Excellency.

Baron Thile inquired whether I was instructed to give him a copy of your Lordship's despatch. I replied that I was not officially charged to do so, but that I would leave it in his Excellency's hands.

Baron Thile informed me that he had reason to believe, by a telegram received from Count Bernstorff, that a copy of this despatch had been already forwarded to Versailles, but that, nevertheless, he would immediately transmit a copy to Count Bismarck.

His Excellency added that, of course, he could express no opinion on the subject to which the despatch referred, his position only permitting him to be the medium of its transmission to the Chancellor.


I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. NO. 3
(1871).

CORRESPONDENCE respecting the Pecuniary Demands
of Prussia on France.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Com-
mand of Her Majesty. 1871.*

LONDON :
PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.



FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. No. 4 (1871).

CORRESPONDENCE

BETWEEN

BRITISH SUBJECTS RESIDING IN FRANCE

AND THE

FOREIGN OFFICE,

IN REFERENCE TO

LOSS OF PROPERTY

SINCE THE

ENTRY OF THE GERMAN ARMY INTO FRANCE.

Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Command of Her Majesty.
1871.

LONDON.

PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

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Correspondence between British Subjects residing in France and
the Foreign Office, in reference to Loss of Property since
the Entry of the German Army into France.

No. 1.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, September 2, 1870.

HAVING received from different parties applications for the protection of their property and for exemption from military requisitions, I thought it best to consult the Law Officers of the Crown on the subject; and as your Excellency will doubtless have received many similar applications, I think it may be convenient for you to be made acquainted, for your guidance, with the nature of the answer which, under their advice, I return to such applications: namely, that "British subjects having property in France are not entitled to any special protection for their property, or to exemption from military contributions to which they will be liable in common with the inhabitants of the place in which they reside, or in which their property may be situated."

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 2.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received January 10.)

My Lord,

Bordeaux, January 6, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to transmit to your Lordship a copy of a letter which I have received to-day from Mr. Robert William Kirby, who appears to be a British subject established at La Ferté Imbault in the Department of the Loire-et-Cher, and who complains of the treatment suffered by him and his family at the hands of German troops, and demands redress. I inclose also a certificate from the Maire of the commune which accompanied the letter.

Lastly, I inclose herewith a copy of the answer which I have made to Mr. Kirby, and in which I have informed him that I have forwarded a copy of his letter to your Lordship.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 2.

Mr. Kirby to Lord Lyons.

*Chateau de la Ferté Imbault, près Salbris, Loire-et-Cher,
December 28, 1870.*

My Lord,

I HAVE the honour to lay before your Lordship a statement of the pillage, menaces and ill-treatment which we, a family of British subjects, have suffered at the hands of the Prussian troops, and to beg for the redress your Lordship may think proper to obtain for us. We have been settled in this commune of La Ferté Imbault for many years, my uncle having bought this property and left it to us. My father is a clergyman of the

Church of England, we have all been educated in England, we are purely English, and I inclose a certificate of our British citizenship.

On the evening of the 7th instant, on hearing of the entry of the Prussians into Salbris, two leagues off, we hoisted the British flag over the gate of our chateau, trusting that respect for a neutral flag would protect our persons and property; in this expectation we were entirely disappointed. On the morning of the 8th instant, Colonel von Rosenberg, commanding the whole or part of the Yellow Lancers or Uhlans, I think the 5th Regiment, came up and peremptorily demanded, through one of his officers, lodging for the night, although we announced our nationality, and directed his attention to the British flag. They then rode away, and were succeeded by a few Hussars, commanded by a young officer, who rode into our courtyard, and finding my father there, an old man and a clergyman, at once put a pistol to his breast, and ordered him to have all our horses brought up instantly that he might choose the best; fortunately, however, he rejected them all as not being good enough, and contented himself with ordering us to bring him three bottles of our best wine, with which he finally withdrew:—all this though we earnestly called his attention to our flag and nationality.

In the evening Colonel Von Rosenberg returned with his troops, and his first proceeding, after turning us nearly all, ladies included, out of our rooms, which he and his officers at once occupied—was to order me, after I should have their dinner ready, to have soup prepared for twenty men also. As I was unable to have this done, the provisions I had in the castle not being enough, Colonel von Rosenberg threatened to put my father and me under arrest, but as I defied him to do so he did not proceed beyond threats. During the officers' dinner, though I had them served with ordinary and good Bordeaux wine, they called me in and demanded six bottles of champagne. As there were only women servants in the house, of course frightened and excited by this invasion, my brother and I were obliged to go and fetch them this ourselves—similarly with tea—and afterwards with blankets, feather beds, fires in each room, &c.: for these gentlemen were contented with nothing short of luxury in their newly-appropriated quarters, and seemed to take a pleasure in giving us the utmost trouble they could. Finally, they ordered breakfast for early morning, and went to bed.

In the meantime their men had broken open the doors of our granaries, and had taken all the oats stored for our horses for the winter, and a great portion of our hay—stabling some of their horses in the hay-shed so as to waste as much as they took. On my remonstrating with the Colonel, he had said this was quite right, and that the fault was mine in not having opened the doors, which, by the way, I would have done if I could have been in several places at once on their arrival, for from the first I offered no opposition to their demands as long as I could satisfy them. Next morning they rode away, after making us serve them at breakfast as before, though their orderlies were in the house; and I had to run after the Colonel to get a receipt for the hay and oats they had taken, simply as a precaution, to be able to show to those that might come after that we had been already plundered. Even then I found it difficult to get his staff officer to put down the right quantity.

That morning and several afterwards many little sundries were missed from the rooms which the officers, fourteen in number, had occupied during the night. Colonel von Rosenberg and another, either an officer or an orderly, had slept in a room usually occupied by an English friend staying with us, Mr. David Cannon. In the morning, Mr. Cannon missed the following articles: a drinking flask, a pair of plated spurs (convenient on the march, as they require little cleaning), one if not two flannel shirts, and a piece of soap. My brother's worked slippers and handkerchief were also stolen, as were some down quilts and pillow slips, &c. Let me say, *en passant*, that it is amusing to see English papers, in speculating on the chances of the war, lay stress on the fact that the Germans came into France insufficiently clad—a small consideration with troops who, like Falstaff's, find linen enough (and woollen too) on every hedge, or rather in everybody's drawers. At Salbris, Nonan, Sheillay, and the other stations on the Ligne du Centre, in this neighbourhood, they have ransacked all the houses, and taken everything they wish for their comfort and luxury. In our stables, the soldiers had turned out our horses, broken down the stalls, stolen five or six bridles, halters, whips, spurs, horse-rug and roller, &c.

Next day, the 9th instant, came twelve Cuirassiers of, I think, the 9th Regiment, commanded by Lieutenant von Spalding. The soldiers rode into our courtyard, and demanded oats and cognac, while the officer went and sat in the auberge of the village. In vain I showed the receipt for all the oats I had had taken from me the day before. The soldier or non-commissioned officer in command (named Fluch, as the officers afterwards told us) proceeded to menaces to make me produce oats that I had not. Finding

menaces useless, he struck me two violent blows on the side of the head with the flat of his drawn sword; finding that useless, he made a lunge to run me through the body, which I avoided, and escaped through the stables, fortunately open, while the cuirassier turned his fury upon my father and Mr. Cannon, who were present. Meantime I went down to the village to complain to the officer in command, who certainly did reprimand the soldier, but who did not refrain from robbing one of our farms of poultry half an hour afterwards, with the same man, though he had given me his word of honour, before witnesses, that the soldier should be punished. I have omitted to state that the same man had previously struck my brother, ordering him to bring wine, and calling him a swine. My brother had returned the compliment, but not brought him the wine.

One Prussian officer had been heard to remark of us in the village, "They think that their filthy rag of an English colour" (which he called by an obscene name) "will protect them, but they will find themselves very much mistaken;" and all the rest of them seem to have acted with the same feeling; except, let me state it to his honour, one staff officer, the Baron von Treskow, who also did good service in protecting the property in the village.

On Saturday, the 10th, two parties of Uhlans arrived and searched for oats in our granaries, though assured by us that there were none left; and again our horses were inspected, but not considered good enough to rob us of. The Uhlans generally, throughout, spoke to us lance and pistol in hand.

About the 13th they retreated from this neighbourhood, and we have seen no more of them here, though they have been pillaging as far as Salleris, and there is continual danger of their return.

I trust your Lordship will excuse the length of this statement. I have considered that the minutest details had a certain importance, as regarding British persons and property. M. le Préfet de Loire-et-Cher has kindly undertaken to forward you our complaint, which I would have despatched sooner had I known that communication was possible.

Though we are anything but rich, we think less of the pecuniary loss we have sustained than of the insults offered to ourselves and our nationality; at the same time I may as well state that from the above occurrences we do not lose less than 4,000 francs, the deterioration of our stock from the loss of our hay and oats in a year of such scarcity being considered. We leave the whole question of reparation, without reserve, in your Lordship's hands, feeling confident that you will exact whatever is possible and adequate.

I beg that your Lordship will, if you should think fit, do me the honour to have this published in the principal English journals.

(Signed) ROBERT WILLIAM KIRBY.

Vu par nous, Maire de la Ferté Imbault, Canton de Salbris, pour légalisation de la signature de Mr. Robert William Kirby apposée ci-dessus.

La Ferté Imbault, le 29 Décembre, 1870.

(Signé) LOUIS DESCHAMPS.

(Translation.)

Seen by us, the Mayor of La Ferté Imbault, Canton of Salbris, for legalizing the signature of Mr. Robert William Kirby, above appended.

(Signed) LOUIS DESCHAMPS.

Inclosure 2 in No. 2.

Certificate of the Mayor of La Ferté Imbault, le 29 Décembre, 1870.

LE Soussigné, L. E. J. Deschamps, Maire de la Ferté Imbault, Canton de Salbris (Loire-et-Cher), France, certifie et atteste que Mr. Robert William Kirby, fils, né en cette commune, est citoyen Angleterre et n'a jamais été naturalisé Français, non plus que son père ni aucun membre de sa famille.

Je déclare en outre, sur l'honneur en mon âme et conscience, que je connais assez et depuis longtemps Mr. Kirby pour savoir qu'il est incapable d'attester un fait faux et qu'il

a toujours été dans cette commune un modèle pour tous les habitants pour la délicatesse, les sentiments d'honneur, d'humanité et de probité.

En foi de quoi j'ai délivré le présent, que je certifie exact devant Dieu et les hommes.
Mairie de la Ferté Imbault, le 29 Décembre, 1870.

(Signed) Le Maire,
LOUIS DESCHAMPS.

(Translation.)

THE Undersigned, L. E. J. Deschamps, Mayor of La Ferté Imbault, Canton of Salbris (Loire et Cher), France, certifies and attests that Mr. Robert William Kirby, son, born in this Commune, is an English citizen, and has never been naturalized a Frenchman, any more than his father, or any member of his family.

I further declare, on the honour of my soul and conscience, that I have known Mr. Kirby well enough, and for a long time, to know that he is incapable of attesting a false fact, and that he has always been in this Commune a model to all the inhabitants of delicacy, sentiments of honour, humanity, and probity.

In faith of which I have delivered these presents, which I certify to be exact before God and man.

(Signed) The Mayor,
LOUIS DESCHAMPS.

Inclosure 3 in No. 2.

Mr. Malet to Mr. Kirby.

Sir,

Bordeaux, January 6, 1871.

I AM desired by Lord Lyons to inform you that he has received to-day your letter of the 28th ultimo respecting the proceedings of the German troops, and that he has sent a copy of it to Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

This is the only step which it is in Lord Lyons' power to take in this matter.

His Excellency desires me to express to you the great regret with which he has heard of the loss and annoyance to which you and your family appear to have been exposed.

(Signed) I am, &c.
E. B. MALET.

No. 3.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, January 11, 1871.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 6th instant, inclosing a letter from Mr. Kirby, an English gentleman established with his family at La Ferté Imbault, complaining of the conduct of the German troops in making requisitions on his property; and I have to instruct you to acquaint that gentleman that much as Her Majesty's Government regret the inconvenience and loss to which he and his family were exposed, it is out of their power to interfere to obtain any redress for him, inasmuch as foreigners residing in a country which is the seat of war are equally liable with the natives of this country to have requisitions levied on their property by the belligerents.

(Signed) I am, &c.
GRANVILLE.

No. 4.

Mr. Consul Bernal to Earl Granville.—(Received January 24.)

My Lord,

Havre, January 23, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a statement made by Mr. Lawrence Smith, master of the English barque "Theresa," respecting the alleged wilful destruction by the German troops of a house and furniture belonging to him at St. Ouen, about fourteen miles below Rouen.

Mr. Smith was absent from home at the time the occurrences are alleged to have taken place.

I have, &c.
(Signed) **FREDERIC BERNAL.**

Inclosure in No. 4.

Protest of Mr. Lawrence Smith, Master of the English Barque "Theresa," against the wanton destruction by fire of his house and property at St. Ouen, a town about fourteen miles from Rouen, on the Honfleur side of the Seine.

ON December 15th, 1870, about 500 Prussian soldiers arrived at St. Ouen, a village about a mile from La Bouville. Though the English flag was flying, 31 soldiers were quartered on me for the night, whom I had to feed at my own expense. On December 17, 60 Prussian soldiers came to my house and robbed me of all my provisions, corn, straw, and farm stock. They left on the 18th. The same evening a party of 4 were quartered on us for the night. On December 31, 60 Prussian soldiers were again quartered at my house until the following day. On January 4, 1871, about 7 o'clock in the morning, about 60 Prussian soldiers surrounded my house. My family had previously retired to the cellars. Five minutes afterwards the Prussians fired a volley of musketry into the cellar, and my family only escaped death by being in a smaller cellar at right angles to the entrance. Mrs. Smith, as soon as the firing ceased, rushed out with a child in her arms, and the remaining portion of the family followed. The troops then broke all the windows, destroyed the furniture, and, making a pile of the *débris*, they set fire to it and the house. They refused to allow linen or anything to be taken away, even burning all our wearing-apparel. They took away all the things they could carry. The English flag which was hoisted was first ordered to be taken down. Everything in the cellar was also burnt; two of my children were frost-bitten badly through the family having been driven away half dressed, with bare feet, into the nearest wood, where they had, without sufficient clothing, to remain three hours in the snow. I estimate my loss at 2,000*l.* sterling.

(Signed) **LAWRENCE SMITH.**

No. 5.

Viscount Enfield to Consul Bernal.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 31, 1871.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 23rd instant, inclosing a statement made by Lawrence Smith, a British subject, respecting the alleged wilful destruction of a house and furniture belonging to him by the German troops at St. Ouen, about fourteen miles from Rouen; and, in reply, to convey to you his Lordship's wishes that you should, if possible, personally inquire into the truth of the alleged facts, and report to him the result of your investigations.

I am, &c.
(Signed) **ENFIELD.**

No. 6.

Consul Bernal to Earl Granville.—(Received February 6.)

My Lord,

Havre, February 3, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of Lord Enfield's despatch of the 31st ultimo, conveying to me your Lordship's wishes that I should, if possible, personally inquire into the truth of the facts alleged by Captain Smith respecting the destruction of his property at St. Ouen by the German forces. There would be no means of my personally inquiring into the truth of his statement without visiting the locality, but I had a conversation with him on the subject, and the impression left on my mind was that he was telling a true story. He gave the same account of the circumstances to Mr. Vice-Consul Wagner, at Honfleur, and to Commander Crozier, of Her Majesty's ship "Helicon" who likewise, I believe, saw Mrs. Smith and her children. Captain Smith

sailed with his vessel the "Theresa," for the Tyne two days ago. His address is, "Care of Messrs. Bell and Dunn, of Queen Street, Newcastle-on-Tyne."

I have, &c.
(Signed) FREDERIC BERNAL.

No. 7.

Messrs. Bell and Dunn to Earl Granville.—(Received February 9.)

Honoured Sir,

8, Queen Street, Newcastle-on-Tyne, February 8, 1871.

WE respectfully beg to ask your Lordship, on behalf of Captain L. Smith of the English ship "Theresa," who had his house burned and furniture destroyed in France on the 4th January last, and his wife and family most cruelly illtreated, without the slightest provocation, by the Prussian soldiers (the particulars of which outrage would be forwarded to your Lordship by Her Majesty's Consul at Havre), if your Lordship has received any reply from the Prussian Government on this matter, and if they have agreed to pay him the compensation which he claims.

Captain Smith arrived in the Tyne with his ship on Saturday last, with his family on board, and as he will require to leave again shortly, he will at once have to make arrangements to leave his family here, and as they have lost everything they possessed, even to their very clothes, the Prussians refusing to allow them to take sufficient to cover the children, driving them into the woods almost naked, of which fact your Lordship will have been already informed. He is very anxious to know if any reply has yet been received, and for your Lordship's information begs to state that Captain Smith having had to go through the country from Havre to near La Douille to get to his family, he did not, although making inquiries, hear of a single similar case to his own, where they had acted with such wanton cruelty, and in the face of such facts is compelled to think that it was owing to the fact that they were English subjects that they were treated thus barbarously.

We have received from all classes, and from all parts, expressions of the greatest sympathy, all trusting the Prussians will at least be made to pay Captain Smith for the loss of property received, if no compensation for the injury done to his family; and soliciting the favour of your Lordship's early reply, we are, &c.

(Signed) BELL AND DUNN, Owners of ship "Theresa."

No. 8.

Mr. Odo Russell to Earl Granville.—(Received February 13.)

My Lord,

Versailles, February 9, 1871.

THE inclosed petition from the English residents at Chantilly has been forwarded to me by Mr. Robert Coningsby, the able correspondent of the "Echo," for presentation to the Emperor of Germany; but as I am not in a position to do so without your Lordship's sanction, I send it home for your Lordship's perusal and decision.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 8.

Petition.

To His Imperial and Royal Majesty William I, Emperor of Germany, King of Prussia, at Versailles.

The humble Petition of the Undersigned British subjects resident at Chantilly (Oise).

Most respectfully sheweth,

THAT your petitioners, knowing Great Britain was a neutral Power, considered their property safe and themselves exempt from requisitions and billeting; that since the 15th September, 1870, we have had heavier requisitions, a greater number in proportion

of your Majesty's soldiers billeted upon us, and more grievous impositions than the French have been subjected to; that unless your Most Gracious Majesty, by a timely exercise of your Royal clemency, interpose on our behalf, complete ruin appears inevitable.

And your petitioners, as in duty bound, will ever pray.

(Signed)	THOMAS CARTER.	WILLIAM PLANNER.
	JOHN PALMER.	S. THOMAS.
	JOSEPH SPINK.	M. EYRE.
	WILLIAM BALCHIN.	JOHN CUNNINGTON.
	J. BARTHOLOMEW.	JOHN BALDRICK.
	JOSEPH ASHMAN.	HENRY KENDALL WOOD.
	JOSEPH JACOBS.	T. PAGE.
	ED. FLATMAN.	W. BOOTH.
	THOMAS HUDSON.	MARY HODGES.
	JOHN BAYNES.	

No. 9.

Mr. West to Earl Granville.—(Received February 26.)

My Lord,

Paris, February 24, 1871.

REPEATED applications are now being made to Her Majesty's Embassy on the part of British subjects, whose property has been destroyed during the war, for indemnity for their losses. They wish to be informed of the decision of Her Majesty's Government respecting their supposed claims, and are most importunate in the matter.

Under these circumstances, I venture to apply to your Lordship for instructions as to the answer which I am to return to them.

I have, &c.

(Signed) L. S. SACKVILLE WEST.

No. 10.

Earl Granville to Mr. West.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 1, 1871.

I HAVE consulted the Law Officers of the Crown upon the point submitted to me in your despatch of the 24th February, as to the claims of British subjects to be indemnified for the loss of property during the war; and I have now to acquaint you that I am advised by them that Her Majesty's subjects resident in France, whose property has been destroyed during the war, cannot expect to be compensated, on the ground of their being British subjects, for losses which the necessities of war have brought upon them in common with French subjects.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 11.

Earl Granville to Mr. Odo Russell.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 2, 1871.

I RETURN to you herewith the letter from Mr. Coningsby, and the petition from the English residents at Chantilly, which you inclosed in your despatch of the 9th ultimo.

Her Majesty's Government are of opinion that you might request Count Bismarck to submit the petition to the gracious consideration of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Germany; but, in doing so, you should state that Her Majesty's Government make no claim for the petitioners to be exempted as British subjects from the evils incident to a state of war, to which all other persons resident in France are exposed, but that they trust

that, as an act of justice, it will not be permitted that heavier burdens should be imposed on the subjects of a neutral Power than are, in fact, imposed on the enemies of Germany.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 12.

Earl Granville to Lord A. Loftus.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 4, 1871.

I INCLOSE to you herewith copies of correspondence* on the subject of the destruction, by Prussian troops, of a house and property at St. Ouen, near Rouen, belonging to a British subject named Lawrence Smith, under circumstances which would seem to call for investigation on the part of the Prussian military authorities.

Her Majesty's Government do not consider that, in strict right, they would be entitled to claim compensation from the Prussian Government for the destruction of Mr. Smith's property, as it would seem that, though an Englishman, he has become the proprietor of a house and farm at St. Ouen, and has established his wife and family there, by which proceeding he has so incorporated himself into the territory of France as to render it unavoidable that his family and property should be exposed, like those of native citizens of France resident in the same district, to the evils incident to a state of war. But, as the case is at present represented, the destruction of the property in question would appear to have been an act of wanton violence on the part of the Prussian troops resulting from lax discipline, and not provoked by any misconduct on the part of the occupants of the house or farm. If this assumption be correct, the case would be distinguishable from those in which the distinction of property is an inevitable incident of war; and I am, therefore, of opinion that you may bring the facts to the notice of the German Government, and express the hope that they will think fit to direct an inquiry to be made by the military authorities, and if the statement of Mr. Lawrence Smith should prove to be truthful, that they will, as an act of justice, award compensation for injuries wantonly inflicted on him and upon his family.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 13.

Mr. Odo Russell to Earl Granville.—(Received March 8.)

My Lord,

Versailles, March 5, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a note I have addressed to the Chancellor of the German Empire, in obedience to your Lordship's instruction of the 2nd instant, recommending the petition of certain British subjects, residents of Chantilly, to the Emperor of Germany.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

Inclosure in No. 13.

Mr. Odo Russell to Count Bismarck.

My Lord Chancellor,

Versailles, 6, Place Hoche, March 4, 1871.

I AM directed by Her Majesty's Government to request your Excellency to submit the inclosed petition of certain British subjects, residents of Chantilly, recommended by Mr. Robert Coningsby, correspondent of the "Echo," to the gracious consideration of His Imperial Majesty the Emperor of Germany, and to state that Her Majesty's Government make no claim for the petitioners to be exempted as British subjects from the evils incident to a state of war, to which all other persons resident in France are exposed, but that they trust that, as an act of justice, it will not be permitted that heavier burdens

* Nos. 4, 5, 6, and 7.

should be imposed on the subjects of a neutral Power than are, in fact, imposed on the enemies of Germany.

I have, &c.
(Signed) ODO RUSSELL.

No. 14.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received March 17.)

My Lord,

Paris, March 15, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith a copy of a letter which I have received from a Mr. J. Rothschild, who states himself to be a British subject, and who complains of the destruction of his property by the fire of the besiegers during the bombardment of Strasbourg by the German forces.

I have, &c.
(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 14.

Mr. S. Rothschild to Lord Lyons.

*48, Rue Tegevin, chez M. Hontoux,
Paris, le 11 Mars, 1871.*

Excellence,

LE Soussigné, S. Rothschild, sujet Anglais, né à Dublin, a l'honneur de faire appel à votre haute protection concernant le fait suivant :—

Habitant de Strasbourg, où j'exploitais l'industrie de tailleur confectionneur, Rue de la Mésange, j'ai été victime du bombardement de cette ville par les Allemands, et cela sans avoir pu le prévoir, comme vous ne l'ignorez pas sans doute, aucune mise en demeure ne nous ayant été faite au préalable, et le droit de bombarder une ville et non ses travaux de défense étant au moins contestable.

Voici du reste les faits :—

A peine même les préliminaires de l'investissement étaient-ils en cours, que déjà certains quartiers, le mien notamment, n'étaient plus que décombrés.

Ayant dès l'abord prévu les ruines dont ce malheureux quartier allait être le théâtre, mais sans supposer, toutefois, ce qui paraissait inadmissible du reste, que le bombardement ne serait pas au moins localisé, j'avais fermé mon magasin et fait transporter mes marchandises (d'une valeur estimée à 25,000 francs, contenues en dix-neuf caisses) chez M. Ch. Sohn, entreposeur, Marais Kagenech, No. 13 ; c'était le 24 Août.

Cette précaution était bonne ; car, quelques jours après seulement, mon magasin était incendié.

Hélas ! j'avais mal jugé en comptant sur la modération des assiégeants ; là, aussi ils devaient exercer leurs ravages. M. Sohn eut, comme moi, ses magasins brûlés.

Je suis ruiné !

J'ose espérer, M. l'Ambassadeur, qu'une semblable situation méritant quelque intérêt, ne fût-ce qu'au nom du droit des gens, vous voudrez bien interposer votre haute autorité en ma faveur pour me faire allouer une indemnité qui n'est qu'équitable.

Une déclaration préalable a, du reste, déjà été faite à ce sujet le 5 Septembre par M. Sohn, mon entreposeur, à la Commission Municipale des Sinistres.

J'ai, &c.
(Signé) S. ROTHSCCHILD.

(Translation.)

Excellency,

48, Rue Tegerin, at M. Hontoux, Paris, March 11, 1871.

THE Undersigned, S. Rothschild, English subject, born in Dublin, has the honour to appeal to your high protection respecting the following fact.

Inhabitant of Strasbourg, where I pursued the trade of tailor, Rue de la Mésange, I have been the victim of the bombardment of that town by the Germans, and that without having been able to foresee it, as you are doubtless aware, no notice having been previously made to us, and the right of bombarding a town, and not its defensive works, being at least contestable.

The following are the facts :—

Scarcely even were the preliminaries of the investment in operation, when already certain quarters, mine notably, were nothing but ruins. Having from the first foreseen the ruin of which that unhappy quarter was to be the theatre, but without supposing, at the same time, that which further appeared inadmissible, that the bombardment would not be at least localized, I had shut up my shop and transported my merchandize (to the estimated value of 25,000 francs, contained in nineteen chests) to M. Ch. Sohn, Manager, Marais Kagenech, No. 13: it was on the 24th August.

That precaution was good, for, but a few days afterwards, my shop was burnt.

Alas! I had judged badly in counting on the moderation of the besiegers; there also they thought proper to exercise their ravages. Mr. Sohn had, like myself, his shop burnt.

I am ruined!

I venture to hope, M. l'Ambassadeur, that such a situation being deserving of some interest, were it but in the name of the law of nations, you will be good enough to interpose your high authority in my favour to cause an indemnity to be granted to me, which is but equitable.

A previous declaration has, further, been already made on this subject on the 5th September by Mr. Sohn, my manager, to the Municipal Commission of the Sinistres.

I have, &c.

(Signed) S. ROTHSCHILD.

No. 15.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 18, 1871.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 15th instant, inclosing a copy of a letter from Mr. S. Rothschild complaining of the destruction of his property by the fire of the besiegers during the bombardment of Strasbourg, and expressing a hope that he may receive some indemnity through your Excellency's intervention.

I have, in reply, to request your Excellency to express to Mr. Rothschild the regret of Her Majesty's Government at the loss which he states he has sustained on the occasion referred to, but you will explain to him your inability to make such an application to the French Government on his behalf as he appears to desire, as it is an established principle which would govern such cases as at present, and which is laid down in my despatch to Mr. West of the 1st instant,* that Her Majesty's subjects resident in France whose property has been destroyed during the war, cannot expect to be compensated on the ground of their being British subjects for losses which the necessities of war have brought upon them in common with French subjects.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 16.

Lord Lyons to Earl Granville.—(Received March 17.)

My Lord,

Paris, March 15, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inclose herewith copy of a letter which I have received from Mrs. Ashburnham complaining of the destruction and pillage of her property at Versailles by the Germans.

I have informed Mrs. Ashburnham that the question whether the proprietor of her lodging can enforce the payment of the last six months' rent appears to be one which must be decided by the French law.

I have, &c.

(Signed) LYONS.

Inclosure in No. 16.

*Mrs. Ashburnham to Lord Lyons.*1, Rue Comte de l'Eguelle, Bruges, Belgique,
March 10, 1871.

My Lord,

WITH many apologies for intruding upon your valuable time, permit me to lay before you my very anxious position. Having suffered very seriously from the recent occupation of Versailles by the Prussians, I am informed that for any indemnity I must address myself to the Ambassador of my own nation. I am the widow of an English clergyman, of very limited means, and have, with my sisters, occupied for the last seventeen years an apartment, 8, Avenue de Paris, Versailles. We had been absent some time before the occupation of that city by the Prussians, and, being ladies alone, it was impossible for us to return. And now, upon making inquiries, I find that during the six months that my apartment has been occupied the larger portion of the furniture has been wantonly destroyed and burnt, and boxes of plate, wearing-apparel, household linen, &c., pillaged. In fact, at the lowest computation, we have been robbed of effects to the value of 300l. Will you kindly inform me whether, as the subject of a neutral Power, I have not a claim to some indemnity, and what steps I ought to take? Also, am I responsible for the maintenance of the Prussians during their occupation of my apartments? And, thirdly, can my proprietor enforce the payment of the last six months' rent, as I am only locataire?

I beg to apologize for this intrusion, but the case is to me very serious, and I shall feel most grateful for a reply to this application, though I am aware that you must have many calls of a similar nature to attend to, but attention to this will be very gratefully received.

(Signed) HARRIET ASHBURNHAM.

No. 17.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 18, 1871.

I HAVE received your Excellency's despatch of the 15th instant, inclosing a copy of a letter from Mrs. Ashburnham, complaining of the destruction and pillage at Versailles by the Germans, and inquiring whether she has not some claim to indemnity, and also whether she is responsible for the rent of her apartments during their occupation by the Prussians.

Your Excellency, it appears, has answered Mrs. Ashburnham's application on the last point; but as regards the general question of her being compensated for the other losses sustained by her, I can only request your Excellency to express to her the regret of Her Majesty's Government at the occurrences in question, and to explain to her that Her Majesty's subjects resident in France, whose property has been destroyed during the war, cannot expect to be compensated, on the ground of their being British subjects, for losses which the necessities of war have brought upon them in common with French subjects.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 18.

Earl Granville to Lord Lyons.

My Lord,

Foreign Office, March 23, 1871.

I HAVE thought it desirable to ascertain the opinion of the Law Officers as to the liability of the French Government to compensate British subjects resident in France for loss and damage to their property during the late war, and I have been advised by them that British subjects resident in France would, in their opinion, have no just ground of complaint against the French authorities in the event of their property having been destroyed by the invading armies. Their losses, under such circumstances, would be amongst the inevitable consequences of war raging in a State within which they have

chosen, as foreigners, to take up their residence; and with regard to such losses, British subjects would not be entitled to claim any compensation from the French authorities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 19.

Lord A. Loftus to Earl Granville.—(Received March 13.)

My Lord,

Berlin, March 10, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your Lordship's despatch of the 4th instant, inclosing copies of correspondence on the subject of the destruction, by Prussian troops, of a house and property at St. Ouen, near Rouen, belonging to a British subject named Lawrence Smith.

In conformity with your Lordship's instruction, I have brought the facts referred to under the notice of the Prussian Government, in a note I have addressed to Baron Thile, of which I have the honour to annex a copy.

I have, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

Inclosure in No. 19.

Lord A. Loftus to Baron de Thile.

M. le Secrétaire d'Etat,

Berlin, March 10, 1871.

IN conformity with instructions which I have received from Earl Granville, Her Majesty's Principal Secretary for Foreign Affairs, I have the honour to bring under the notice of the Prussian Government, the particulars as they have been reported to Her Majesty's Government, and which your Excellency will find related in the accompanying statement, of the destruction by Prussian troops, in the months of December and January last, of a house and farm near St. Ouen, near Rouen, belonging to a British subject named Lawrence Smith, under circumstances which appear to Her Majesty's Government to call for investigation on the part of the Prussian military authorities.

Her Majesty's Government do not consider that, in strict right, they would be entitled to claim compensation from the Prussian Government for the destruction of Mr. Smith's property, as it would seem that, though an Englishman, he has become the proprietor of a house and farm at St. Ouen, and has established his wife and family there, by which proceeding he has so incorporated himself into the territory of France, as to render it unavoidable that his family and property should be exposed, like those of native citizens of France, resident in the same district, to the evils incident on a state of war.

But, as the case is at present represented, the destruction of the property in question would appear to have been an act neither justified by necessity, nor provoked by any misconduct on the part of the occupants of the house or farm, towards the Prussian troops. If this assumption be correct, the case would be distinguishable from those in which the destruction of property is an inevitable incident of war; and I am consequently instructed to express to your Excellency the hope that the Prussian Government will think fit to direct an inquiry to be instituted by the military authorities; and that if Mr. Lawrence Smith's statement should prove to be correct, they will, as an act of justice, award compensation for injuries inflicted without cause, upon him and his family.

I avail, &c.
(Signed) AUGUSTUS LOFTUS.

No. 20.

Mr. Stewart to Earl Granville.—(Received March 23.)

My Lord,

33, Upper Brunswick Place, Brighton, March 22, 1871.

HAVING noticed in the papers the question of Mr. Cadogan in the House of Commons, and the answer of Lord Enfield, relative to property of British subjects in

France, I have the honour to lay before your Lordship a statement of the property I possess in Paris and its neighbourhood, and request that my interests may be placed under the protection of his Excellency Lord Lyons, the English Ambassador, in order that the same may be submitted to the French Government, when the proper time shall arrive, for a claim to be made for the occupation of the property, and for the dilapidations committed therein.

The following is a statement of my property :—

No. 1. Mansion, house, and offices, with grounds to the extent of about 1,650 metres, situated at No. 5, Avenue des Princes, Boulogne-sur-Seine, near Paris, let to M. J. Tourreil, Agent de Change, 85 Rue de Richelieu, Paris, on lease at a rental of 5,500 francs a year.

By order of the Government of Defence issued at the commencement of the siege, all persons occupying houses in the neighbourhood of Paris were ordered to vacate their residences, and to remove their furniture into the city. M. Tourreil obeyed this order, and immediately the house and “dépendances” were occupied by more than 150 French soldiers, who remained in possession upwards of five months. After the occupation of Paris by the Germans, their troops entered the house and premises, and remained for a day or two.

After the evacuation of the property, M. Tourreil caused a statement of the dilapidations of the premises and grounds to be made by M. J. Delisle, of 7, Rue de Provence, Paris, a most respectable French architect, accompanied by a huissier, who is a Government officer, in order that the latter might certify to the exact nature of the dilapidations in the statement of the architect to be submitted to the French Government.

M. Delisle, the architect, estimates the sum that will be required to put the premise into repair at 12,000 or 13,000 francs, and until the repairs are completed the tenant refuses to pay any rent.

No. 2. A house and grounds, situated at No. 90, Rue de la Pompe, Passy, Paris. The house was, in the first place, occupied by French soldiers at the commencement of the siege, and was afterwards used as a canteen by order of the authorities. It has only been evacuated within the last few days. A statement of dilapidations has not yet been prepared by the architect.

No. 88. A house situated No. 88 Rue de la Pompe, let out in different apartments and shops. This house has been occupied by soldiers, emigrés, and peasants, until within the last few days. A statement of the dilapidations has not yet been prepared by the architect.

No. 4. A house with gardens. This house has been occupied by French officers during the siege, and has not, I understand, suffered any injury; but a claim for occupation in the shape of rent will form a part of the indemnity I shall demand from the French Government for all the above houses.

The apartment I reside in at Paris, No. 4, Avenue de l'Impératrice, has been partially occupied by French soldiers and peasants; but I am informed that up to this time it has not suffered more than similar apartments in the neighbourhood.

When the affairs of France are in a more settled condition, I shall submit my claims in a more formal manner to Lord Lyons, being convinced that his Excellency will use every exertion in his power to obtain a just indemnity for the occupation and injury done to my property.

I trust your Lordship will pardon this application on my part, and that you will extend to me the same protection and assistance which your countrymen have hitherto received at your hands.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAS. STEWART.

No. 21.

Mr. Hammond to Mr. Stewart.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 28, 1871.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 22nd instant, containing a statement of certain property possessed by you in Paris and the neighbourhood, and referring to the losses which you state you have sustained in consequence of the occupation of such property by French and German troops, and requesting that your interests may be placed under the protection of Lord Lyons, with

the object of your claim being ultimately urged upon the French Government on account of such losses and dilapidations.

I am now to inform you that Lord Granville has taken the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown as to the liability of the French Government to compensate British subjects resident in France for loss and damage to their property during the late war, and that his Lordship has been advised by them that British subjects resident in France would have, in their opinion, no just ground of complaint against the French authorities in the event of their property having been destroyed by the invading armies; their losses under such circumstances would be amongst the inevitable consequences of war raging in a State within which they have chosen, as foreigners, to take up their residence, and with regard to such losses, British subjects would not be entitled to claim any compensation from the French authorities.

I am, &c.
(Signed) E. HAMMOND.

No. 22.

Mr. Stewart to Earl Granville.—(Received August 31.)

My Lord, 33, Upper Brunswick Place, Brighton, March 30, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge your Lordship's letter of the 28th instant, in answer to mine of the 22nd, on the subject of the losses I have sustained by the occupation of my houses in Paris and its neighbourhood by French troops during the late war, informing me that your Lordship had taken the opinion of the Law Officers of the Crown as to the liability of the French Government to compensate British subjects resident in France for loss and damage to their property during the late war; and that your Lordship had been advised by them that British subjects resident in France would have, in their opinion, no just ground of complaint against the French authorities in the event of their property having been destroyed by the invading armies.

I beg to submit to your Lordship that my case does not come within the terms of the one submitted to the Law Officers of the Crown. At the commencement of the siege of Paris all the inhabitants of Boulogne-sur-Seine were ordered by the French Government to leave their houses, and my tenant at No. 5, Avenue des Princes, Boulogne-sur-Seine, accordingly removed his furniture and gave up possession to the authorities, who occupied the premises for more than five months with upwards of 150 French soldiers, who remained in it until the signature of the Treaty of Peace, and then left it in the most ruinous condition. The German troops passed one night on the premises after the temporary occupation of Paris, but did no additional damage to the property. My other houses within the enceinte of Paris were occupied wholly by French troops and French peasants. "No destruction of property by invading armies" consequently took place in my case.

In my opinion my claim is similar to that made by your Lordship on the German Government for the loss sustained by British ship-owners whose vessels were seized and sunk near Rouen. In the one case ships were seized and destroyed by the German authorities; and, in the other, houses were seized and destroyed by the French authorities, both belonging to British subjects, and demanding similar compensation.

I have now, therefore, to beg that your Lordship will be so good as to forward my claim on the French Government to Lord Lyons, with a request that his Excellency will give me such assistance as may be required in his capacity of English Ambassador, in order to induce the French Government to entertain my claim when the proper time shall arrive for submitting it to the authorities. I beg, however, to add that I am informed that, by the law of France, compensation is due not only to foreigners, but to French subjects for injury done to their property by invading armies, and for the occupation of their houses by French troops, and for damages resulting therefrom. I trust, therefore, that it will not be necessary to call for Lord Lyons' intervention.

I have thought it my duty to trouble your Lordship with this letter, in order that I may point out the difference between my case and that submitted to the Law Officers of the Crown, and I may add that I think it will be found that few British subjects are in the same position as I am with respect to my French property.

I have, &c.
(Signed) CHAS. STEWART.

Viscount Enfield to Mr. Stewart.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 13, 1871.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 30th ultimo, in which, with reference to the answer which Lord Granville caused to be returned to your letter of the 22nd of March, respecting the losses which you state you have sustained by the occupation of your houses in Paris and the neighbourhood by French troops during the war, you now submit that your case does not come within the terms of that which had been submitted to the Law Officers of the Crown, and upon whose opinion with reference thereto the answer to your representation had been founded, inasmuch as there was "no destruction of property by invading armies," but that the damage was caused in consequence of the occupation of your property by French troops, which property had been vacated by orders of the French authorities themselves.

I am now to state to you that Lord Granville has taken the opinion of the Law Officers upon your further application, and I am to observe that Her Majesty's subjects resident in France cannot of right claim to be in a better position in respect to their immovable property in France than French subjects, and that, if you have been correctly informed as to the Law of France, the intervention of Her Majesty's Government will not be required to enable you to prefer a claim before the French authorities to compensation for any losses resulting to you from the occupation of your houses by French troops. But whether you have been correctly informed or not, Her Majesty's Government cannot intervene, if you receive at the hands of the French Government the same treatment which French subjects themselves receive.

With regard to your allusion to the case of the British ships which have sunk at Rouen, I am to observe that there is no analogy between ships and immovable property.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ENFIELD.

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. No. 4
(1871).

CORRESPONDENCE between British Subjects residing
in France and the Foreign Office, in reference to
Loss of Property since the Entry of the German
Army into France.

*Presented to both Houses of Parliament by Com-
mand of Her Majesty. 1871.*

FRANCO-GERMAN WAR. No. 5 (1871).

CORRESPONDENCE

RESPECTING THE

CAPTURE

OF THE TWO

VESSELS "SOPHIA RICKMERS"

AND

"ROBERT RICKMERS"

IN THE

CHINA SEAS.

*Presented to the House of Commons by Command of Her Majesty, in pursuance of their
Address dated March 28, 1871.*

LONDON:

PRINTED BY HARRISON AND SONS.

[C. 313.]—Price 3d.

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RETURN to an Address of the Honourable the House of Commons, dated March 28, 1871;

for—

‘Copy of Correspondence relating to the Capture of the two vessels ‘Sophia Rickmers’ and ‘Robert Rickmers’ in the China Seas.’

No. 1.

Mr. Rickmers to Earl Granville.—(Received January 25.)

My Lord,

London, January 25, 1871.

I, THE undersigned Peter Andreas Rickmers of Heligoland, ship-owner, have the honour respectfully to submit to your Lordships’ consideration the following statement:—

That I am a natural-born British subject, born of British parents belonging to the islands of Heligoland, and my certificate citizenship there is dated the 23rd day of March, 1864.

That I hold a passport from the Governor of the said island in the name of Her Majesty, and such passport has been from, time to time, when required in my travels on business, been produced to and acknowledged and certified by the Consuls in Bremerhaven in the port of Bremen and in France and Holland, and *visé* by the police of the Free State of Bremen.

That I also hold a passport as a British subject dated the 8th February, 1869, to pass freely to and from Yedo in Japan, and such passport was admitted and endorsed by the Japanese authorities.

That in the summer of 1863 I took the oath of alliance to the Free State of Bremen, but on the 26th day of July last, pursuant to the provisions of the Act 7 and 8 Vict., cap. 66. I took the oath of allegiance to Her Majesty.

That on the 10th day of November last, I *bond fide* purchased the ship “Sophie Rickmers” of 827 tons (register) registered at the Port of Geestemunde for 12,400*l.* sterling, which vessel was then lying in the Port of Singapore.

That the said ship and her appearances were duly transferred to me by bill of sale dated the said 10th day of November last, executed in the presence of Her Majesty’s Vice-Consul at Bremerhaven, and I thereupon made the declaration of ownership as required by the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, and the bill of sale and declaration of ownership were forthwith forwarded by me to Singapore, and a provisional certificate of registry of the ship was granted to her by the proper authorities in Singapore about the beginning of the present month of January.

That I have been informed by two telegrams from Singapore that the said ship, whilst proceeding from Singapore to Java, under charter under the said provisional certificate of registry, has been captured in Banca Straits by French cruisers and taken as a prize into Saigon where, she is now detained.

I have, therefore, humbly to request that your Lordship will, upon consideration, be pleased to accord to my vessel the protection of Her Majesty’s Government, and by telegram or otherwise make such representations to the French authorities at Saigon as will induce them to release my vessel.

I am, &c.

(Signed) P. A. RICKMERS.

P.S.—I shall be happy to pay all expenses of telegraphs in order to expedite the release of my vessel.

P. A. R.

No. 2.

Lord Enfield to Mr. Rickmers.

Sir,

Foreign Office, January 30, 1871.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of the 25th instant, respecting the circumstances under which your vessel the "Sophie Rickmer" has been captured by French cruizers, and I am in reply to acquaint you that his Lordship is in consultation with the proper law adviser of the Crown as to whether this case is one in which Her Majesty's Government can properly interfere. I am to add that a further communication will be addressed to you as soon as a decision in this matter shall have been arrived at.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ENFIELD.

No. 3.

Lord Enfield to Mr. Rickmers.

Sir,

Foreign Office, February 4, 1871.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to acquaint you that his Lordship has had under his consideration, in communication with the proper Law Adviser of the Crown, your letter of the 25th ultimo, requesting the interference of Her Majesty's Government, with the view to procure the release of your vessel the "Sophie Rickmers," which has been captured and taken into Saigon by a French cruiser.

I am now to inform you, that his Lordship is advised that your case is not one in which Her Majesty's Government would be justified, from considerations either of municipal or of international law, in intervening.

I am to observe, that the statement contained in your letter does not show that you were qualified to become the owner of a British ship on the 10th of November last, when you allege that you purchased the "Sophie Rickmers."

Assuming you to be a natural-born British subject, although you do not state that you were born within Her Majesty's dominions, it would appear that you disqualified yourself to be the owner of a British ship, by taking an oath of allegiance to the free State of Bremen; and you do not show that you have complied with the requirements of the Merchant Shipping Act (17 and 18 Vict., cap. 104, sec. 18), so as to regain a qualification. The Act 7 and 8 Vict., cap. 66, to which you refer, has no application to your case; besides, it was repealed prior to the 26th of July last, when you say that you conformed to its provisions.

Taking, however, the most favourable view which can be taken of your title to be the owner of a British ship, and of the circumstances of the sale, and the registration of the vessel, Her Majesty's Government are advised that upon principles of international law they would not be justified in intervening diplomatically on your behalf.

It is for the Prize Court of the captors to determine whether the "Sophie Rickmers" is a good prize of war; and Lord Granville is of opinion that the French Prize Courts, if they observe their long-established practice, will not recognize the sale of an enemy's vessel made in a neutral port after the commencement of the war, the necessity of such sale being caused by the exigencies of the war; and the object of such sale being to defeat the exercise of belligerent right as regards the capture of enemy's property on the high seas.

I am, &c.
(Signed) ENFIELD.

No. 4.

Mr. Herbert to Lord Enfield.—(Received March 11.)

Sir,

Downing Street, March 10, 1871.

I AM directed by the Earl of Kimberley to transmit to you, for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, the copy of a despatch from the Governor of the Straits' Settlements respecting certain correspondence which has passed between the Assistant Colonial Secretary and the North German and Russian Consuls, in the case of

the British ship "Sophia Rickmers," and that of the North German barque "G.F., Vorwerk."

I am to state, that this despatch was not accompanied by the inclosures it purported to annex; but that these inclosures will probably be received in the course of a few days and that they will be at once forwarded for the information of Earl Granville.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT G. W. HERBERT.

Inclosure in No. 4.

Governor Sir H. Ord to the Earl of Kimberley.

(Extract.)

Government House, Singapore, January 31, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward to your Lordship copies of a correspondence which passed during my absence at Penang between the Assistant Colonial Secretary and the Consuls for Germany and Russia respecting the capture of a vessel called the "Sophia Rickmers," which sailed from this port under British colours, and also regarding a sailor, said to be a Russian subject, taken in the said vessel.

I also inclose, as relating to the question, though not actually connected with it, a correspondence between the Assistant Colonial Secretary and the Consul for Germany respecting certain persons said to have been captured in the North German barque "G. F. Vorwerk," and brought into this port by the capturing vessel—the French vessel of war "Japon."

The Assistant Colonial Secretary was advised in the course he pursued by the Attorney-General, and was materially assisted by the copy of a confidential letter addressed to the Admiral commanding on the station by the Admiralty, under date November 1870, containing certain legal opinions furnished to Her Majesty's Government on cases which had occurred at home with reference to the observance of neutrality, and which was very kindly placed at the disposal of the Assistant Colonial Secretary by Captain Moore, of Her Majesty's ship "Barrosa," the Senior Naval Officer on the station.

I trust that Mr. Irving's proceedings will meet your Lordship's approval.

No. 5.

Mr. Herbert to Lord Enfield.—(Received March 18.)

Sir,

Downing Street, March 16, 1871.

WITH reference to my letter of the 10th instant, I am directed by the Earl of Kimberley to transmit the inclosures to Sir H. Ord's despatch of the 31st January, a copy of which was inclosed in my letter.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ROBERT G. W. HERBERT.

Inclosure 1 in No. 5.

Mr. Mooyer to the Colonial Secretary.

Sir,

Singapore, January 18, 1871.

AS I had already the honour to state verbally to you, I beg now to inform you in this more formal way that the French vessel "Japon," which man-of-war arrived here this morning, has on board part of the crew of the captured North German barque "G. F. Vorwerk."

The Commander of the "Japon" refuses to give up to me these German subjects. They are treated as prisoners of war, and it appears to be the intention of the Commander to take them to France. I am of opinion that the Commander has no right to retain prisoners of war in a neutral port. I therefore most respectfully ask you to aid me to get these German subjects liberated.

I have, &c.

(Signed) O. MOOYER.

Inclosure 2 in No. 5.

Mr. Irving to Mr. Mooyer.

Sir, *Colonial Secretary's Office, Singapore, January 18, 1871.*
IN reply to your letter of this day's date, stating that the French man-of-war "Japon" had arrived in Singapore with the crew of the captured North German barque "G. F. Vorwerk" on board, and requesting that I will aid you to get these German subjects liberated, I have the honour to inform you that I regret that the matter is not one in which this Government can render any assistance.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. IRVING,
Assistant Colonial Secretary, Straits Settlements.

Inclosure 3 in No. 5.

Messrs. Behn, Meyer, and Co., to the Colonial Secretary.

Sir, *Singapore, January 18, 1871.*
WE have the honour to inform you that the captain of the Dutch mail-steamer "Minister van Stadt Rochussen," which vessel arrived here yesterday, reports having seen on the 14th instant in Lucipara Passage that a French gun-boat was capturing a full-rigged barque, which, according to the full description given by the Captain, is almost beyond any doubt the British "Sophia Rickmers," which vessel left here on the 8th instant bound for Batavia. The following telegram, received this morning from Batavia, viz.,—" 'Sophia Rickmers' not arrived. Rumours vessel flying British colours stopped by French 'Volta Java Lea,'"—confirms our suppositions. The "Sophia Rickmers" having been registered in this port, and we being agents, attorneys for the owner, we crave the aid of the Straits Government, in case this report should prove true, in recovering the said British ship, as well as damages for loss of time, &c.

Thinking that it will be of the utmost importance that immediate steps should be taken in this matter, we most respectfully request you to lay the matter before his Excellency the Governor; and knowing that his Excellency will leave Penang to-morrow en route for this, *vid* Malacca, we shall be most thankful if you will telegraph the facts to his Excellency to-day.

We have, &c.
(Signed) BEHN, MEYER, AND Co.,
*Agents and Attorneys for the Owner of the British barque
"Sophia Rickmers."*

Inclosure 4 in No. 5.

Mr. Irving to Messrs. Behn, Meyer, and Co.

Gentlemen, *Colonial Secretary's Office, Singapore, January 18, 1871.*
I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your letter of this day's date, informing me of the reported capture by a French man-of-war in the Lucipara Passage of a ship supposed to be the "Sophia Rickmers," a vessel registered in this port, and requesting the aid of this Government, in case the report should prove true, in recovering the said ship, as well as damages for loss of time, &c., and further requesting that a telegram should be sent to the Governor in Penang to inform his Excellency of the supposed capture.

In reply I beg to inform you that the matter will be brought to the notice of Government at once, but as there is no confirmation of the Report, it does not appear to me to be necessary to send a telegram to Penang at present.

Any further communication from you on this subject will meet with immediate attention.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. A. IRVING,
Assistant Colonial Secretary, Straits Settlements.

Inclosure 5 in No. 5.

Messrs. Behn, Meyer, and Co. to the Colonial Secretary.

WE beg to acknowledge receipt of your favour of yesterday, and beg to tender our best thanks for the information contained therein.

We learn this morning, on good authority, that the French gun-boat, "Volta," arrived; this has really captured the British "Sophia Rickmers;" that the Captain and mate of the vessel have been sent on by the vessel, whilst the remaining crew, twelve in number, are on board the "Volta," now in this harbour. We again most respectfully crave the aid of the Government here to recover the said ship, as well as damages for loss of time, &c.

We have, &c.
(Signed) **BEHN, MEYER, AND Co.,**
Agents and Attorneys for the Owner of the British barque
"Sophia Rickmers."

Inclosure 6 in No. 5.

Mr. Irving to Messrs. Behn, Meyer, and Co.

Gentlemen,

Colonial-Secretary's Office, Singapore, January 19, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of this day's date, stating that you have received news on good authority that the French gun-boat "Volta," which arrived in this port to-day, has really captured the British ship "Sophia Rickmers;" that the Captain and mate of the vessel have been sent on by the vessel, whilst the remaining crew, twelve in number, are now on board the "Volta" in the harbour, and asking for the aid of the Government to recover the ship, as well as damages for loss of time, &c.

In all probability the vessel will be sent to Saigon before the Prize Court, in which case you will no doubt take the necessary steps for defending her from condemnation.

The facts will be communicated to the British Consul at Saigon.

His Excellency the Governor is expected here on Tuesday next, the 24th instant, when the matter will be brought to his immediate notice.

I have, &c.
(Signed) **E. A. IRVING,**
Assistant Colonial Secretary, Straits Settlements.

Inclosure 7 in No. 5.

Messrs. Behn, Meyer, and Co. to Mr. Irving.

Sir,

Singapore, January 20, 1871.

WE have the honour to acknowledge receipt of your letter of the 19th instant, stating you will lay the contents before His Excellency the Governor on his arrival from Malacca, and that the facts concerning the seizure of the British barque "Sophia Rickmers" will be communicated to the British Consul at Saigon.

We are giving full instructions to the captain by the steamer leaving to-morrow for Saigon, to protest both with the British Consul and the French authorities at Saigon against the seizure of the ship, but we think that will be everything in his power to do in the matter.

Whilst tendering you our most sincere thanks for the attention you have given to this case, we again most respectfully crave the protection of the Government here, either direct or through the British Consul at Saigon, in recovering the said ship, with damages for loss of time, &c.

We have, &c.
(Signed) **BEHN, MEYER, AND Co.,**
Agents and Attorneys for the Owner of the British barque
"Sophia Rickmers."

Inclosure 8 in No. 5.

Mr. Irving to Mr. Hartung.

Sir, *Colonial Secretary's Office, Singapore, January 19, 1871.*
I HAVE the honour to inform you that it has been represented to this Government that a vessel called the "Sophia Rickmers," registered in Singapore as a British vessel, has been captured in the Lucipara passage by the French man-of-war "Volta;" that the vessel, her captain, and part of her crew have been sent to Saigon, and that the remainder of the crew are on board the "Volta," now lying in Singapore Roads.

In the absence of his Excellency the Governor I have the honour to request that you will favour this Government with any information on the subject which it may be in your power to afford.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. A. IRVING,
Assistant Colonial Secretary, Straits Settlements.

Inclosure 9 in No. 5.

M. Hartung to the Colonial Secretary.

M. le Secrétaire Colonial, *Consulat de France, Singapore, le 20 Janvier, 1871.*
JE m'empresse de vous accuser réception de la lettre que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser à la date d'hier au sujet du navire "Sophie Rickmers," qui aurait été capturé par l'avis le "Volta."

Le Capitaine de frégate, M. de Coatpont, Commandant du "Volta," auquel j'ai transmis votre communication, vient de m'informer qu'il avait effectivement capturé un navire portant le nom de "Sophie Rickmers," que ce navire était commandé par un Capitaine Allemand, que l'équipage était Allemand, et qu'il avait envoyé la prise à Saigon. Ce sera au Conseil des Prises siégeant en Europe qu'il appartiendra de décider la validité de la prise, validité sur le compte de laquelle le Commandant du "Volta" n'a pas le moindre doute.

Veillez, &c.
Le Gérant du Consulat,
(Signé) V. HARTUNG.

(Translation.)

Sir, *French Consulate, Singapore, January 20, 1871.*
I HASTEN to acknowledge the receipt of the letter which you did me the honour to address to me yesterday, on the subject of the ship "Sophia Rickmers," which had been captured by the aviso "Volta."

M. de Coatpont, Capitaine de frégate, Commander of the "Volta," to whom I transmitted your communication, has just informed me that it was a fact that he had captured a ship bearing the name of "Sophia Rickmers," that that ship was commanded by a German captain, that the crew were Germans, and that he had sent the prize to Saigon. It will be the duty of the Prize Court sitting in Europe to decide on the validity of the prize, in regard to which the Commander of the "Volta" has not the slightest doubt.

Accept, &c.
The Consular Agent,
(Signed) V. HARTUNG.

Inclosure 10 in No. 5.

Mr. Irving to Consul Caswell.

Sir, *Colonial Secretary's Office, Singapore, January 19, 1871.*
I HAVE the honour to inform you that a report has been made to this Government that the barque "Sophia Rickmers," registered in this port as a British ship, has been captured by the French gun-boat "Volta" in the Lucipara Channel, and is now being taken to Saigon for condemnation in the Prize Court.

I send you a certified copy of the registry of this ship, as possibly, for the protection of British interests, you may feel it necessary to interfere.

I have, &c.
(Signed) E. A. IRVING,
Assistant Colonial Secretary, Straits Settlements.

Inclosure 11 in No. 5.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to the Officer in command of Her Majesty's Naval Forces on the China Station.

Sir, *Admiralty, November , 1870.*

I AM commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to communicate to you, for your information and guidance, the following occurrences which have taken place with reference to the observance of neutrality, and the legal opinions which have been furnished to Her Majesty's Government in each case:—

1. A French vessel-of-war having entered the Firth of Forth with German prisoners on board, and the attention of Her Majesty's Government having been called by the Consul of the North German Confederation at Leith to the circumstances, as a breach of neutrality on the part of this country, Her Majesty's Government was legally advised as follows:—

"First, that the French war-ship had a right to enter the Firth of Forth, and remain there during such time, and for such purposes, as are allowed to belligerents in the present war under Her Majesty's Proclamation.

"Secondly, with regard to the assertion of the North German Consul, that the German prisoners on board the French war-ship were, *ipso jure*, free, as the ship was in neutral waters; that there is no warrant in the law of nations for such a position. So long as the Germans remained on board the French war-ship they were under French jurisdiction, and the neutral authorities had no right to interfere with them. If they had been landed from the war-ship, the question raised would have been different, as they would have passed out of French jurisdiction, and have become practically free."

2. The North German vessel "Heinrich," in charge of a French prize crew, having entered Lowestoft Roads, and having been detained by the Customs authorities, Her Majesty's Government was legally advised as follows:—

"That it could not be proper, except under the pressure of some necessity, such as stress of weather, for either of the belligerents to bring into and anchor prizes in British waters; and that unless, therefore, there be some reason of necessity for the French crew coming into Lowestoft Roads, the terms of the Foreign Office Circular letter of the 19th July last, which appears to be in substance applicable to this case, should be immediately put in force against them.

"Further, that the letter of 19th July, above referred to, does not authorize the detention of prizes brought into British ports, but requires that they shall be immediately ordered to quit, and if necessary, compelled to do so by force.

"That the vessel should be released by the Customs' authorities, and required instantly to depart, unless there is absolute necessity for provisions, in which case such provisions only should be allowed as will prevent the crew from starving before they reach the nearest French port."

I am, &c.
(Signed) VERNON LUSHINGTON.

Inclosure 12 in No. 5.

Mr. Whampoa to Sir H. Ord.

*His Imperial Royal Majesty's Vice-Consulate at Singapore,
January 25, 1871.*

Sir,

AT the request of Captain D. Michayloff, of His Imperial Royal Majesty's corvette "Vsadnick," I have the honour to lay the following facts before your Excellency regarding a seaman named Franz von Malachowski, who was sent on board his vessel by the Commander of the French man-of-war "Volta," the latter stating that the said seaman was a Russian subject, and had been captured in the "Sophia Rickmers." On receipt of

the seaman's papers, however, it was found on examination of them that he was German subject. The "Volta" having sailed, the man was sent on shore with an officer to the German Consul, to whom the circumstances were stated; but that gentleman refused to recognize the said seaman as a German subject, as the ship "Sophia Rickmers" was at the time of her capture under British colours. I shall, therefore, feel obliged by your Excellency informing me whether Franz von Malachowski is to receive the protection of Her Majesty's Government or of the German Consul.

I have, &c.

(Signed) H. A. K. WHAMPOA,
His Imperial Royal Majesty's Vice-Consul.

Inclosure 13 in No. 5.

Mr. Irving to Mr. Whampoa.

Sir, *Colonial Secretary's Office, Singapore, January 27, 1871.*
I AM directed by his Excellency the Governor to acknowledge your letter dated the 25th instant, representing, at the request of Captain D. Michayloff, of His Imperial Royal Majesty's corvette "Vsadnick," that a seaman named Franz von Malachowski was sent on board his vessel by the Commander of the French man-of-war "Volta," who stated that the seaman was a Russian subject, and had been captured in the "Sophia Rickmers;" that on examination of his papers the man was found to be a German subject; but that the German Consul has refused to recognize him, as the ship "Sophia Rickmers" was at the time of her capture under English colours. And you inquire whether Franz von Malachowski is to receive the protection of Her Majesty's Government or of the German Consul.

2. His Excellency desires me to state in reply that, under the peculiar circumstances of this case, the Government does not feel obliged to interfere in this man's favour, and refers you to the Consul of his nation.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. A. IRVING,
Assistant Colonial Secretary, Straits Settlements.

No. 6.

Consul Medhurst to Earl Granville.—(Received March 18.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, January 25, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inclose, for the information of your Lordship, copy of my despatch of to-day's date and inclosures, to the address of Her Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires on the subject of the capture by a French cruiser of a barque under British colours.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 6.

Consul Medhurst to Mr. Wade.

Sir,

Shanghai, January 25, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to report that the barque "Robert Rickmers," under British colours, was seized by the French cruiser "Linois," in these waters on the 22nd instant.

The "Robert Rickmers" came to this port originally under the North German flag. On the 18th instant Mr. Probst, of the German firm of W. Pustan and Co., presented at this Consulate a bill of sale for the vessel in favour of a British subject, both attested by Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Bremerhaven, and under authority of a Power of Attorney in his favour, requested me to register the transfer in my books, and to grant the vessel the usual provisional certificate. Finding all these papers (copies of which I inclose) in proper order, I registered the transfer, and granted the provisional certificate, a copy of which I also forward. The vessel thereupon cleared for Hong Kong.

Immediately upon learning the tidings of the seizure I submitted the papers to Mr. Rennie, Counsel for the Consulate, and begged him to furnish me with a written opinion as to the validity of the transfer, and consequently of the title of the vessel to fly the British flag. Mr. Rennie's opinion, a copy of which I forward herewith, being entirely in my favour, I consulted with Commander Davidson, R. N., Her Majesty's Senior Naval Officer, as to the proper course to be pursued in the matter. We eventually arrived at the conclusion that our sole duty was severally to record a strenuous protest against the proceeding, leaving the French Admiral to justify his act to his own Government as he best can.

I accordingly addressed Admiral Dupré a letter, copy of which I have the honour to submit, and I likewise inclose a transcript of his reply.

As far as I can at present ascertain the capture was made in the immediate vicinity of the light ship which, although fifty miles distant from Woosung, cannot be considered as within Chinese Waters, it being placed to mark a shoal in the mouth of the Yangtze River. The question of neutral territory does not, however, seem to be affected, as the Chinese have not proclaimed their neutrality as regards existing hostilities. I presume it was the knowledge of this fact that encouraged the Commander of the French cruiser to bring the prize back to Woosung, and communicate with the flag-ship "Venus" now in port, before embarking the prize crew which was to carry her to Saigon.

I observed the "Linois" leave the anchorage at about 5.30 P.M. on the 21st, doubtless for the purpose of following the "Robert Rickmers," which had sailed, I am told, at 11 A.M. on the same day.

I have, &c.
(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 6.

Bill of Sale of Barque "Robert Rickmers."

BILL of sale between the undersigned, Mr. Peter Andreas Rickmers, citizen of the British Island of Heligoland and Mr. R. C. Rickmers, ship-builder at Geestemunde: the following Contract and Bill of Sale has been concluded at the day and date hereof.

1. The said R. C. Rickmers, owner of the ship or vessel called the "Robert Rickmers," of the burthen of 422 tons register or thereabouts, registered at the Port of Geestemunde, according to the certificate of registry dated 14th October, 1870, and which, according to the latest news, was then lying in the Port of Shanghai, sells to the afore-said Peter Andreas Rickmers, of Heligoland, the above-named ship or vessel, with all the inventory, stores, and all her materials, and other necessities thereunto belonging, and on board at the time of making this contract, at and for the sum or price of 3,200l. sterling.

2. The right of possession and property is hereby vested and transferred to the said purchaser immediately on signing this contract, who will thereupon take and keep possession, and hold the same at his own risk and account. The purchaser acknowledging, on signing this contract, the good condition of the ship, her inventory, and appurtenances, and accepts the same accordingly. The vendor binds himself to indemnify the purchaser against all claims, whatever they might be, and to warrant and defend the said ship "Robert Rickmers," and all the above said appurtenances, against all and every person and persons whomsoever, and engages to deliver up the said ship's papers, as far as required, to the said purchaser or his representative, who should be appointed by the purchaser to take possession of the vessel for him at the Port of Shanghai, or at any other port or harbour, or wherever she may be.

To the true and faithful performance of all and every of the foregoing agreement, the said parties do hereby bind themselves, and in virtue whereof the said parties hereunto have signed the present contract with their own hands this 10th day of November, in the year of our Lord, 1870.

(Signed) • R. C. RICKMERS.
P. A. RICKMERS.

This is to certify that the foregoing Bill of Sale was agreed and signed before me by R. C. Rickmers, ship-builder at this Port of Bremerhaven, and P. A. Rickmers, merchant, at the British Island of Heligoland.

Given under my hand and seal of office at Bremerhaven, this 10th day of November, 1870.

(Signed) M. SCHWOON, *Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul.*

Registered at Her Majesty's Consulate, Shanghai, the 18th day of January, 1871, at 3.30 P.M.

(Signed) COLIN M. FORD (for Consul).

Inclosure 3 in No. 6.

Declaration of Ownership.

Official Number of Ship.				Date of Registry.			
General Description of Ship.				Port of Registry.		How Propelled.	
Robert Rickmers		Foreign. Built at Bremenhaven, 1866.				Sails.	
Number of decks	One	Build	Carvel.	Number of masts	Three	Galleries	None.
Rigged	Barque	Head	Scroll.	Stern	Square	Framework	Wood.
MEASUREMENTS.							
Length from the free part of stern under the bowsprit, to the aft-side of the head of the sternpost							Feet. Tenth.
Main breadth to outside plank							119 9 Bremen.
Depth in hold from tonnage-deck to ceiling at midships							23 2 "
							14 5.5 "
TONNAGE.							No. of Tons.
Tonnage under deck							
Closed-in spaces above the tonnage-deck, if any, viz. :—							
Space or spaces between deck							
Poop							
Round-house							
Other inclosed spaces, if any, naming them							
Total register tonnage							422

I, the undersigned Peter Andreas Rickmers, shipowner, of the British Island of Heligoland, declare as follows :—

I am a natural-born British subject, of British parents, belonging to the British Island of Heligoland, and that since I took the oath of allegiance to a foreign State, viz., Bremen, I did, on the 26th day of July, 1870, take the oath of allegiance to Her Majesty.

The above general description of the ship is correct. , whose certificate of competency or service is No. , is the master of the said ship. I am entitled to be registered as owner of sixty-four shares in the said ship. To the best of my knowledge and belief, no person or body of persons other than such persons or bodies of persons as are, by the Merchant Shipping Act 1854, qualified to be owners of British ships is entitled, as owner, to any interest whatever, either legal or beneficial, in the said ship. And I make this solemn declaration, conscientiously believing the same to be true.

(Signed) P. A. RICKMERS.

Made and subscribed the 10th day of November, 1870, by the above-named Peter Andreas Rickmers, in the presence of

(Signed) M. SCHWOON, *Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul.*

Inclosure 4 in No. 6.

Provisional Certificate.

Name of Ship.				British or Foreign Built.		How Propelled.	
Robert Rickmers				Foreign. Built at Bremerhaven, 1866.		By sails.	
Number of decks	..	..	One	Build	..	..	Carvel.
Number of masts	..	..	Three	Galleries	..	..	None.
Rigged	..	..	Barque	Head	..	..	Scroll.
Stern	..	..	Square	Framework	..	..	Wood.
MEASUREMENTS.							
							Feet.
							Tenths.
Length from the fore part of stem under the bowsprit to the aft-side of the head of the sternpost							119
Main breadth to outside plank							23
Depth in hold from tonnage-deck to ceiling at midships							14
							9
							2
							5.5
TONNAGE.							No. of Tons.
Tonnage under tonnage-deck							
Closed-in spaces above the tonnage-deck, if any, viz. :—							
Space or spaces between decks							
Poop							
Round-house							
Other inclosed spaces, if any, naming them							
Total tonnage							422

I, the undersigned Walter Henry Medhurst, Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at the Port of Shanghai, hereby certify that—

1. The ship, the description of which is prefixed to this my provisional certificate, has been surveyed at Bremen, and that the above description is true.*
2. That Hermann Rothfos, of Bremen, is the master of the said ship.
3. That the said ship was built at Bremerhaven, on the 13th day of August, 1866, and her foreign name is "Robert Rickmers."†
4. That the person whose name is hereunder written has purchased all the shares in the above ship.

Name, Residence, and Occupation of the Owner.	Number of Sixty-fourth Shares.
Peter Andreas Rickmers, of the British Island of Heligoland, shipowner.	Sixty-four.

Dated at Shanghai, the 18th day of January, 1871.

(L.S.)

(Signed)

W. H. MEDHURST,
Her Britannic Majesty's Consul.

NOTE.—This provisional certificate of registry continues in force only until the 18th day of July, 1871, or until she completes her voyage from Shanghai to some port at which there is a British Registrar, whichever first happens.

Inclosure 5 in No. 6.

Opinion of Mr. Rennie.

FRANCE and Germany being at war, and the North German ship "Robert Rickmers" being at Shanghai, Messrs. Pustan and Co. produce, at Her Britannic Majesty's Consulate, a Bill of Sale executed at Bremerhaven by her then owner, a North German subject, in favour of one Peter Andreas Rickmers, a British subject, resident at Heligoland, a declaration of ownership made by the latter, and a power of attorney from

* If the ship has not been surveyed for the purpose, the Consul must insert the description as fully and accurately as he can, stating how he has procured it.

† These words to be added if the ship is foreign.

him to Messrs. Pustan and Co. to take possession of the ship on his behalf. On the production of these documents the transfer is noted at the Consulate, and at the request of the master of the said ship a provisional certificate is granted to him by Her Britannic Majesty's Consul, under section 54 of the Merchant Shipping Act, to enable the ship to proceed to Hong Kong, being the nearest port of British registry. Shortly after leaving port, and while under the British Flag, she is seized by the French ship-of-war "Linois," a prize crew put on board, and the whole or a part of her own crew taken out and sent back to Shanghai, where they are now detained on board of the French Admiral's ship.

The sale of a ship by an enemy to a neutral in time of war is not illegal, provided the sale be absolute and *bond fide* (Sovensen v. the Queen, the "Ariel," 11, Moore, P. C. C., 119). Under the circumstances above stated, and until the contrary be shown, I am of opinion that Her Britannic Majesty's Consul is justified in considering the sale to be a *bond fide* and absolute one, and that the "Robert Rickmers" was entitled to the protection of the British Flag under provisional certificate. He should, therefore, in the interests of the British claimant to her ownership and of her crew (for the time being under the neutral flag), protest in due form against her seizure and the imprisonment of her crew. The French Admiral having taken upon himself the responsibility of her capture under circumstances which it is to be presumed he considers threw suspicion upon the *bond fide* and absolute nature of her sale and transfer, the eventual question of the legality or non-legality of his proceedings will have to be decided either in the Prize Court to which he may send her for condemnation, or form the subject of Diplomatic intervention hereafter. In the meanwhile, I cannot advise anything further than a formal protest by the Consul, in which, probably, also the Senior Naval Officer of Her Britannic Majesty should concur.

(Signed) P. T. RENNIE,

Counsel to Her Britannic Majesty's Government, Shanghai.

Shanghai, January 23, 1871.

Inclosure 6 in No. 6.

Consul Medhurst to Admiral Dupré.

Sir,

Shanghai, January 22, 1871.

IT having been reported to me that the barque "Robert Rickmers," flying the British colours, and which cleared from this Consulate, bound for Hong-Kong, on the 19th instant, has been seized by a man-of-war under your Excellency's command, and her crew made prisoners on board of your flag-ship, I have the honour to inform you that the vessel in question would appear, from a Bill of Sale dated 10th November, 1870, to have been transferred with the usual formalities required by law, at Bremerhaven, before Her Majesty's Vice-Consul there to a British subject; that, on exhibition of such Bill of Sale and of a Declaration of Ownership by the said transferee through his Attorney at this port, I registered the transfer in my books, and, on the application of the Master, issued the Provisional Certificate of Registry required by the British Merchant Shipping Act to enable her to proceed to the nearest port of British Registry.

It is my duty, therefore, to regard her as entitled to the protection of the British Flag, and to record my solemn protest against her or her crew being detained or interfered with in any way.

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 7 in No. 6.

Admiral Dupré to Consul Medhurst.

M. le Consul,

"Vénus," Shanghai, le 24 Janvier, 1871.

J'AI reçu la protestation que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser au sujet de la capture du navire Allemand "Robert Rickmers," arrêté le 22 Janvier, sous pavillon Anglais, par un croiseur de la division sous mon commandement.

J'ai l'honneur de vous informer que ce navire, dont la nationalité est au moins très douteuse, a été dirigé avec son capitaine et son équipage, tous Allemands, sur le port de Saigon, où un tribunal compétent, auquel j'envoie copie de votre protestation, statuera sur la validité de la prise.

Agréez, &c.

Le Contre-Amiral, Commandant-en-chef,
(Signé) DUPRE.

(Translation.)

Sir,

"Vénus," Shanghai, January 24, 1871.

I HAVE received the protest which you did me the honour of addressing to me on the subject of the capture of the German ship "Robert Rickmers," seized the 22nd January, under the English flag, by a cruiser of the division under my command.

I have the honour to inform you that that ship, whose nationality is at least very doubtful, has been sent, with her captain and crew, all Germans, to the Port of Saigon, where a competent tribunal, to which I send a copy of your protest, will decide on the validity of the prize.

Accept, &c.

The Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-chief,
(Signed) DUPRE.

No. 7.

Consul Medhurst to Earl Granville.—(Received March 18.)

My Lord,

Shanghai, February 1, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inclose copy of my despatch of this day's date to Her Majesty's Legation at Peking, forwarding a letter from Contre-Amiral Dupré, describing the date and locality of the capture of the British barque "Robert Rickmers."

I have, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 1 in No. 7.

Consul Medhurst to Mr. Wade.

Sir,

Shanghai, February 1, 1871.

ADVERTING to my despatch dated the 25th ultimo, in which I reported the capture by Contre Amiral Dupré, commanding the French squadron in these waters, of the British barque "Robert Rickmers," I have now the honour to inclose, for your information, copy of a letter which I have this day received from Admiral Dupré in reply to a desire I expressed to be informed as to the exact date and locality of the capture.

Your, &c.

(Signed) W. H. MEDHURST.

Inclosure 2 in No. 7.

Admiral Dupré to Consul Medhurst.

M. le Consul,

"Vénus," Shanghai, le 1 Février, 1871.

D'APRES le désir que vous m'exprimez en votre lettre à la date de ce jour, j'ai l'honneur de vous informer que le "Robert Rickmers" a été capturé par l'avis le "Linois," dans l'après-midi du 22 Janvier dernier, aux attéragés du Yang-tse-Kiang, par 31° 6' de latitude nord et 119° 49' 30" de longitude à l'est de Paris; c'est-à-dire, à sept milles environ dans l'est $\frac{1}{4}$ sud-est du bateau feu de Tung-sha.

Veuillez, &c.

Le Contre-Amiral, Commandant-en-chef
(Signé) DUPRE.

(Translation.)

Sir,

"Vénus," Shanghai, February 1, 1871.

IN accordance with the desire which you express in your letter to me of to-day's date, I have the honour to inform you that the "Robert Rickmers" was captured by the aviso "Linois" in the afternoon of the 22nd of January last, in the moorings of the Yang-tse-kiang, in 31° 6' north latitude, and 119° 49' 30" longitude east of Paris; that is to say, at about seven miles S. E. $\frac{1}{4}$ E. of the light-ship of Tung-sha.

Accept, &c.

The Rear-Admiral, Commander-in-chief,
(Signed) DUPRE.

No. 8.

Sir F. Rogers to Lord Enfield.—(Received March 21.)

Sir, *Downing Street, March 21, 1871.*
 WITH reference to the letters from this Department of the 10th and 16th instant, I am directed by the Secretary of State for the Colonies to transmit to you the under-mentioned documents for the consideration of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

I am, &c.
 (Signed) FREDERIC ROGERS.

Inclosure 1 in No. 8.

Governor Sir H. Ord to the Earl of Kimberley.

My Lord, *Government House, Singapore, February 14, 1871.*
 WITH reference to my despatch of the 31st ultimo I have the honour to forward to your Lordship copy of a letter from the British Consul at Saigon with inclosures on the subject of the barque "Sophia Rickmers," whose capture I have reported to your Lordship in the despatch above quoted.

I have, &c.
 (Signed) H. ST. GEORGE ORD.

Inclosure 2 in No. 8.

Consul Caswell to Mr. Irving.

Sir, *Saigon, February 4, 1871.*
 I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of 19th ultimo, with reference to the barque "Sophia Rickmers," and the information about which vessel has had my careful attention.

I at once placed myself in communication with the Governor of this Colony on the subject, and forwarded him the copy of the registry which you sent me; but, nevertheless, his Excellency has refused to release the vessel, upon the grounds stated in the annexed copy of his letter to me.

I do not see what further steps I can take in the matter, but will be glad to receive any suggestions from Her Majesty's Governor of the Straits Settlements. The vessel has not arrived here as yet, but in the meantime another barque belonging to the same owners, and called the "Robert Rickmers," has been captured in the China Sea, and brought in here as a prize. She was taken the day after she left Shanghai.

I have, &c.
 (Signed) J. G. CASWELL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 8.

M. de Cornulier to Consul Caswell.

M. le Consul, *Saigon, le 4 Février, 1871.*
 LE navire Prussien "Sophia Rickmers" était bien sous pavillon Anglais, quand il a été arrêté, visité, et capturé par le "Volta;" mais comme il est avéré que ce navire a changé de nationalité depuis la déclaration de guerre et à cause de la guerre, au moyen d'une vente simulée, il est de bonne prise d'après la jurisprudence établie en cette matière, ainsi que le décidera sans doute le Tribunal des Prises, séant à Paris, seul compétent dans l'espèce.

Recevez, &c.
 (Signé) DE CORNULIER.

(Translation.)

Sir,

Saigon, February 4, 1871.

THE Prussian ship "Sophia Rickmers" was certainly under the English flag when stopped, visited, and captured by the *Volta*, but as it is averred that that ship has changed nationality since the declaration of war and by reason of the war, by means of a fictitious sale, she is good prize according to the jurisprudence established in this matter, as doubtless will be decided by the Tribunal of Prizes sitting in Paris, which is alone competent to deal with matters of this sort.

Receive, &c.

(Signed) DE CORNULIER.

No. 9.

Consul Caswell to Earl Granville.—(Received March 25.)

My Lord,

Saigon, February 6, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to lay before your Lordship the accompanying copies of a correspondence which has taken place between the Government of Singapore, the Governor of this Colony, and myself, relative to the capture, by a French vessel of war, of a barque called the "Sophia Rickmers," under British colours.

It appears that the said vessel formerly belonged to Bremen, but was recently transferred to the British flag at Singapore, as were also other vessels belonging to the same owner. The vessel now stands registered in the name of P. Rickmers, of Heligoland. This person, I learn, is a son of the original owner, but I am unable to furnish your Lordship with any further reliable information on the matter.

I beg that your Lordship will instruct me as to what further steps I am to take in the matter.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. G. CASWELL.

Inclosure 1 in No. 9.

Mr. Irving to Consul Caswell.

Sir,

Singapore, January 19, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that a Report has been made to this Government that the barque "Sophia Rickmers," registered in this port as a British ship, has been captured by the French gunboat "Volta," in the Lucipara Channel, and is now being taken to Saigon for condemnation in the Prize Court.

I send you a certificate and copy of the registry of this ship, as possibly for the protection of British interests you may feel it necessary to interfere.

I have, &c.

(Signed) E. A. IRVING,

Assistant Colonial Secretary, Straits Settlements.

Inclosure 2 in No. 9.

Consul Caswell to Admiral Cornulier.

M. le Gouverneur,

Saigon, le 30 Janvier, 1871.

J'AI l'honneur de vous informer que j'ai reçu une dépêche du Gouvernement de Singapore, relative à la barque "Sophia Rickmers," capturée par le navire de guerre Français "Volta," dans le Canal de Lucipara, lequel navire est maintenant en route pour ce port comme une prise.

La dépêche dit que la barque "Sophia Rickmers" est enregistrée à Singapore comme navire Anglais, et une copie de son enregistrement m'a été expédié. Ce document je vous le sou mets pour vérification, et comme il est en règle, je vous prie d'avoir la bonté de donner ses ordres afin que le nécessaire soit fait au sujet de ce navire.

J'ai, &c.

Le Consul d'Angleterre,

(Signé) J. G. CASWELL.

D

(Translation.)

Sir,

Saigon, January 30, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to inform you that I have received a despatch from the Government of Singapore relating to the barque "Sophia Rickmers," captured by the French man-of-war "Volta" in the Canal of Lucipara, which ship is now on her way to this port as a prize.

The despatch says that the barque "Sophia Rickmers" is registered at Singapore as an English ship, and a copy of her register has been sent to me. This document I submit to you for verification, and as it is in order I beg you to have the goodness to give directions in order that what is necessary may be done in regard to that ship.

I have, &c.

The English Consul,
(Signed) J. G. CASWELL.

Inclosure 3 in No. 9.

M. de Cornulier to Consul Caswell, February 4, 1871.

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 8.]

Inclosure 4 in No. 9.

Consul Caswell to Mr. Irving.

Sir,

Saigon, February 4, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 19th ultimo, with reference to the barque "Sophia Rickmers," and the information about which vessel has had my careful attention.

I at once placed myself in communication with the Governor of this Colony on the subject, and forwarded him the copy of the registry which you sent me, but nevertheless his Excellency has refused to release the vessel upon the grounds stated in the annexed copy of his letter to me.

I do not see what further steps I can take in the matter, but will be glad to receive any suggestions from Her Majesty's Governor of the Straits Settlements.

The vessel has not arrived here as yet, but in the meantime another barque belonging to the same owners, and called the "Robert Rickmers," has been captured in the China Sea, and brought in here as a prize. She was taken the day after she left Shanghai.

I have, &c.

(Signed) J. G. CASWELL.

No. 10,

Lord Enfield to Sir F. Rogers.

Sir,

Foreign Office, March 27, 1871.

WITH reference to your letters of the 10th, 16th, and 21st instant, forwarding correspondence relative to the capture by a French cruizer of the "Sophia Rickmers," I am directed by Lord Granville to state to you, for the information of the Earl of Kimberley, that an application on the subject had already been received from the registered owner of the vessel, Mr. Peter A. Rickmers, a copy of whose letter is inclosed for Lord Kimberley's information, and referred to the Queen's Advocate, whose Report expresses the opinion that it is not a case in which Her Majesty's Government can properly interfere.

Lord Granville has, since the date of this report, referred your letters to the Queen's Advocate, who states that he does not find in the correspondence received from the Governor of Straits Settlements anything to alter the opinion expressed in his former report.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ENFIELD.

The Secretary to the Admiralty to Lord Exmouth.—(Received March 28.)

Sir,

Admiralty, March 27, 1871.

WITH reference to paragraph 5, in the copy of a general letter from the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the China station, inclosed in my letter of the 25th instant, I am commanded by my Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty to transmit to you, for the information of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, copies of a further despatch, dated the 4th February, and its inclosures, from Sir Henry Kellett, on the subject of the capture of two vessels, the "Robert Rickmers" and the "Sophia Rickmers," sailing under British colours off Shanghai and in the Straits of Banca respectively, by French men-of-war.

2. The sub-inclosures in the letter of the 28th January from the Commander of the "Hornet" are sent in original, and I am to request they may be returned when done with.

I am, &c.

(Signed)

VERNON LUSHINGTON.

Inclosure 1 in No. 11.

Vice-Admiral Sir H. Kellett to the Secretary to the Admiralty.

(Extract.)

"Ocean," at Hong Kong, February 4, 1871.

FORWARDED for the information of the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty.

I have carefully perused the whole of these papers, and am of opinion that the validity of the transfer of the "Robert Rickmers" to the British flag is open to very grave suspicion, and that the case is a proper one for adjudication by a Prize Court.

I inclose an extract from a letter I have received from Captain Moore of the "Barrosa," reporting the capture in the Straits of Banca of another vessel, the "Sophia Rickmers," similarly transferred by the same owners to Peter Andrew Rickmers, a so-called British subject.

Inclosure 2 in No. 11.

Captain Moore to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Kellett.

(Extract.)

"Barrosa," January 20, 1871.

19th.—ARRIVED the French steam-sloop of war "Volta," from Batavia. She captured in the Straits of Banca the "Sophia Rickmers;" this vessel had been transferred by the agents on shore at this port from North German to British Colonies, a few days before she left, to escape the French cruisers. The vessel, with the captain and mate, have been sent to Saigon; but the "Volta" had on board twelve of her crew, viz., eight Germans, two Swedes, and one Russian, who was sent to the "Vsadmik" this day, and also a Norwegian.

The captain of the "Volta" informs me that the papers on board the "Sophia Rickmers" showed that the vessel had merely been transferred from father to son, who was a native of Heligoland, but had become a German subject; and, again, to effect the transfer of the ship to the British flag, had, a few days before the transfer was completed, sworn allegiance to Queen Victoria.

Inclosure 3 in No. 11.

Commander Davidson to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Kellett.

Sir,

"Hornet," Shanghai, January 28, 1871.

I HAVE the honour to forward herewith copies of the whole of the papers connected with the transfer and capture of the ship "Robert Rickmers," which, at my request, Mr. Medhurst has allowed me to make for your information.

They are as follows:—

- (a.) Bill of sale at Bremerhaven.
- (b.) Declaration of ownership, Bremerhaven.
- (c.) Provisional certificate, Shanghai.
- (d.) Counsel's opinion on seizure of ship.
- (e.) Protest of British Consul.
- (f.) Reply of French Admiral.
- (g.) British Consul's report to Mr. Wade.

I am, &c.
(Signed) D. G. DAVIDSON.

Inclosure 4 in No. 11.

Commander Davidson to Vice-Admiral Sir H. Kellett.

Sir, "Hornet," Shanghai, January 24, 1871.
I HAVE the honour to report that the barque "Robert Rickmers," which sailed from this port under the British flag on the 21st instant, has been captured by the French ship of war "Linois," and sent as a prize for adjudication to Saigon.
The vessel in question has been lately transferred from the German to the British flag, and Mr. Consul Medhurst informs me that the transfer was perfectly regular, and that she is legally entitled to be considered a British vessel.
Immediately I received information of the capture I conferred with Mr. Medhurst, and thought it my duty to address a protest to the French Admiral, a copy of which, marked A, I beg to inclose, and also a copy of his reply to my protest, marked B.
Mr. Medhurst also lodged a protest with the French Admiral against the validity of the capture.
The French flag ship "Venus," and the gun vessels "Linois" and "Coetlogon" are now in this port.
All is perfectly quiet here.

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. G. DAVIDSON.

Inclosure 5 in No. 11.

Commander Davidson to Rear-Admiral Dupré.

Sir, "Hornet," Shanghai, January 25, 1871.
IT having been reported to me that the ship "Robert Rickmers," which cleared outward from the port of Shanghai on the 19th January, under the British flag, has since been seized by the French man-of-war "Linois," under your orders, and that her crew have been made prisoners, I have the honour to communicate to you my earnest protest against this proceeding, and to report to you that it is my duty to report the matter to my Commander-in-chief.
I beg to inform you that I have conferred with Her Britannic Majesty's Consul at this port, who has shown me copies of the papers of the ship "Robert Rickmers," and has informed me that the transfer of that vessel from the German to the British flag was, as far as he is aware, entire *bonâ fide* and legal.

I have, &c.
(Signed) D. G. DAVIDSON.

Inclosure 6 in No. 11.

Rear-Admiral Dupré to Commander Davidson.

M. le Commandant, Shanghai, le 24 Janvier, 1871.
J'AI reçu la protestation que vous m'avez fait l'honneur de m'adresser au sujet de la capture du navire "Robert Rickmers," arrêté le 22 Janvier par un aviso sur mes ordres.

Je m'empresse de vous annoncer que j'envoie copie de votre protestation à Saigon, où un tribunal compétent aura à statuer sur la validité de la prise de ce navire, dont le capitaine et l'équipage, tous Allemands, ont été dirigés au Saigon, à l'exception du second, qui a été débarqué.

Agréez, &c.
Le Contre-Amiral Commandant-en-chef,
(Signé) DUPRE.

(Translation.)

Sir, *Shanghai, January 24, 1871.*
I HAVE received the protest which you have done me the honour to address to me on the subject of the capture of the ship "Robert Riekma," seized on the 22nd of January by an aviso under my orders.

I hasten to inform you that I am sending a copy of your protest to Saigon, where a competent tribunal will have to decide as to the validity of the capture of their vessel, whose captain and crew, all Germans, have been sent to Saigon, with the exception of the latter, who have been brought on shore.

Accept, &c.
The Rear-Admiral Commanding-in-chief,
(Signed) DUPRE.

Inclosure 7 in No. 11.

Bill of Sale.

[See Inclosure 2 in No. 6.]

Inclosure 8 in No. 11.

Declaration of Ownership.

[See Inclosure 3 in No. 6.]

Inclosure 9 in No. 11.

Provisional Certificate.

[See Inclosure 4 in No. 6.]

Inclosure 10 in No. 11.

Opinion of Mr. Rennie.

[See Inclosure 5 in No. 6.]

Inclosure 11 in No. 11.

Consul Medhurst to Rear-Admiral Dupré, January 22, 1871.

[See Inclosure 6 in No. 6.]

Inclosure 12 in No. 11.

Rear-Admiral Dupré to Consul Medhurst, January 24, 1871.

[See Inclosure 7 in No. 6.]

Inclosure 13 in No. 11.

Consul Medhurst to Mr. Wade, January 29, 1871.

[See Inclosure 1 in No. 6.]

No. 12.

Earl Granville to Consul Medhurst.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 12, 1871.

I HAVE had under my consideration, in communication with the Law Advisers of the Crown, your despatches of the 25th of January and 1st of February, reporting the circumstances connected with the capture of the barque "Robert Rickmers" by the officer commanding the French Naval Squadron; and I have now to state to you that it has been the long established rule of the French Prize Courts not to allow the sale of an enemy's vessel to a neutral after the commencement of war to change its national character, so as to exempt it from capture on the high seas. The right of France to observe such a rule cannot be impugned, and the French Courts have acted upon it, both when France was at war with England in 1801, and when she was the ally of England against Russia in 1854. Under these circumstances, although Great Britain may be content to observe a milder rule, as in the case of the "Ariel," upon which Mr. Rennie relied in advising you the rule of the English Courts is not binding upon France; and I am of opinion that you were in error in protesting against the capture of the "Robert Rickmers" by the French Admiral.

I transmit for your information a copy of a letter which I have caused to be addressed to Mr. Rickmers,* in reply to an application which he made to me on the subject.

I am, &c.

(Signed) GRANVILLE.

No. 13.

Lord Enfield to Mr. Caswell.

Sir,

Foreign Office, April 13, 1871.

I AM directed by Earl Granville to acknowledge the receipt of your despatch of the 6th of February last, inclosing copies of a correspondence which had passed between the Government of Singapore, the Governor of Saigon, and yourself, respecting the capture of the "Sophia Rickmers" by a French vessel of war.

I am now to state to you that, before the receipt of your despatch above referred to, Lord Granville had received a representation from Mr. P. A. Rickmers, the owner of the "Sophia Rickmers," requesting the interference of Her Majesty's Government in order to procure the release of that vessel; and the Law Officers of the Crown having been consulted on the case, Mr. Rickmers has been informed of the grounds on which Her Majesty's Government consider that they would not be justified in interfering on his behalf.

For your more complete information, I inclose a copy of the answer which has been returned to Mr. Rickmers,* from which you will see that he has been further informed that it is for the Prize Court of the captors to determine whether the "Sophia Rickmers" is good prize of war.

I am, &c.

(Signed) ENFIELD.



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